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Abstract of Procédures and Outcomes : .
This work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a 
more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering 
the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose 4 
of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language- { 
use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from 
those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutlonary acts. 
Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a 
speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory 
of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in 
Chapter One. The orthodox ”reject-and-replace” view of the relation- • 
ship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his 
distinction between locutionary and Illocutionary acts threatens sevm 
eral of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate 
for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the per- 
formatlve-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-re- 
place" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves 
the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction betweep ! 
locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction be-' = 
tween locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also establish­
ed in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in 
which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocu- 
tionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-con- 
ventional outcomes - indicate the theoretical framework required for a 
development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is 
expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some out­
comes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results.
Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily 
movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary 
acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Four the interpretation custom- 
Jarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. 
'An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's 
own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illo­
cutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are 
'constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary 
'ipts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In " 
Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures con­
stitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in 
the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims 
implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix 
Austin's performatlve-constative distinction and his later views on 
truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.
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Section Chapter One EâSÊ.
1 The main purpose of Austin's conception of speech 
acts, formulated in terms of a threefold distinc­
tion between locutionary, illocutionary, and per- 
locutionary acts, was the elucidation of a speci­
fic use of language. Some of his comments on these 
types of act provide textual support for the claim 
that the species of language-use central to that 
conception is a species of sentence-use. The uses 
of language for referring and predicating are not, 
therefore, central to Austin's conception of speech 
acts, these uses being selective with respect to 
expressions which are only parts of sentences. 1
2 Ryle's argument that talk of the use of sentences
is absurd because it involves a category mistake is 
examined and found to contain errors ; in particu­
lar, a conflation of sentences and acts of saying 
something. It is argued that once this distinction 
is recognized the terminology of the use of a sen­
tence to say or ask something is unexceptionable, 
appropriate, and necessary. 3
3 One source of Ryle's errors is located in the way he
drew and deployed the distinction between Language 
and Speech. This distinction is redrawn along differ­
ent lines, and a point of contact between it and Aus­
tin's conception of speech acts is fouL I in one of 
the distinctions v/hich Austin drew v/ithin the locu­
tionary act. 9
4 These distinctions between phonetic, phatic and
rhetic acts are expounded, leading to a statement of 
a criterion for the meaningfulness of a speaker's ut­
terance. 13
5 Austin used the devices of direct and indirect quota­
tion to identify, respectively, phatic and rhetic acts 
performed in speech act situations. The rationale for 
this is explained. An example is provided to show that 
restrictions on the forms of indirect quotation need
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to be imposed if this form of quotation is to be a 
reliable means for identifying rhetic acts. Such 
restrictions are imposed in terms of basic normal 
forms of indirect quotation. 18
6 Robinson's proposed revisions of Austin's defini­
tions of phatic and rhetic acts are rejected on 
the grounds of inadequate justification. Her ac­
count of the relationship between phonetic and 
phatic acts is shown to be exegetically incorrect, 
inadequate and false. 25
? Austin's account of locutionary acts elucidates
one species of language-use and one species of the 
use of sentences. But the species of language- and 
sentence-use that are central to Austin's concep­
tion of speech acts are those exemplified by illo­
cutionary acts, not locutionary acts, A locution- 
ary act exemplifies a use of Language ; an illocu­
tionary act exemplifies a use of Speech. A locu­
tionary act is the use of a sentence with a certain 
meaning to say or ask something ; an illocutionary 
act is the use of a sentence (meaningful utterance) 
with a certain force to do something distinct from 
saying or asking something. 36
Chapter Two
1 In its early version, Austin's conception of speech 
acts was formulated in terms of the performative - 
constative distinction. The distinction is expound­
ed. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the 
relationship between this distinction and the dis­
tinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts
is sketched and shown to be false. 41
2 An alternative view is proposed ; this view takes 
account of the contemporary philosophical trends in 
which Austin's work on speech acts was set and pre­
serves the unity of Austin's conception of speech 
acts. Some insights in that conception, threatened 
by the reject-and-replace view but retrievable on
the alternative view, are discussed. 51
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3 Austin's distinction between locutionary and illo­
cutionary acts is defended against Searle's criti­
cisms.
4 The distinction is established by a reductio ad
absurdum argument against Vendler's account of in­
direct quotation. *^2
5 Austin's parallel distinction between the locu­
tionary meanings and illocutionary forces of ut­
terances is established in the course of defending
it against Cohen's criticisms. 76
Chapter Three
1. The terms .ill which Austin distinguished illocution­
ary and perlocutlonary acts are the terms in which 
he sketched the outlines of those aspects of a 
theory of action that are required for an elucida­
tion of the performative use of language. Austin's 
discussion of the distinction in the formal mode is 
reviewed. 99
2 The notional framework drawn from a theory of act­
ion which is required for an elucidation of the 
performative use of language, and is indicated by 
the two main features of the distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutlonary acts, is that 
which is required to elucidate a particular kind of 
conventional act, distinguished from its non-con- 
ventional outcomes. One difficulty in distinguish­
ing acts and outcomes is noted ; Austin's two (un­
satisfactory) suggestions of ways around this dif­
ficulty are discussed. 103
3 Austin distinguished three types of outcomes in­
volved in the performance of illocutionary acts in 
terms of "securing uptake", "taking effect", and 
"inviting by convention a response or sequel". Each 
is distinct from an outcome of an illocutionary act 
that is a perlocutlonary act in so far as each is a 
conventional type of outcome. These three types of 
outcomes are discussed. 108
vil
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4 A conceptual analysis of some outcomes of human 
acts - effects, consequences and results - is com­
menced. The wider interest attaching to such an 
account, beyond the clarification of Austin’s dis­
tinction between illocutionary and perlocutlonary 
acts, is noted. Some conceptual features of these 
outcomes are elicited from the forms and functions 
of the adjectives formed from "effect", "conse­
quence" and "result", e.g., that all acts have ef­
fects but some acts do not have results. The rela­
tionships between the distinct notions of effect­
iveness, efficacy and efficiency are discussed. 117
5 The account is continued with an analysis of the 
different functions of the verbs "effect" and "re­
sult". Differences between the temporal character­
istics of occurrences of outcomes of the respec­
tive types are claimed on the basis of this analy­
sis, e.g., that effects have temporal duration but 
results do not. Differences between the temporal 
relationships obtaining between occurrences of out­
comes of these types and their respective antece­
dent acts are claimed on the basis of phrases used 
in .description of outcomes, e.g., that effects can 
be more or less temporally remote from their ante­
cedent acts but results are not and are coincident 
with the terminus of their antecedent act. A number 
of considerations are advanced in support of the 
suggestion that consequences, unlike effects and 
results, are not occurrences, but states initiated
by their respective antecedent acts. 127
6 The account is concluded with a discussion of re­
sults, which are claimed to be outcomes of more or 
less successful attempts by agents to achieve pur­
poses. The notions of intentions and purposes, and 
of attempting and trying, are discussed by way of 
clarification of this claim. 143
Chapter Four
1 The problem of the constitution of illocutionary
Y1.11 •
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acts is set. The problem arises because such acts 
are not just physical acts ; the problem consists 
in determining the feature by virtue of which a 
locutionary act is constituted as an illocutionary 
act. Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are 
conventional acts indicates the direction in which 
a solution to the problem is to be sought. It is 
also the thesis that has attracted the most con­
certed opposition from critics of his conception 
of speech acts. 159
2 Irrespective of how sympathetically Austin's thesis 
of the essential conventionality of illocutionary 
acts has been received, it has become customary to 
interpret it in terms of Anscombe’s distinction be­
tween brute and institutional facts. The distinc­
tion is expounded and its applicability to Austin’s 
conception of speech acts is noted. Searle's,
Strawson's and Schiffer’s commitment to this inter­
pretation of Austin's thesis is shown. The fidelity 
of this interpretation to Austin's thesis is tested
and found wanting. 162
3 An alternative interpretation is constructed from 
points made in the text of Austin’s own lectures.
The solution to the problem of the constitution of 
illocutionary acts yielded by this interpretation 
is that an illocutionary act is constituted as such 
by virtue of the conventional procedure as part of 
which a locutionary act is performed. The respec­
tive merits of conventional procedures and social 
institutions as candidates for the essential con­
stitutive feature of illocutionary acts are discus­
sed ; arguments are advanced in favour of the for­
mer. 170
4 The suggestion that illocutionary acts are consti­
tuted as such by virtue of the circumstances in ‘ 
which locutionary acts are performed is canvassed.
The outlines of an account of the constitution of 
illocutionary acts in these terms are sketched. It
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is argued that even if such an account were to he 
made complete, it would not yield an adequate ac­
count of the constitution of illocutionary acts. . 179
Chapter Five
Searle's notion of constitutive rules is criticiz­
ed. It is argued that Searle has not shown that 
rules are constitutive in any sense other than one 
which he himself admits is trivial, and that what 
Searle regards as a "constitutive rule" in some 
non-trivial sense is not a rule but a definition. 197
An alternative account of the constitution of illo­
cutionary acts, in tex‘ms of conventional proce­
dures, is commenced. The notion of a procedure is 
introduced and explained, leading to a principle 
for the individuation of conventional procedures.
Such a procedure, constitutive of illocutionary 
acts of a particular type can be specified in the 
form of an ordered triplet comprising a set of 
(types of) presuppositions, a set of locutionary 
act types, and a set of (types of) strictly neces­
sitated outcomes. 211
Some cases of promising, warning and objecting 
are analyzed in terms of this account by way of 
clarification. 280
The bases of Austin's classification of verdictive, 
exercitive, commissive, behabitive and expositive 
illocutionary act types are discussed. The connex­
ions between these bases and the present account 
are shown. 238
An account of the conventional nature of the pro­
cedures constitutive of illocutionary acts is com­
menced, with initial reference to the example of 
promising. The account is developed to the point 
where it can be said that there is a convention 
with respect to this procedure. This sense of 
"convention" is that of a "rule or practice". Two 
explananda of an adequate account of the conven-
XSection E&SÊ.
tional nature of the procedure are noted, neither 
of which is explained by the account given so far. 232
6, The account is developed to provide such explana­
tions. The notion informing the sense of "conven­
tion" involved in this development is that of an 
"implicit agreement constituting the origin and 
foundation of any custom, institution,... as em­
bodied in any accepted usage, standard of behav­
iour. ..or the like". The notion of implicit agree­
ment is spelled out in terms of the coincidence of 
certain social expectations and preferences. The 
application of the conclusions of this account to 
the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts 
of other types is shown. 243
Chapter Six
1 The strategy for defending the claim that a theory 
of action provides a more appropriate framework 
for developing Austin's conception of speech acts, 
and furthering its purpose, than a theory of lan­
guage, is set out. 269
2 A feature of Schiffer’s account of Austin's concep­
tion of speech acts, which is symptomatic of Schif­
fer's misunderstanding of that conception, is dis­
cussed. Various features of Strawson's argument, en­
dorsed by Schiffer, against Austin's thesis of the 
essential conventionality of illocutionary acts are 
discussed in order to support the claim that that 
argument is an ignoratio elenchi. 274
3 Examples are adduced to show, contra Schiffer and
Strawson, that speakers' intentions are not the es­
sential constitutive features of illocutionary acts, 293
4 Searle's hypothesis for giving an account of illo­
cutionary acts within the framework of a theory of 
language is discussed. It is argued that Searle has 
failed to establish that what he regards as the rules 
constitutive of illocutionary acts are manifested in 
the semantic conventions of a language. An analogy,
X I
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between playing chess and using a language, is de­
veloped to show why it is misguided to attempt to 
give an account of the use of language exemplified 
by illocutionary acts within the framework of.a 
theory of language. A possible objection against 
this analogy, and against the claim being defended 
in this chapter, is discussed. The objection, that 
the theories of language informing that analogy and 
that claim are too restricted in not, apparently, 
including a pragmatic component, is dismissed. 898
Appendix
1 Austin's perforraative-constative distinction - as a
distinction between non-truth-valued utterances and 
truth-valued utterances - is defended against the 
arguments of Lemmon and Warnock et.al. who have 
argued that explicit performative utterances are 
truth-valued. 321
8 Strawson's misunderstandings of Austin's views on
truth in Words are exposed. 333
3 A neglected feature of Austin's later views on truth
is discussed in order to show a possible starting 
point for a theoretical justification for his per- 
formative-constative distinction. 345
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A.J.P. Australasian Journal of Philosophy
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Foot-notes are collected at the ends of their respective chap­
ters. In order to minimize their number, page references of
quotations are given in the body of the text. Page references
are given without titles when the work referred to is the same 
as that referred to with the immediately preceding reference.
"I do not know what I may appear to the world, hut to myself 
I seem to have been only a boy playing on the sea-shore, and 
diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble 
or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of 
truth lay all undiscovered before me."
- attributed to Sir Isaac Newton
"Finally we must meet the objection about our illocutionary 
and perlocutlonary acts - namely that the notion of an act 
is unclear - by a general doctrine about action. We have the 
idea of an 'act* as a fixed physical thing that we do, as 
distinguished from conventions and as distinguished from 
consequences. But..."
- J.L. Austin in How to Do Things with Words
One
Locutionary Acts
The main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts was 
the elucidation of a specific use of language. The particular 
species that was at the focus of Austin's attention can he 
Identified, to some extent, by the type of linguistic unit -* a 
word, a phrase or a sentence - which bulked largest within that 
conception. For to some extent, species of language-use can be 
distinguished on the basis of the suitability or non-suitability 
for specific uses of linguistic units of these types. Much as 
different kinds of job are selective with respect to the tools 
which can be used for them, different species of language-use 
are selective with respect to the type of linguistic unit that 
can be put to those uses. Referring is a specific use of language 
for which words or phrases of certain types, parts of sentences, 
are suitable, but one for which whole sentences are not. Saying 
something, on the other hand, is a use of language for whole 
sentences, even single word sentences, but not one for parts of 
sentences. The possibility of classifying specific language-uses 
on this basis is limited, however. There are more species of use 
than types of unit so this basis will not yield an exclusive 
classification of specific uses of language,. Predicating and 
syncategorematic uses of language, as well as referring, are 
selective with respect to parts of sentences ; and asking some­
thing, like saying something, is a language-use selective with 
respect to whole sentences. Nor will this basis yield an ex­
haustive classification. Some uses of language are not tied to 
any of these types of linguistic unit, e.g.,, the use of language 
in poetry* But in so far as some uses of language can only be 
accomplished with one type of linguistic unit and not another,
2
seeing which type was central to Austin's conception of speech 
acts will help to narrow the range in which the specific use of 
language that he was concerned to elucidate lies. The main pur­
pose of Austin's conception of speech acts can he characterized, 
in the formal mode, as the elucidation of one of the senses of 
the phrase "the use of language".
In its later version, that conception was formulated in terms 
of a three-fold distinction between locutionary, illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts. Each type of act is an abstraction from 
an actual speech act situation ; a situation, that is, in which 
a speaker not only says something but does something and where 
what is done is not exhausted by the acts performed as part of 
the act of saying something. Before reviewing these types of act 
and their distinguishing characteristics, some of Austin's com­
ments about them in connexion with the use of language should be 
noted, "Here we have three, if not more, different senses or di­
mensions of the 'use of a sentence' or of 'the use of language* 
(and, of course, there are others also)" (’Words pp, 109-10). "Our 
interest in these lectures is essentially to fasten on the 
second, illocutionary act and contrast it with the other two. 
There is a constant tendency in philosophy to elide this in 
favour of one or other of the other two. Yet it is distinct from 
both"(p). 103), Immediately after introducing the notion of an il­
locutionary act Austin said, "To determine what illocutionary 
act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using 
the locution”(p.9 3 ) and after listing a number of examples,
"The trouble rather is the number of different senses of so vague 
an expression as 'in what way are we using it' - this may refer 
even to a locutionary act, and further to perlocutionary acts,,," 
(p.99). On the following page the discussion returns to the use
3
of language : "..«we have here an illustration of the different 
uses of the expression, 'uses of language*, or 'use of a sent­
ence*, etc, - 'use* Is a hopelessly ambiguous or wide word, just 
as is the word 'meaning', which it has become customary to de­
ride. But 'use*, its supplanter, is not in much better case. We 
may entirely clear up the 'use of a sentence* on a particular 
occasion, in the sense of the locutionary act, without yet touch­
ing upon its use in the sense of an illocutionary act"(pp.100-1), 
Further on ; "...the expressions 'meaning' and 'use of sentence* 
can blur the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts. We now notice that to speak of the 'use* of language can 
likewise blur the distinction between the illocutionary and per­
locutionary act..."(p.103). And so on ; similar comments are 
scattered throughout the second half of Words. What these com­
ments and those just quoted make clear are the two points that 
in his conception of speech acts, Austin was concerned to come 
to grips with the manifold ambiguity of the phrase "the use of 
language" and that the species of use with which he was primarily 
concerned had to do with whole sentences rather than expressions 
which form only parts of sentences. The uses of language for re­
ferring and predicating were not, therefore, central to Austin's 
conception of speech acts. However, the use of sentences which 
was central to that conception remains to be made clear.
Ryle maintained in "Use, Usage and Meaning"(C.P.II pp.407-14) 
that talk about the use of sentences is absurd because it in­
volves a category confusion. His general argument to this con­
clusion was that though it makes sense to talk of the employment 
or use of words, it does not make sense to talk of the employment 
or use of sentences because words and sentences belong to differ-
4
ent categories. Words stand to sentences as coins to lendings, 
roads to journeys and bats to strokes ; as coins are used to 
make loans, roads used to make journeys and bats to make strokes, 
80 words are used to say things ; and for Ryle "...a sentence is 
an instance of someone saying something"(p.409). But as lendings, 
journeys and strokes are not the sort of things which either 
have or lack a use, so sentences or the sayings of things are 
not the sort of things which can be used, misused or left unused. 
They are the uses to which words and phrases are put. For in­
stance, "We are tempted to treat the relation between sentences 
and words as akin to the relation between faggots and sticks*
But this is entirely wrong. Words, constructions, etc. are the 
atoms of a Language ; sentences are the units of Speech....Words 
have histories ; sentences do not, though their authors do....I 
am ^ a  sentence * s y author, not its employer"(p.408). "As we em­
ploy coins to make loans, but do not employ lendings, so we em­
ploy words, etc. in order to say things, but we do not employ 
the sayings of things - or misemploy them or leave them unem­
ployed either. Dictions and dicta belong to different categories. 
So do roads and journeys ; so do gallows and executions"(p.410). 
"My last sentence but three, say, is not something with which I 
once learned how to say things. It my saying something. Nor 
is an execution something erected to hang people on. It the 
hanging of somebody"(p.418).
In an example which bears closely upon current interests,
Ryle considered different uses of the Latin expression "vici" ; 
first as it was used by Caesar when boasting of his exploits in 
Asia Minor and second as it may have been used by a Roman gladi­
ator coming to after some combat and inquiring as to its outcome, 
Ryle attempted to demonstrate the category mistake involved in
5
talking of the use of sentences from an alleged queerness in 
the question, "Is 'vici* a word or a sentence?" He said, "The 
boast 'vici' was a different sentence from the question 'vici?', 
though the authors of both used the same Latin word, of which 
neither was the inventor. The word 'vici' was there, in their 
common fund, to be employed, misemployed or left unemployed by 
anyone anywhen. The boast 'vici' and the query 'vici?' were two 
momentary speech-acts in which this one word was utilised for 
saying different things. Our question 'Is "vici" a word or a 
sentence?' was queer because its subject was ambiguous. Was it 
about a speech-episode, like a boast or a query, or was it about 
an inflected Latin verb? It was queer also because '...a word or 
a sentence?' was a disjuction between predicates of quite differ­
ent categories, on a par with '...a bat or a stroke?(p.409).
There are several mistakes in this account. One is Ryle's 
identification of speech acts with acts of saying something. It 
is false that the different sayings of things with the word 
"vici" are the speech acts of boasting and querying. If Caesar 
had said "Vici" modestly rather than boastfully, he would have 
uttered the same sentence and said the same thing, viz., that he 
conquered, but he would not have performed the speech act of 
boasting. So a speech act is not just an act of saying something* 
But it is on the presumption of identity relations holding be­
tween such acts and sentences that Ryle argues that talk of the 
use of sentences is categorially confused. The confusion, al­
legedly evident in the question "Is 'vici' a word or a sentence?", 
is held to consist in disjoining predicates of different types : 
a type of linguistic unit and a type of action, respectively. 
Secondly, even if this argument was sound, (which it is not, for 
as will be shown presently, sentences should not be identified
6
with acts of saying something) it would not establish the point 
the Ryle wanted it to. For the category difference which he al­
leged to exist between words and sentences does not by itself 
show that talk of the use of sentences is absurd. Indeed, Ryle's 
own examples of category differences parallel to this one, be­
tween roads and journeys, bats and strokes, coins and loans and 
gallows and executions show quite the opposite. It is not absurd 
to ask what the use of Heyerdahl's journey on the Kon-ïiki raft 
was, nor to answer that it proved such a journey to be possible 
and hence confirmed a hypothesis about South Pacific migrations. 
Similarly, the square cut is a type of cricketing stroke used to 
play a ball which is moving away from the off stump* And loans 
and executions have their uses : to help a friend out of trouble 
or to make an example of some poor wretch* The uses to which 
cars and roads (or rafts and oceans), bats, coins and gallows 
are put - to make journeys, strokes, loans and executions - are 
indeed different from the uses to which these latter can be put, 
but this does not show that these latter do not have uses, nor 
that it is absurd to talk about such uses. Mutatis mutandis. the 
uses to which words are put to form sentences are indeed differ­
ent from the uses to which sentences can be put, but this does 
not show that sentences do not have uses, nor that it is absurd 
to talk about such uses* This conclusion is one which, elsewhere,
oRyle showed himself willing to accept*
So is the question "Is 'vici' a word or a sentence?" really 
as queer as Ryle tried to make it out to be, or even queer at 
all? It is not queer if English translations of the Latin are 
substituted into it. The question "Is 'I conquered' a word or a 
sentence?" can be asked without absurdity and can be given an 
unequivocal and obvious answer. The grammatical conventions of
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a language provide criteria for determining to which type of 
linguistic unit - a word, a phrase or a sentence - any token 
linguistic expression belongs, so of any token linguistic ex­
pression, the question "Is it a word or a sentence?" can sens­
ibly be asked. Nor is Ryle's question made queer by the fact, 
evidenced by his example, that some grammatically well-formed 
sentences can be composed of just one word. "FireI" is a sent­
ence-token of one type ; "Fire?" is a sentence-token of a dif­
ferent type ; "fire" is a word-token. The sentence-frame "Is
a word or a sentence?" generates no absurdity when tokens 
of these types are substituted alternately for the gap-sign* In ;
the case of one-word sentences, the grammatical conventions pro­
viding criteria for determining the type of a token linguistic 
expression may only be those of spelling and punctuation but 
these are, nevertheless, adequate for being able to answer suit­
ably filled-in questions of the form "Is a word or a sent­
ence?"» Thus asking such a question neither involves the category ' 
mistake nor shows the sort of category dilTerence between words 
and sentences that Ryle alleged.
The conception of a sentence as a grammatically well-formed 
word-sequence is one which Ryle appeared to reject in maintain- ;
ing that a sentence an instance of someone saying something.
But ironically, in maintaining this, Ryle himself committed a 
category mistake. For things of the kind that are ordinarily 
thought of as sentences are among the things that can be uttered 
or written down, but an instance of someone saying something is 
not something that can be uttered or written down. On the other
hand, instances of someone saying something are dateable events ^
and have histories» albeit short ones, but sentences are not 
dateable events and, as Ryle said, they have no histories. There
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is, therefore, an inconsistency as well among the things which 
Ryle said about sentences*
To identify sentences with speakers' sayings of things is 
to confuse those acts and what they are performed with ; it is 
to confuse the instrument of the act with the act itself. Ryle's 
mistake in maintaining that a sentence is an instance of someone 
saying something can he diagnosed as just such a confusion. And 
once this distinction, between an act of saying something and 
what such an act is performed with, is recognized, the terminol­
ogy of the use of a sentence to say something is not only unex­
ceptionable but appropriate. Moreover, the identification of a 
sentence with an instance of someone saying something is apt to 
mask other features of people's speech behaviour, viz., that dif­
ferent tokens of the same type of sentence can be used on differ­
ent occasions to say the same thing or something different and 
that token sentences of different types can be used to say the 
same thing. If one speaker says "Venus is the morning star" and 
another speaker says "Venus is the morning star”, these may be 
two instances of the same thing being said though it is said with 
a sentence of the same type in each instance. If one speaker says 
"I'll do it to-day" and another speaker says "I'll do it to-day", 
different things will have been said, though again, each has been 
said with a sentence of the same type. Ryle's gladiator could 
just as well have said "Superavi?" as "Vici?" to inquire as to 
the outcome of his fight, and Caesar could have said with "Super­
avi" that he conquered just as well as with "Vici", To cope with 
these cases, the terminology of the use of a sentence to say or 
ask something is not only unexceptionable and appropriate but 
seems necessary. However, it would be excessively carping to be­
labour Ryle any further on this point. Elsewhere, he talked of
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the uses of sentences without any apparent categorial qualms or
misgivings and his arguments in '*Use, Usage and Meaning" seem to
3have been an unfortunate aberration.
One source of Ryle's errors in "Use, Usage and Meaning" is 
that in taking over the Language*rSpeech distinction from Gardin­
er's book. The Theory of Speech and Language,, albeit with the in­
tention to "draw, develop and apply" that distinction in his own 
way, Ryle accepted uncritically the point that recurs like a 
slogan throughout Gardiner's book, viz., that the word is the 
unit of Language, the sentence is the unit of Speech. Having ac­
cepted that distinction, drawn in those terms, within a discus­
sion of the use of language, it is easy to see the temptation it 
creates to deny sense to all talk of the use of sentences. The 
Language-Sjjeech distinction was not, of course, Gardiner's in­
vention I he ackowledges de Saussure's earlier use of it and it 
is the latter who is generally ackowledged to have introduced the 
distinction into modern linguistics. But as the distinction be­
tween Language and Speech, or between langue and parole « occurs 
in linguistic theory, being drawn in different ways by different 
writers, it is not a settled uniform distinction. (Contrast Chom­
sky's distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic 
performance and other writers' distinctions between code and mes­
sage. ) Even if it was, that would not preclude drawing the dis­
tinction along different lines for the purposes of philosophical 
analysis. These last two points are offered in partial justifica­
tion of redrawing the distinction as follows.
"Language", as it it here being used with the initial letter 
capitalized, denotes the lexicon and set of syntactic, phono­
logical, semantic, phonetic and orthographic conventions of a
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particular natural language. It thus makes sense to speak of 
the Language of a language.» "Speech", on the other hand, denotes 
the activity speakers of a natural language engage in when and 
just in so far as they say (or write) things in their language.
A mastery of Language, in the sense of an acquaintance with the 
lexicon and knowledge of how to operate with the relevant con­
ventions, is required for fluency in that language, i.e., the 
ability to produce and understand utterances of an indefinitely 
large class of previously unencountered sentences of that lang­
uage. Speech is the continual exercising of that ability. The 
traditional aim of linguistic theories has been to provide theo­
retical descriptions of the Language of particular natural lang­
uages. Speech provides the explananda for such theories and the 
data against which hypotheses formulated as part of that theory 
construction are tested. How, precisely, the Language of any 
natural language is organized is a matter of scientific discovery 
progress towards which will be guided and judged by the usual 
canons of explanatory power, theoretical economy, goodness of 
fit between theory and fact and so on. The present state of pro­
gress of current linguistic theories with this task need not be 
reviewed here ; for present purposes it will be sufficient to re­
gard the Language of a natural language, say English, as specifi­
able in some such way as the following*
The lexicon will comprise a list of all the simple (i.e., non 
complex) units of the language. Lexical items in traditional 
theories of linguistics are variously described as phonemes or 
morphemes depending on whether the emphasis of the particular 
theory is phonological or semantic. With no such emphasis being 
adopted here, the lexical items referred to may be regarded as 
vocables or words. Certain syntactic, phonological and semantic 
information will be specified with each vocable's listing in the
? I
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lexicon ; specifications of, respectively, the syntactic cate- 
gory to which the vocable belongs (e.g., article, nonn, verb, 
adjective, etc., although these traditional syntactic categor­
ies are certainly subject to finer sub-division, and may be 
subject to more or less radical revision), the phonemic descrip­
tion of the vocable and a specification of its normal use. Homo­
nyms will, therefore, have as many listings in the lexicon as 
the number of ways in which they are homonymous. The normal use 
of a vocable will usually be specified in terms of its normal 
sense or reference but in some cases the specification of the 
syntactic category to which it belongs will exhaust the .speci­
fication of its normal use.
The syntactic conventions may be specified in terms of rules 
for forming all and only those types of sentences of the language 
that are syntactically correct. In the currently influential 
theories of phrase-structure transformational grammar, for in­
stance, such rules are of three types : first, phrase-structure 
rules which generate the basic forms of the sentences of the 
language, usually referred to as deep structures. Some of these 
rules are recursive in nature, generating complex syntactic 
structures either by embedding one or more simple structure (a 
sentence or a phrase) within another, or by concatenating (con­
joining or disjoining) two or more simple structures. Second, 
transformation rules which operate on the deep structures gen­
erated by the phrase-structure rules to yield the surface struc­
tures of sentences. Such rules govern, for instance, the deletion 
of identical elements in embedded structures, the transformations 
between constructions around verbs in the indicative and impera­
tive mood and transformations between constructions around verbs 
in their active and passive voice. The surface structures of
sentences derived by the combined operations of phrase-structure 
and transformation rules are specified in terms of ordered se­
quences of syntactic categories* Lexical insertion rules, the 
third type of syntactic rule, yield syntactically correct sent­
ences of the language by mapping lexical items belonging to the 
appropriate syntactic categories onto the derived surface struc­
tures. It perhaps needs.emphasizing that these types of syntactic 
rules are but some of the types under discussion and development 
in current linguistic theories.
The phonological conventions may be specified in terms of 
rules governing the location of stress on individual constituent 
units of a sentence and the pitch contour or intonation over the 
whole. Together with the phonological information specified for 
each vocable in the lexicon, these conventions determine.all and 
only those types of the sentences of the language that are phono- 
logically correct.
The semantic conventions may be specified in terras of rules 
for inteï'preting lexically, syntactically and phonologically 
correct sentences of the language in terras of the semantic in­
formation specified for each of their constituent units in the 
lexicon. Phonetic and orthographic conventions (among other sig­
nalling conventions),may be specified in terms of rules of pro­
nunciation and spelling for realizing the sentences of the 
language in sensible (i.e., audible or visible) form.
This sketch of what is involved in one side of the Language- 
Speech distinction, though drawn in the broadest of schematic 
outlines, reflects the commonplace of linguistic theory that 
the sentence is the maximum unit of grammatical analysis and 
shows that sentences are units of Language rather than Speech. 
Instances of the latter, being an activity, are acts : acts of
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saying or asking something. The strongest relation that can be 
held to obtain between a sentence and an act of saying or ask­
ing something is that the production of the former is a neces­
sary condition for the latter. But it is not a sufficient con­
dition and the issuing of incomplete or elliptical sentences of 
some sorts as part of Speech suggests that it may not even be a 
necessary condition. However, the units of Speech are what is 
said and what is asked, products of acts of saying or asking 
something. Certainly, "what is said" and "what is asked" have 
their ambiguities, some of which will be resolved in the next 
section. But it was a distinction between Language and Speech 
drawn along lines very similar to these that Austin alluded to 
with his remark, "The pheme is a unit of language....the rheme 
is a unit of speech..."(Words p.98),
Phones, phemes and rhemes are utterances of different types ; 
the acts of uttering which are respectively phonetic, phatic and 
rhetic acts.^ The definitions of these types of act define pro­
gressively richer senses of "saying something" and together ex­
haust its full normal sense. By extension to the products of 
these acts - phones, phemes and rhemes - these definitions also 
define different senses of "what is said". Austin introduced 
these definitions as follows : "...to say anything is
(A.a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a
'phonetic' act), and the utterance is a phone ;
(A.b) always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or
words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as
belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construc­
tion, i.e. conforming to and as conforming to a certain |
grammar, with a certain intonation, etc. This act we may i
call a 'phatic' act, and the utterance which it is the act j 
of uttering a 'pheme' (as distinct from the pherneme of j
linguistic theory) ; and
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(A*c ) generally to perform the act of using that pheme or its
constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense* 
and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together 
are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may call a 
'rhetic' act, and the utterance which it is the act of 
uttering a 'rheme'"(pp.92-3).
"The act of 'saying something' in this full normal sense I call, 
i.e. duh, the performance of a locutionary act, and the study of 
utterances thus far and in these respects the study of locutions, 
or of the full units of speech"(p.94)♦
Austin's abstraction from the locutionary act in terms of 
the phonetic act is simply a gesture towards accommodating the 
fact that in oral speech act situations, to which the scope of 
these definitions is restricted, utterances are oral utterances. 
Phemes and rhemes issued in such situations have phonetic re­
alization, This is not a customary interpretation of Austin's 
notion of the phonetic act and will he defended in the penulti­
mate section of this chapter.
Two conditions, severally necessary and jointly sufficient, 
have to be satisfied for a speaker's utterance to be a pheme : 
first, that it conforms to the lexicon and the syntactic and 
phonological conventions of the language which the speaker is 
using and second, that in so conforming it is as the speaker 
intends it to be. Austin drew attention to both these condi­
tions by saying that a phatic act is the uttering of "...noises 
of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain 
vocabulary...conforming to and as conforming to a certain gram­
mar, with a certain intonation, etc." The differences between 
these conditions can be illustrated by the different kinds of 
fault that occur when one or other of them is not satisfied. 
Accidental malapropisms and spoonerisms and Freudian slips of 
the tongue provide examples of putative phemes which, though
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conforming to the lexicon and syntactic and phonological con­
ventions of the language, are not as.their authors intend them 
to be. Solecisms and mispronunciations on the other hand, com­
mon enough when a speaker is in the process of learning a new 
language, provide examples of putative phemes v/hich are as 
their authors intend them to be but fail to conform to these 
conventions of the language. In everyday practice, the bound­
aries set by this condition between what counts as a pheme and 
a mere nonsense utterance have a fairly wide degree of toler­
ance. While probably no amount of good intentions would save 
"Doo-dah-diddy-dum-diddy-dah" from being nonsense, a French­
man's utterance of "That was a book very interesting” may pass 
as a pheme in spite of its not conforming strictly to the syn­
tactic conventions of English. Whatever these tolerances, how­
ever, a faultless pheme is an utterance having the properties 
of a lexically, syntactically and phonologically correct sent­
ence and which is, with respect to t&ose properties, as the 
speaker intends it to be » Malapropisms, spoonerisms and Freud­
ian slips are interesting in this respect in that they seem to 
be the limiting cases of word-sequences that are well-formed 
sentences in spite of their authors' intentions.
The conditions to be satisfied for a speaker's utterance to 
be a rheme, further to those satisfied by the performance of a 
phatic act, are that the pheme or its constituents are used with 
a more or less definite sense and reference which together are 
equivalent to meaning. Here again, severally necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions can be distinguished in terms of 
conventions and intentions : first, that the use of the pheme 
or its constituents conforms to the semantic conventions of the 
language and second, that in so conforming it is as it is in­
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tended to be. And here again, different speech phenomena oc­
curring when one or other of these conditions is not satisfied 
illustrate the differences between them. Some metaphorical uses 
of language (e.g., "He had to eat his words" and "The cold hand 
of winter gripped the land") are instances of the use of a 
pheme with a particular sense and/or reference which the speak­
er intends it to have but which is not in strict conformity 
with the semantic conventions of the language. Instances of 
litotes and hyperbole provide other examples of similarly non­
conformist rhemes. Some types of ambiguity, on the other hand, 
illustrate how a pheme may be used with a sense and/or refer­
ence which is in strict conformity with the conventions of the 
language but which is not as intended, or not just as intended, 
by the speaker. The ambiguous reference of "He" or the ambigu­
ous sense of "on the bench" in "He sits on the bench on Tuesday 
mornings" may make such a rheme less than completely successful 
for this reason*. (Ambiguities of sense and reference are types 
of rhetic ambiguity and are to be distinguished from types of 
phatic ambiguity ; the latter occurs if the same word-sequence 
forms a grammatical construction of more than one type, each of 
which conforms to the syntactic and phonological conventions of 
the language, e.g., "He saw her duck" and "They can fish".) But 
here too, there is a wide degree of tolerance in actual speech 
for any utterance which does not satisfy with complete strict­
ness these conditions for being a rheme. It may have been for 
this reason that Austin qualified his characterization of the 
meaning of an utterance with the phrases "...a certain more or 
less definite 'sense* and a more or less definite 'reference'.,." 
The main reason for this tolerance is, of course, that the cir­
cumstances of the situation in which the utterance is issued
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may serve to disambiguate the rheme or be such as to make it 
clear both that and how the speaker is using the pheme in some 
non-literal way. That is to say, it may be quite clear from the 
context in which the speaker said, "He sits on the bench on 
Tuesday mornings" both who the speaker is referring to with 
his use of "He" and with what sense he is using "on the bench" 
so that it is clear that the speaker's utterance means that the 
local tramp sits on the seat in the garden each Tuesday morning 
rather than that the local magistrate conducts hearings of his 
court on Tuesday mornings. In such cases, the performance of 
the rhetic act is quite successful. Similarly, the context of 
an utterance may make it clear that a speaker is speaking meta­
phorically and so make it clear that his utterance of "He had 
to eat his words" does not mean literally that someone had to 
chew and digest linguistic units. Such figurative, non-literal 
uses of language are common enough and may easily be recognised 
in the contexts in which they occur so need not necessarily 
make the performance of the rhetic act unsuccessful. And if, 
even in spite of contextual clues, the meaning of the utterance 
is unclear, it will usually be open to the speaker to use a 
different pheme so as to avoid the ambiguity or non-literalness 
of the original rheme and so make his meaning more precise. For 
example, a speaker may say, "Old Swagger sits on the seat in 
the garden every Tuesday morning" or "He had to retract his 
statement" and mean more precisely therewith what was meant by, 
respectively, "He sits on the bench on Tuesday mornings" and 
"He had to eat his words". Austin called pairs of rhetic acts 
like these rhetically equivalent acts. These are to be distin­
guished from "the same rhetic acts" which are performed by the 
use of identical phemes with identical sense and/or reference,
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e.g., if one speaker says, "He had to retract his statement” 
and another speaker says, "He had to retract his statement" 
and both speakers refer to the same person and talk about the 
same retraction. "When different phemes are used with the same 
sense and reference, we might speak of rhetically equivalent 
acts ('the same statement' in one sense) but not of the same 
rheme or rhetic acts (which are the same statement in another 
sense which involves using the same words)"(p.98).
However, there are limits to the degree of tolerance in 
the conditions upon an utterance being a rheme. These limits
are not easily specified in advance. But where a non-literal
use of language is too far removed from uses sanctioned by the 
semantic conventions of the language (as perhaps would be the 
case with "All the world's a stage") or where there is a com­
plete absence of intention on the part of the speaker to use a 
pheme with any sense or reference (as in the case of an actor 
going over his lines just to see whether he could remember 
them) a rhetic act, attempted or not, is not performed and the 
utterance is meaningless. So generally, an utterance is mean­
ingless if and only if, in the context in which it is Issued, 
either the speaker does not intend to use the pheme (or its 
constituents) with a sense and/or reference in conformity with 
the semantic conventions of the language or so intending, such
use is neither in strict conformity with those conventions
(i.e., it is literally meaningless) nor within certain limits 
of non-literal conformity with those conventions. Otherwise, 
the utterance is meaningful and the speaker has uttered a sent- j 
ence with meaning. |
Austin used the devices of direct and indirect quotation to
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identify, respectively, phatic and rhetic acts performed in 
speech act situations. These devices are suitable for this pur­
pose because the necessary conditions for the truth of the dif­
ferent forms of speech reports are specifiable in the same 
terms as the defining characteristics of the respective types 
of act, A speaker quoting directly reports the form of the 
quojied utterance ; a direct quotation is true only if it con­
tains a sentence of the same type as that used by the quoted 
speaker ; words of the same types, in a syntactic construction 
of the same type, with the same types of phonological features 
as the original, A speaker quoting indirectly reports the con­
tent or meaning of the quoted utterance ; an indirect quota­
tion is true only if it contains a paraphrase of the quoted 
utterance,
A direct quotation abstracts from the meaning of what was 
said. This is why, if an utterance is meaningless, it can only 
be truly quoted directly and not indirectly. The indirect quo­
tation of an actor memorizing his lines, e.g., "He said that 
friends, Romans and fellow-countrymen were to lend him their 
ears", is false whereas a direct quotation of the actor's ut­
terance in the same situation, e.g., "He said, 'Friends, Ro­
mans, fellow-countrymen ; lend me your ears'", is true. A 
meaningless utterance cannot be quoted indirectly because it 
cannot be paraphrased. If an utterance is rhetically ambiguous 
a true indirect quotation of it must preserve the ambiguity, 
although in some such cases indirect quotation is problematic 
and only true direct quotation may be possible. For instance, 
still lacking the contextual clues whose absence rendered the 
meaning of "He sits on the bench on Tuesday mornings" unclear, 
the indirect quotation "He said that he sits on the bench on
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Tuesday mornings" is misleading because it suggests, what is 
false, that he who does the saying and the sitting are one and 
the same, whereas the direct quotation "He said, 'He sits on 
the bench on Tuesday mornings'" entails what is true, that 
they are different. As Austin said, "If the sense or reference 
is not being taken as clear, then the whole or part is to be 
in quotation marks. Thus I might say : 'He said I was to go to 
"the minister", but he did not say which minister'•••"(pp.96-7). 
In abstracting from the meaning of what was said, a direct quo­
tation abstracts from the rhetic act performed as part of an 
act of saying something and reports only the phatic act. This 
is not to say, of course, that an utterance quoted directly is 
always quoted as being meaningless, simply that its meaning on 
the occasion of its issuance is not reported by such a quota­
tion. A directly quoted utterance may be understood to have 
whatever meaning it had on the occasion of its issuance. An in­
direct quotation, on the other hand, abstracts from the type of 
sentence used by a speaker and reports only the meaning of what 
was said. This is why a speaker can only be truly quoted indi­
rectly and not directly in translation. Thus if, of the same 
situation, "Pierre said, 'C'est un livre très intéressant'" is 
true, then while "Pierre said that this is a very interesting 
book" is true, "Pierre said, 'This is a very interesting book'" 
is not a direct quotation. And in abstracting from the type of 
sentence used and reporting only the meaning of what was said, 
an indirect quotation abstracts from the phatic act performed 
as part of an act of saying something and reports only the 
rhetic act. Austin's examples of pairs of phatic and rhetic 
acts distinguished by these means are quoted on p.68 below.
Discussing this point, Austin said, "We cannot, however,
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always use 'said that' easily : we would say 'told to', 'ad­
vise to', etc., if he used the imperative mood, or such equiva­
lent phrases as 'said I was to', 'said I should', etc. Compare 
such phrases as 'hade me welcome' and 'extended his apologies'" 
(p.97). This remark raises the question of how variable in form 
the device of indirect quotation can be and hence, how effective 
it is as a means for identifying the rhetic act performed in a 
speech act situation. For if "He bade me welcome" is an accept­
able form of indirect quotation, it can be shown that a true re­
port of a speech act situation, cast in that form, does not al­
ways identify the rhetic act performed in that situation. Sup­
pose "He bade me welcome" to have been said of a tribal chief 
by a missionary after arriving by river boat at the tribal vil­
lage. As he arrived, the missionary was greeted by the chief of 
the tribe standing on the river banlc, chanting and waving a .palm 
leaf. The missionary knew the natives' language and customs and 
interpreted the chief's chants and waves correctly. His report 
"He bade me welcome" is therefore true and in the form of an in­
direct quotation. But now suppose that the missionary's arrival 
coincided with the tribe's annual day of river rites ; rites 
which required the tribal chief to stand by the river chanting 
prayers to the river gods enjoining them to give the men of the 
tribe abundant fishing in the year ahead. And suppose too that 
the natives' only form of bidding welcome to non-members of the 
tribe was to wave palm leaves at them as they approached. The 
natives have no verbal form of greeting with which to bid a 
stranger welcome* Now, in this case, the missionary's report 
"He bade me welcome", though true and in the form of an indirect 
quotation, is not a report of the rhetic act(s) performed in 
that situation. The acts which the missionary's utterance does
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report and In virtue of which it is true are the chief's acts 
of waving his palm leaf, and these are not rhetic acts. The 
rhetic acts performed in this situation are those acts perform­
ed as part of the chief's chanting of his prayers, and these 
acts are not reported in the missionary's utterance. But clear­
ly, "He hade me welcome" can he used to identify the rhetic act 
performed in a speech act situation ; it is a quite acceptable 
indirect quotation by the addressee of a speaker's utterance,
"I hid you welcome". Bo either the use of Indirect quotation-de- 
vices to identify rhetic acts performed in speech act situations 
has to he abandoned, because true reports cast in such,form do 
not always identify the rhetic acts performed therein, or re­
strictions need to be imposed on the forms of indirect quotation 
so that true reports of speech act situations, cast in those 
forms, do always identify the rhetic acts performed in those sit­
uations. In view of the initial attractions of the quotation de­
vices as means for identifying phatic and rhetic acts, it seems 
preferable to exhaust the possibilities left open by the latter 
alternative before adopting the former.
Such restrictions may be imposed by specifying a basic 
normal form of indirect quotation, viz., "S said that..." where 
"S" here and hereafter reserves a place for an expression used 
to refer to the quoted speaker(s) and reserves a place for
a paraphrase of the quoted utterance. True reports of speech act 
situations cast in this form identify the rhetic acts performed 
in those situations. A basic normal form of direct quotation can 
also be specified, viz., "S said, where reserves a
place for a token sentence of the same type as that used by the 
quoted speaker(s). True reports of speech act situations cast in 
this form identify the phatic acts performed in those situations.
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The restrictions imposed on quotation devices by these basic 
normal forma are not so arbitrary as they might appear at first 
sight. Save for one qualification on the basic normal form of 
indirect quotation to be introduced shortly, any speech act 
situation in which a phatic and rhetic act is performed can be 
reported in these forms and true reports so cast identify the 
respective acts. This applies even to those situations in which 
acts may be performed about which Austin expressed some uneasi­
ness at reporting with the use of "said that" ; i.e., situa­
tions in which the speaker extends his apologies or bids his 
hearer welcome or uses a sentence in the imperative mood to 
tell or advise his hearer to do something. "He said that he was 
sorry", "He said that I was welcome", "He said that I was to go" 
and "He said that I should go" are all quite acceptable indirect 
quotations in basic normal form by the addressee of a speaker's 
utterance issued in such situations. Austin's remark that "said 
that" cannot always be used easily should not be taken as making 
the point that sometimes this form of indirect quotation cannot 
be used to report the rhetic act performed in a speech act situ­
ation. That would be false. Rather, Austin's remark makes the 
quite different point that sometimes the forms of speech reports 
may not be the most appropriate forms in which to report the 
situation. And obviously, the purposes with which reports are 
given may vary widely from case to case and diifersnt features 
of the situation are likely to be more relevant to some pur­
poses than to others. So an indirect speech report, for instance, 
which captures only the meaning of the speaker's utterance may 
not be the most appropriate form of report to use if other fea­
tures of -the situation are more relevant.. For example, it may be 
more appropriate to report a speech act situation with "It was
24
an order" than with "He said that I was to go" if the reporter 
is being urged by some third person not to go. But the latter 
may be more appropriate than the former if there is some un­
certainty as to who was to go. That these are reports of dif­
ferent features of the situation can be seen from their differ­
ent truth conditions. While "He said that I was to go" may be 
true, "It was an order" may not be true ; the speaker, in say­
ing "You are to go" may have been giving instructions rather 
than an order, or merely relaying them as distinct ffom actual­
ly giving them. There are very many different reports that can 
be given of a speech act situation and it cannot be assumed 
that all such reports are speech reports of the situation. Some 
reports make no pretence of being speech reports, e.g., "It was 
an order", "lie gave the order", "He relayed the instructions" ; 
others, while in a form in which speech reports can be given 
may, in spite of that, not be speech reports. The example of 
the missionary's report "He bade me welcome" is a case in point 
and similar examples could be constructed around the forms "S 
extended his apologies", "S told..." and "S advised,..". The ad­
vantages of the basic normal forms of quotation are that true 
reports of speech act situations cast in those forms are always 
and only speech reports of those situations.
The need for a qualification on the basic normal form of 
indirect quotation arises from cases in which a speaker asks a 
question, e.g., if he may go out, whether the postman has called 
yet, what time the train was due to leave, where the biscuits 
are kept, which route is shorter, why the furniture was ar­
ranged as it was, etc. Such utterances cannot be quoted indirect­
ly in the form "S said that..." so the basic normal form of in­
direct quotation needs to be augmented to include both this form
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and the form "8 asked..." where again reserves a place
for a paraphrase of the quoted utterance. Because the basic 
normal forms of indirect quotation specify forms of speech 
reports which identify rhetic acts performed in speech act 
situations, the need for these two forms suggests that there 
are two distinct types of rhetic act (saying something and 
asking something) ; and so in terms of the rhetic act perform­
ed, two distinct types of sentence-use : the use of a sentence 
to say something and to ask something.
Revisions to the distinctions Austin drew between the dif­
ferent types of act performed as part of a locutionary act have 
been proposed by Robinson in "The Individuation of Speech Acts"
(p.Q.(1974)pp.516-36).^ These distinctions and the proposed re­
visions are discussed there with reference to the following 
examples :
(1) Jones' uttering at t the phonetic sequence ^ The bull 
is in the field 7
(2) Jones* uttering at t the syntactically and lexically 
correct English sentence "The bull is in the field"
(S) Jones' uttering at t the meaningful English sentence 
"The bull Is in the field"
(4 ) Jones' expressing at t the proposition that the bull 
is in the field.
Robinson does not explain what she means by "syntactically and jilexically correct English sentence". But as the examples she 
gives of sentences that are either syntactically or lexically j
incorrect are the same as those Austin gave of sentences with j
faults of grammar or vocabulary it may be assumed that this dif- î
ference between Robinson and Austin is merely one of terminology. i
Robinson claims that "in Austin's terms, (1) is the phonetic !
act, (3 ) the phatic act, and (2) is an "abstraction" from the
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phatic act” but makes no claim on his behalf about the relat­
ionship between (3) and (4), asserting rather that they are re­
spectively her versions of the phatic and rhetic acts (p.820)»
But in terms of Austin's definitions of these acts, quoted on 
pp.13-4 above, it would seem that (l) exemplifies a phonetic 
act, (2) a phatic act, not just an abstraction from a phatic 
act, and (3) a rhetic act, not a phatic act. The differences 
between Robinson's view of these acts, Robinson's view of 
Austin's view of them and Austin's own view, with reference to 
(l)-(4) can be shown as follows :
Robinson Austin per Robinson Austin
(1) phonetic act phonetic act phonetic act
(2) abstraction from abstraction from phatic actphatic act phatic act
(3) phatic act phatic act rhetic act
(4) rhetic act ? -
Robinson's proposed revisions of Austin's distinctions are two­
fold, comprising (a) a redefinition of the rhetic act as the ex­
pression of a proposition ; and (b) a redefinition of the phatic 
act as the uttering of a syntactically and lexically correct and 
meaningful English sentence* The first need not be lingered over. 
Robinson admits the redefinition requires defence and that the 
distinction between (3) and (4) requires clarification but 
chooses to ignore these matters as irrelevant. Without such 
clarification the distinction between (3) and (4) seems to be 
one without a difference ; its application to those which Austin 
drew is problematic since the notion of acts of expressing pro­
positions had no place within his conception of speech acts. 
Robinson does, however, offer two justifications for the second 
of her proposed revisions.
The first is that Austin himself allowed that further dis-
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tinctions could be made within the phatic act beside those 
drawn in terms of the lexical and syntactic features of sent­
ences. This is true. Austin said, "Obviously in the definition 
of the phatic act two things are lumped together : vocabulary 
and grammar....Yet a further point arising is the intonation 
as well as grammar and vocabulary"(Words p.96). Thus, as al­
ready indicated, phonological features of sentences are includ­
ed in Austin's notion of phatic acts. Tokens of the sentence- 
types "You are going?" and "You are going!" uttered in certain 
ways would exemplify token phemes that are lexically, syntac­
tically and phonologically correct but which are, on .phonologi­
cal grounds, of distinct types. This distinction is not one 
that Robinson mentions but it is no doubt one that she would hot 
deny has a place within the phatic act. Robinson maintains, how­
ever, that yet another distinction can be made within the phatic 
act in terms of a distinction between the lexical and syntactic 
correctness of sentences and their meaniïigfulness. She illu­
strates this distinction with the sentence "Quadruplicity drinks 
procrastination", to utter which "...is to utter a syntactically 
and lexically correct English sentence, but one that most people 
would hold to be meaningless"(P.Q.p.321). Hence, Robinson argues, 
the performance of a phatic act is not successful if only a syn­
tactically and lexically correct sentence is uttered. The pheme 
must also satisfy a certain criterion of meaningfulness - a cri­
terion of the sort that "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" 
apparently fails to satisfy. Robinson does not spell out this 
criterion ; nor is it clear how she is using "meaningful English 
sentence" in the description of a pheme to mean something other 
than just a lexically and syntactically correct English sentence. 
In order to draw this further distinction within the phatic act,
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such a criterion would need to he one, like those for the lexi­
cal and syntactic correctness of sentences, which applies to 
types of sentences ; one such that if any token of a particular 
type of sentence satisfied or failed to satisfy the criterion, 
then all tokens of that type satisfied or failed to satisfy it.
It is doubtful that such a criterion for the meaningfulness of 
sentences can be formulated which meets this requirement and 
opens a non-vacuous distinction between types of lexically and 
syntactically correct sentences.
The attempt to distinguish types of sentences that are mean­
ingless though well-formed (i.e., lexically and syntactically 
correct) runs counter to the following intuition about language: 
for any type of well^formed sentence, there is a possible con­
text such that a token sentence of that type, used in that con­
text, in conformity with the normal semantic conventions of the 
language, is meaningful. If this intuition is correct, it follows 
that there are no types of well-formed but meaningless sentences. 
For if meaninglessness is a property of some types of sentences 
then all tokens of those types are meaningless.. But ex hypothesi. 
there is no type of well-formed sentence of which at least one 
token could not be meaningful in a possible context of use. While 
it may be difficult to prove this intuition to be true, an in­
formal justification for it is forthcoming from the natural 
economy of language. As the resources of a language are developed 
to enable users of that language to cope more efficiently with 
the situations confronting them, a capacity to construct types of 
well-formed but meaningless sentences, if it existed, would be 
curiously redundant. For there is no possible use for such sent­
ences in normal situations of linguistic communication and from 
the point of view of the natural economy of language a capacity
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to construct such sentences would evidence a rare and excep­
tional overrichness in the resources of the language. This 
point should raise doubts, either about the well-formedness 
of the alleged examples, (and these doubts may lead on to some 
beneficial revisions of the traditional syntactic categories) 
or, if these doubts are shown to be unfounded, other doubts 
about whether there are not contexts in which these examples 
could be meaningful*
A consequence of this intuition, viz., that there are no 
types of well-formed but meaningless sentences, is, in fact, 
the common ground between what are otherwise widely diverging 
views on the status of suspect sentences such as "Quadruplicity 
drinks procrastination". It is the common ground between, on the 
one hand, the view that tokens of these types of sentence are 
not well-formed and, on the other hand, the view that they are 
meaningful (and therefore well-formed) but false* These views 
differ as to whether some particular types of sentences are well- 
formed or not and hence, differ over the scope of the syntactic 
rules of a language required to generate all and only the well- 
formed sentences of that language. But they are alike in denying 
that there are types of well-formed but meaningless sentences.
So it is up to those, of whom Robinson would seem to be one, who 
wish to adopt some middle position between these views and main­
tain that there are types of well-formed but meaningless sent­
ences, to establish their position. The familiar examples pro­
duced for this purpose are none too successful* Whether the 
token sentence "Tuesday is in bed" (with "Tuesday" used as a 
proper name to refer to a day of the week) is meaningless or 
false, a different token of the same type with "Tuesday" used 
as a proper name, or a nick-name, to refer to a person would be
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meaningful and could be true. Similarly, if procrastination is 
a species of moonshine and one of a drinking fraternity is nick­
named "Quadruplicity" by his fellows - he may have used that 
word on some inebriate occasion and the incident has had .a last­
ing effect on his friends - then, in such a context, the token 
sentence "Quadruplicity drinks procrastinatlcn" would not only 
be meaningful but could be used to give a true description of 
that person's drinking habits. It is not a sound objection 
against this example that it involves an abnormal use of lang­
uage. The use of some words as nick-names, carrying with it the 
use of words with unfamiliar reference, is not an abnormal use 
of language. It is a use of language which any adequate theory 
of linguistics has to accommodate. Here is another example : if 
in a dream (it would probably be a nightmare) someone dreamed 
that quadruplicity drinks procras tination and on waking was de­
scribing his experience to another, the token sentence "Qua3.ru- 
plicity drinks procrastination" would seem to be the most suit­
able for giving a succinct, true and, therefore, meaningful re­
port of the content of the dream experience. It is not a sound 
objection against either of these examples that tokens of the 
sentence type "Quadruplicity drinks procras tina tion" can only be 
shown to be meaningful by specifying possible contexts for their 
use. It is only in a context of use that any sentence is meaning­
ful or meaningless. The context-dependence of the meaning fulness 
of a sentence, consisting in the sense and reference with which 
words in the sentence are used bn the occasion of its production, 
which is in contrast with the independence of context of a sent­
ence's lexical and syntactic correctness, is one reason for not 
including the meaningfulness of the sentence among the necessary 
conditions on a satisfactory pheme. It is also a reason for lo-
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eating the meaning of an utterance where Austin located it : 
in the rheme, not in the pheme ; in the use of .that pheme 
or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' 
and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together are 
equivalent to 'meaning')"(Words p.93).
This last point, however, is one that Robinson would deny. 
For her second justification of the proposed revision of 
Austin's definition of the phatic act is that it is in accord 
with his remarks and examples. "My claim that a phatic act is 
correctly and fully described as the utterance of a meaningful 
English sentence seems to me justified in view of Austin's 
usage"(p.Q.p.321). Now if this were true, it would mean that 
there was some inconsistency between Austin's definition of 
phatic acts and some of his remarks about them. So what is 
Robinson's textual support for this justification? She says, 
TEvery example he gives of a pheme is a meaningful English 
sentence, and the examples of sequences that fail to be phemes 
are sequences that fail in one way or another to be meaningful" 
(p.321), The examples of putative phemes which Austin gave were 
"cat thoroughly the if" and "the slithy toves did gyre". These 
are only examples of, respectively, syntactically and lexically 
incorrect word-sequences ; neither example introduces the kind 
of fault of sentence-types which Robinson is referring to here 
as meaninglessness. And what property Austin's examples of sat­
isfactory phemes have, over and above their syntactic and lexi­
cal correctness, which Robinson refers to as their meaningful­
ness, is not evident in those examples. So Austin's examples do 
not warrant a revision of his definition of phatic acts. What 
of his remarks? Robinson says, "Austin says that the "typical 
fault"'of a pheme is to be meaningless or nonsense. This is an
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ambiguous statement, but I take it to mean not that some phemes 
unfortunately suffer from meaninglessness, but that if anything 
is meaningless then it is not a pheme"(p.321). Austin's actual 
words were, "The pheme is a unit of language ; its typical fault 
is to be nonsense - meaningless"(Words p.98). This remark is am­
biguous and it bears interpretations different from that which 
Robinson places upon it. For instance, Austin may have been 
using "meaningless" here with the same sense that he used it 
with in the phrase "meaningless sentence", between scare quotes, 
to mean "ungrammatical, incomplete, mumbo-jumbo, etc*"(p.51) ; 
i.0o, as an umbrella term for the different ways in which a 
word-sequence can fail to be a well-formed sentence. Inter­
preted in this way, Austin's last quoted remark does not evi­
dence any shift away from the distinction between the lexical, 
syntactic (and phonological) aspects of an utterance and its 
semantic aspects which lies behind the distinction between 
phatic and rhetic acts as Austin originally defined them. 
Moreover, Robinson's claim to the effect that such a shift took 
place, based on that one ambiguous remark, can only be sustain­
ed if Austin's other remarks about phatic and rhetic acts are 
ignored. There are, for instance, his repeated remarks that 
phatic acts are reported in direct quotation and rhetic acts in 
indirect quotation. And as shown earlier, the necessary condi­
tions for the different forms of quotation can be specified in 
the same terms as those in which Austin defined phatic and rhetic 
acts. So Robinson has not shown any inconsistency between Austin's 
definition of phatic acts and his remarks about them either, and
hence has failed to make good this second justification of her
6proposed revision of that definition.
Robinson lays down a criterion for the use of the expression
53
"same act" according to which a phonetic and phatic act per­
formed in a speech act situation can he said to be the same 
act. By this criterion, which is specified in terms of the set- 
theoretic concept of inclusion, the set of phatic acts is a 
subset of the set of phonetic acts. "The reason for this is 
that the set of meaningful English sentences is a subset of the 
set of syntactically and lexically correct English sentences, 
which in turn is a subset of the set of phonetic sequences" 
(P.Q.p,381). There is a certain now-you-see-it-now-you-don*t 
quality about what is claimed on behalf of the identity rela­
tionship expressed in this criterion and alleged to hold be­
tween the different acts. For Robinson says that it is inac­
curate to say that they are strictly identical acts, but that 
they are the same act according to her Inclusion Criterion, 
but then later, that it is doubtful that the criterion defines 
some sense of the expression "same act" when it is not a sym­
metric relation holding between these acts (pp., 321,323). How­
ever this may be, and irrespective of the difference between 
Robinson's and Austin's definitions of the phatic act, this 
account of the relationship between phatic and phone tic acts 
is incorrect as an exegesis of Austin's view of that relation­
ship, inadequate as it stands and, even when strengthened in 
appropriate ways, false. Austin said, "Obviously, to perform 
a phatic Aact^/ I must perform a phonetic act, or, if you like, 
in performing one I am pei'*forming the other (not, however. that 
phatic acts are a sub-class of phonetic acts ; we defined the 
phatic act as the uttering of vocables as belonging to a cer­
tain vocabulary) ; but the converse is not true, for if a 
monkey makes a noise indistinguishable from 'go' it is still 
not a phatic act"(Words pp.95-6, underlining added). The clause
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not underlined in the parenthesis of the remark just quoted 
indicates the reason why Robinson's account is inadequate as 
it stands. On her account the set of phatic acts includes the 
utterings of phonetic sequences which just happen to conform 
to the syntactic and phonological conventions of a language 
and whose constituents just happen to be member© of the phonem­
ic lexicon of that language. And such an account is too weak, 
for on that basis it requires an arbitrary restriction to hu­
man acts to exclude a piece of random monkey chatter, phonetic­
ally indistinguishable from r from the set of phatic acts, 
Robinson's account ignores the necessary condition on the suc­
cessful performance of a phatic act tSriat the pheme, in conform­
ing to the lexicon and syntactic and phonological conventions 
of the language, is as it is intended to be. However, even if 
Robinson's account were to be strengthened to include this 
condition, as it easily could be, it would still be false.
One reason for this, a reason which also supports Austin's 
denial of such an account, can be gleaned from a number of re­
marks in the text of his lectures. Utterances that are phemes, 
the products of phatic acts, can be produced in more than one 
way, which is to say that a phatic act can be performed in 
more than one way : orally (or phonetically) certainly ; but 
also in writing (or graphically), and in other ways as well, 
e.g., in semaphore, morse code, etc. Several of Austin's re­
marks show that he was using "utterance" with a sense that 
was not restricted to that of "oral utterance" or "spoken ut­
terance" but included that of "written utterance" ; for ex­
ample, "...the utterance (in writing) of the sentence..."(p,57) 
"(a)In verbal utterances..." and "(b)In written utterances.*." 
(p.60), and "...written utterances are not tethered to their
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origin in the way spoken ones are"(p.61). On the following 
page there are examples of performative utterances : " .  *][,
John Jones, warn you that the hull is dangerous' or This hull 
is dangerous. (Signed) John Jones"(p.68) ; the first example 
is of an oral utterance, the second of a written one. Later,
Austin discussed ways in v/hich the illocutionary force of ut­
terances can be made explicit in both written and spoken 
language (pp.74-5), and most importantly, on p.114, there is j
the foot-note "Still confining ourselves, for simplicity, to |
spoken utterance". In view of these remarks it seems certain 1
that Austin envisaged his conception of speech acts having 
application to situations involving written utterances as j
iwell as oral utterances. j
The context of the definition of the phatic act on pp.92-3 ;|
of Words, especially the paragraph preceding the statement of j
that definition, as well as Austin's repetition of the défini- |
tion of the phonetic act (...the act of uttering certain ij
■noises...) within the definition of the phatic act (...the act |
1of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e., noises of certain 
types...) makes it clear that Austin was restricting that def­
inition to acts performed in oral speech act situations, i.e., 
to acts performed as part of acts of saying something, to the 
exclusion of acts performed as part of, say, acts of writing 
something. It is this restriction, made for the sake of sim­
plicity, which is referred to in the foot-note on p.114. If 
this restriction is lifted, a general definition of the phatic 
act can easily be obtained from Austin's definition by deleting ' 
the definition of the phonetic act from the definition of the 
phatic act (where it is redundant in any case) and reformulat­
ing the latter as "...the act of producing certain vocables or
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words belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, 
in a certain construction...etc.". The abstraction from the 
total oral speech act situation which Austin made in terms of 
the phonetic act can then be seen as a gesture towards accom­
modating the fact that in such situations the phatic act is 
performed orally, or to put it another way, the fact that in 
such situations the pheme has phonetic realization. For other 
types of speech act situations parallel definitions can be 
formulated for the appropriate types of act which provide ways 
of performing a phatic act in those situations. For example, 
for situations in which a phatic act is performed as part of 
an act of writing something, i.e., for situations in which a 
pheme has graphic realization, a graphic act can be defined as 
the act of making certain marks. Hence, the set of phatic acts 
is included in the sum of the set of phonetic acts, the set of 
graphic acts and the sets of such other acts as provide ways 
of performing phatic acts (e.g., the set of semaphore-signal­
ling acts), but is not included within any one such set.
Robinson admits that Austin picked out important features 
of the locutionary act in terms of the three-fold distinction 
between phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts (P.Q.p.820). Irre­
spective of what others have said about his choice of labels
7for these types of act, the distinctions Austin drew in these 
terms rnesh with some of the more important distinctions drawn 
and deployed in linguistic theory. And his account of locu­
tionary acts in these terms, specifying severally necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions on the issuing of a satis­
factory locution - a full unit of Speech - elucidates one
species of language-use t the use of a sentence to say or ask 
something. But it is not this species of language-use, nor
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this use of sentences, which is central to Austin's concep­
tion of speech acts, "Our interest in the locutionary act is, 
of course, principally to make quite clear what it is, in 
order to distinguish it from other iTillocutionary^/ acts 
with which we are going to he primarily concerned".(Word© pp.
94-5). The use of language exemplified in locutionary acts
is a use of Language ; the use of language exemplified in 
illocutionary acts is a use of Speech. The use of a sentence 
exemplified in a locutionary act is the use of a lexically, 
syntactically and phonologically correct word-sequenee 
(which with respect to those features is as it is intended 
to he) to say or ask something. That is, it is the use of a
pheme or unit of Language with sense and reference (together Iequivalent to meaning) to produce a meaningful utterance or Jj
rheme. The use of a sentence exemplified in an Illocutionary 1
jact is the use of a rheme or unit of Speech with a certain 1
-Iforce, to do something distinct from saying or asking some- jjthing, e.g., to describe or to report, to promise or to state J
:|
an intention, to request or to order, to bet or to christen. I
1"When we perform a locutionary act, we use speech : but in jiwhat way precisely are we using it on this occasion? For there |1are very numerous functions of or ways in which we use speech, iiand it makes a great difference to our /"illocutionary^/ act i
...in which way and which sensje we were on this occasion 'us- j
Iing' it. It makes a great difference whether we were advising, 
or merely suggesting, or actually ordering, whether we were |
strictly promising or only announcing a vague intention, and j
so forth. These issues penetrate a little but not without con- |
fusion into grammar, but we constantly do debate them, in such IIterms as whether certain words (a certain locution) had the |
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force of a question, or ought to have been taken as an esti­
mate and so on"(p.99). Thus within a particular speech act 
situation, each of these different species of language-use, 
as well as that exemplified in perlocutionary acts which will 
be discussed later, may be evident in a speaker’s locutionary 
act of saying, that he had forgotten to bring it, his illocu­
tionary act of reporting that he had forgotten to bring it and 
his perlocutionary act of angering his audience. Or, again, 
these uses may be evident in a speaker’s locutionary act of 
asking if he could go ashore, his illocutionary act of re­
questing permission to go ashore and his perlocutionary act of 
getting permission to go ashore. Some more of Austin’s examples 
of these different uses of language are quoted on p.68 below.
Foot-notes ;
1 (from p.2) This sentence is quoted from the first edition, 
of Word St. Its omission from the second edition would seem 
to be somewhat less than felicitous. Introducing the notion 
of an illocutionary act, Austin made the two points ; (a) 
that to perform a locutionary act is eq ipso to perform an 
illocutionary act and (b) that to determine what illocu­
tionary act is performed it is necessary to determine how 
the locution is used. After listing some examples of il­
locutionary acts Austin took up these points, dismissing 
the first with "There is nothing mysterious about our eo 
ipso here" and concentrating his discussion on the second. 
The immediate relevance of this discussion is made unclear 
in the second edition by the omission of the quoted sentence.
2 (from p.6) For example, in "The Theory of Meaning"(C,P.II 
pp.350-72) Ryle said, "The sorts of things that we do with 
sentences are different from the sorts of things that we do 
with most single words - and some sorts of things that we 
can significantly do with some sorts of sentences, we cannot
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significantly do with others"(p.365)«
3 (from. p.9) "We have to learn to use sentences for the first 
job before we can learn to use them for the second, and we 
have to learn to use them for the first and second jobs be­
fore we can learn to use them for the third. There are, of 
course, plenty of other sentence-jobs, which it is not our 
present business to consider. For example, the sentences 
which occupy these pages have not got any of the jobs which 
they have been describing"(The Concept of Mind p.123).
4- (from Pels) Throughout, "utterance" is used with the sense 
of "what is uttered" to denote a product of, or an object 
produced by, an act of uttering. It is not used with the 
sense of "act of uttering". This usage is in accord with 
Austin’s practice, not always strictly adhered to, but 
clearly announced in Words. "I use ’utterance’ only as e- 
quivalent to uttera turn ; for utteratio I use ’the issuing 
of an utterance’"(p.92,fn.l).
5 (from p.25) This section is a modified version of the writer’s 
"Robinson’s Individuation of Speech Acts"(P.Q.(1976)pp.261-6).
6 (from p.32) In "The Logic of Austin’s Locutionary Sub­
division" (j^eqrj^( 1969) pp. 204-14) Griffiths gives an extra­
ordinarily confused and inaccurate exposition of Austin’s 
notions of phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts* There is a run­
ning together of phatic and rhetic acts (p.205) and of pheme a 
and rhemes (p.209). Griffiths fails to take the point of 
Austin’s examples "cat thoroughly the if" and "the slithy 
toves did gyre", allowing that in direct quotation these are 
reports of phatic acts. Griffiths shows a complete ignorance 
of the conditions on the speaker’s intentions involved in 
the performance of these acts, as well as of the "act-object" 
or "process-product" ambiguity of the noun "utterance". Thus 
he remarks, "However, one problem which arises is how a rheme 
...differs from a rhetic act"(p.207). And while, "One cannot 
perform a rhetic act without producing a rheme..." is correct, 
how "...one can produce a rheme without performing a rhetic 
act"(p.207) remains a mystery. Griffiths claims that "Talk
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about token and type phemes makes sense, but it is nonsense
to talk about token and type rhemes"(p*208). Yet Austin dis­
cussed briefly 'Hhe question when one pheme or one rheme is 
the same as another, whether in the ’type* or ’token’ sense 
. (Wordsp.97). Two token utterances are rhemes of the same 
type if and only if two token phemes of the same type are 
used with the same sense and reference.
7 (from p.36) In "Austin on Perfomatives"(Symp.pp.401-11)
Black says, "It seems to me somewhat crude and perversely 
idiosyncratic.« ®"(p.409).
Chapter Two 
Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts
In its early version, Austin’s conception of speech acts 
was formulated in terms of the distinction between performative 
and constative utterances. The range of this distinction shows 
that conception to be informed by the same concern with a 
specific use of sentences in its early version as in its later 
one. Some of Austin’s remarks adverting to the distinction do 
likewise : "...very commonly the same sentence is used on dif­
ferent occasions of utterance in both ways, performative and 
constative"(Words p.67); "... it will be most dangerous...to 
take it that we somehow know that the primary or primitive use 
of sentences must be, because it ought to be, statemental or 
constative..."(p.72). Austin’s remarks locating his work on 
speech acts within the contemporary developments in philosophy 
show this too. These historical remarks are also important for 
what they show of Austin’s reasons for attending to different 
species of language-use. While such remarks can be found on 
the opening pages of Words, more succinct remarks to the same 
effect were made in his later radio talk "Performative Utter­
ances"; accordingly, the following quotations are from the tran* 
script of that talk (Papers pp.233-62). "We have not got to go 
very far back in the history of philosophy to find philosophers 
assuming more or less as a matter of course that...the sole in­
teresting business of any utterance - that is, of anything we 
say - is to be true or at least false.... philosophers have as­
sumed that the only things that they are interested in are ut­
terances which report facts or which describe situations truly 
or falsely"(p^233;. Austin regarded other philosophers’ grow­
ing interest in the uses of language as a reaction against some
42
of the excesses which this assumption had led to. The view 
espoused by some Logical Positivists in their Verifiability 
Criterion of Meaningfulness, that utterances having the same 
indicative grammatical form as sentences typically used to 
make statements were nonsense or meaningless if they lacked 
a decidea'ble truth-value, is one example of such an excess. 
"After all, we set some limits to...the amount of nonsense 
that v/e are prepared to admit we talk; and so people began to 
ask whether after all some of those things which, treated as 
statements, were in danger of being dismissed as nonsense did 
after all really set out to be statements at all. Mightn’t 
they perhaps be intended not to report facts but to influence 
people in this way or that, or to let off steam in this way or 
that?...On these lines people have now adopted a new slogan, 
the slogan of the ’different uses of l a n g u a g e ^ t h e  old 
statemental approach is sometimes called even a fallacy, the 
descriptive fallacy"(p.234). But Austin saw this new approach, 
the ’use of language’ movement, as being in danger of being 
taken to excess as well. "It’s rather a pity that people are 
apt to invoke a new use of language whenever they feel so in­
clined, to help them out of this, that, or the other well-known 
philosophical tangle;.,.I think we should not despair too easily 
and talk, as people are apt to do, about the infinite uses of 
language"(p,234). Hence the need to distinguish and elucidate 
specific uses of language, "Certainly there are a great many 
uses of language..we need more of a framework in which to dis­
cuss these u s e s . N o w  it is one such sort of use of language 
that I want to examine here"(pp.234-5).
This use, the performative use of langage, is exemplified in 
the issuing of utterances which are not nonsense, and have in-
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dicative gr arrima tic al form, but are such that :
"A, they do not ’describe’ or 'report* or constate anything 
at all, are not 'true or false’; and 
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing 
of an action, which again would not normally be described 
as, or as ’just’, saying something"(Words p.5).
Austin’s initial examples of such performative utterances in 
Words were "I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife", 
as uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony, "I name this 
ship the Queen Elizabeth"« as uttered when smashing the bottle 
against the stem, "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother", 
as occurring in a will, and "I bet you sixpence it will rain 
to-morrow". Of these, Austin said, ".,,it seems clear that to 
utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) 
is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so utter­
ing to be doing or to state that I am doing it : it is to do it* 
None of the utterances cited is either true or false....To name 
the ship is_ to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words 
’I name, etc*'. When I say, before the registrar or altar, etc., 
’I do', I am not reporting on a marriage : I am indulging in it" 
(p.6). Some examples of the contrasted type of constative utter­
ances were the truth-valued utterances : "The cat is on the mat", 
"He is running", "France is hexagonal", "Lord Raglan won the 
battle of Alma", "He did not do it"*
Although Austin’s definition and examples of performative 
utterances on p.5 of Words are only part of the "preliminary 
isolation of the performative"(p.4), two necessary conditions 
on an utterance being a performative utterance are already evi­
dent there : first, that it is not of a kind which could be 
either true or false, and second, that the issuing of the utter­
ance is part of an action which is not exhausted by the speaker’s
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act of saying something but includes what the speaker "should 
he said in so uttering to he doing"; e.g., marrying in saying 
"X do", naming in saying "I name, etc.", bequeathing in saying 
"I give and bequeath, etc.", betting in saying "I bet you".
Thus performative utterances satisfying these conditions, bets, 
bequests, christenings or namings, promises or vows, etc. are 
distinguished from truth-valued constative utterances such as 
statements, descriptions, reports, assertions, etc.-
In Lecture II Austin filled out the terms of the performa- 
tive-constative distinction. For though performatives are not 
truth-valued, and hence, not assessable as either true or false, 
it does not follow that they are immune from all assessment or 
criticism. As utterances, they are liable to the different kinds 
of fault which may beset any utterance : meaninglessness, am­
biguity and vagueness on the one hand, and on the other, not 
being correctly or completely understood by their addressees.
And as products of acts they are liable to the kinds of fault 
that may mar any product of an act : being unintended, produced 
by mistake, by accident, under duress, etc. As well as these 
faults, the products of the acts under consideration here (al­
though not only these, of course) are also liable to the kinds 
of fault due to the act being attempted or performed in inap­
propriate circumstances. Austin’s stress on the appropriateness 
of the circumstances in which these acts are satisfactorily per­
formed is clearly evident both from the examples he gives and 
his comments on them. When, because of some misperforrnance or 
because the act is attempted or performed in inappropriate cir­
cumstances "...something goes wrong and the act - marrying, bet­
ting, bequeathing, christening, or what not - is therefore at 
least to some extent a failure : the utterance is then, we may
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say, not indeed false but in general unhappy"(p.14). So here 
is another general dimension of assessment of utterances to set 
alongside that in which the truth-values of utterances are as­
sessed. What Austin took the bases of these respective types 
of assessment to be will be discussed presently; what may be 
noted here is that an utterance's being assessable as either 
happy or unhappy completes the characterization of a performa­
tive utterance. Austin summarized this characterization at the 
start of Lecture III. "In our first lecture we isolated in a 
preliminary way the performative utterance as not, or not mere­
ly, saying something but doing something, and as not a true or 
false report of something. In the second, we pointed out that 
though it was not ever true or false it still was subject to 
criticism ™ could be unhappy, and we listed six of these types 
of Infelicity"(p.86). And at the start of Lecture XI the per­
forma tive-cons tative distinction was fully specified in the fol­
lowing terms : "When we originally contrasted the performative 
with the constative utterance we said that (l) the performative 
should be doing something as opposed to just saying something;* 
and (S) the performative is happy or unhappy as opposed to true 
or false"(p.133).
There is a widely held and, to the writer's knowledge, no­
where dissented from view of the relationship between the early 
and later versions of Austin's conception of speech acts. This 
view is that Austin rejected the performative-constative dis­
tinction and replaced it by the distinction between locutionary 
and illocutionary acts.^ It is not difficult to show that prima 
facie there is something very wrong with this "reject-and-re- 
place" view. For at the start of Lecture XIX, having discussed 
the two versions in the preceding lecture, Austin said, "The
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doctrine of the performative/constative distinction stands to 
the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total 
speech act as the special theory to the general theory"(p.148).
To relate the two distinctions in this way, albeit one which re­
quires elucidation, is, clearly, not to reject or abandon the 
former and replace it by the latter. The signal feature of the 
reject-and-replace view is the failure of its proponents to per­
ceive clearly the several necessary conditions on performative 
utterances^ : that they are such that their Issuance is part of 
an action which is not just an act of saying something and that 
they are not of a kind that are assessable as either true or 
false but are assessable, rather, as happy or unhappy^ These 
conditions are jointly sufficient but severally necessary. Thus 
an utterance may be such that its issuance is not just (part of) 
an act of saying something and hence is assessable as either 
happy or unhappy, but if it is also assessable as either true or 
false, i.e., is of a kind which is truth-valued, then it is not 
a performative utterance but a constative utterance. As it seems 
to be a misunderstanding of this point which lies at the bottom 
of the error and confusion in the reject-and-replace view, a 
discussion of the bases of these respective dimensions of utter­
ance assessment, and the types of utterance that are assessable 
on each basis, will not only show why that view is false but 
will also clarify the performative-constative distinction and 
justify Austin’s retention of it.
Austin spelled out the basis for the assessment of an utter­
ance as either happy or unhappy in terms of necessary conditions 
for the felicitous performance of the act that a speaker performs 
on the occasion of uttering which would not normally be described 
as an act of saying something but as what the speaker should be
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said in so uttering to be doing. A speaker’s utterance is 
bappy or unhappy to the extent that these Felicity conditions 
are satisfied or not i
"(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure
having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to 
include the uttering of certain words by certain persons 
in certain circumstances, and further,
(A.8) the particular persons and circumstances in a given 
case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked.
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants 
both correctly and 
(B.8) completely,
(f.l) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by 
persons having certain thoughts or feelings /”or in­
tentions^?, or for the Inauguration of certain conse­
quential conduct on the part of any participant, then 
a person participating in and so invoking the proced­
ure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings /”*or 
intentions^/, and the participants must intend so to 
conduct themselves, and further 
(r.8) must ac tually so conduct themselves subsequently"(pp,14-5)/
Austin devoted more than two and a half lectures (Lectures II,
III and most of IV) to a discussion of these conditions and the 
different types of infelicity arising from their non-satisfac­
tion. These latter were referred to, respectively, as non-plays, 
misapplications, flaws, hitches, insincerities and breaches.
This emphasis gives some indication of the importance of these 
Felicity conditions within Austin’s conception of speech acts.
At. several places in his lectures (pp. SO, 54-5, 136-40),
Austin raised the question of whether some types of constative 
utterance, e.g., assertions, descriptions, reports, statements, 
etc. , are also subject to assessment on the basis of the Fel­
icity conditions (A.l)-(f.8). His answer was in the affirmative. 
His discussions of this point, the most detailed of which, con-
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centrating on the example of statements, was in Lecture XI, 
showed, not only that utterances of these types are subject to 
assessment in the happy-unhappy dimension but also that acts of 
asserting, describing, reporting and stating are as much acts 
performed in acts of saying something as acts of betting, be­
queathing, christening and marrying etc. But this does not col­
lapse the performative-constative distinction. For even though, 
as Austin said that he had shown, statements, for instance, lack 
nothing that performatives have (p.140), they, like all consta­
tive utterances, have something which performatives do not and 
which disqualifies them from being performatives : they have 
truth-values.
The basis for assessment of utterances in terms of truth 
and falsity was, for Austin, their correspondence to facts. He 
did not spell out this basis in detail in Words. But a simple 
view, adequate for utterances whose truth-value is a contingent 
matter, which can be slotted smoothly into position here is as 
follows. A speaker using a sentence with certain sense and ref­
erence characterizes, according to the tense of the verb, a past, 
present or future possible state of affairs. The question may 
then be asked whether the possible state of affaire so charac­
terized by the utterance was, is or will be an actual state of 
affairs. To ask this question is to ask whether the utterance 
corresponds to a fact. If the question has an answer in the af­
firmative, the utterance receives a positive assessment on this 
basis; if the answer to the question is in the negative, the ut­
terance receives a negative assessment.
When at different stages in his lectures (pp.54-5, 140-5), 
Austin raised the question of whether some types of performative 
utterance, though not assessable in terms of truth and falsity.
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are assessable on the basis of their correspondence to facts, 
his answer was again in the affirmative. Taking warnings as 
one example, he said, "**.connected with the performative (I 
presume it is one) ’I warn you that the bull is about to charge* 
is the fact, if it is one, that the bull is about to charge ; 
if the bull is not, then indeed the utterance...is open to 
criticism - but not in any of the ways we have hitherto charac­
terized as varieties of uniiappiness... .we should feel much more 
inclined to say the y/arning was false or (better) mistaken..." 
(p. 55). In the later, fuller discussion of this point, again 
in Lecture XI, a similar example drew the comment, "...it is 
both a warning and true or false that it /“the b u l l i s  going 
to charge; and that comes in in appraising the warning just as 
much as, though not quite in the same way as, in appraising the 
statement"(p«136). Some other examples Austin considered were 
pieces of advice, judgements of certain kinds and ascriptions 
of blame. How while none of these is assessable in terms of 
truth and falsity, each is subject to some kind of assessment 
on the basis of its correspondence to fact. The blame a speaker 
ascribes in saying, e.g., "He did it" is merited or unmerited 
according as the person referred to by "He" did "it"; a Court 
judge’s finding that the defendant is guilty of negligence is 
a fair or unfair judgement according as the defendant was or 
was not negligent; the advice given in saying, e.g., "You 
should go" is good or bad advice according as the addressee of 
the utterance should or should not go. So here are cases of 
some types of performative utterance whose tokens are assess­
able on the same basis as that upon which the truth-values of 
constative utterances are assessed. But, again, this does not 
collapse the performative-constative distinction. For though
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these performative utterances are assessable on the same basis 
as constative utterances are assessed in terms of truth and 
falsity they are not assessed as either true or false on that 
basis. Austin summarized the position as follows : "...consid­
erations of the happiness and unhappiness type may infect state­
ments (or some statements)..."(p.55); "...we found sufficient 
indications that unhappiness nevertheless seems to characterize 
both kinds of utterance, not merely the performative; and that 
the requirement of conforming or bearing some relation to the 
facts, different in different cases, seems to characterize per­
formatives. (p. 91) ; "...considerations of the type of truth 
and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)"
(p. 55).
It is on these grounds that some proponents of the reject- 
and-replace view have claimed that the performative-oonstative 
distinction collapses. Such claims betray a misunderstanding of 
the terms in which that distinction was drawn. For underlying 
the distinction, there is, introduced in the A. clause of the 
definition on p. 6 of Words and restated in Austin's stuiimaries 
on pp.25 and 133, a distinction between (constative) truth­
valued utterances and (performative) utterances that are not 
truth-valued. This distinction demarcates two classes of utter­
ances that are necessarily mutually exclusive. And neither the 
second distinction informing the performative-constative dis­
tinction, introduced in the B. clause of the definition on p.5 
of Words and drawn in terms of doing and saying, nor the notion 
of an utterance's assessability as either happy or unhappy with 
which Austin completed his characterization of the performative 
utterance, is inconsistent with the performative-constative dis­
tinction being a mutually exclusive distinction ranging over ut­
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terances. So it is just not the case that the two classes of 
utterances are identical, as ¥/hite suggests in saying that the 
distinction between performatives and constatives "...had broken 
down...because either can be appraised both in the true/false 
and in the happy/unhappy dimension"(An. S.(I965)p.60). Performa­
tive utterances such as ascriptions of blame, pieces of advice 
and Court verdicts, though they may be assessed on the same 
basis of correspondence to fact as constative utterances are as­
sessed for truth and falsity, are not assessed in the true/false 
dimension on that basis. Nor, even, is it the case that one 
class of utterances is a sub-class of the other, e.g., that all 
constatives are performatives in being assessable in the happy/ 
unhappy dimension as well as the true/false dimension, as Searle 
suggests in saying, "\%at was originally supposed to be a 
special case of utterances (performatives) swallows the general 
case (constatives)..."(Essays p.142)* There are what Austin 
called "extreme marginal cases"(Words p.146) and elsewhere "mar­
ginal limiting"(p.150) cases of utterances that are assessable 
in only one or other dimension. "Now in certain cases, perhaps 
with mathematical formulas in physics books as examples of con­
statives, or with /^utterances produced in^/ the issuing of 
simple executive orders or the giving of simple names, say, as 
examples of performatives, we approximate in real life to find­
ing such things"(p.146).
The reject-and-replace view exposes a sorry standard of 
textual exegesis and philosophical acumen. That view would not, 
perhaps, have gained such widespread acceptance if its propon­
ents had paid more attention to the contemporary philosophical 
trends impinging on Austin’s work and to the influences of those
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trends upon his conception of speech acts* An appreciation of 
the (philosophical) historical circumstances in which a philo­
sopher’s work is set seldom hinders and usually helps the under­
standing of that work. And it is clear, in Austin’s case, what 
the main impinging trends were : first, the working out of the 
implications of recognizing the Descriptive Fallacy and second, 
the burgeoning employment of the notion of different uses of 
language. Although these trends were not unrelated, the latter 
growing out of the former, they were different, as were Austin’s 
reactions to them. Whereas in the former case Austin tried to 
show precisely where and why the Descriptive Fallacy was a fal­
lacy, in the latter case, his aim was to refine the notion of 
use of language by providing a framework in which different 
species of language-use could be distinguished and elucidated.
If the early and later versions of Austin’s conception of speech 
acts are seen as embodying these respective reactions the in­
sights in that conception threatened by the reject-and-replace 
view can be retrieved.
It was pointed out earlier that this view founders on 
Austin’s relating of the performative-constative distinction to 
the one between locutionary and illocutionary acts as the special 
theory to the general theory. His use of this simile was part of 
his final attempt in Words to show just what was wrong with the 
Descriptive Fallacy. Austin took this fallacy to be the assump­
tion that "...the primary or primitive use of sentences must be 
...statemental or constative, in the philosophers’ preferred 
sense of simply uttering something whose sole pretension is to 
be true or false and which is not liable to criticism in any 
other dimension"(p.72). What he took the relationship to be be­
tween this assumption and the early version of his conception of
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speech, acts is clear from the following remark : "This topic is 
one development - there are many others - in the recent movement 
towards questioning an age-old assumption in philosophy - the 
assumption that to say something...is always and simply to state 
something"(p.is). Now if Austin’s specification of the performa- 
tive-constative distinction in Words (p.133) is recurred to (i.e., - 
".that (l) the performative should he doing something as opposed 
to just saying something; and (S) the performative is happy or ‘
unhappy as opposed to true or false") it will he seen that the 
notions used to characterize performative utterances - doing 
something as opposed to saying something, and utterances that 
are happy or unhappy as opposed to true or false - are foils for 
the notions encapsulated in the Descriptive Fallacy : acts of 
saying something and truth-valued utterances. By drawing each of 
the distinctions (l) and (2) underlying the performative-consta­
tive distinction, Austin exposed different points at which the 
assumption involved in the Descriptive Fallacy errs. The second 
distinction, (8) above, not only shows that the assumption is 
false, simply by demarcating a non-empty class of (performative) 
utterances that are not truth-valued though they may be meaning­
ful and in the same grammatical form as sentences typically used 
to make statements. It also exposes the error in assuming that 
statements are liable to criticism in no other dimension than 
the true/false one. For in his discussion of the terms in which 
that distinction was drawn, i.e., the Felicity conditions on the 
basis of which an utterance is assessed as either happy or unhap­
py, Austin showed that statements are subject to assessment in 
this dimension as well. Utterances that are only assessable in 
the true/false dimension, which usually and swiftly and rather 
too swiftly had been called ’statements’, are in fact special
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cases, not the central or primary cases as assumed by propon­
ents of the Descriptive Fallacy. The first distinction, (l) 
above, exposes the error in assuming that to say something is 
always and simply to state something. Stating is a type of act 
which can be performed îni saying something but for whose suc­
cessful and felicitous performance particular sorts of circum­
stances are required to obtain further to those in which acts 
of just saying something may be performed. And in this, stating, 
and other types of act given pre-eminence by the Descriptive 
Fallacy, e.g., asserting, describing, reporting, etc., are on 
a par with such other types of act as betting, bequeathing, 
marrying, christening, promising, warning, blaming, judging, 
advising, etc., whose tokens may also be performed iji acts of 
saying something. "Stating, describing, etc., are just two 
names among a very great many others for illocutionary acts; 
they have no unique position"(pp.148-9).
What was needed as a corrective for these errors was the 
view of a statement, not as a type of sentence, but as the 
product of an act of using a sentence in a particular way. 
Austin disclaimed originality for this discovery but he did 
give a new form of expression both to the diagnosis of these 
errors and to the prescription for their correction. The De­
scriptive Fallacy had arisen, according to Austin, because of 
philosophers’ concentration on too few types of sentence-use 
and an over-simplification of those types they had attended to. 
Not only had a whole general basis of utterance-assessment been 
ignored - the sort which Austin sketched in terms of his Fel­
icity conditions for the use of sentences but the basis of 
assessment to which attention had been given - that of an ut-. 
terance’s correspondence to fact - had been over-simplified by
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being regarded as yielding just one dimension of assessment : 
the true/false dimension. Different types of utterance, ignored 
by the assumption in the Descriptive Fallacy, are subject to 
assessment in different dimensions on the same basis; for in­
stance, as warnings are assessable for being misleading or not, 
verdicts for being fair, or unfair, blame for being merited or 
unmerited, advice for being good or bad, etc. Moreover, some 
constative utterances are assessable in some of these other di­
mensions as well; statements can be assessed for being mislead­
ing or not, fair or unfair too. "When a constative is confront­
ed with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the 
employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with those we 
use in the appraisal of performatives"(pp.148-3).
What Austin prescribed in his conception of speech acts as 
a corrective for these errors was a general theory of the species 
of sentence-use exemplified by acts performed in saying something, 
the need for which "...arises simply because the traditional 
’statement' is an abstraction, an ideal, and so is its tradit­
ional truth or falsity"(p.148), and for which the locutionary- 
illocutionary distinction provides a partial outline. Such a 
theory construes differences between utterances of the types 
statement, description, warning, judgement, advice, bet, promise, 
order, etc. as determined by the different types of (illocution­
ary) act performed in (locutionary) acts of saying something in 
particular types of speech act situation. It will explain not 
only how sentences are used in these ways, i.e., their illo­
cutionary forces, but also, how the tyx^ e of force which an ut­
terance has determines the particular dimension(s) of assess­
ment on the basis of correspondence with fact to which an utter­
ance is exposed by virtue of its being issued with a certain
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sense and reference. In general, therefore, utterances are as­
sessable on both bases; both on the basis of whether the act 
performed in issuing the utterance is felicitous or not and on 
the basis of its correspondence with fact. Only special cases, 
the "extreme, marginal, limiting cases" - "pure performatives" 
and "pure constatives" - are assessable on just one basis, "(a) 
With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocution­
ary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, 
and we concentrate on the locutionary : moreover, we use an 
over-simplified notion of correspondence with the facts - over­
simplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary 
aspect. This is the ideal of what would be right to say in all 
circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, etc. Perhaps 
it is sometimes realized, (b) With the performative utterance, 
we attend, as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the 
utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence 
with facts"(pp.145-6).
One conclusion that may be drawn from the reject-and-replace 
view, and one which most of its proponents seem to have acted on, 
is that Austin’s effective discussion of his conception of 
speech acts started at the end of Lecture VII and what preceded 
that is of little consequence. For instance, the selection from 
Words in Rosenberg and Travis’ collection includes only Lectures 
VIII, IX and XI. By thus encouraging a neglect of the first half 
of Austin’s lectures, the reject-and-replace view puts at risk 
one important insight concerning a type of theory which is not 
appropriate for elucidating the performative use of language and 
several insights concerning the type of theory that is.
Because it can be the case that "the same sentence is used 
on different occasions of utterance in both ways, performative
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and constative", hopes of being able to identify performative 
utterances by particular syntactic or lexical features of sent­
ences are doomed. Such hopes have little justification from the 
outset, however, in view of Austin’s introduction of performa­
tive utterances as utterances having the same grammatical form 
as constative utterances though differing from the latter in 
lacking a truth-value. The main burden of Austin’s fifth, sixth 
and seventh lectures was to show that no criterion couched in 
terms of either syntactic or lexical features of sentences, or 
any combination of these, sufficed to identify performative ut­
terances* Issued token sentences constructed around their main 
verb in any mood, in either voice and in any tense, with the 
subject term in first, second or third person, singular or 
plural, can be performative utterances. No particular person, 
tense, voice or mood is either a necessary or sufficient cond­
ition for an issued token sentence being a performative utter­
ance; nor is the inclusion of any particular word in an issued 
token sentence a necessary or sufficient condition for its be­
ing a performative utterance. No criterion specifying a com­
bination of lexical and syntactic features of sentences fares 
any better. For instance, it is not a necessary condition for 
an issued token sentence being a performative utterance that 
it be constructed around a verb,in the first person present 
indicative active, which could otherwise be used to name the 
type of act that the speaker may be performing in issuing the 
sentence. For contrasted to the explicit performative utter­
ances satisfying this condition, "I promise that I shall go",
"I order you to go" and "I question his suitability for the 
job", there are the primary or implicit performative utter­
ances, "I’ll go", "Goi" and "Is he suitable?", in saying which
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the speaker may, respectively, he promising, ordering or quest­
ioning just as felicitously. (The distinction between primary 
and explicit performative utterances is discussed further on 
pp.80-1 below.) Nor is it a sufficient condition for being a 
performative utterance that the issued token sentence is in the 
form of an explicit performative utterance. If a speaker states 
something in saying, "I state that he did not do it", then his 
utterance is not a performative but a constative utterance. 
Austin discussed other defects of such a criterion in Lectures 
V-VII. His demonstration in these lectures that no linguistic 
criterion could be formulated for identifying: utterances exem­
plifying the specific use of language which his conception of 
speech acts was designed to elucidate strikes a cautionary note 
against trying to elucidate that use and develop that concep­
tion within the framework of a theory of language or part of a 
theory of language such as a theory of syntax. This point has 
been lost on philosophers such as Vendler (in Res Gogitans) and 
Searle (in "A classification of illocutionary acts") - each a 
proponent of the reject-and-replace view - as well as some 
theorists of linguistics who attempt to explain this use of 
language in terms of linguistic descriptions of the deep struc­
tures of sentences. These attempts have been criticized by 
other theorists of linguistics as well as by Cohen (in "Speech 
Acts") and Holdcroft (in "Indicatives, Performatives and Deep 
Structure"). What these latter discussions fail to bring out, 
however, is that such attempts show a radical misunderstanding 
of the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts and that as 
attempts to develop that conception, they are misdirected. It was 
a specific use of language that that conception was designed to 
elucidate, use rather than language, and for this purpose, clear-
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ly, a theory of action is more appropriate than a theory of 
language.
Austin*8 introduction of the distinctions between locu*- 
tionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts at the end of 
Lecture VII and through Lecture VIII was not the new, radical 
point of departure in his conception of speech acts suggested 
by the reject-and-replace view. These distinctions had been 
adumbrated as early as Lecture II when Austin said, "We were 
to consider, you will remember, some cases and senses in which 
to say something is to something; or in which ^  saying or 
in saying something we are doing something"(p.12). So pace 
White, Austin's moves in Lectures VII and VIII were not a case 
of Austin starting all over again and considering ^  novo these 
different senses (An.S.(1965)p.60)» Austin said, "We want to 
reconsider more generally... " these senses (Words p. 91); and. 
by way of summary at the start of Lecture VIII, "...it seemed 
that we were going to find it not always easy to distinguish 
performative utterances from constative, and it therefore seem­
ed expedient to go farther back for a while to fundamentals - 
to consider from the ground up how many senses there are in 
which to say something to do something, or in saying some­
thing we do something.(p.94 underlining added). When Austin 
said, "It is time then to make a fresh start on the problem"
(p.91), he was not starting all over again de novo ; he was go­
ing back to the distinction, introduced in the B. clause of the 
definition on p.5 of Words, between acts of saying something 
and acts performed on the occasion of uttering which would not 
normally be described as acts of saying some thing but rather as 
what the speaker should be said in, so uttering to be doing.
This distinction had lain fallow since being drawn in the open­
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ing lecture with only two passing references being made to it 
in the following six lectures; once on p.13 and again on p.47 : 
"This is one way in which we might justify the *performative- 
constative* distinction - as a distinction between doing and 
saying"* It was only at the end of Lecture VII that Austin took 
up this distinction in earnest ("It is time to refine upon the 
circumstances of 'issuing an utterance'."(p*92)) and then de­
veloped it in terms of the distinction between locutionary and 
illocutionary acts* The distinction runs through Austin's con­
ception of speech acts from beginning to end : "...these two 
kinds of acts jTillocutionary and locutionary^/ seem to be the 
very things which we tried to use, under the names of 'doing' 
and 'saying', as a means of distinguishing performatives from 
constatives"(p.133).
Austin's characterization of different species of language- 
use in terms of different kinds of doing associated with saying 
can be seen as a move towards describing the phenomenon which 
he was concerned to elucidate in terms which makes it amenable 
to subsumption under a theory of action. The reject-and-replace 
view obscures this fact by failing to show clearly that the 
crucially important distinction between (locutionary) acts of 
saying something and (illocutionary) acts performed jja saying 
something was drawn in both versions of Austin's conception of 
speech acts. And by effectively bifurcating Austin's lectures, 
that view obscures the relevance of Austin's discussion in his 
early lectures to the later version* For instance, Austin's 
statement and discussion of the Felicity conditions in Lectures 
ÏI-IV is the closest approach in his published work to a state­
ment and discussion of the general conditions for the specific 
use of language which his conception was designed to elucidate.
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One effect of the reject-and-replace view's encouragement to 
neglect these lectures can be seen in the total neglect in 
postvAustinian developments in speech act theory of the notion 
which featured so prominently in his statement of the Felicity 
conditions : the notion of a conventional procedure.
Austin did not pretend to have provided a formula for 
identifying illocutionary acts performed in speech act situa­
tions comparable in precision to the basic normal forms of in­
direct quotation for identifying locutionary acts. The formula 
"In saying that..., S was v-ing" which he was prepared to use 
with caution for this purpose does not, when filled out as a 
report of a speech act situation, exclude all acts other than 
the illocutionary act that may be performed in that situation.
But in the copious literature on the subject published subse­
quently to Words no improvement on this formula has been sug­
gested; nor, regrettably, is one to be offered here. This lack 
is not serious, however. There is, even among critics of Austin's 
conception of speech acts, agreement with him on a large body of 
examples of types of illocutionary actr These examples, some of 
which have been mentioned here already, provide an adequate basis 
from which to defend and develop that conception. The distinction 
between locutionary and illocutionary acts will be made more 
clear in the next section, in the course of defending it against 
some objections.
In "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts"(Essays 
pp.141-59) Searle argues in support of two objections against 
this distinction. The weaker of the two is that it is not a com­
pletely general distinction, in the sense of marking off tv/o 
mutually exclusive classes of acts, because some members of the
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class of locutionary acts are members of the class of illocu­
tionary acts. His stronger objection is that there really is 
no distinction at all in this sense because all the members of 
the class of locutionary acts are members of the class of il­
locutionary acts. Searle summarizes his argument in support of 
the first objection as follows : "The concept of an utterance 
with a certain meaning (that is, the concept of a locutionary 
act) is indeed a different concept from the concept of an ut­
terance with a certain force (that is, the concept of an illo­
cutionary act). But there are many sentences whose meaning is 
such as to determine that the serious utterance of the sentence 
with its literal meaning has a particular force. Hence the 
class of illocutionary acts will contain members of the class 
of locutionary acts. The concepts are different but they denote 
overlapping classes"(p.144). Searle*s example of a joint member 
of these classes is an uttering of the sentence,"I hereby 
promise that I am going to do it", of which he says, "Its seri­
ous and literal utterance must be a promise....The meaning of 
the sentence determines an illocutionary force of its utter­
ances in such a way that serious utterances of it with that 
literal meaning will have that particular force. The descrip­
tion of the act as a happily performed locutionary act, since 
it involves the meaning of the sentence, is already a descrip­
tion of the illocutionary act, since a particular illocutionary 
act is determined by that meaning. They are one and the same 
act"(p.143).
The point of this objection is not that locutionary and il­
locutionary acts are acts of identical types. Searle apparently 
allows this type difference by admitting that the respective 
concepts of locutionary and illocutionary acts are distinct.
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His point here is that at least in some cases, a token of one 
of these types of act may also he a token of the other type; 
one and the same act may he both a locutionary and an illocu­
tionary act. The point is mistaken, however. The identity 
conditions of a token locutionary act are not the same as those 
of a token illocutionary act. Conditions further to the neces­
sary and sufficient conditions for a successful performance of 
the former have to be satisfied for a performance of the latter 
to be successful. In particular, the circumstances of the situ­
ation in which a locutionary act is performed have to be ap­
propriate in certain ways for any attempt therein at an illo­
cutionary act to be successful. And some sorts of inappropriate 
circumstances are sufficient to frustrate such an attempt with­
out impairing the success of the locutionary act. For example, 
if unexpectedly and unbeknown to the speaker at the time of his 
seriously and literally uttering "I hereby promise that I am 
going to do it", and continuously thereafter, it is impossible 
for him to do "it", then while he may have successfully per­
formed a locutionary act, his attempt to promise therein will 
not be successful. In such a case the purported promise is 
void. This can be seen from the fact that the speaker would not 
be said to have broken his promise when he fails, perforce of 
these circumstances,to do what he said that he promises to do. 
The point has general application. It is generally the case 
that additional circumstances to those obtaining when a locu­
tionary act is successfully performed are required to obtain 
for any attempted illocutionary act to be successfully perform­
ed. These circumstances are of the sort alluded to in Austin's 
(A,3) Felicity condition. Now Searle seems to take this point 
when he subsequently considers a possible defence of Austin's
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distinction along these lines(pp.144-6). He even provides an 
example of his own to illustrate it - that of a putative order 
given by a speaker lacking the requisite authority. Searle dis­
misses the point on the grounds that it reduces the distinction 
between locutionary and illocutionary acts to one between try­
ing to perform an illocutionary act and succeeding in doing so, 
a distinction which he claims is not only different but less 
interesting than the original. But by dismissing the point in 
this way, Searle shows that he has failed to appreciate the 
force of the counter-objection. That a speaker can attempt to 
perform an illocutionary act in performing a locutionary act, 
and succeed in the latter but fail in the former demonstrates 
that these acts have different identity conditions and hence, 
that even when an illocutionary act is successfully performed 
in a locutionary act it is mistaken and misleading to talk of 
the one as identical with the other in such terms as "one and 
the same act".
Searle's objection gains a measure of plausibility from his 
identification of the concepts of a locutionary act and an il­
locutionary act with those respectively of an utterance with a 
certain meaning and an utterance with a certain force. Given 
this assimilation, his objection seems plausible because it 
seems plausible to maintain that an utterance with a certain 
meaning could also be an utterance with a certain force. Searle, 
in fact, introduces Austin's distinction in these terms and sug­
gests that Austin did likewise. "As initially presented, it is 
the distinction between uttering a sentence v/ith a certain mean- 
ing, in one sense of 'meaning' which Austin characterizes as 
'sense and reference* (the locutionary act) and uttering a sent­
ence with a certain force (the illocutionary act)"(p,142). Set-
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ting aside for the moment the question of whether this was 
actually the way Austin introduced his distinction, it can be 
seen that this move of Searle's reduces locutionary and illo­
cutionary acts to the same type of act, viz., utterings. If 
this is consistent with Searle*s previously noted admission 
that the respective concepts of these acts are distinct, the 
content of that admission is now unclear. But this apart, his 
reduction of illocutionary acts to the same type of act as 
locutionary acts involves a category confusion. Locutionary 
acts, acts of saying something, are utterings of a certain 
type; illocutionary acts are not. Any two locutionary acts 
performed in oral speech act situations can be compared in 
terms of their relative loudness or softness but the same com­
parison cannot be made between illocutionary acts. If Galileo 
did say "Eppur si muove" rising from his knees after reciting 
the formula renouncing his Copernican views, then he performed 
two illocutionary acts ; an abjuration and an objection. But 
he did not perform a loud abjuration followed by a soft objec­
tion. Similarly, a sergeant bawling out orders to the squad of 
soldiers being drilled on the parade ground is not therein or­
dering loudly, noisily, sonorously or stridently. Nor if some­
one makes a request in a whisper is she requesting quietly, 
softly or pianissimo. Acts of promising are not loud or soft,
nor can someone listen for them or literally be deaf to them.
"Did you hear him promise?" is an ellipsis for "Did you hear him 
say that he promises?" just as "Did you hear him order the ad­
vance?" is elliptical for "Did you hear him give the order to
advance?". This latter question makes sense whereas "Did you 
hear him order to advance?" does not; "Did you hear him say to 
advance?" does, "lie was deaf to all our entreaties" is just a
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figure of speech* It is simply a category confusion to as­
similate, as Searle does, acts of ^hese different types* The 
Austinian formula, "In saying that..., S was v-ing", express­
ing the relationship between locutionary and illocutionary acts, 
if it does nothing else, serves to mark the distinction between 
acts of these types for the relation expressed by that formula 
does not have all the formal features of an identity relation.
For example, "In saying that he promises to go, he was promising 
to go" expresses an asymmetric and irreflexive relation.
Nor, to return to the point deferred a moment ago, is it the 
case that Austin introduced his distinction between these acts 
as one between uttering a sentence with a certain meaning and 
uttering a sentence with a certain force. As initially presented 
the distinction is one between different species of language-use, 
drawn in terms of different types of act performed in a speech 
act'situation and isolating the specific use of language that 
Austin's conception of speech acts was designed to elucidate. 
Characterizing this use in terms of a type of act performed by a 
speaker in saying something indicates the sort of theory in 
whose terms the species of language-use is to be elucidated ; a 
theory of action rather than a theory of language or part of a 
theory of language such as a theory of meaning. When Austin did 
come to broach the meaning-force distinction, after introducing 
the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, it 
was expressly to set aside and warn against giving an explana­
tion of this species of language-use in terms of a theory of 
meaning. "Yet still perhaps we are too prone to give these ex­
planations in terms of 'the meanings of words'. Admittedly we can 
use 'meaning' also with, reference to illocutionary force - 'He 
meant it as an order', etc. But I want to distinguish force and
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meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to sense 
and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish 
sense and reference" (Words p.100). Searle's programme for 
elucidating the nature of illocutionary acts in terms of a 
theory of meaning, foreshadowed in his assertion that "...the 
study of the meanings of sentences and the study of the illo­
cutionary acts which could be performed in the utterances of 
sentences are not two different studies, but one and the same 
study from two different points of view"(Essays p.154), not 
only runs counter to this warning but warps Austin's concep­
tion of speech acts beyond recognizable shape. For where that 
conception was designed to elucidate a specific use of language 
in terms of a theory of action, Searle's programme is aimed at 
elucidating a type of act in terms of a theory of meaning.
The reasons for the failure of Searle's weaker objection 
against Austin's distinction, viz., that the identity conditions 
for a token locutionary act and any illocutionary act performed 
therein are different, and that it is a category confusion to 
assimilate the different types of act, are also reasons for the 
failure of his stronger objection. But Searle supports this ob­
jection, that every member of the class of locutionary acts is 
a member of the class of illocutionary acts, with a different 
argument which must be examined independently. The argument 
turns on Austin's use of various forms of report to distinguish 
the different types of act. It embodies three claims (pp.146-7) : 
(C.l) that Austin used the forms of direct and indirect quota­
tion to identify, respectively, not only phatic and rhetic 
acts but also locutionary and illocutionary acts,
(C.2) that the verb phrases in the reports of rhetic acts in­
variably contain illocutionary verbs and hence in charac-
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terizing rhetic acts Austin characterized them as illo­
cutionary acts, and 
(C.S) that there is no way to give an indirect speech report 
of a rhetic act which does not turn the report into a 
report of an illocutionary act.
Searle's argument, then, is that Austin used the form of in­
direct quotation to identify both rhetic and illocutionary acts; 
these are therefore identical acts, and since a token rhetic act 
is equivalent to a token locutionary act, a token locutionary 
act is equivalent to a token illocutionary act - there is no 
distinction between them. However, each of Searle's claims 
(C.1)^(C.3) is false.
In support of (G.l) Searle cites Austin’s own examples of 
reports of acts of the various types (Words pp.95, 101-2) : 
Phatic acts
(Ph.l) He said "The cat is on the mat".
(Ph.2) He said "I shall be there".
(Ph.3) He said "Get out",
(Ph.4) He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?"
Rhetic acts
(Rh.1) He said (that) the cat was on the mat,
(Rh.2) He said he would be there.
(Rh.3) He told me to get out.
(Rh.4) He asked whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge, 
Locutionary acts
(A,1) He said to me "Shoot her!" meaning by "shoot" shoot and 
referring by "her" to her.
(A.2) He said to me "You can’t do that" ^meaning by "can’t do" 
cannot do and referring by "You" to me and by "that" to 
what I was going to do. .^7
Illocutionary Acts
(B.1) He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.) me to shoot her.
(B.2) He protested against my doing it.
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From these examples it is clear that Austin did use the forms 
of direct and indirect quotation to identify phatic and rhetic 
acts, but equally clear that he did not use these forms to 
identify locutionary and illocutionary acts. The reports of 
locutionary acts, (A.2) filled out in a fashion indicated by 
the form of (A.1), are not exhausted by direct quotations of 
the speaker’s words. The first part of each report, including 
just the direct quotation, is a report of the (phonetic and) 
phatic component(s) of the locutionary act; the remainder, 
specifying the sense and reference with which the quoted words 
were used, is a report of the rhetic component of the locution­
ary act. So in this form of report of locutionary acts, Austin 
included reports of each of the component acts involved and 
quite consistently used direct quotation for reporting only the 
phatic act, Searle is quite mistaken, then, to claim that Austin 
used this form of report for identifying locutionary acts. He is 
similarly mistaken in claiming that Austin used the form of in­
direct quotation for identifying illocutionary acts. Such re­
ports of the utterances "Shoot her!" and "You can’t do that" 
would be "He said that I am/was to shoot her" and "He said that 
I cannot do that" and neither of these is the example of the 
report of the illocutionary act which Austin gave. His examples, 
(B.1) and (B.2), are not indirect quotations, not reports of 
what was said, but reports of what was done in saying what was 
said. So Searle’s first claim is false.
His second claim fares no better, i.e., (C.2), that the 
verb phrases in the reports of rhetic acts invariably contain 
illocutionary verbs and hence, in characterizing rhetic acts 
Austin characterized them as illocutionary acts. A test of ab­
solute minimal strictness for a verb "v" being an illocutionary
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verb is whether "v" can occur in the formula "In saying that.,., 
S was v-ing". This test is minimally strict in the sense that 
while the relation between any rhetic or locutionary act and an 
illocutionary act performed therein can be expressed in this 
form, numerous instances of the use of this formula can be 
imagined which yield reports which are not reports of such re­
lations. But because of the irreflexivity of the relation ex­
pressed by that formula, the verb "say" fails even this test.
"In saying that he would be there, he was saying that he would 
be there" is just a pleonasm. Nor is it the case that the verb 
"ask", which Austin also used in giving examples of reports of 
rhetic acts, is invariably an illocutionary verb. There is a 
fairly clearly discernible ambiguity on "ask" as between its 
uses to report rhetic and illocutionary acts. For example, it 
is used to report the rhetic acts but cannot be used to report 
truly the illocutionary act in "In asking if she would close 
the door on her way out, he was telling her to leave", - the 
speaker’s words were "You’ll close the door on your way out, 
won’t you?". Conversely, "ask" is used to report the illocu­
tionary act but cannot be used to report truly the rhetic act 
in "In saying that he was sorry and that he could not hear you, 
he was asking you to repeat what you said", - the speaker’s 
words were "I’m sorry. I couldn't hear you". It is only this 
ambiguity on the word "ask" which prevents "In asking whether 
it was in Oxford or Cambridge, he was asking whether it was in 
Oxford or Cambridge" from being pleonastic as well. Now it is 
true that in one example of a report of a rhetic act, (Rh.3), 
Austin did use the illocutionary verb "tell". But this slip is 
inconsequential. As has already been shown, a report of this 
rhetic act can be cast in one of the basic normal forms of in-
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direct quotation : "He said that I was to get out." It is 
quite untrue, however, for Searle to say that "the verbs in 
Austin’s examples of indirect-speech reports of rhetic acts 
are all illocutionary verbs of a very general kind, which 
stand in relation to the verbs in his reports of illocutionary 
acts as genus to species"(Essays p.147). The verbs "say" and 
"ask" as used in one or other of the basic normal forms of in­
direct quotation are not illocutionary verbs, whether of a
very general kind or no. So, Austin’s slip with "He told me to
get out" aside, Searle’s second claim is false.
The collapse of this claim brings down his third claim as
well, i.e., (C.3), that there is no way to give an indirect 
speech report of a rhetic act which does not turn the report 
into a report of an illocutionary act. The basic normal forms 
of indirect quotation, "S said that..." and "S asked,..", pro­
vide the means for giving such reports. True reports of speech 
act situations cast in either of these forms are reports of 
the rhetic acts performed in those situations. They are not 
reports of the illocutionary acts performed by the speakers, 
for "say" and "ask" as used in these reports are not illocu­
tionary verbs and these reports leave unspecified which illo­
cutionary act, if any, was performed in issuing the reported 
utterance.
The failure of Searle’s argument in support of his stronger 
objection to Austin’s distinction is due to his misunderstand­
ing of Austin's use of quotation devices to identify sorrie of 
the acts performed in a speech act situation. Searle is not 
alone in this misunderstanding. For example, Holdcroft in 
"Doubts About the Locutionary Illocutionary Distinction"(l.B.P. 
(I974)pp.3-16) says that Austin used both direct and indirect
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quotation for reporting locutionary acts (pp.7-8), And For- ' 
guson, in a reply to Searle in "Locutionary and Illocutionary 
Acts"(Essays pp.160-85) in which he attempts to defend Austin's 
distinction, takes the points of Searle’s first two claims :
(c.l) and (c.2). Forguson engages in a long and involved apology 
on Austin's behalf about the rationale and limitations of quo­
tation devices which is designed to show that the potentially 
embarrassing feature of the necessity of using illocutionary 
verbs in indirect speech reports of rhetic acts is a red herring. 
Forguson’s account is not, in all respects, correct. For example, 
he claims that the rationale for the use of oratio recta for re­
porting locutionary acts is provided by the recognition that an 
utterance may be meaningful and worth reporting even if the in­
tended force is ambiguous (p.176). But in such cases, the use of 
oH.dÈi.0 obliqua is equally, if not more, appropriate. "He said 
that he will do it" may be used to report the meaning of a 
speaker's utterance "I'll do it", even if the force of the utter­
ance is ambiguous as between that of a threat, a warning, a pre­
diction, a promise or a statement of intention. But the main 
point against Forguson is that no apology on Austin's behalf is 
required. Searle's claims (C.l)—(0.3) are false and his argument 
against Austin s distinc bion, based on those claims, just does 
not get started.
Vendler is another who has demonstrated, unwittingly, a mis­
understanding of the use of direct and indirect quotation devices 
for reporting some of the different acts performed in a speech 
act situation (Res Cpffitans pp.55-7). Vendler would take a dim 
view of the "S said that..." form of indirect quotation as it 
has been introduced and deployed here. For he claims "...that
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indirect quotation does not by any means consist in a blind ap­
plication of 'said that’ followed by the original utterance or 
some slightly revised version of it"(p.56) and asserts that 
"...telling what somebody said will consist in specifying the 
illocutionary act that person performed. Consequently any such 
report will begin by indicating the illocutionary force : 'He 
stated...suggested...promised...ordered.,,praised... 'etc."(p.55). 
Indeed, Vendler is loath to allow the use of the verb "say" in 
any non-defective indirect speech report. The use of this verb 
is proscribed by his normal form of indirect quotation :
I V nom (N^ t (V^) nom (NY +))
"...where the suffixes mean performative (verb) and human (noun) 
and t indicates the tense mark (past) on the second performative" 
(p.57). An indirect quotation in this form of the utterance "I 
order you to attack" would be "I report that he ordered me to at­
tack". And it can be quickly shown that an indirect quotation 
constructed around the verb "say" does not meet the conditions 
imposed by Vendler'8 normal form. "I report that he said that he 
orders me to attack" moves the performative verb, of the original 
utterance to a position that is marked for a non-performative 
verb; "I report that he said that I was to attack" is defective 
according to Vendler because it leaves the illocutionary force 
of the original utterance unspecified. Vendler shies away from 
openly stating the conclusion to which his account of indirect 
quotation drives him, i.e., that the use of "say" is out of place 
in any adequate indirect quotation. He allows that such use can 
sometimes be in order, but only, it seems, because "say" is a 
very general performative verb which can stand in for the more 
specific performative verbs : "state", "suggest","promise", 
"order", "praise", etc.(p.55). But this grudging concession is
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not enough; "say" is not a performative verb, even on Vendler's
own definition of such verbs (p.7 fn.2) since its use does not
make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance. Moreover, 
Vendler*8 antipathy towards the use of "say" in correct and 
adequate indirect quotation is clear from his comments on four 
alternative indirect quotations of the utterance "I order you 
to attack", all cast in the form "S said that..." : (p.56)
(1) He said that he ordered me to attack.
(2) He said that he had ordered me to attack.
(3) He said that I should attack.
(4) He said that he orders me to attack.
Vendler advances reasons for rejecting each of (l)-(4) but none 
of these is a good reason for rejecting the use of "say" in 
such reports.
Vendler claims that (1) is ungrammatical and misleading. It 
is difficult to see how it could be both of these; if it was un­
grammatical it could be neither misleading nor not misleading. 
But the grammatical faults of (1) are not apparent and if it is 
misleading it is not because of the occurrence of the verb "say" 
but because (l) would be used more correctly to report an utter­
ance of "I ordered you to attack" than "I order you to attack". 
Vendler claims that (2) is grammatically correct but false. This 
claim is true but (2) is false, again, not because of the use of 
"say", but because (2) could only be true of the utterance(s) "I 
(have/had) ordered you to attack". Vendler claims that (3) is 
grammatically correct, true but vague (and therefore defective) 
because the use of "say" in place of "order" leaves the illocu­
tionary force of the original utterance unspecified. But (3) is 
inaccurate. It would be more accurate as a report of "You should 
attack" or even, though rather imprecisely, of "I advise you to
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attack" rather than "I order you to attack". The truth of an 
indirect quotation is not impugned by the use of "say" but by 
how inaccurate or imprecise it is as a paraphrase of the orig­
inal utterance. And that quite satisfactory indirect quotations 
can be given of utterances whose illocutionary forces are un­
clear (as in "You should attack", wherein the addressee may 
have been ordered, told or advised to attack) shows, contra 
Vendler, that it is not a function of such reports to include 
a specification of the illocutionary force of the utterance.
Vendler's initial comment on (4) is that it "...is an in­
teresting specimen. The tense goes from 'order* to 'say', leav­
ing 'order' tenseless - a bloodless appendage to 'say'"(p.56). 
This feature of the report amounts to a failure to satisfy one 
of Vendler's conditions on satisfactory.indirect quotation, 
which is expressed in his normal form, that the performative 
verb occurring in the original utterance is reproduced in its 
past tense. In a footnote on p.57 Vendler makes it clear that 
he regards a report such as (4) "and the like" — presumably, 
all reports of explicit performative utterances cast in the 
form "S said that..." with the performative prefix reproduced 
in the present tense - as dubious exceptions. But it is hardly 
true that such reports are exceptions. "He said that he orders 
me to attack" may be used quite unexceptionably to answer the 
question "What did he say?" Nor need this example be frozen 
fast to. "He said that he warns us not to do it again", "He 
said that he advises us to act cautiously in the future", "She 
said that she apologizes for what happened last night", "She 
said that she promises not to do it again" are all examples of 
unexceptionable indirect quotations cast in the form ”S said 
that..." with the performative verb of the original utterance 
reproduced in the present tense. Such examples are "dubious"
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only in so far as they are effective counter-examples to Vend- 
ler's account of indirect quotation. But it is, surely, just 
absurd to maintain, what follows from that account, that the 
use of "say" is never in order in a completely non-defective 
indirect quotation. Nor is the origin of this absurdity diffi­
cult to trace. For Vendler repeatedly identifies acts of saying 
something, locutionary acts, with illocutionary acts (pp.6, 25, 
53, 54, 55), Hence his claim that a correct report of what a 
speaker said should contain a specification of the Illocution­
ary force of the utterance, the illocutionaryactperformed in is­
suing the utterance. And Vendler attributes to Austin the view 
that to say something in the full sense of "say" is to perform 
an illocutionary act. Not only is this a gross misrepresenta­
tion of Austin's view but the absurdity to which Vendler's ac­
count leads, that the verb "say" has no place in correct in­
direct quotation,, is an effective re due tio ad absurdum of not 
drawing a clear distinction between these different types of act.
Parallel to the distinction between locutionary and illo­
cutionary acts, Austin distinguished the locutionary meanings 
and illocutionary forces of utterances. The distinctions are 
not co-ordinate; each of the terms of the latter distinction 
is derivative upon the respective terms of the former distinc­
tion, An utterance has an illocutionary force of a particular 
type (say, F) if and only if an illocutionary act of type F is 
performed in issuing the utterance-: (Words p.150). An utter­
ance has locutionary meaning if and only if the pherrie produced 
as part of the issuing of the utterance, or its constituents, 
is used with a certain more or less definite sense and refer­
ence in conformity with the semantic conventions of the language*
' ‘ "-f
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(The apparent tension in Austin's conception of speech acts, 
evident in this general specification of the locutionary mean­
ing of an utterance by way of a general specification of the 
rhetic act performed as part of a locutionary act, is only ap- | 
parent* Because a rhetic act presupposes the performance of a 
phatic act and these two presuppose the performance of a pho­
netic act and these three together are sufficient for the per­
formance of a locutionary act, the performance of a rhetic act 
is equivalent to the performance of a locutionary act, When 
and only when there is one, there is the other,) J
Austin's concept of illocutionary force and the accompany- 
ing distinction between the meaning and force of an utterance 
have been subjected to quite hostile criticism by Cohen in "Do 
Illocutionary Forces Exist?"(Symp. pp.420-44), However, there 
is much rhetoric and little cogent argument against Austin's 
position in Cohen's rather long article. The main points with 
which Cohen tries to justify a negative answer to the title 
question are made in section II of his article and it is only 
these which will be dealt with here. The discussion in sections 
III and IV adds nothing of consequence to his argument and 
section I is just a fairly accurate summary of the main points 
of Austin's eighth, ninth, and tenth lectures, Cohen begins by 
taking advantage of the lacunae in Austin’s account of meaning 
in terms of sense and reference to suggest three possible inter­
pretations, each of which is objectionable. However, none of 
these objections is as serious for Austin's distinction between 
meaning and force as Cohen makes it out to be. For instance,
Cohen claims, correctly, that it is the meaning of a whole utter­
ance rather than the meaning of its parts which Austin wished to 
distinguish from its illocutionary force, but claims that by
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"sense" and "reference" Austin must, therefore, have meant the 
sense and reference of a whole utterance, since the sense and 
reference of an utterance's component words or phrases are in­
sufficient to determine the meaning of the whole utterance. "He 
would have had to cite sense, reference and word-order instead, 
for he could hardly have wanted to ascribe the same meaning to 
'George hit John' and 'John hit Georp;e'"(p.423). But the word- 
order of an utterance is accommodated in Austin's account of 
locutionary acts in terms of the phatic act performed as part 
of an act of saying something. Moreover, the notion of word- 
order is a syntactic rather than a semantic one, and even if 
syntactic features of utterances do help to "determine the 
meaning of a whole utterance" in some sense of that rather ob­
scure phrase, it does not follow that such features are part of 
the meaning of an utterance, on a level with sense and refer­
ence. Cohen goes on to mention several features of Frege's 
theory of sense and reference of whole utterances which are 
claimed to be disadmntageous for Austin's purposes. But Austin 
is not committed to Frege's theory of the sense and reference 
of whole utterances by his use of the terms "sense" and "refer­
ence" and in the text of his lectures there is no evidence to 
suggest that Austin did adopt this theory. The little that 
Austin did have to say in his lectures about meaning, which is, 
incidentally, another indication that he did not intend his 
conception of speech acts to be developed within the framework 
of a theory of meaning, is not, however, so little as to pre­
vent any defence from being put up against Cohen's criticisms. 
There is sufficient material in Austin's lectures to construct 
a working definition of "locutionary meaning" which is adequate 
for defending his distinction between meaning and force against
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Cohen's criticisms. Austin located the meaning of an utterance 
in the rheme - the product of the (rhetic) act of using the 
pheme, or its constituents, with a certain more or less defin­
ite sense and reference. Any rhetic act performed in a speech 
act situation can be identified by a true indirect speech re­
port - in basic normal form - of that situation, and an in­
direct quotation in that form is true if and only if it con­
tains a paraphrase of the reported utterance. The locutionary 
meaning of an utterance is, therefore, what is specified by 
the content of a true indirect quotation of the utterance in 
either of the forms "S said that..." or "S asked...". Cohen 
ignores this point and it does not seem to have been fully ap­
preciated by Strawson in "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'" 
(Essays pp.46-68).^
Cohen concludes these initial sallies against Austin's 
notion of locutionary meaning with the rather sharp remark that 
"...in some respects it seems doubtful whether Austin can have 
had any clear idea of meaning at all here"(Symp. p.424). This 
remark is unjustified and it suggests, equally unjustifiably, 
that if Austin's ideas about meaning were confused then his at­
tempt to distinguish illocutionary force from locutionary mean­
ing may be equally confused. Cohen reinforces this suggestion 
by implying that there is an inconsistency between Austin's 
views that every utterance except for exclamations has both 
meaning and force because both a locutionary and an illocution­
ary act is performed, and that where there is an explicit per­
formative there is an illocutionary act. "When we say 'I warn 
you that' or 'I order you to’ as an explicit performative, we 
perform the illocutionary act of warning or ordering, respect­
ively. But what locutionary act do we then perform? What is the
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meaning of our utterance, as distinct from its illocutionary ■;
force?"(p.424). But neither "I warn you that" nor "I order you ?
to" exemplify explicit performatives and the uttering of either 1
of these phrases would not be the performance of a locutionary
act in which an illocutionary act of warning or ordering could
be performed. In giving these phrases as examples of explicit ?
performatives Cohen has mistaken performative prefixes for ex- i
plicit performative utterances. Austin made it clear from the f
outset of his lectures that he was using "performative" as short :
for "performative utterance" or "performative sentence" (Words 
p. 6), so the uttering of a performative requires the uttering 
of a whole sentence. A similar requirement holds for the per- f
formance of a locutionary act. Austin also devoted some space 
to the distinction between explicit and implicit performatives |
(pp.52-3) or between explicit and primary performatives (pp.69-77).J 
Performative prefixes such as : |
(l.a) I warn you that, or
(2. a) I order you to I
appended to implicit or primary performatives such as ; j
(l.b) Your haystack is on fire, or 
(2.b) Go to London!
transform the latter into the explicit performatives :
(1) I warn you that your haystack is on fire, and
(2) I order you to go to London.
The function of the prefix is to make explicit the type of illo­
cutionary act whose performance is being attempted in the issu­
ing of the utterance, or, what is the same, to make explicit the 
intended force of the utterance. Its function is not to describe, 
report or state the type., of act being attempted, nor to describe, 
report or state anything. For although this device is perhaps
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the most effective for this purpose, the same function is 
shared by other linguistic devices : grammatical mood, adverbs 
and adverbial phrases, connecting particles, intonation, stress, 
emphasis, etc., and it would not be said of these devices that 
their function is to describe, report or state something. So 
within the framev^ork of Austin's conception of speech acts, 
Cohen's questions "What locutionary act do we perform?" and 
"V*/hat is the meaning of our utterance, as distinct from its il­
locutionary force?" posed with reference to either (l.a) or 
(2,a) are just incoherent. When asked of examples of actual ex­
plicit performatives such as (l) and (8) these questions are 
coherent, but then they do not expose any tension within Austin's 
conception. The locutionary acts performed are the acts of utter­
ing the sentences (l) and (2) with more or less definite sense 
and reference. The meaning of each utterance is what would be 
specified by the content of the "that"-clause of an indirect 
speech report of each utterance; e.g., "He said that he warns 
me that my haystack is on fire" and "He said that he orders me 
to go to London",, as reported by the addressee of each utter­
ance. And if the illocutionary act that one might normally ex­
pect to be performed in the uttering of each sentence is suc­
cessfully performed, then the illocutionary force of each ut­
terance is, respectively, that of a warning and an order. And 
this may be reported in such forms as "He warned me that my 
haystack was on fire" and "He ordered me to go to London". If, 
on the other hand, these illocutionary acts are for some reason 
not successfully performed - if, for example, the addressee of 
the 'warning' already knows that his haystack is in flames, or 
the person giving the 'order' lacks the requisite authority - 
then the respective utterances lack the force of a warning or
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an order. Even so, in these different circumstances the mean­
ings of the utterances may he same; the indirect speech reports 
of the utterances may be true whether or not the utterances 
have the specific illocutionary forces their speakers intend* 
Indeed, this form of report seems especially appropriate for 
reporting the unhappy situation where an utterance lacks a par­
ticular force : "He said that he warns me....But I knew that al­
ready" and "He said that he orders me....But he can’t order me 
around". The point these examples illustrate, that utterances 
with the same meaning may have or lack a particular illocution­
ary force, is evidence for the distinction Austin drew between 
the meaning and force of utterances. So not only is there no 
inconsistency between these two views of Austin's which Cohen 
alleges "...are very difficult to reconcile"(Symp. p.424), but 
Cohen's own examples, when more carefully considered, support 
the distinction which he is seeking to break down.
Cohen next launches a two-stage argument to establish his 
main conclusion that "...what Austin calls the illocutionary 
force of an utterance is that aspect of its meaning which is 
either conveyed by its explicitly performative prefix, if it 
has one, or might have been so conveyed by the use of such an 
expression"(p.429). In effect, Cohen splits an explicit per­
formative utterance into two parts : its performative prefix 
and the subordinate clause following the performative prefix, 
and considers in turn whether the illocutionary force of the 
utterance can be distinguished from the meaning, of either part. 
"It is tempting at first to suppose that in Austin's view the 
meaning of our utterance is found solely in the clause that fol­
lows the performative prefix. The meaning would then lie in the
clause 'your haystack is on fire', when the whole utterance was ,.v]
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'I warn you that your haystack is on fire', or in the clause 
’go to London' when the whole utterance was 'I order you to go 
to London'. It would then he plausible to claim that these ut­
terances have precisely the same meaning and illocutionary 
force as their respective subordinate clauses might have had 
if uttered alone and without the benefit of performative prefix. 
Their only difference from the latter kind of utterance would 
be in.having their illocutionary force rendered explicit"(pp. 
424-5). And after advancing three objections against this view 
Cohen concludes, "One is thus forced to the conclusion that on 
Austin's view the meaning of an utterance like 'I warn you that 
your haystack is on fire' is not to be found solely in its sub­
ordinate clause"(p.425). But Cohen's objections against Austin 
in this stage of his argument are purely rhetorical. Why, in 
the first place, is it tempting to suppose that in Austin's 
view the meaning of an utterance of a sentence such as (l) or
(2) is to be found solely in the clause following the performa­
tive prefix? And why is one forced to the conclusion that on 
Austin's view this is not so? The view that the meaning of an 
utterance of a compound sentence is to be found solely in its 
subordinate clause is a very odd view indeed. It was certainly 
not one that Austin shared and it is significant that Cohen 
does not provide any textual support for succumbing to the 
temptation of supposing that it was. But Cohen's whole strategy 
here of looking for the distinction between meaning and force 
in parts of utterances and when failing to find any declaring 
that the concept of illocutionary force is empty really is 
rather crude. Nor does it work. For the immediate conclusion 
to be drawn is not that illocutionary forces do not exist but 
that the distinction between the meaning and force of utter­
j
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ances ranges over whole utterances and not parts of utterances. 
However, having established to his own satisfaction the 
somewhat trivial conclusion that the meaning of an utterance of 
a sentence such as (l) or (2) is not to be found in its sub­
ordinate clause, and hence that the distinction between meaning 
and force does not range over subordinate clauses of sentences, 
Cohen passes on to the second stage of his argument by way of 
answering the question, "In what way then does the illocution- 
ary force of such an utterance differ from that part of its 
meaning which belongs to it in virtue of its performative pre­
fix?" (p. 486) • But here again, Cohen confuses performative pre­
fixes with explicitly performative utterances. Having posed the 
question in terms of the former, Cohen proceeds to answer it in 
terms of the latter, "If your utterance ^~"I protest"^/ is to 
be assigned a meaning of any kind, this meaning must be of a 
performative kind. The meaning lies solely in the making of the 
protest. This emerges,even if we accept Austin* s own thesis 
that the meaning of a locutionary act is reported in indirect 
discourse. For we can report your utterance not only by 'You 
protested*, but also by 'You said you protested*, as Austin re­
marks else'where" (p.426), Cohen's reference to indirect speech 
reports and to the meaning of a locutionary act in this argu­
ment makes it clear that the direction of his attack against 
the meaning-force distinction has swung away from just the per­
formative prefixes of explicit performatives. So setting aside 
the confusion of these two things which, however, vitiates any 
support that this stage of Cohen's argument would have given to 
the conclusion he is concerned to establish, and attending to 
his argument as it now applies to whole utterances, it would 
still seem that Cohen fails to show that Austin was mistaken in
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drawing such a distinction. Cohen's argument here is that the 
report "You protested" is just as much an indirect speech re­
port of a speaker’s utterance "I protest" as "You said you pro­
tested". Hence in being a report of the meaning of an utterance, 
a report such as "You protested", while it may be a report of 
the illocutionary act performed in the issuing of the utterance 
is not a report of anything, such as illocutionary force, which 
is to be distinguished from meaning.
But the conflation of these two types of report can only be 
bought at the cost of ignoring certain logical differences be­
tween them. "You said you protested" is indeed a form of in­
direct speech report which may be used to report the speaker's 
utterance "I protest". But it does not follow from the truth of 
this report of the meaning of the speaker's utterance that the 
speaker, in saying what he said, was making a protest. For if 
the speaker was replying to the question "What do you do when 
someone infringes your rights?", then in saying "I protest" he 
would not be making a protest but describing a habit. So "You 
said you protested" does not entail "You protested". And while 
the use of "You protested" to describe some feature of a speech 
act situation would most probably be a report of an illocution­
ary act performed in that situation, which in Austin's terms, 
is just to say that it is a report of the illocutionary force 
of the utterance issued in that situation, it does not follow 
from the truth of this report that the meaning of the utterance 
in which the protest is made is the same as that of "I protest". 
For a speaker may make a protest in saying something like "Wait 
a minute. You can't do that" and this utterance would require an 
indirect speech report very different from "You said you pro­
tested", e.g., "You said that he was to wait a minute and that
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he couldn't do that". So "You protested" does not entail "You 
said you protested" either. This is not to deny, of course, 
that both the reports "You said you protested" and "You pro­
tested" could be true of the same situation. But if and when 
this is the case, it is a contingent matter, dependent on the 
circumstances of the situation, and the logical independence 
of the truth of reports of the meanings of utterances and what 
Austin called their illocutionary forces shows that each is a 
report of a different type of feature of a speech act situation.
Cohen advances several points against Austin's thesis that 
the illocutionary force of an utterance is made explicit by the 
use of a performative prefix. But none of these is successful 
in collapsing the distinction between meaning and force. "If 
one says 'He caught a large one’ and is asked to be more ex­
plicit, one might say 'James landed a trout more than ten pounds 
in weight', and certainly then it is meaning - sense and refer­
ence, if you like - that has been made explicit. What reason is 
there for supposing that it is illocutionary force, rather than 
meaning, that has been rendered explicit in 'I warn you that 
your haystack is on fire'?"(p.486). But it is not the sense and 
reference of "Your haystack is on fire" that is made explicit in 
"I warn you that your haystack is on fire". If, for example, the 
reference of "Your haystack" is ambiguous in the former, it re­
mains so in the latter. Rather, what is being made explicit in 
the latter utterance is the type of illocutionary act the speak­
er intends to perform in issuing his utterance and this just is 
the intended illocutionary force of his utterance.
Cohen's second point is a red herring. "It is no use arguing 
that meaning is said to be rendered explicit only when the sense 
or reference of individual expressions within the utterance is
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vague, ambiguous or otherwise uncertain. It may instead be the 
whole grammatical structure of an utterance that prevents its 
meaning from being fully explicit"(p.426)* This is true but the 
possibility of utterances being phatically ambiguous does not 
impinge at all on the question of whether they can have an il­
locutionary force as well as a meaning. The different types of 
phatic ambiguity that can occur manifest themselves in the pheme 
which is used in an act of saying something and the distinction 
Austin drew between the meaning and force of an utterance falls 
between the rhetic or locutionary act and the illocutionary act. 
If Cohen had wanted to question Austin's distinction in terms of 
the various species of ambiguity that can occur in a speech act 
situation, his question would only have been relevant if direct­
ed towards these types of act. But, of course, it is well for 
Cohen not to raise such a question. For it is true, as Austin 
said, "We may agree on the actual words that were uttered, and 
even also on the senses in which they were being used and on the 
realities to which they were being used to refer, and yet still 
disagree as to whether, in the circumstances, they amounted to 
an order or a threat or merely to advice or a. warning" (Words 
p.115, fn.l). The possibility of an utterance being quite unam­
biguous rhetically (i.e., with respect to sense and reference) 
and yet ambiguous with respect to its force adds further support 
for Austin's distinction.
Cohen's third point starts off in much the same vein as his 
first. "Similarly, it is pretty clear that if you address the 
English sentence 'is it raining?' to your friend, as he looks 
out of the window, your meaning would be made even more explicit 
if you added, a moment later, 'I ask whether it is raining'"
(Symp. pp.426-7). But would it? What if the. addressee of the
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question understands from the speaker’s intonation that he is 
asking a question but does not know the meaning of the word 
"raining"? Cohen continues, "Yet even in your first utterance 
(’Is it raining?’), let alone in your second (’I ask whether it 
is raining’), it is impossible to distinguish illocutionary 
force from meaning* What on earth could be the meaning of your 
locutionary act other than to ask whether it is raining?"(p.42?). 
This last question, however, merely exposes the categorial con­
fusion in the notion of meaning that Cohen deploys against 
Austin’s concept of illocutionary force. For the answer that 
question invites is : the meaning of the locutionary act just is 
to ask whether it is raining, i.e., the meaning of an utterance 
is the illocutionary act performed in issuing the utterance* The 
same notion of meaning, involving the same category mistake, is 
evident in Cohen’s already quoted remarks on an utterance of "I 
protest", viz., that if the utterance is to be assigned any 
meaning, that meaning must be of a performative kind and that 
the meaning lies solely in the making of the protest. A weaker 
version of this notion of meaning is deployed in the paragraph 
following in which Cohen says, "...if the utterance ’Your hay­
stack is on fire’ gives a warning that is rendered explicit by 
’I warn you that your haystack is on fire’, and if the warning 
is part of the meaning of the latter utterance, it is hardly un­
reasonable to suppose that the warning is also part of the 
former utterance’s meaning..."(p.426 underlining added). The 
category mistake involved here consists in assimilating the mean- j 
ing of an utterance to a kind of action. And it can be shown very ; 
quickly that the meaning of an utterance is not a kind of action. 
Actions are performed, meanings are not; meanings can be para­
phrased, actions cannot. It seems extraordinary tliat Cohen should f 
be so bent on eliminating Austin’s concept of illocutionary force 4
  ...........a
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as to be led into making such, an error. But the exposure of 
this confusion in Cohen’s notion of meaning also helps to justi­
fy Austin’s distinction for it is just such a categorial dis­
tinction between the meaning of an utterance and a type of il­
locutionary act performed in issuing the utterance that Austin’s 
distinction between meaning and force is intended to mark.
Cohen’s final point against Austin’s thesis that illocution­
ary force can be made explicit by the use of certain linguistic 
devices takes in such other devices beside performative prefixes 
as verb-mood, tone of voice, cadence, emphasis, adverbs and ad- 
verbial phrases and connecting particles. Cohen’s point is that 
"Austin seems to hold that all such devices clarify illocution­
ary force, not meaning. But on this view there can be no differ­
ence of meaning at all between such utterances as ’It must have 
rained, because the streets are wet’ and ’It must have rained, 
therefore the streets are wet’"(p.487). This point seems to be 
an extension of the one Cohen earlier tried unsuccessfully to 
establish,that what Austin called the illocutionary force of an 
utterance is to be found in specific parts of an utterance but 
has, here, the additional feature that those parts of an utter­
ance which do help to make force explicit are meaningless and 
contribute nothing to the meaning of the utterance. This is a J
misunderstanding. Not only is it not true that Austin’s distinc­
tion between the meaning and force of an utterance ranges over 
parts of utterances but it was not part of Austin’s concept of 
illocutionary force either that those words and phrases which do 
help to make the force of an utterance explicit are, because of 
that,meaningless. It is significant that here too, as in the 
former case, Cohen does not cite any textual support for at­
tributing this view to Austin,
A
90
Foot-notes :
i (from p.45) This "reject-and-replace" view can he seen to 
have been held by each of the following writers. Searle says 
in "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts"(Essays pp. 
141-59), "The main theme of Austin’s Words is the replacement 
of the original distinction between performatives and consta- 
tives by a general theory of speech acts"(p.141). And in "A 
classification of illocutionary acts"(Language in Society 
(I976)pp.1-23), "The original distinction between constatives 
and performatives was supposed to be a distinction between 
utterances which are sayings (constatives, statements, asser­
tions, etc.) and utterances which are doings (promises, bets, 
warnings, etc.)....The main theme of Austin’s mature work.
Words. is that.this distinction collapses"(p.14). Garner’s 
main aim in "Utterances and Acts in the Philosophy of J.L. 
Austin"(Nous (I968)pp.209-27) is "... to explain Austin’s aban­
donment of the performative-constative distinction..."(p.209). 
"Words is...a play by play account of the pursuit of the per­
forma tive-cons ta tive distinction (and its thrilling, if some­
times frustrating, escape). About half way through the book 
Austin seems to despair of being able to draw the distinction 
which he had so boldly sketched in the first few chapters, and 
turns to a discussion of locutionary, illocutionary and perlo- 
cutionary acts"(pp.216-7). In their introduction to the sec­
tion on speech acts in Readings in the Philosophy of Language 
Rosenberg and Travis say, "Austin originally hoped that "per­
formative" would turn out to mark a well-defined, grammatically 
specifiable class of things we can do by talking - as opposed 
to saying or stating something (consta bive functions of lang­
uage) - but this early view was abandoned in favor of the more 
complex typology of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocu- 
tionary acts..."(p.558). According to Holdcroft in "Doubts 
about the Locutionary Illocutionary Distinction"(l.B.P.(1974) 
pp.3-16), Austin in Words "...starts by trying to make a dis­
tinction between two kipds of sentence type" but "...abandoned 
the attempt to distinguish performatives from constatives,and 
instead developed a classification of speech acts"(p.3)* In 
"Austin on Performa lives"(Symp. pp.401-11), Black discusses 
"...Austin’s main reasons for rejecting the original distinc­
tion between constatives and performatives as ultimately un-
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satisfactory"(p.405) and the considerations which "...played 
a large part in Austin’s decision ’to make a fresh start on 
the problem’ by introducing the doctrine of *illocutionary 
forces(p.408). Nordenstam, in "On Austin’s Theory of Speech 
Acts"(Mind(1966)pp.141-3), says, "The upshot of Words is that 
the deceptively simple constative-perforraative distinction 
should be abandoned in favour of a more general distinction 
between locutionary and illocutionary speech acts"(p.141).
Reviewers of Words also espoused this view. In his critical 
review (Symp<> pp.351-79), Cerf claims that Austin’s doctrine 
of speech acts "...is the Aufhebung of his old distinction 
between performatives and constatives"(p.351) and that "Lec­
tures I and VII of Words draw, and then begin to erase, the 
distinction between constatives and performatives, between 
utterances used to state something and utterances used to do 
something"(p.352). And in his review (A. J.P. (1965)pp.417-24). 
Brov/n says, "Austin abandoned his original contrast between 
two classes of utterances - performative and cons ta tive be­
cause he thought they threatened to coalesce. In his ’theory 
of linguistic acts’ he accepted this as unavoidable and con­
verted these two classes into dual aspects of every speech 
act. But in thus making every utterance an illocution, Austin 
discarded the distinction with which he began, that between 
(a) saying something true or false and (b) performing an act­
ion in issuing an utterance"(p.428). Forguson, in "Locutionary 
and Illocutionary Acts"(Essays pp.160-85), claims that "the 
first seven sections of Words chronicle the rise and fall of 
the performative-constative distinction"(p. 160), and in an 
article actually entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine 
of Performatives"(Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, pp. 
197-212), Ross claims that in Words Austin "...presented the 
doctrine in a slightly revised form and actually stated his 
premises for the conclusion that the doctrine had to be aban­
doned as a mistake..."(p.197). Likewise Fingarette in "Per­
formatives" (A^jh_^( 1967)pp. 39-48) : "In f  Words, 7 his most 
elaborate stud.y of the performative use of language, Austin 
mentioned certain crucial and intuitively obvious features of 
the performative, but he failed to appreciate them adequately. 
It is for this reason, I believe, that the initially distinct­
ive notion seems to dissolve before his very eyes. He ends by
92
"producing a programme" rather than proposing a definitive 
account of the nature of the performative"(p.39).
If this view is not declared, it is evidently assumed by 
those writing on the subject. For instance, Vendler says,
"In this new perspective /Tof the looutionary-illocutionary 
distinction 7 the performative-constative distinction fades 
away..,"(Res Cogitans p.8). And in his review of Words 
(An.8.(l963)pp.58-64), White says "Having established this 
new classification of Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocut- 
ionary, Austin then (lecture XI) tries to take up into this 
new classification the distinction of Performative and Con- 
stative - which had broken down, both because Constatives as 
much as Performatives are a doing as well as a saying, and 
because either can be appraised both in the true/false and 
in the happy/unhappy dimension"(p.60). Chisholm, in his re­
view of Papers (Symp. -pp.101-26), says that "...Austin seems 
to despair of being able to draw any clearcut distinction 
/^between performatives and constatives^?"(p*109) and in 
"Some Types of Performative Utterance"(Essays pp.69-89), War- 
nock, too, can be seen to subscribe to some form of the reject- 
and-replace view. In "Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" 
(Practical Inferences pp.100-14), Hare gives an extra twist 
to the story by suggesting that though Austin rejected the 
performative-constative distinction and replaced it by the 
locutionary-illocutionary distinction, the latter distinction 
should also be rejected because it retains some of the ob­
jectionable elements of the former. "So, then, the performa­
tive-constative distinction, immensely fruitful and import­
ant as it was, had to be abandoned. But, on its way out, it 
engendered the locutionary-illocutionary distinction; and I 
think that this itself is open to grave objection, and that 
it might never have been produced in the form in which we 
have it but for the historical reason that Austin was trying 
to salvage something of his original distinction"(p.105). A 
possible exception to this view being expressed nem. con, is 
Sesonske in "Performatives"(J.P.(I966)pp.459-68). Sesonske 
does only claim that the performative-constative distinction 
"...finally disappeared almost entirely..."(p.459).
Obviously, the many expressions of this view embrace a num­
ber of variations on its central theme, some minor, some not i
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so. The performative-constative distinction is variously 
taken to range over sentence-types (Holdcroft), utterances 
(Searle), uses of utterances (Cerf), acts (Brown) or both 
utterances and acts (White). There is also a major differ­
ence between proponents of the reject-and-replaee view as to 
whether Austin was right or wrong to reject the distinction. 
For example, Fingarette (op.cit.) and Holdcroft, in "Per­
formatives and Statements"(Mind (l974)pp.1-18), mount their 
own resaue operations for the performative-constative dis­
tinction while Searle inveighs, "As Austin saw but as many 
philosophers still fail to see, the parallel ^between per­
formatives and constatives^/ is exact"(Language in Society 
p.14); and Ross claims that "Austin is well-known as the 
author of the doctrine, but less well-known as the man who 
did away with it. Thus people continue to dispute the defini­
tion of "performatives" without discussing (or noticing?) 
Austin’s virtual admission that the concept lacks any 
rationale"(op.cit. p.197). Similarly, in an exchange between 
Black, Chisholm and Forguson, the former two propose differ­
ent definitions of the performative-constative distinction 
aimed at avoiding the difficulties which allegedly caused 
Austin to abandon it, and are taken to task for doing so by 
Forguson in "In Pursuit of Performatives"(Symp. pp.412-9). 
"...I wish to suggest that neither Chisholm’s nor Black’s 
amendment in any way avoids the difficulties Austin foresaw, 
and that both of these attempts to amend Austin’s analysis 
are based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of his reasons 
for abandoning it"(p.413), All are agreed, however, that 
Austin abandoned it. So deeply entrenched is this view that 
it may be called the orthodox view - an expression of it oc­
curs on the dust-jacket of Words. It happens to be false.
2 (from p.47) The parenthetical phrases are added on the 
grounds that they occur in Austin’s restatement of this 
Felicity condition on p.39 of Words. Other discrepancies in 
the wording between Austin’s statement and restatement of 
these conditions are insignificant.
5 (from p.79) In the first half of "Austin and ’Locutionary
Meaning’"(Essays pp.46-68), Strawson discusses, but only to
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reject, three possible interpretations of Austin’s notion of 
locutionary meaning. This is done in order to clear the way 
for his own interpretation in terms of the notions of a pro­
position, imperative, etc, which is spelled out and defended 
against what Strawson imagines to be Austinian objections in 
the second half of his paper. Textual support from Words is 
claimed for each of the interpretations Strawson rejects al­
though this claim seems able to be made good only with respect 
to the third interpretation Strawson discusses (pp.55-6). His 
reasons for rejecting this interpretation in terms of the con­
tent of the rhetic act performed as part of a locutionary act 
are inadequate. Having introduced a notion of restricted sense- 
and-reference as that which is left of the meaning of an utter­
ance, other than an explicit performative, after abstracting 
from the significance of the grammatical mood and the implica­
tions of such words as "but", "therefore", "perhaps", etc, oc­
curring in the utterance (p.54), Strawson queries this inter­
pretation by asking, "How much more than restricted sense-and- 
reference is to be allowed into locutionary meaning by way of 
the specification of the rhetic act? Which of the linguistic 
devices employed are to be allowed to bear on the specification 
. of the rhetic act, and why?"(p.55). Strawson believes that some 
restrictions on the devices that are to be allowed so to bear 
are required if this interpretation is not to blur Austin’s 
distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force. 
And it is the alleged failure to be able to impose such restric­
tions that is Strawson’s reason for rejecting this interpreta­
tion. It is for the same sort of reason that Strawson rejects 
the first interpretation of locutionary meaning that he dis­
cusses. This interpretation is, in substance, tantamount to the 
third, though couched in terms of Strawson’s own distinctions 
between different senses of the phrase, "the meaning of what is 
said", rather than the distinctions Austin drew within the lo­
cutionary act. Strawson spells out his reason for rejecting this 
interpretation, which applies to the third interpretation as 
well, as follows : "In general, on this interpretation, the more 
freely a speaker uses the devices which Austin refers to in Lee- 
ture VI as devices for ’making explicit’ the force of his utter­
ance 7~e.g., performative prefixes, grammatical mood, connecting 
particles, etc./, the narrower will be the gap between know-
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ledge of the locutionary meaning of the utterance and know­
ledge of its illocutionary force....One could say, indeed, on 
this interpretation of Austin’s distinctions, that his dis­
covery of the explicit performative formula was precisely a 
discovery of one device of peculiar precision for absorbing 
more and more illocutionary force into locutionary meaning"
(pp.51-8). That Strawson’s grasp of Austin’s distinction be­
tween locutionary meaning and illocutionary force displayed 
in his metaphor of the former absorbing the latter - later, 
on p.55, he talks of force entering into meaning - is quite 
mistaken, is argued in the second section of Chapter Six.
Here, it is sufficient to register the point against Strawson 
that even if there is no gap between knowing the locutionary 
meaning of an utterance and knowing its illocutionary force, 
it does not follow from this that such knowledge is knowledge 
of the same thing, nor that the distinction between meaning 
and force is thereby collapsed. So the need to exclude those 
features of an utterance which serve to make explicit its il­
locutionary force from a specification of its locutionary mean­
ing, by way of a specification of the content of the rhetic act 
performed as part of the act of saying something, is not one 
that arises. Hence Strawson’s reason for rejecting this inter­
pretation of "locutionary meaning", which is based on the al­
leged inability to satisfy such a need, is not a good reason.
(A corollary to the view that such features do need to be ex­
cluded is the quite extraordinary view, which Strawson also at­
tributes to Austin (p.61), that these features have no locu­
tionary meaning at all, in the sense that they contribute no­
thing to the meaning of the utterance.) Strawson’s claim that 
the locutionary meaning of an utterance cannot be specified by 
way of a specification of the content of its corresponding 
rhetic act without including some specification of its illocu­
tionary force ignores the possibilities created by the basic 
normal forms of indirect quotation. The examples Strawson holds 
out as recalcitrant to this interpretation - utterances in the 
optative mood and explicit performative utterances - are easily 
accommodated by these forms. The rarely used optative mood, 
when it is used, is used to express a wish, so an indirect quo­
tation of the utterance "Would it were day!" in basic normal 
form would run "He said that he wishes it were day" and that of
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an explicit performative such as "I promise to be there" can 
simply be cast as "He said that he promises to be there". In 
each case, the content of the "that"-clause in the indirect 
quotation specifies the locutionary meaning of the quoted ut­
terance,
Strawson summarizes his own interpretation of "locutionary 
meaning" as follows : "... in every case in which a locution as 
a whole expresses a proposition, we should say that its locu­
tionary meaning is the proposition expressed. For such other 
broad classes of locutions as we may find it expedient to dis­
tinguish from proposition-expressing locutions, we shall need 
terms of art comparable with the term ’proposition*, to set be­
side the latter. Let us suppose that ’imperative’ is one such 
term.. •.Then, again, we should say, of every locution which, as 
a whole, expresses an imperative, that its locutionary meaning 
is the imperative expressed.... A scheme for separately specify­
ing the illocutionary force and the locutionary meaning of 
single utterances which, as wholes, express propositions or im­
peratives (or any other broad classes we find it expedient to 
distinguish) might be imagined as follows i
X issues the ____ _ (that...) with the force of a xxxxx.
A specification of the general type of locutionary meaning fills 
the first blanlc /“e.g., "proposition", "imperative", etc.^/, of 
specific locutionary content the second e.g., "that S is P", 
"that Z(person) is to Y(act)", respectively^/, of illocutionary 
force the third /“e.g., "accusation", "report", "forecast", "con­
clusion", "objection", "hypothesis", "guess", "verdict", etc. 
and "command", "request", "piece of advice", "prayer", "invita­
tion", "entreaty", etc., respectively^/"(p.60).
Granted that "locutionary meaning" is a term of art whose 
use requires explanation, it can scarcely be accounted an ade­
quate explanation simply to replace this term of art by others, 
even one so familiar as "proposition". For the familiarity of 
the notion of a proposition stems not from its being a clearly 
defined notion, having a definite location within the theory of 
language, but from its ubiquity in philosophical discussions of 
the theory of language and iLs continuing capacity therein to 
be different things to different men; even different things to 
the same man as Strawson demonstrates. For as well as proposing 
that propositions are the locutionary meanings of some types of
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utterance,Strawson also wants to maintain that propositions 
are the primary and essential hearers of truth-value. It 
sounds exceedingly odd to say that what is primarily and 
essentially either true or false is the meaning of an utter­
ance. The point is not that as a term of art, it is open to 
those who use the term "proposition" to define it as they 
please; the point is that because it is a term of art, it 
has to be defined if its introduction is to serve any ex­
planatory purpose. And this, Strawson manifestly fails to do. 
He admits that his remarks "...are not offered as a complete 
characterization of the notion of a proposition"(p.61); 
earlier, he disclaims that it is his "...present purpose to 
say exactly what limitations on the notion of proposition 
are to be imposed"(p.59). His one gesture towards defining 
the notion of a proposition is contained in what he calls 
"the normal form provision" for the expression of proposi­
tions : "Any proposition is capable of being expressed either 
in some clause or sentence which is capable, in all linguist­
ic propriety, of following the phrase ’it is true that’ or 
in some logical compound (e.g. a disjunction) of such clauses 
or sentences"(p.57)* Strawson’s remarks on this provision, 
however, only serve to emphasize its weakness and in one re­
spect which bears on his Interpretation of "locutionary mean­
ing", this weakness is crucial. Strawson distinguishes pro­
positions and imperatives as different types of locutionary 
meaning and from his examples, two utterances with meanings 
of these different types would be of the forms "S is P" and 
"Z(person) is to Y(act)", respectively. But some utterances 
of the latter form satisfy the normal form provision for the 
expression of propositions, e.g., "It is true that he is to 
resign". So this characterization of a proposition does not 
even serve to distinguish this type of locutionary meaning 
from others which Strawson evidently wants to set beside it. 
Moreover, in Strawson’s correlation of specific types of il­
locutionary force with general types of locutionary meaning 
- "...imperatives being variously expressible with the force 
of pieces of advice, requests, commands, recommendations, 
prayers, invitations, etc."(p.60) - &nd in consequent 
suggestion that different types of locutionary meaning may be 
distinguished by the different types of illocutionary force
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with which they may he expressed, there is just that blur­
ring of the distinction between locutionary meaning and il­
locutionary force which Strawson claimed, albeit mistakenly 
in those cases, to be grounds for rejecting other interpre­
tations of "locutionary meaning". In the absence of argument 
to the contrary, there is no need within, a conception of 
speech acts to distinguish general types of locutionary mean­
ing in such terms as "proposition", "imperative", etc. Straw­
son’s reasons, which are not good reasons, for grinding this 
particular axe will be discussed in the Appendix when the 
criticisms in the final section of his paper of Austin’s views 
on truth in Words are examined. Here, an alternative scheme 
for specifying the locutionary meaning and illocutionary force 
of an utterance, without recourse to general types of locu­
tionary meaning, can be noted :
S said that...(or asked...) with the force of a _____,
where a specification of locutionary meaning in the form of a 
paraphrase of the speaker’s utterance fills either of the first 
two blanks and a specification of illocutionary force the third.
Chapter Three 
Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts
Compared to the distinction between locutionary and illo­
cutionary acts, the' distinction between illocutionary and per­
locutionary acts has received little attention in the critical 
literature on Words. Austin thought that this latter distinction 
was the one "...likeliest to give trouble..»"(Words p.110). 
Usually it is only mentioned in summaries of Austin’s conception 
of speech acts and then dismissed as yet another distinction 
which he drew. For instance, at the end of a short paragraph 
devoted to the distinction Schiffer says, "I shall have nothing 
more to say about perlocutionary acts"(Meaning p.91) ; while 
Furberg says of Austin, "He discusses the perlocutionary act 
only in passing, and I shall follow his example"(Locutionary and
-ÎIllocutionary Acts p.187). This last hardly accords with the 
fact that Austin devoted two whole lectures to the distinction. 
The neglect of the distinction between illocutionary and perlo­
cutionary acts is not so much a sign of its tacit acceptance by 
Austin’s critics as a symptom of their misunderstanding of his 
conception of speech acts. For the terms in which Austin distin­
guished these types of act are the terms in which he sketched
the outlines of those aspects of a theory of action that are re­
quired for an elucidation of the performative use of language.
In Lecture X the discussion of the distinction was conducted 
in the formal mode and concentrated on the formulas ;
(l) In saying that..., 8 was v-ing, and
(8) By saying that..., S was v-ing
to see if these provided adequate means for identifying and dis­
tinguishing acts of the respective types. "For it was because of 
the availability of these formulas which seem specially suitable,
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the former (in) for picking out verbs which are names for illo­
cutionary acts, and the latter (by) for picking out verbs which 
are names for perlocutionary acts, that we chose in fact the 
names illocutionary and perlocutionary"(Words p.122). Thus some 
substitution instances for "v-ing" in (l) : "advising", "argu­
ing", "ordering", "promising", "protesting", "threatening", 
"undertaking", "warning", etc. are names for illocutionary acts, 
while some substitution instances for "v-ing" in (2) : "alarm­
ing", "alerting", "amusing", "annoying", "convincing", "deter­
ring", "frightening", "humiliating", "misleading", "persuading", 
"surprising", "upsetting", etc. are names for perlocutionary 
acts. "The general conclusion must be, however, that these form­
ulas are at best very slippery tests for deciding whether an ex­
pression is an illocution as distinct from a perlocution or 
neither"(pp.131-2).
A true report of a speech act situation cast in the form of
(l) does not necessarily identify the illocutionary act perform­
ed in that situation. Such a report may identify a perlocutionary 
act, as in
(l.a) In saying that she could do better herself, she was 
humiliating him ;
or it may identify a component of a locutionary act, as in
(l.b) In saying that Adam was innocent, he meant that Adam 
was ignorant of evil.
Or such a report may identify an act which is neither of these
nor an illocutionary act, as in
(l.c) In saying that New Zealand is part of Australia, you 
are making a mistake.
Austin maintained (p.128) that in cases like (l.a), saying what 
was said accounts for or explains what was done - here, her hu­
miliating of him ; whereas in cases like (l.b) and (l.c) doing
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what was done - meaning and making a mistake - accounts for or 
explains what was said. But, according to Austin, neither of 
these is the case when (1) is filled out as a true report 
identifying some illocutionary act performed in a speech act 
situation. Such a report as
(l.d.l) In saying that it was slipping, he was warning, is like
(l.d.S) In buzzing, I was pretending to be a bee, and
(l.d.3) In buzzing, I was behaving like a buffoon
in so far as "...saying what one did (buzzing) in intention or 
in fact constituted rny saying so-and-so, an act of a certain 
kind, and made it callable by a different name /^"pretending to 
be a bee" pnd "behaving like a buffoon"^/....But it / (l.d.l)_/ 
is different...in that the act is constituted not by intention 
or by fact, essentially but by convention. * *"(p.188). But it is 
not clear that the cases (l.d.1-3) do differ from the cases (l.b) 
and (l.c) in the way that Austin claimed. In each of (l.d.1-3), 
which are Austin’s examples, doing what was done accounts for or 
explains what was said (or the buzzing) as in (l.b) and (l.c). 
Austin also claimed that when (l) is used in any of the cases 
(l.a)-(l.c) it is used with the sense of "in the process of" or 
"in the course ofV as distinct from its use involving the sense 
of "a criterion" when an Illocutionary verb is substituted for 
"v-ing"(pp.126-7). This claim is not very clear either but it 
recurs in Austin’s discussion of (2).
A true report of a speech act situation cast in the form 
of (2 ) does not necessarily identify a perlocutionary act per­
formed in that situation. It too may Identify a component of a 
locutionary act, as in
(2 .a) By saying that they can fish, he meant that they 
tin fish, not that they may fish.
It may identify an act which is not a component of a locutionary
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act, nor either an illocutionary act or a perlocutionary act, 
as in
(S.b) By saying that I had been doing 140m.p.h.,
I put myself in the wrong.
When an illocutionary verb is substituted for "v-ing" in (2),
as in
(2.C.1) By saying that it was slipping, he was warning him 
this "...sense of 'by’ - the criterion sense - is, it seems, 
also very close to ’in’ in one of its senses...and in this way 
’by’ can certainly be used with illocutionary verbs in the ’by 
saying’ formula"(pp.129-30). This sense of "by" is further 
exemplified in
(2.C.2) By inserting a plate, I was practising dentistry
where "...’by’ indicates a criterion, that about what I did
which enables my action to be classified as practising dentist-
ry"(P'b29 Austin’s own examples). "But ’by’, in this sense, is
not used with perlocutionary verbs"(p.130). When it is, as in
(8.d.l) By saying that I would definitely be there,
I convinced (persuaded) him
"...’by’ will here have the means-to-end sense, or anyway sig­
nify the manner in which or method by v/hich I did it"(p. 130) ; 
and this is the same as in
(8.d.2) By hitting the nail on the head, I was driving 
it into the wall
where "...’by’ indicates the means by which, the manner in which 
or the method by which I was bringing off the action..."(p.129).
In spite of the failure of the formulas (l) and (2) to pro­
vide means for identifying exclusively the illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts performed in speech act situations, they are 
not the broken reeds alleged by White (An.S.(1963)p.64). The 
formal features of .the relationships expressed by those formulas
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are instructive. The asymmetry and irreflexivity of the re­
lationship expressed by (l), when that formula is filled out 
to give a report of a locutionary act and an illocutionary act, 
have already been deployed in defence of the distinction be­
tween acts of those types against Searle’s objections. Later, 
the transitivity of that relationship will be deployed against 
another of Cohen’s objections. And Austin’s comments on (2), 
when that formula is used to frame a report of a perlocutionary 
act performed in some speech act situation, make it clear that 
the antecedent acts to perlocutionary acts so reported stand in 
the relationship of means to end.
Introducing his notion of perlocutionary acts in Lecture 
VIII Austin said, "Saying something will often, or even normally, 
produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, 
or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other per­
sons : and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose 
of producing them ; and we may then say, thinking of this, that 
the speaker has performed an act in the nomenclature of which 
reference is made either only obliquely, or even not at all, to 
the performance of the locutionary or illocutionary act. We shall 
call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a 
'perlocutionary’ act..."(Words p.101). After giving some examples 
of such acts Austin said, "It will be seen that the consequential 
effects of perlocutions are really consequences, which do not in­
clude such conventional effects as, for example, the speaker’s 
being committed by his promise (which comes into the illocution­
ary act). Perhaps distinctions need drawing, as there is clearly 
a difference between what we feel to be the real production of 
real effects and what we regard as mere conventional consequences.
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we shall in any case return later to this"(p.102).^ And towards 
the end of that lecture : "Finally we must meet the objection 
about our illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - namely that 
the notion of an act is unclear - by a general doctrine about 
action. We have the idea of an ’act’ as a fixed physical thing 
that we do, as distinguished from conventions and as distinguish­
ed from consequences. But (a) the illocutionary act and even the 
locutionary act too involve conventions :.#..(b) the perlocution­
ary act always includes some consequences, as when we say ’By do­
ing X I was doing y’ : we do bring in a greater or less stretch 
of ’consequences* always.(p. 107). This formula was soon re­
fined and recast in the form "By B-ing he C-ed" for use when "... 
we mention both a B act (illocution) and a C act (perlocution)..." 
(p.108), The relationship expressed by this formula, determined 
by the particle "by", is, again, one of means to end. "This is 
the reason for calling C a perlocutionary act as distinct from an 
illocutionary act"(p.l08). So by the time Austin came to discuss 
the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in 
Lecture IX the main features of that distinction had already been 
adumbrated. In summary they are two :
(1) "Illocutionary acts are conventional acts : perlocutionary
acts are not conventional"(p.121). "Speaking of the ’use of
"language" for arguing and warning* /“illocutionary acts^ looks 
just like speaking of ’the use of "language" for persuading, 
rousing, alarming’ / “perlocutionary acts_/; yet the former may, 
for rough contrast, be said to be conventional....but the latter 
could not"(p.103).
(2) An illocutionary act stands to perlocutionary acts performed
in the same speech act situation as an act to some of its 
outcomes, "V/e have then to draw the line between an action we do
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(here an illocution) and its conseguences"(p. Ill) ; "...a line 
for our present purposes where we want one, that is, between 
the completion of the illocutionary act and all consequences 
thereafter"(p.114),
The notional framework drawn from a theory of action which 
is required for an elucidation of the performative use of lan­
guage as exemplified in illocutionary acts is, therefore, that 
which is required to elucidate a particular kind of conventional 
act distinguished from its non-conventional (perlocutionary) out­
comes. In Lecture IX Austin discussed one difficulty confronting 
the attempt to distinguish acts from their outcomes, two possible 
ways around this difficulty and three types of outcome involved 
in the performance of illocutionary acts which are to be distin­
guished from perlocutionary acts in so far as each is a conven­
tional type of outcome.
One difficulty in distinguishing acts and outcomes arises 
from the fact that some descriptions of acts are also descrip­
tions of outcomes of (other) acts. Both "He filled the tank" and 
"He was working the pump-handle" may be true descriptions of acts 
performed by some agent. Combined in the description "By working 
the pump-handle, he filled the tanlc" the double role of "He fill­
ed the tank" as a description of both an act and an outcome is 
shown explicitly. The identical form of this compound description 
and substitution instances of "By B-ing he C-ed", v/hich Austin 
devised for use when both an illocutionary and a perlocutionary 
act is mentioned, shows that this difficulty arises in the case 
of distinguishing acts of these types. Whatever the solution to 
this difficulty may be, the point relieves a tension between the 
two main features of the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction,
(1) and (3) above. For thinking of those, it may be asked how the
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same distinction can be drawn in terms of both two types of act, 
i.e., in terms of (1), and a general distinction between an act 
and some of its outcomes, i.e., in terms of (2), when the second 
term of the latter distinction is prima facie not of a type with 
acts. The answer lies in the fact that in some cases, including 
this one, what can be described as an act can also be described 
as an outcome of an act.
Austin claimed that""...we can import an arbitrarily long 
stretch of what might also be called the ’consequences’ of our 
act into the act itself..." and held that this "...is, or should 
be, a fundamental commonplace of the theory of our language 
about all ’action’ in general"(p. 107). Perhaps it now is. Austin’s 
reason for emphasizing this commonplace ~ he recurred to it twice 
in Lecture IX (pp.Ill,117) - was his wish to deny that the notion 
of movements of bodily parts (what Austin called the minimum 
physical act) had a very significant place in the concept of hu­
man action ; and hence, to deny that any very significant dis­
tinction between acts and outcomes could be drawn in these terms, 
"There is no restriction to the minimum physical act at all"
(p.107) : "We not merely do not use the notion of a minimum 
physical act (which is in any case doubtful) but we do not seem 
to have any class of names which distinguish physical acts from 
consequences.(p.112). Some types of ac t are constituted by 
movements of bodily parts, e.g., nodding, winking, crossing the 
legs, folding the arms, etc. But the concept of human action is 
informed by a variety of notions yielding different constitutive 
features of acts in terms of which acts can be described. Austin 
mentioned two such features beside outcomes : "... we nearly al­
ways naturally name the action not in terms of what we are here 
calling the minimum physical act, but in terms which embrace a
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greater or less but indefinitely extensive range of what might 
be called its natural consequences (or, looking at it another 
way, the intention with which it was done)"(p.ll8) ; and 
doing obeisance. It is obeisance only because it is conventional 
and it is done only because it is conventional"(p.107). There 
are others too : the circumstances in which some acts are per­
formed constitute those acts as tokens of particular types of 
act and, as some have said, some acts are constituted by virtue 
of being performed in accordance with certain rules.
Austin’s two suggestions for ways of marking the distinction 
between illocutionary "'.and perlocutionary acts are marred by his 
speaking of the former as acts of saying something, i.e., as lo­
cutionary acts. This fault is fatal to his second suggestion and 
the first has additional problems which render it unsatisfactory 
as well. The first suggestion exploits the "nomenclature of il- 
locutions" : "...the vocabulary of names for acts (b ) /"i.e., il­
locutionary acts_7 seems expressly designed to mark a break at a 
certain regular point between the act (our saying something) and 
its consequences (which are usually not the saying of anything), 
or at any rate a great many of them"(p.112). But this suggestion 
requires a satisfactory test for whether an expression is a name 
of an illocutionary act or not and, as shown in the previous sec­
tion, the formula "In saying that..., S was v-ing", while it may 
be the best test available, does not satisfy this requirement. 
Austin’s parentheses in the last quoted remark foreshadow his 
second suggestion. Whatever the outcomes of acts of saying some­
thing are, they are not usually other further acts of saying 
something, so in this case act and outcome may be distinguished 
on the grounds that they are not in pari materia as "... ’a move­
ment of a trigger finger’ is ini pari materia with ’a movement of
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a trigger’?(p.113,fn.l). But however sound this distinction may 
be, it is not to the point of distinguishing illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts. For the acts which this distinction would 
isolate from their outcomes are acts of saying something, locu­
tionary acts, not illocutionary acts. And in the paragraph fol­
lowing these suggestions (pp.113-6) Austin went to some length 
to deny that either illocutionary or perlocutionary acts are 
outcomes of locutionary acts. "What we do import by the use of 
the nomenclature of illocution is a reference, not to the conse­
quences (at least in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to 
the conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special 
circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance"
(p.115). The reason why neither of these suggestions for drawing 
the act-outcorne distinction between illocutionary and perlocu­
tionary acts is a good suggestion is, perhaps, that that distinc­
tion is not just a single uniform distinction. Outcomes of dif­
ferent types, e.g., effects, results and consequences, stand in 
different relationships to their antecedent acts, and the dis­
tinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, drawn in 
terms of a general distinction between acts and outcomes., will 
not really be clear until, these various relationships have been 
distinguished and analysed. Some attempt to do this will be made 
following the next section in which three types of non-perlocu- 
tionary outcomes involved in the performance of illocutionary 
acts are reviewed.
Austin distinguished these outcomes in terms of "securing 
uptake", "taking effect" and "inviting by convention a response 
or sequel". Each is distinct from any outcome in which an illo­
cutionary act may issue as a perlocutionary act in so far as
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each is a conventional outcome of its antecedent act whereas a 
perlocutionary act is not a conventional act» However, the con­
ventions involved are not the same in all cases.
The securing of uptake ‘'...amounts to bringing about the 
understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution"
(p.117). Austin indicated the type of conventions involved in 
the production of this effect on an audience in a foot-note :
"...the sense in which saying something produces effects on other 
persons, or causes things, is a fundamentally different sense of 
cause from that used in physical causation by pressure, etc. It 
has to operate through the conventions of language.(p.115,fn.l) 
Austin's comments on the securing of uptake take up a point which 
he foreshadowed much earlier, in Lecture II, when he was discuss­
ing different kinds of infelicity of utterances. There, he dis­
tinguished from the specific infelicities arising from the non­
satisfaction of the Felicity conditions (A.l)-(r.2) two general 
kinds of infelicity to which all utterances are liable simply be­
cause they are utterances and products of acts, ne called these 
two general kinds "Misunderstandings" and "Mistakes" and said of 
the former, "It is obviously necessary that to have promised I I
must normally (A) have been heard by someone, perhaps the promisee;} 
(b ) have been understood by him as promising. If one or another of 
these conditions is not satisfied, doubts arise as to whether I 
have really promised, and it might be held that ray .act v/as only 
attempted or was void"(p.22). A similar point is made with a dif­
ferent example in his later discussion of securing uptake. "I can­
not be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say 
and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be achiev­
ed on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out"
(p.116). A locutionary act's securing of uptake can be seen as the
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satisfaction of necessary and sufficient conditions for such an 
act being an act of successful linguistic communication. It is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a speaker successfully 
communicating something to his audience with his locutionary act 
that the audience hears what is .said and understands its meaning 
and force. But it is not the case, nor did Austin maintain, that 
either a locutionary act with uptake secured, or just the secur­
ing of uptake, is an illocutionary act. "This is not to say in 
the first edition : "This is to be distinguished from saying...^7 
that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect" 
(p.116). However, it appears from the second previous quotation 
that Austin did hold that the securing of uptake is a necessary 
condition for the performance of an illocutionary act. This does 
not seem to be correct. For included in the securing of uptake is 
the bringing about of the audience's understanding of the illocu­
tionary force of the utterance ; this presupposes that the utter­
ance has a particular illocutionary force which in turn presup­
poses that an illocutionary act of the respective type is per­
formed in issuing the utterance. Perhaps the point can be clari­
fied by some illustrative examples.
Austin made it clear that "our performative utterances, fel­
icitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary cir­
cumstances" (p. 22) ; i.e., not as issued by an actor in a play, or 
by a speaker reciting a poem or practising elocution, and not in 
circumstances where the speaker is using language metaphorically, 
sarcastically or in other non-literal ways. Now taking Austin's 
first example, promising : assuming that the circumstances are in 
these ways "ordinary", and that they are such that a felicitous 
promise could be given, and further that the speaker, intending 
to carry out his promise, does say seriously and literally that
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he promises to go, then it is far from obvious that the speaker 
fails to promise in that situation just "because his utterance 
goes unheard or is not understood by his audience as a promise.
The speaker may fail to achieve the purpose he had in promising. 
And he may be in trouble later on if pressed to prove that he 
promised and there is no record of it nor any witnesses to 
vouchsafe. The situation may be unhappy in either of these ways 
but neither is sufficient to void the promise. And it would not 
be untoward for the speaker in such a situation either to feel 
obliged to do what he has said that he promises to do, or to 
mention as a reason for doing it the fact that he had promised 
to do it. Similarly, protests made sotto voce and muttered 
statements seem, ceteris paribus, to be no less protests or 
statements for not being understood by their audiences. Again, 
the order to withdraw may not get through and the platoon 
marches on into the ambush - a very unhappy situation for those 
concerned. But the order was given. Austin's second example, 
warning, raises a special difficulty. Numerous senses are speci­
fied in the Dictionary for the verb "warn" ; one of these is 
"give notice to", another is "put on guard". This ambiguity may 
encourage the view that the securing of uptake is a necessary 
condition for the illocutionary act of warning. But "warning", 
when used with the sense of "putting on guard" as a name for an 
act which is performed in a speech act situation, implies more 
than just bringing about the understanding of the meaning and 
force of the utterance. It also implies some effect on the feel­
ings, thoughts and even actions of the audience in the light of 
that understanding. It seems clear that when used with this sense 
"v/arning" is the name of a perlocutionary act. When used with the 
sense of "giving notice to", "v/arning" can be the name of an illo-
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cutionary act, but then it also seems clear that such an act does 
not require the securing of uptake in order to be accomplished.
The differences between these acts of warning and their rela­
tionships with the securing of uptake are illustrated by the 
following cases :
(1) S uttered a warning and thereby put his audience, A, on its 
guard against the danger.
(2) S uttered a warning which A understood but ignored.
(3 ) S uttered a warning ("Look out!") ; A heard what was said 
but misunderstood the utterance, craned forward to look out of 
the window and was hit on the head by the falling brick.
(4 ) S uttered a warning ; A heard what was said but did not 
understand the language.
(5) S uttered a warning but A was stone deaf and could not 
lip read.
(6) S opened his mouth to utter a warning but at that precise 
moment was shot in the head and died instantly.
In each case, S attempted to perform the illocutionary act of 
warning ; in (l)-(5) that attempt succeeded, in (6) it failed.
In (1 ) and (2) uptake was secured ; in (3)-(6) it was not, be­
cause in (3 ) A misunderstood, in (4) A did not understand, and 
in (5) A did not hear what was said. In (l) S performed the per­
locutionary act of warning ; in (8)-(6) he did not.
The outcomes of illocutionary acts which Austin distinguish­
ed from perlocutionary acts in terms of "taking effect" and "in­
viting by convention a response or sequel" differ from the secur­
ing of uptake in that (a) they are outcomes of illocutionary acts, 
not locutionary acts and (b) the conventions by virtue of which 
they follow are the conventions of illocutionary force which are 
not the conventions of language. An illocutionary act’s taking 
effect is to be "...distinguished from producing consequences in 
the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the ’normal' way.
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i.e. changes in the natural course of events"(p.11?). Austin ex­
panded on this point in his subsequent lecture "Performative - 
Constative" (P. L. pp. 15-22). "VVe do not mean by that /^i.e., an 
illocutionary act’s taking effect^/ that such-and-such a future 
event is or will be brought about as an effect of this action 
functioning as a cause. Yie mean rather that, in consequence of 
the performance of this act, such-and-such a future event, it 
happens, will be iji order, and such-and-such other events, if 
they happen, will not be in order. If I have said ’I promise’, I 
shall not be in order if I break my word ; if I have said ’I 
welcome you’, I shall not be in order if I proceed to treat you 
as an enemy or an intruder"(p.14). This distinction between per­
locutionary acts and outcomes of illocutionary acts taking effect 
was foreshadowed in Austin's distinction (quoted on p.103 above) 
between "the consequential effects of perlocutions that_7 are 
really consequences", e.g., a promisee’s being convinced that the : 
promisor will perform the promised act, and "...such conventional 
effects as, for example, the speaker’s being committed by his 
promise (which comes into the illocutionary act)".
A sequel to an illocutionary act is a further act performed 
by the speaker ; a response to an illocutionary act is a further 
act performed by someone other than the speaker. Where the out­
come of an illocutionary act taking effect is to put in or out of 
order certain further acts which may be performed, but whose per­
formance is not required by the conventions of illocutionary 
force invoked by the performance of the illocutionary act, re­
sponses and sequels to illocutionary acts that are invited by 
convention are further acts required by the respective conven­
tions. All successfully performed illocutionary acts take effect, 
but many do not invite conventional responses or sequels. The il-
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locutionary act of warning is one such example : it would he out 
of order for someone who had been warned against some peril to 
protest after the peril befell him that he had been given no 
warning. But the conventions of warning do not require the per­
son warned to perform any act in response to it - a warning may 
be ignored without any breach of convention. And once a warning 
is given, no further act is required of the speaker as a sequel 
to it. Apologizing, describing, protesting and stating are other 
illocutionary acts which do not invite conventional responses or 
sequels. Of those which do, these outcomes may be one-way or two- 
way ; inviting just a response or just a sequel or inviting both. 
In these terms Austin distinguished ordering (inviting a one-way 
response - obeying) and promising (inviting a one-way sequel - 
carrying out the promise) from offering (inviting first a re­
sponse - the offeree’s acceptance - and secondly a sequel - the 
offeror's execution of the offer).
The differences between these non-perlocutionary outcomes 
involved in the performance of illocutionary acts can be further 
illustrated from speech act situations in which they occur at 
temporally distinct stages. Thus a promise given to-day to leave 
town on the first stage-coach after noon to-morrow may secure up­
take to-day, will take effect at noon to-morrow and, if carried 
out, will have its sequel implemented when the first stage-coach 
leaves town after that time. A Government minister may order a 
retrospective salary increase for his Department’s employees, to 
be paid in full on the occasion of the next salary disbursements. 
Such an order would secure uptake as and when it is received and 
understood by those to whom it is directed, take effect as from 
the date to which the increase is back-dated, and have its re­
sponse accorded on the next pay day. This latter example also il-
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lustrâtes the conventional nature of an illocutionary act’s 
taking effect, i.e., not in the normal way as producing changes 
in the natural course of events. In the natural course of events 
things do not happen retrospectively.
The differences between perlocutionary acts and outcomes 
involved in the performance of illocutionary acts which Austin 
distinguished in terms of securing uptake and taking effect seem 
clear enough. The difference between perlocutionary acts and the 
responses and sequels to illocutionary acts invited by conven­
tion may not seem so clear because Austin also spoke of some per­
locutionary acts as responses and sequels to illocutionary acts 
(Words p.119). However, the different ways in which these respec­
tive responses and sequels were said to occur - the former being 
accorded or implemented, the latter being achieved or produced - 
indicate the substantial differences between them. Of those in­
vited by convention, "if this response is accorded, or the sequel 
implemented, that requires a second act by the speaker or another 
person ; and it is a commonplace of the consequence-language that 
this cannot be included under the initial stretch of action"(p. 
117). This effectively disqualifies these outcomes from being 
perlocutionary acts. Descriptions of illocutionary acts and con­
ventional responses and sequels to them cannot be cast in the 
form "By B-ing he G-ed" which can be used as a form of descrip­
tion when both an illocutionary act and a perlocutionary act are 
mentioned. For example, neither "By ordering him, he obeyed"
(when "him" and "he" are used with identical reference) nor "By 
promising to go, he went" makes sense. The act-outcome nexus be­
tween illocutionary acts and these conventional responses and 
sequels to them is not that of means-to-end as it is in the case 
of an illocutionary and perlocutionary act. Nor can these re­
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sponses or sequels be ascribed to the speaker performing the il­
locutionary act as an act performed by him ; whereas non-conven- 
tional perlocutionary responses and sequels to the illocutionary 
act can be so ascribed. They can be included under the initial 
stretch of action as in "By ordering her to stop, he stopped her/ 
got her to stop" and "By promising to go, he convinced her that 
he would go". Here the illocutionary act is the means to the end 
achieved and described in terms of the perlocutionary act, "Thus 
we must distinguish 'I ordered him and he obeyed' a convention­
al response to an illocutionary act^/ from 'I got him to obey'7~& 
perlocutionary act_/. The general implication of the latter is 
that other additional means were employed to produce this conse­
quence as ascribable to me, inducements, personal presence, and 
influence which may amount to duress.(pp.117-8). Thus acts 
called by the names of perlocutionary acts which are the achieving 
of ends may be achieved by non-conventional means and even non­
verbal means, but illocutionary acts are only exceptionally per­
formed. non-verbally and even then to deserve the name of an illo­
cutionary act it must be a conventional non-verbal act, e.g., 
giving a warning in flashing a red light. Illocutionary acts are 
conventional means for attaining ends (pp.119-23).
"The perlocutionary act may be either the achievement of a 
perlocutionary object or the production of a perlocutionary se­
quel" (p. 118) . This comment reflects the point common to most acts, 
including perlocutionary acts, that agents' attempts to achieve 
their purposes may succeed or fail and in either case have unin­
tended outcomes. "Thus the act of warning may achieve its perlo­
cutionary object of alerting and also have the perlocutionary se­
quel of alarming, and an argument against a view may fail to 
achieve its object but have the perlocutionary sequel of convinc­
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ing our opponent of its truth (*I only succeeded in convincing 
him')"(p.113).
A conceptual analysis of the outcomes of human action has 
an interest extending "beyond the clarification of Austin's dis­
tinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Such an 
account of even the restricted set of effects, consequences and 
results of human acts would help to fill some gaps in philosoph­
ical understanding of the general concept of human action ; gaps 
which have been left open by the preponderant emphasis in dis­
cussion of that concept upon the antecedents of human acts. This 
is not to deny that that discussion has been fruitful. Aspects 
of the general concept of human action, that most complex of 
concepts, have been elucidated by the discussion of conceptual 
distinctions and relationships between, say, agents' causes, 
reasons and motives for acting, and between acting deliberately, 
intentionally and purposely. But just as this is so, an account 
of the conceptual distinctions between such outcomes of acts as 
effects, consequences and results, and of the relationships in 
which they stand to their respective antecedent acts, may also 
elucidate aspects of the general concept of human action.
Vendler has published tv/o attempts at such an account, both 
of which rely heavily on linguistic data gathered from the forms 
and functions of some of the expressions used to articulate the 
concepts of effects, consequences and results. The following ac­
count has a similar basis but some of its conclusions differ 
significantly from those of Vendler's accounts. Some of the con­
clusions of Vendler's first account, "Effects, Results and Con­
sequences" (AnalyM;^^ Fhjdnspiplpy (l962)pp. 1-15), have already 
been criticized by Brornberger in "What are Effects?" (pp. 15-80)
J
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and by Dray in "Must Effects Have Causes?"(pp.20-5). Some of 
bhc conclusions of Vendler's second account in Chapter 6 of 
Linguistics in Philosophy have already been criticized by Cohen 
in a review of Vendler's book (Foundations of Language (1971) 
pp.125-30). Those criticisms need not be repeated here. The de­
ficiencies of Vendler*s accounts are in part due to his exclus­
ive attention to the linguistic constructions in which the 
nouns "effect", "result" and "consequence" can or cannot occur. 
Vendler pays no attention, for instance, to the fact that "ef­
fect" and "result" also function as verbs while "consequence" 
does not ; nor to the instructive differences that there are 
between the functions, as verbs, of "effect" and "result". He 
ignores, too, the various adjectives formed from these words : 
"consequent" and "consequential", "resultant" and "resultful", 
"effective" and "effectual", and the latter two's not too dis­
tantly related to be interesting cousins, "efficient" and "ef­
ficacious". Nothing is made either of the differences between 
the prepositions which go with some of these words in typical 
phrases, e.g., that an outcome is said to result from, be ef­
fected by or be consequent upon the act which is said to have 
that effect, result or consequence. 'The concepts of these out­
comes are articulated and deployed in linguistic constructions 
around these words as well, and the forms and functions of 
these words and phrases provide additional perspectives on 
these concepts.
The different senses imported by the different suffixes 
forming these adjectives can, with a little ingenuity, be used 
to elicit features of the concepts articplated by the use of 
those adjectives in descriptions of acts and outcomes. For in­
stance, the suffix "-ial" forming adjectives from nouns ending
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in "-ance" or "-ence" imports a sense of "being of the kind..." 
or "having the nature of..." that which is denoted by the root 
substantive. Thus prudential counsel is wise counsel, informed 
by prudence, rather than uninformed, hollow or misdirected 
counsel ; a providential intervention is a lucky, freakish one, 
rather than a planned, deliberate one, and circumstantial evi­
dence is evidence gathered from the circumstances of the case, 
distinct from hearsay evidence or evidence of eye-witnesses. So 
to describe, say, some loss arising from some damage as a conse­
quential loss is to describe that loss as a consequence of the 
damage. These descriptions have a classifying function as well. 
Just as the description of counsel as prudential, of evidence as 
circumstantial and of an intervention as providential classifies 
that counsel, evidence or intervention as being of a certain 
kind, the description of some loss as consequential classifies 
that loss as being of a certain kind and may be made in order to 
distinguish it from other losses.
The selectivity of different suffixes with respect to cer­
tain roots suggests that the conceptual features expressed by 
words so formed are exclusive to the respective concepts. For 
instance, "consequent" and "resultant" are used in descriptions 
of consequences and results but there is no similarly formed 
adjective for use in the description of effects. And as may be 
expected from these adjectives being formed with the Latin pres­
ent participial suffix, there are differences between the kinds 
of temporal relationships obtaining between outcomes of these 
respective types and their antecedent acts. Some of these dif­
ferences will be discussed in the next section. "Resultful" is 
unique among the group of adjectives "resultant", "consequent" 
and "consequential" in not being used to describe outcomes ;
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like "effective" for instance, "resultful"- is used to describe 
acts in terms of some of the outcomes they may have. The dif­
ferent ways in which these two adjectives are negated show a 
difference between the relationships between acts and effects 
and acts and results. The sense of negation imported by the 
suffix "-less" in the transformation from "resultful" to "re- 
sultless" is that of "none at all" or "none whatsoever". Some­
thing described by an adjective in this negative form is thus 
described as completely lacking or quite devoid of the respec­
tive quality. Thus a useless tool is one which has no use at 
all and a thoughtless deed is one to which no thought was given 
by the person who did it ; likewise, a resultless act is one 
which has no result. However, this interpretation is too strong 
for the sense of negation imported by the prefixes "in-" or 
"un-" to adjectives formed by the suffix "-ive". If a person's 
memory is said to be unretentive, or the hearing an audience 
gives a speaker is said to be inattentive, it is not being said 
that the person can remember nothing of the past, or that the 
audience paid no attention to the speaker. If either of these 
v/as the case it would be more accurate to say that the person 
had lost his memory, or had no memory, and that the audience 
did not give the speaker a hearing. A completely unretentive 
memory is not a memory and a completely inattentive hearing is 
not a hearing. The sense of negation involved here is just that 
of "not many or much, but some". So if an act is said to be in­
effective, it is not being said that the act had no effect, or 
that the act was completely devoid of effects ; by comparison 
with completely unretentive memories and completely inattentive 
hearings, the complete absence of effects may be evidence for 
an act not having been performed. Rather, one of the things
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that may be meant by the phrase "ineffective act" is that the 
act had some but not many effects, or some but not much effect. 
This point, bhat all acts have effcet(s) but some acts do not 
have results, is supported by the selectivity of the different 
prefixes and suffixes with respect to the different adjectives: 
"resultive" and "effectful" are not lexically correct words.
If all acts have effects it will generally be uninforma­
tive to qualify descriptions of acts with the adjective "effec­
tive" or, for that matter, to modify verbs of action occurring 
in sentences used to make such descriptions with the adverb 
"effectively". No extra information is provided by such quali­
fication or modification if all that is being asserted with 
such sentences is that this general feature of acts has been 
instantiated in the case described. Attention to some of the 
contexts in which these words are used informatively reveal 
certain typical considerations limiting their application in 
the description of acts ; in particular, to cases in which what 
happened deviated in some way from what was intended or desired. 
For instance, both "Smith effectively led the expedition" and 
"Smith was the effective leader of the expedition" imply that 
Smith was not appointed or intended to be the leader, but never­
theless ended up doing the leading. The former, especially, may 
be contrasted with the barely informative "Smith led the exped­
ition effectively" ; and each of these with the quite different 
"Smith ,led the expedition efficiently". The adoption and use of 
the phrase "side-effects" to refer to unintended effects of acts 
indicates in a different way that the Intended effects of acts 
are of primary importance in an assessment of their effectiveness.
"Efficacious", unlike "effective" ,^...is not used in descrip­
tions of human agents or their acts but in descriptions of the
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instrujnents or methods which agents use to perform their acts. 
Doctors may prescribe medicines and pills that are efficacious 
for treating the ills of their patients, but they do not pre­
scribe medicines and pills efficaciously, nor are they themselves 
the more or less efficacious according as what they do prescribe 
does or does not reduce the ills of their patients. Describing 
something as efficacious attributes to it a capacity for being 
used or put into action and thereby being instrumental in the 
production of effects. Of something described as efficacious it 
will always make sense to ask, "Efficacious for what?" And part 
of what is required for a correct answer to such a question is a 
reference to some act for whose performance what is so described 
can be used as an instrument or method. "What were the doctor’s 
pills efficacious for?" "Treating his patient’s complaint."
Efficacy, being a capacity, is a disposition and the uses 
of "efficacious" are generally dispositional. "Effective" also 
has dispositional uses but effectiveness is not the same sort of 
disposition as efficacy ; rather than a capacity it is more akin 
to a tendency. The differences between capacities and tendencies 
are various but for present purposes they may be put as follows. 
Statements attributing* a tendency entail but are not entailed by 
statements attributing a corresponding capacity, A stronger 
statement about what is likely to happen is made when a tendency 
is attributed to something than when a capacity is attributed to 
something. If an agent, A, swears a lot, then obviously A can 
swear, but even if another agent, B, can swear, that does not 
entail that B does or will swear a lot. Likewise with the at­
tribution of tendencies to and capacities for the production of 
effects. In the former case, what is being said is that it is 
likely, perhaps very likely, that effects will be produced ; in
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the latter case, it is not being said that it is likely that 
effects will be produced but only that they can be produced. 
This difference helps to explain why attributions of effec­
tiveness and efficacy with the words "effective" and "effica­
cious" are made to the different sorts of things that they 
are. Agents, by their acts, produce effects and so support the 
attribution of a tendency to produce effects. Instruments and 
methods for performing acts, on the other hand, are not likely 
to produce effects by themselves ; it is only when they are 
used or applied in the performance of acts that effects are 
produced and for this reason only support the attribution of a 
capacity to produce effects. Sometimes of course, perhaps 
often, attributions of tendencies to produce effects are made 
to things which in other contexts can be referred to as instru­
ments or methods of acting. But far from providing counter-in­
stances to the point that it is not things of these types but 
rather acts and agents to which such tendencies are attributed, 
all that this shows is that some tokens of some of these dif­
ferent types may be identical. For instance, what in one con­
text may be referred to as an act may in a different context 
be referred to as a method of acting. Writing a letter is an 
act which can be performed with a pen or pencil and a piece of 
paper and comments can be made on the efficacy of this equip­
ment for letter-writing. Comments can also be made on the ef­
ficacy of letter-writing, not as an act but in so far as it is 
a method of performing an act - communicating with a distant 
friend or conducting business negotiations. Even the type dis­
tinction between agents and instruments of action may disap­
pear at token level ; some people regard themselves as instru­
ments of God's will. But in general the type distinctions be-
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tween agents and acts and between instruments and methods of 
action are clear enough - agents perform acts, instruments 
are used and methods are applied by agents in performing
acts. So the possibility of one thing being referred to as a
token of one type in one context and as a token of a differ­
ent type in another context should not be allowed to obscure
the distinctions between the uses of "efficacious" and "ef­
fective" which have been drawn here in terms of the types of 
thing each is used to describe. Moreover, these distinctions 
are not arbitrary and the reason why they are marked in ord­
inary language is not difficult to find. Gonmon everyday 
needs for finding satisfactory ways of doing things, or means 
adequate for accomplishing intended ends, impose: a require­
ment for linguistic forms suitable for expressing both these 
needs and their satisfaction. Frequently, situations arise in 
which questions are posed and answers given as to what could 
be done and what would happen if something were done, what 
can be done and what tends to happen if it is done. The avail­
ability of adjectives such as "efficacious" and "effective" 
satisfies, in part at least, the requirements on language for 
the means of expressing such questions and answers.
Dispositions are to be contrasted with occurrences and 
dispositional uses of expressions with their occurrent uses ; 
i.e., the use of an expression to attribute a disposition or 
to describe an occurrence. To attribute a disposition to pro­
duce effects to something is not to say that that thing is ef­
fecting outcomes of a certain type at a particular time but 
that such outcomes can be produced under certain conditions or 
that they tend to be produced in circumstances of certain kinds. 
To describe actual occurrences of the production of effects, on
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the other hand, is to say that at a particular time effects 
were or are being produced. However, a tendency to produce ef­
fects could not be attributed truly to something of a particu­
lar type unless there were actual occurrences of things of 
that type producing effects* Saying that acts tend to produce 
effects, or that acts are effective, is not the same as saying 
of a particular act that it was or is effective, that it did 
produce effects or is, even now, producing them ; but unless 
things like these latter can be said truly from time to time, 
things like the former could not. In this way the dispositional 
use of "effective" is dependent upon its occurrent use. The 
dispositional use of "efficacious" is also dependent upon the 
occurrent use of "effective". The attribution to an instrument 
or method of a capacity for producing certain effects when used 
or applied under certain conditions could not be made, or if 
made, would have to be withdrawn, if on repeated occasions acts 
performed with those instruments or by applying those methods 
did not produce such effects. Describing something truly as ef­
ficacious is dependent on the acts performed, using the instru­
ments or applying the methods so described, producing effects. 
And this shows the relative status of these uses of "effica­
cious" and "effective" because for acts to produce effects is 
for them to be effective.
The use of "efficient" is dependent on the use of "effec­
tive" too, though in a different way from that of "efficacious". 
And there are other differences between the uses of "efficient" 
and "efficacious". The latter cannot be used in descriptions of 
agents or their acts but the former can. Doctors may be effic­
ient or inefficient in the way they run their practices but they 
cannot by the same token be efficacious or inefficacious. The
treatment which a patient receives from his doctor may he ef­
fective and efficient hut to say that a patient was given ef­
fective treatment is not to say that he was given efficient 
treatment. A sufficient condition for the truth of the first 
is that the treatment given the patient had some effect, e*g., 
a reduction of his ills, hut this is only a necessary and not 
a sufficient condition for the truth of the second. In addition 
to being productive of effects acts have to be performed with a 
certain manner or style in order for either them or their agents 
to be described truly as efficient. A notion of economy of ef­
fort in the performance of acts is included in the sense of say­
ing that they are efficiently performed and this restricts the 
use of "efficient" in comparison with that of "effective". If a 
patient recovers his health because of treatment he has received 
the treatment can be said to have been effective. But if the 
patient made his recovery only after first having to recover 
from the effects of treatment which exacerbated his condition 
and which was prescribed on the basis of a mistaken diagnosis, 
the treatment he received could not be said to have been effici­
ent, On the other hand, no amount of economy of effort in the 
performance of an act will preserve the efficiency of that per­
formance if the act lacks a certain effectiveness ; a doctor may 
stream-line his procedures for treating patients and so become 
more efficient, but if the stream-lining is carried to the point 
where the treatment received by the patients does not have those 
effects the doctor and the treatment of his patients cease to be 
efficient.
The concept of causation in action has diverse applications. 
It applies not only in the case of acts producing effects, and 
thereby to agents, but also, via the notion of efficiency, to
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the manner or style of an agent's performance, and via the 
notion of efficacy to instruments and methods which an agent 
might use in the performance of acts. But as is shown by the 
various dependencies of the different uses of the adjectives 
"effective", "efficient" and "efficacious" upon the occurrent 
use of "effective", the central application of the concept of 
causation in action is to the relationship between an act and 
the effects caused thereby. This relationship, however, is but 
one of the relationships obtaining between an act and its out­
comes.
It was noted earlier that "effect" and "result" function 
as verbs but "consequence" does not. This fact is indicative 
of a difference between, the outcomes of the respective types ; 
in particular, that effects and results have, whereas conse­
quences lack, those features that are expressed by the use of 
verbs and verb-phrases. What those features are may best be 
brought out by first examining the similarities and differences 
between the grammatical behaviour, as verbs, of "effect" and 
"result".
An expression, say "A", used to refer to a human agent, 
can occupy the place of the grammatical subject of the verb 
"effect", cast in the active voice, but this is not the case 
for the verb "result". Acceptable sentences can be formed by 
completing "A effected...", e.g., "The mechanic effected re­
pairs to the car" ; but acceptable sentences cannot be formed 
by completing "A resulted in...". "A resulted from..." yields 
acceptable sentences, e.g., "He resulted from his parents 
spending the night together stranded in an elevator during the 
power failure". However, in these cases, "A", is not used to
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refer to a person as a human agent hut as an outcome of some 
act. This is a use of "result" in a quasi-passive voice. The 
forms of simple sentences constructed around "effect" and "re­
sult" in a past tense in their quasi- active and quasi-passive 
voices are as follows :
(l) A effected 0
(8) 0 was effected by A
(3) A resulted in 0
(4) 0 resulted from A
where "A" reserves a place for an expression used to refer to 
some act (or agent in the case of "effect") and "0" reserves a 
place for an expression used to refer to some outcome of the 
act. These "active-passive" transformations are exemplified 
below :
(l.a) his pumping effected a rise in the water-level.
(2. a) A rise in the water-level v/as effected by his pumping.
(3. a) The search resulted in a find of explosives.
(4.a) A find of explosives resulted from the search.
These transformations coincide with the active-passive trans­
formations as defined in traditional grammar in the case of "ef­
fect" but not in the case of "result". The reasons for this, 
which have led to describing the voices of the verbs in these 
sentences as quasi-active and quasi-passive, need not be gone 
into here.
"Effect" and "result" are highly determinable verbs used to 
express occurrences which belong to two broad genera. Many of 
the specific occurrences belonging to each of these genera can 
be expressed with verbs which are determinate in relation to the 
verbs "effect" and "result". This relationship is exemplified in 
the relationships between the verbs in the sentences (l.a) and
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(l.ü) and (3.a) and (o.b) respectively :
(l.b) iïis pumping raised the water-level.
(3.b) The searchers found some explosives*
The verbs "effect" and "result" and their respective determin­
ates differ in their present tense behaviour. The use of "effect" 
and its determinates in the present continuous tense is not prob- ; 
lematic. Both "The mechanic is effecting repairs to the car" and 
"A rise in the water-level is being effected by his pumping" are 
acceptable sentences. But the use of "result" and its determin­
ates in the present continuous tense is problematic, While "Re­
pairs are being effected" is an acceptable sentence, "Repairs 
are being resulted" is not. And in "Repairs are resulting" the 
use of "result" is like the use of "win" and "find" in the sent­
ences "My horse is winning" (uttered, say, as the horse comes to 
the last fence well clear of the rest of the field) and "The 
jewels are being found right now" (uttered to the irate owner of 
some jewels which have been borrowed and lost). What is proble­
matic in these cases is that the utterances are not descriptions, 
reports, statements, etc. of something in process or going on at 
the time at which they are uttered as is implied by the use of 
the present continuous tense. The horse may go on to win the 
race, or it may fall at the last fence and never cross the 
finishing line and so not v/in the race ; the jewels may be found, 
already, just then or eventually, or they may be lost forever. 
Other verbs, different from these in that they can be used un- 
problernatically in the present continuous tense, are available 
for expressing more accurately what is in process or being done 
in such circumstances. The horse may be said to be leading the 
field, or holding its lead ; it may be said of the jewels that 
they are being looked for, searched for, hunted high and low. On
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the basis of the points made in this and the previous paragraph, 
"effect" and its determinates are verbs of action, in that broad 
sense of the phrase "verb of action" in which a verb is such if 
sentences formed around it can be used to give sensible answers 
to the question "What is he (or "she") doing?" The verbs "result" 
and its determinates are not verbs of action in this sense.
The differences in the present tense behaviour of "effect" 
and "result" are indicative of differences in the temporal 
characteristics of occurrences of outcomes of the respective 
types. Of.an occurrence that can be expressed by a verb which 
can be used unproblematically in the present continuous tense, 
it makes sense to ask any of the questions ; "When did it start?", 
"When did it finish?", "How long did it go on for?" ; e.g., "When 
did his pumping start/finish raising the water-level?", "How long 
did the raising of the water-level go on for?", "When did the 
mechanic start/finish effecting repairs to the car?", "How long 
did the effecting of repairs to the car go on for?" If all three 
questions are asked of any one occurrence, correct answers to the ; 
first two questions specify points in time which mark the begin-- 
ning and end of a period of time which, if continuous, is occu­
pied by the occurrence and specified by a correct answer to the 
third question. The raising of the water-level goes on for so 
long and at any moment during that period the water-level is be­
ing raised. The effecting of repairs goes on for so long and at 
any moment during that period repairs are being effected. However,| 
this set of questions is inappropriate for determining the temp­
oral location of occurrences that are expressed by verbs, such as > 
"result" and its determinates, which cannot be used unprobleraat- 
ically in the present continuous tense. If information about the 
temporal locations of these occurrences is required the question .
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to ask is simply, "When did it occur?" | e.g., "When were the 
jewels found?", "When was the race won?", "When did the search 
result in a find of explosives?" And a correct answer to any of 
these questions specifies not a period of time during which the 
occurrence took place, but a point in time at which it took 
place. The temporal locations of occurrences of effects are 
specified in terms of periods of time ; those of results are 
specified in terms of points in time.
Differences between the kinds of temporal relationship ob­
taining between occurrences of effects and results and their 
respective antecedent acts are indicated by some phrases used 
in ordinary speech. A number of phrases used in descriptions of 
effects import references to such relationships. Effects are 
described as short- or long-term effects, immediate effects, 
after-effects, lasting effects and delayed effects. (Consé­
quences, too, are described as short- or long-term, and this 
suggests that like effects, but unlike results, consequences 
have temporal duration.) But among the phrases used in descrip­
tions of results there is no corresponding stock of phrases al­
luding to the temporal relationships in which results stand to 
their antecedent acts. The phrases used in descriptions of ef­
fects which do this seem to be designed to discriminate between 
effects of varying duration and to single out effects standing 
in relationships of greater or less temporal proximity to their 
antecedent acts. This suggests, in turn, that the temporal re­
lationship between an act and one of its effects and the dura­
tion of any effect are not conceptual features of outcomes of 
this type but are, rather, contingent matters, dependent on the 
empirical circumstances in which the effect occurs* Were this 
not so, i.e., if the duration of an effect and its temporal re-
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lationship to the antecedent act were conceptual matters, such 
that all effects were of equal duration and stood In the same 
temporal relationship to their antecedent acts, the use of these 
phrases would he redundant. There would be no need for, and 
hence, no point in using phrases for disjiinguishing effects in 
these ways, and the natural economy of speech would have pre­
vailed against these phrases entering common usage. On the other 
hand, the absence of a corresponding stock of phrases for re­
sults suggests that the tem%)oral characteristics of these out­
comes are not diverse as in the case of effects# A stock of
phrases parallel to those used in descriptions of effects has 
not developed for use in descriptions of results because out­
comes of this type neither have varying duration nor are more or
less proximate in time to their antecedent acts. An explanation 
of the former is forthcoming from the previously established 
point about the temporal characteristics of occurrences of re­
sults : results do not have varying duration because they do not 
have duration. And if results do not occur at various intervals 
after the acts of which they are results it is hardly a contin­
gent matter that they all occur at the same time relative to 
their acts. It is more likely that this relationship is a con­
ceptual one and one which may be expected to be discovered by 
further analysis of examples. Before going on to do this, how­
ever, something of the diversity in the temporal relationships 
between acts and their effects can be illustrated with the fol­
lowing example.
Suppose an agent is operating a manual pump to move water 
from one tank to another. One effect of the agent's act of pump­
ing is the raising of the water-level in the second tank | these 
tv/o are related as cause to effect : the former makes the latter
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happen. If the system is suitably pressurized this effect may 
be completely simultaneous with its cause : as soon as the agent 
operates the pump water flows into the second tank and the water- 
level starts to rise ; when the agent stops pumping the flow of 
water stops and the water-level in the second tank ceases to 
rise. If the system is not pressurized there may be a time-lag 
between the commencement of pumping and the water-level in the 
second tank starting to rise as water flows along the pipe con­
necting the two tanks : in this case, the commencement of the |
effect succeeds the commencement of its cause. If the agent con- j
Itinues to pump until the water-level in the second tank begins jIto rise cause and effect are temporally contiguous : if the agent | 
stops pumping before the water-level in the second tank begins to 1 
rise cause and effect are not temporally contiguous. In these |
I
icircumstances, too, there may be a time-lag between the cessation I
!of pumping and the water-level in the second tank ceasing to rise |Ias pumped water continues to flow into it out of the connecting
pipe ; in this case, the cessation of the effect succeeds the
1cessation of its cause. |
This example can also be used to illustrate how the duration i 
of an effect can be determined by circumstances in which it oc- ; 
curs apart from the duration of its cause. Apart from the water- | 
level ceasing to rise because the agent stops pumping (and ceas- | 
ing to rise either simultaneously with or subsequently to the Iagent stopping pumping) the water-level may cease to rise while I
Ithe agent is pumping either because the first tank is pumped dry | 
or because the second tank overflows. In these latter two cases, 
it is not only that the duration of the effect is determined by 
circumstances other than the duration of the cause ; in these 
cases, the duration of the effect determines the duration of the
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cause. The act of pumping which is performed after the water- 
level has ceased to rise is not a cause of the water-level ris­
ing for this effect doss not occur. This point provides one in­
dication that the notion of retroactive causation is not part 
of the concept of causation in action. So much is also indicated 
by the fact that such phrases as "prior effects" or "pre-effect­
ive action", whose use might be expected if some acts produced 
temporally precedent effects, are not used in the description of 
acts and their effects.
For an act to result in a particular outcome is for it "to 
end or conclude in a specified manner". This definition of the 
verb "result", when used in its quasi-active voice, indicates 
that the point in time which dates an occurrence of a result is 
coincident with the completion of its antecedent act. The result 
of competing in a contest, e.g., a win, a loss, a tie or a draw, 
is determined on the basis of the end-position of the contest.
It is not until the contest is completed that the results of it 
are determined or can be said to have occurred. Some colloquial 
locutions that may seem to controvert this point, e.g., "He won 
from the start", "The result was never in doubt from the begin­
ning", do not. in fact do so. Both have a ring of the wisdom of 
hindsight and the first is inaccurate. It would be more accurate 
to say something like "He led from the start" or "He led from 
start to finish". The second does not entail that the result oc­
curred before the completion of the contest ; merely that from 
the way the contest progressed one could be reasonably certain 
what its result would be. Moreover, other colloquial locutions 
support the point. Both "The result was a foregone conclusion" 
and "The result was in doubt to the end" bring in a reference to 
the terminus of the act when its result occurs. But if a result
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of an act does not occur before the act is complete, neither 
does it occur after the act is complete. There is no time in­
terval between a chess player’s completing of the final move of 
of a game and his checkmating his opponent ; nor between the 
front runner breasting the tape and his winning the race. Of 
course, the result of an act may not be known until some time 
after the completion of the act. But just because, in some 
cases, it may take time to collate all the data required for 
working out a result, and then for the necessary calculations 
to be made, and then for the result to be made known, this does 
not alter the fact that it is the end-position of the act that 
provides the basic data for such calculations and dates the 
actual occurrence of the result. Examples of results that may 
evidence these characteristics apart from results of competing 
in contests are results of voting in elections, conducting sci­
entific experiments and sitting examinations.
The conceptual as opposed to the contingent nature of the 
temporal relationship of a result coincident with the terminus 
of its act can be demonstrated in the first instance with refer­
ence to examples drawn from contests of some types. One function 
of rules for contests is to govern the duration of the contest. 
In some cases, this function is discharged, not by the rules 
stipulating a specific time limit, but by their specification of 
one or more positions of play which determine a result of the 
contest. For instance, the Laws of Chess do not stipulate any 
time limit for a game of chess but Articles 11, 12 and 17 of the 
Laws specify various positions of play which determine, respec­
tively, a won, drawn or lost game. A;game of chess concludes 
once one of these positions is reached. The rules governing 
major tennis tournaments do not stipulate time limits for
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matches either, but they do stipulate that matches are to be 
decided on the basis of the player or pair who wins the most of 
three or five sets. Thus a men’s match, for instance, will con­
tinue for three, four or five sets, just until one player or 
pair has won three. Were the temporal location of a result at 
the terminus of its act not a conceptual matter, but a contin­
gent one, perhaps true in all past instances but possibly false 
in some future instances, it would not be able to be exploited 
as it is in the formulation of rules governing the duration of 
contests by specifying positions of play which determine a re­
sult. The conceptual nature of this relationship is reflected 
in the incoherence of an utterance, addressed by a tennis play­
er to his opponent who has just lost three straight sets: "Well, 
I’ve won the match but we’ll play on and see if you can win it." 
One thing that would be clear about such a situation though, is 
that if the players did play on they would not be contesting the 
same match which they were contesting in the three previous sets. 
The rules governing some other games do prescribe time limits on 
the duration of play and specify procedures for determining the 
result of the game at its conclusion. For instance, the rules of 
Rugby Union football prescribe that play shall continue for two 
forty mnute intervals at the end of which the result of the 
game is determined on the basis of the number of points each 
side has scored in that time. In spite of this difference, the 
nature of the temporal relationship between the playing of the 
game and the occurrence of its result is the same. It is concep­
tually impossible for two football teams to go on contesting the 
game and thereby attempt to affect the result after the referee 
has blown the final whistle.
Occurrences of results serve to terminate acts of certain
1S7
sorts other than contests of certain sorts. Finding something 
may be the result of a search and except where mistakes are 
made about the identity of the object being sought, or where 
there is a lack of communication between numerous searchers, 
a successful search comes to an end when the thing being sought 
is found. This is not just a contingent point about searching 
and finding ; were someone to say, "Good, I’ve found the thing 
I was looking for* Now I’ll go on searching for it" he would be 
demonstrating a misunderstanding of the respective concepts. 
This point provides the solution to the riddle, "Why do we al­
ways find the thing we are looking for in the last place we 
look for it?" We do so, not because, irrespective of the number 
of places in which we look for something, it just happens that 
we find it, if we do, in the last place we look, but because we 
cannot (conceptually) go on looking for it (continue performing 
the act) after we have found it (after a result of the act has 
occurred). If a search is called off before the thing being 
sought is found and then resumed, and on this second occasion 
with success, this is not a case of two results occurring at 
different points in time during one act but a case of two re­
sults occurring at the respective termini of two distinct acts. 
This is shown by an unsuccessful searcher deciding for himself 
or being instructed to look again or to go and have another - 
look. Gases such as unsuccessful searches in which the occur­
rence of a result does not serve to terminate the act are not 
counter-instances. All that such cases show is that other 
factors can determine the duration of an act. And it is not 
difficult to imagine a wide range of reasons why a search may 
be called off without the quarry being found ; nor is it diffi­
cult to see why time limits are set for the duration of exam-
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inations rather than having their duration determined by the 
achievement of results.
The verbs "effect" and "result" exhibit the characterist­
ics of what Vendler calls, respectively, "accomplishment" and 
"achievement" terms (Linguistics in Philosophy pp.97-121).
These two classes of verb-uses form part of a fourfold classi­
fication which Vendler sets up by distinguishing "activity", 
"accomplishment", "achievement" and "state" terms on the basis 
of the different "time-schemata" exhibited in the use of verbs; 
"...the concept of activities calls for periods of time that 
are not unique or definite. Accomplishments...imply the notion 
of unique and definite time periods.... achievements involve 
unique and definite time instants, states involve time instants 
in an indefinite and nonunique sense"(pp.106-7). Vendler claims 
that the "air of completeness" about this classification is one 
of its merits. But on closer inspection of his examples it 
seems that the bases of his different time-schemata are at once, 
though in different ways, both too fine-grained and not fine­
grained enough to do justice to the interesting differences 
that there are between uses of verbs. For instance, the distinc­
tion between activity and accomplishment terms is developed 
with reference to such examples as "running" and "pushing a 
cart" (activity terms) and "running a mile" and "drawing a 
circle" (accomplishment terms). But on Vendler’s criteria, "run­
ning a distance” and "drawing a line" would be classified as 
activity terms, and it may be questioned (a) whether the differ­
ence between these terms and "running a mile" and "drawing a 
circle" does not just show a difference between the types of 
thing that can be referred to with the grammatical object of 
these verbs rather than a difference between uses of these
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verbs, and (b) whether the former difference is more signifi­
cant than the difference between transitive and intransitive 
uses of verbs which Vendler'a criterion obliterates by classi­
fying both "running" and "running a distance" as activity terms# 
In view of Vendler’s classification being designed to cap­
ture different uses of verbs, it is surprising that he does not 
incorporate within his system of classification the distinction 
between dispositional and occurrent uses of verbs. Vendler is 
evidently aware of these distinct types of use but he classi­
fies dispositional uses of verbs as state terms. "Habits (in a 
broader sense including occupations, dispositions, abilities, 
and so forth) are also states in our sense. Compare the two 
questions : ’Are you smoking?’ and ’Do you smoke?* The first 
one asks about an activity, the second, a state....It is not 
only activities that are "habit-forming" in this sense. Writers 
are people who write books or articles, and writing a book is 
an accomplishment ; dogcatchers are men who catch dogs, and 
catching a dog is an achievement.... Many activities (and some 
accomplishments and achievements) have a "derived" state sense 
A sic_7"(pp.108-9). However, the suggestion that Vendler*s 
classification of activity, accomplishment and achievement 
terms on the one hand and state terms on the other hand cap­
tures the distinction between occurrent and dispositional uses 
of verbs, albeit clumsily and with idiosyncratic terminology, 
is not borne out by his discussion of the verb "see" in the 
last few sections of the chapter. There, Vendler distinguishes 
the use of "see" as an achievement terra, as in "I see it now!", 
from its use in "I saw him cross the street". Vendler claims, 
correctly, that when the verb is used in this latter way its 
sense involves a period of time, and he asks whether such
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a period la a process or a state. Denying that seeing can be a 
process, Vendler opts for the latter. But this is an occurrent 
use of "see", and classifying it as a state term along with 
dispositional uses obscures the distinction between this use 
of "see" and its dispositional use in e.g., "The supervisor 
sees his research student each week". There are other tensions 
in Vendler’s categorization of states which will be discussed 
presently. But perhaps sufficient has been said already to 
show both that Vendler’b time-schemata do not provide an ade­
quate basis for distinguishing verb-uses and that his cate­
gorization of types of occurrence that can be expressed by the 
use of verbs and verb phrases is in need of revision.
If different uses of verbs are to be appealed to in draw­
ing type distinctions between occurrences a distinction which 
is of first importance is that between occurrent and disposi­
tional uses of verbs. If this distinction is not observed it 
is most likely that things which are not occurrences will be 
regarded as such. It is the occurrent, not the dispositional, 
uses of verbs that are apposite to distinguishing types of oc­
currence that can be expressed by the use of verbs. Deploying 
the notion of different time-schemata exhibited in the gram­
matical behaviour of verbs may not further this process far 
beyond distinguishing period from point occurrences, i.e., 
those that do have temporal duration from those that do not. 
But using whatever other criteria are sound and relevant to 
current concerns, distinctions may be drawn within these two 
broad types in terms of period events, processes, acts, accom­
plishments, point events, achievements, etc. It will be noted 
that unlike Vendler’s categorization, this list of types of 
occurrence does not include states. The reason for this is
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that it is by no means certain that states are a type of oc­
currence, States are conditions in which things are ; occur­
rences are happenings.
As already remarked, Vendler categorizes both disposi­
tions and occurrences as states. Vsfhether or not dispositions 
are states, they are not occurrences and it seems very forced 
to say, as Vendler does, that an occurrence of someone seeing 
another crossing a street is a state. The seer may get into a 
state because of what he sees but his seeing of what he sees 
is not a state ; rather, it is a period event, i.e., an event 
with temporal duration. Vendler*s claim that such instances of 
seeing are states because seeing is not a process falls foul 
of the suggestio falsi, in his disjunction "a state or a pro-l i t .» i.WiViiAVii» W  ................................  f  ^
cess", that it is only states and processes that have temporal 
duration. However, Vendler categorizes other things beside 
dispositions and occurrences as states. "Prom the point of 
view of time schemata, being married, being present or absent, 
healthy or ill, and so on also behave like states. But then we 
can take one more step and realize that this is true of all 
qualities. Indeed, something is hard, hot, or yellow for a 
time, yet to be yellow, for instance, does not mean that a pro­
cess of yellowing is going on* Similarly, although hardening 
is a process (activity or accomplishment), being hard is a 
state"(p.108), Now these examples, someone’s being married, 
healthy or ill, and something’s being hard, hot or yellow, are 
examples of states. Each is a condition which some person 
or thing may be in. But what is notable about these examples 
is that they are neither occurrences nor, save for the excep­
tion of being ill, can they be expressed by the use of verbs. 
Marrying, or getting married, is an occurrence, but being mar-
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ried is a state ; one may present or absent oneself, and each 
of these is an occurrence, but each is different from being 
present and being absent. The difference between occurrences 
which initiate states and the states themselves is fairly ob­
vious. A typical form of expression of states is not a verb, 
as is the case for occurrences, but a predicate formed with 
the copula and an adjective. This linguistic difference re­
flects the difference between states, as conditions in which 
things are, and occurrences as happenings. The tension in 
Vendler*s categorization of states on the basis of his time- 
schema for state terms is this. A few verbs, e.g., "ail" and 
"equal", whose use does exhibit this time-schema, are used to 
express states. But all those verbs whose occurrent use exhib­
its this time-schema are not used to express states, and most 
of those terms whose use exhibits this time-schema and which 
are used to express states are not verbs. Vendler himself
notes this tension in his comment on states : "...that puz- !1zling category in which the role of verb melts into that of |
predicate, and actions fade into qualities and relations"(p.109). |
However, in these last few points there are indications 
1^both of an explanation of why "consequence" does not function Iias a verb and of the status of consequences in contrast to that j
of effects and results. If it is the case, as it seems reason- |
iable to suppose, that if something is an occurrence of a cer­
tain type then it can be expressed by the use of a verb, it iIfollows from "consequence" not being used as a verb that conse- I
‘ Iquences are not occurrences. The examples adduced in the previ- j
ous paragraph of states initiated by occurrences suggest what |
the status of consequences of acts may be. Just as, for in­
stance, being harder and being hotter are consequences of the
I
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processes of, respectively, hardening and heating, so being 
married Is a consequence of the act of getting married. The 
distinctions marked in ordinary language between various types 
of consequence - logical and causal consequences, natural and 
conventional consequences, etc. - can easily be accommodated 
by this view of consequences of acts as states arising from 
("consequent upon") the performance of acts. Being married is 
a logical consequence of getting married but being tired and 
happy would be causal consequences of getting married. If a 
wedding couple were tired in consequence of getting married 
then their tiring would be an effect of getting married ; their 
being tired would be a logical consequence of their tiring. A 
promisor being committed to perform the promised act is a con­
ventional consequence of his promising ; the promisee’s being 
convinced that the promisor will perform the promised act is a 
natural ( and also causal) consequence of the promisor’s act.
It has been suggested that effects and results are tokens 
of different types of occurrence ; accomplishments and achieve­
ments respectively. This distinction may be made more clear by 
the following example. Track athletes are said to accomplish 
distances and field athletes are said to achieve distances. But 
it is not said of track athletes that they achieve the distances 
they run ; rather that they achieve certain times for the dis­
tances they run or that they accomplish the distances in certain 
times. And it is not said of field athletes that they accomplish 
the distances of their jumps or throws ; rather that they 
achieve these and accomplish their run-ups, take-offs and wind­
ups. The selectivity of these terms in descriptions of athletic 
events is not a terminological idiosyncrasy, peculiar to such
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descriptions ; it reflects a general difference between accom- 
plishments and achievements whose connexions with effects and 
results are also evident in this example. What is said to be
achieved in each case determines the result of the event. The 
iplacings of competitors in field events are determined by the 
distances of their throws and leaps ; the placings of competi­
tors in track events are determined by the times taken to cover 
the distances. What is said to be accomplished in each case is 
part of what is effected ; jumpers effect their take-offs, jum­
pers and javelin-throwers effect their run-ups, hammer- and 
discus-throwers effect their wind-ups. Nor is it too forced to 
say that runners effect the distances they accomplish ; for in­
stance, "He effected the rest of the distance with blood pour­
ing from his wound, gripping the baton between his teeth, hold­
ing his shorts up with one hand and acknowledging the cheers of 
the crowd with the other".
When acts are assessed in terms of what is accomplished or 
achieved by their performance assessments of different types are 
being made. To know what is accomplished by an act is not neces­
sarily to know what is achieved thereby. For instance, to knov/
that a runner finished in a race, that he accomplished the dis­
tance, is not to know what he achieved, i.e., whether or not he 
won or where he was placed - a result of the race. And to know
that a survey team has accomplished its task of effecting a
survey of an area is not to know the results of the survey - 
whether or not oil was found. Accomplishments consist in what is 
completed by an act, achievements consist in something over and 
above the completion of the act. Confirming a hypothesis, an 
achievement, does not consist in an extra piece of experimental 
testing, and missing a train is not of a piece with running onto
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the platform as the train pulls out of the station. In eases 
where achievements are results, the assessment of an act’s 
achievement is generally made with reference to the purpose 
with which the act was performed. This is evident from the ath­
letics example. A field athlete’s purpose in competition is to 
jump or throw as far as he can, and it is not the purpose of 
an athlete competing In a track event to accomplish the dis­
tance of his race but generally to cover that distance in the 
shortest possible time. These are the things which the athletes 
purpose to do and with reference to which their achievements 
are assessed. These are things striven for, unlike what is ac­
complished. A well trained mi1er does not have to strive to ac­
complish that distance, just as a well trained discus-thrower 
does not have to strive to accomplish his wind-up and a well 
trained pole-vaulter does not have to strive to accomplish his 
run-up and take-off in an attempt at a certain height ; their 
training enables them to do these things without striving, and 
with "accomplished ease".
The connexions between results, achievements and purposes 
that are evident in this example suggest that a result of an 
act is the more or less successful outcome of an attempt by an i
agent to achieve some purpose. "Purpose" may be understood here |Ias a general term for a variety of objects of acts whose I
'iachievement may be attempted by an agent, e.g., the end, goal j
or objective which an agent has in mind when acting in a cer- |
tain way, the aim or point of his action, etc. There are no j
doubt discernible differences between some of these but some- 1]
thing which they all need to be distinguished from, and in con- |
Itrast to which they are as one, is an agent’s intention in act- i|
Iing in a certain way. Utterances of the forms "A v-ed Intention- |
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ally" and "A v-ed purposely", where in each case "A" reserves 
a place for an. agent-referring expression and "v" reserves a 
place for a verb of action, can be used to deny that the agent 
acted, respectively, without any intention and without any pur­
pose. But whereas in the former case, it can be inferred from 
the utterance what the agent’s intention was, in the latter 
case, it cannot be inferred from the utterance what the agent’s 
purpose was. If it is said that she left her handkerchief there 
intentionally, vjhat ie being said is that she did not leave the 
handkerchief there by accident or by mistake, unconsciously or 
inadvertently, but with the intention of so doing. If it is 
said that she left her handkerchief there purposely, then while 
it may be true that she acted with some purpose, what that pur­
pose was cannot be inferred from what is said; e.g., that her 
purpose in leaving the handkerchief there was to compromise an­
other. The same point is suggested by the fact that neither "A 
v-ed on intention" nor "A v-ed for an intention" yield accept­
able sentences, but both "A v-ed on purpose" and "A v-ed for a 
purpose" do. Utterances of either of the latter tv/o forms al­
lude to some object of the act, further to its performance, to 
be achieved by so acting. In line with this difference between 
intentions relating to acts themselves and purposes relating to 
objects to be achieved by acting is the difference between the 
sufficient conditions for fulfilling an intention and achieving 
a purpose. The performance of the act expressed by the verb of 
action "v" in each utterance is a sufficient condition for the 
former but not for the latter. Leaving the handkerchief there 
fulfills the lady’s intention but it does not necessarily ach­
ieve her purpose ; the abandoned handkerchief may go forever 
unnoticed so that no-one is compromised.
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Just as some acts can be performed both intentionally 
and purposely, with some intention and with some purpose, so 
other acts, e.g., snoring while asleep, can be performed both 
unintentionally and purposelessly, without any intention and 
without any purpose. The distinction between intentions and 
purposes may be made more clear by cases in which acts are per­
formed with one and not the other. Wanton acts of vandalism 
are examples of acts that are performed without any purpose 
but with some intention. People who wantonly deface public 
buildings or slash the tyres of parked cars do so purposelessly 
but not unintentionally. They are not unaware of what they are 
doing when they push the point of the knife through the rubber, 
nor do they daub the walls accidentally. More interesting is 
the question whether acts can be performed without any inten­
tion but with some purpose. If there were such acts then they 
could be said, literally and truly, to be performed "accident­
ally on purpose", for to perform an act accidentally is to per­
form it unintentionally. But usually this phrase is not used 
literally, but sarcastically, insinuatingly. And usually the 
acts so described are performed in such a way as to only make 
them appear as though they are performed unintentionally while 
they are, in fact, performed intentionally (and on purpose) 
and not accidentally. Thus a reluctant party-goer, opening the 
car door for his eagerly anticipating partner as they are about 
to set off for the party may "accidentally on purpose" drop the 
car keys down the drain at the kerb-side, thereby preventing 
their departure. His act may appear to be unintentional, and it 
may be backed up with exasperated exclamations. The deception 
may work ; the party may be avoided and the lady may not be too 
disappointed after all. But her charge that he had dropped the
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keys down the drain "accidentally on purpose" would be one way 
of showing that the deception had been penetrated. And if there 
had been no deception then the act would not have been perform­
ed "accidentally on purpose" because it would not have been 
performed on purpose. That the phrase "accidentally on purpose" 
is usually reserved for descriptions of acts whose appearances 
are contrary to fact suggests that acts cannot, in fact, be per­
formed accidentally on purpose, i.e., unintentionally but on 
purpose. However, there are cases in which acts performed unin­
tentionally nevertheless* achieve purposes which their agents 
have. The way in which B.F. Goodrich discovered the method of 
what later became known as the vulcanization of rubber provides 
an example. While conducting experiments to find a way of reduc­
ing the sensitivity of rubber compounds to variations in temp­
erature, Goodrich unintentionally left a bunsen flame burning 
beneath a crucible containing some latex solution. After recti­
fying his mistake and allowing the crucible to cool he noticed 
that its contents were harder and tougher than before, and sub­
sequent tests showed their texture to be less susceptible to 
changes in temperature than previously. Goodrich had found what 
he had been looking for : he achieved his purpose by doing some­
thing which he did not intend to do. Goodrich’s unintentional 
act of leaving the bunsen burning under the crucible would not 
be described as having been performed purposely, nor on purpose 
or for the purpose he had in conducting his experiments but
«Zrather as being to the purpose he had.
The identification of results with achievements of purposes 
and the possibility of some acts being performed (either inten­
tionally or unintentionally) without any purpose helps to ex­
plain why some acts do not have any results. (This last claim
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was made in the second previous section on the basis of the 
forms of the adjectives "resultful" and "resultless",) Those 
acts which have no results are those acts which are not per­
formed purposely, nor on or for a purpose, or whose perhaps 
unintentional performance is not to any purpose.
The claim that a result of an act is the more or less suc­
cessful outcome of an attempt by an agent to achieve a purpose 
requires for its clarification some clarification of the no­
tions of attempting and trying. The verbs "try" and "attempt" 
are not verbs of action. This is shown by the oddity of the 
simple answers "Attempting" or "Trying" to the question "What 
is he doing?" At best, each answer is elliptical, requiring an­
other verb to be understood or supplied in order for the answer 
to make sense. The complementing verb need not be a verb of 
action : "Attempting to find it" and "Trying to win" are equal­
ly sensible answers to the question "What is he doing?" as "At­
tempting to look for it" and "Trying to run". Hence whether or 
not the verb "v" in the complexes "trying to v" and "attempting 
to v" is itself a verb of action, each of these verb complexes 
is the form of a verb of action if, when filled out, the whole 
yields a sensible answer to the question "What is he doing?" 
Because "try" and "attempt" are not verbs of action, "trying" 
and "attempting" are not names of species of acts, nor even 
names of genera of acts divisible into species.
Thalberg, in his account of trying, "Some Puzzles about 
Effort"(B.A.pp.87-104). claims otherwise and suggests that pre­
tending is a form of trying (p.94). The falsity of this sugges­
tion is fairly obvious. In one of Baroness Orczy’s stories, the 
French agent, Chauvelin, intercepts a message written over the 
device of the Scarlet Pimpernel, telling the addressee to meet
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the writer in a certain room of a house at a certain time during 
a party that is to he given in the house. Chauvelin goes to the 
party and at the appointed hour moves to watch the room in order 
to discover the identity of the Scarlet Pimpernel. Nobody comes. 
Eventually, Chauvelin enters the room to find onl,y Sir Percy 
Blakeney, sprawled on his back on a couch, snoring softly and 
apparently the worse for the wine. Chauvelin withdraws, foiled 
again. The Scarlet Pimpernel was pretending to be asleep but he 
was not trying to be asleep. Thalberg argues that because trying 
to try is impossible and pretending is a form of trying, trying 
to pretend is impossible. He examines one of Austin’s examples 
of trying to pretend. Thalberg’s failure to refute this counter­
example is instructive because some of Austin’s comments on the 
example are indicative of the functions of the verbs "try” and 
"attempt" and help to clarify the notions of trying and attempt­
ing. The example occurs in Austin’s paper "Pretending"(Papers 
pp.253-71). "Told to pretend to be a hyena at a party....you 
proceed to jump around powerfully on your hind legs, boxing with 
your fists and fondling something in your pocket....you evident­
ly have a wrong idea of what a hyena is....You are meaning or
trying to pretend to be a hyena, but actually behaving like a \ikangaroo : this is the correct and the shortest accurate way of j 
describing the situation. There is no short answer to the ques­
tion ’Is he pretending to be a hyena or isn’t he?’ nor to ’Is he 
pretending to be a hyena or a kangaroo?* since such simple ex­
pressions are not adequate to cope with such a complicated case" 
(pp.265-7). Part of Thalberg’s response to this example is that
I"...if we assume, with Austin, that you meant to pretend to be a I
hyena, we must conclude that you were indeed pretending, although |
your gestures were singularly inappropriate. Consequently, you i
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were not trying to oretend"(E,A.p.94). There are two errors in 
the response so far. The first is in Thalberg’s apparent claim 
that if someone intends to pretend ("meant" here just means 
"intended") then he does pretend, no matter how inappropriate 
his gestures. This is far too strong ; with instances of pre­
tending, as with instances of any other intentional action, 
there are limits to the types of act that may be performed 
which serve to fulfil the Intention with which they are per­
formed. Thalberg’s second error is in his claim that from "you 
were indeed pretending" it follows that you were not trying to 
pretend. Comment on the falsity of the principle "If A (indeed) 
v-ed, then A did not try to v" will be deferred for the moment. 
For Thalberg continues, "If Austin cannot give the short answer 
that you were not pretending to be a hyena, how will he main­
tain that you were only trying?"(p.94). It seems from this lat­
ter question that Thalberg thinks that by not being able to 
give the short answer that you were not pretending to be a hy­
ena, Austin is committed to giving the short answer that you 
were pretending to be a hyena, which makes the claim that you 
were only trying to pretend to be a hyena out of place. But 
Austin is not so committed, and his point was, of course, that 
none of the short answers invited by the questions "Is he pre­
tending to be a hyena or isn’t he?" and "Is he pretending to be 
a hyena or a kangaroo?" will do in the circumstances. The ques­
tions oversimplify the complicated situations they are about 
and short answers to them are either false or misleading. The 
short answer "A kangaroo" given to the second question is false 
because although his behaviour is like that of a kangaroo, he 
is not pretending to be a kangaroo because that is not his in­
tention and pretending is intention-dependent. One cannot pre­
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tend inadvertently. The short answer "A hyena" given to either 
question is false, because although it is his intention to pre­
tend to be a hyena his performance falls short of fulfilling 
that intention. And the answers "No" or "No, not a hyena" given 
to the first question are misleading, because they may suggest 
that he is pretending to be something other than a hyena when 
he is in fact not managing to pretend to be anything. It is in 
cases such as these, where the situation to be described is more 
complex than any simple description can adequately cope with, 
that such words as "try" and "attempt" come into play. "He is 
trying to pretend to be a hyena" is the shortest accurate de­
scription of what is done in the situation, and the shortest 
accurate answer to the question "Vihat is he doing?" asked about 
that situation.
The vocabulary of verbs of action is finite whereas the 
range of what those verbs are used to express is not so finite ; 
it is subject to indefinite extension by the number of different 
ways in which people do things and the number of different ways 
in which they fail to do things. The verbs "try" and "attempt" 
provide means for systematically extending the scope of the vo­
cabulary of verbs of action and thus help to satisfy the need, 
when it arises, for a means of expressing those acts performed, 
successfully or unsuccessfully, in ways which cannot be express­
ed by simple verbs of action. In some cases, the function of the 
verbs "try" and "attempt" in the complexes "try to v" and "at­
tempt to v" is that of what Austin called "adjuster-words". The 
analogy he used to explain the meaning of this term may not be 
familiar. "If we think of words as being shot like arrows at the 
world, the function of these adjuster-words is to free us from 
the disability of being able to shoot only straight ahead ; by
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their use on occasion, other word8_/can be, so to speak, 
brought into connexion with targets lying slightly off the 
simple, straightforward line on which they are ordinarily 
aimed"(S.S.p.74). The example of the description of the per­
son intending to pretend to be a hyena, but behaving like a 
kangaroo instead, is a case in point. There is no simple verb 
of action "v" such that a description of the form "He is v-ing" 
would be an accurate description of his performance. "He is 
trying to pretend to be a hyena" contains the necessary adjust­
ment to "He is pretending to be a hyena". It is easy to imagine 
many other similar examples. But it is important to notice that 
the use of "try" and "attempt" is not confined to descriptions 
of acts which are in some way unsuccessful. Someone may have 
tried to get a job and got it. Descriptions of the type "He ap­
plied for the job and got it" may be adequate for some such 
situations but the moves made in some other situations in order 
to get the job may not be as uncomplicated and straightforward 
as can be expressed simply by the verb "apply". For instance, 
someone who wants the job and is well qualified to hold it but 
is ineligible to apply for it may resort to all sorts of manoe­
uvres - pleas, cajoleries, threats and even blackmail - in order 
to circumvent his ineligibility. Here again, there is no simple 
verb of action "v" such that a description of the form "He v-ed" 
is an accurate description of the acts he performed in order to 
have his application "accepted". The description "He tried to 
get the job and got it" copes with the complication.
The verb complexes "try to v" and "attempt to v" provide 
compendious forms for expressing acts which cannot be expressed 
by simple verbs of action. Their use brackets what is done in 
certain ways ; this bracketing function is also evident in the
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use of the nouns "try" and "attempt"» Confronted by the need 
to say what a team of mountaineers is doing, the long story of 
their performance of all the planned tasks as well as the un­
foreseen and perhaps unforeseeable ones can be cut short by 
saying that they are making an attempt on the summit. Descrip­
tions of acts cast in these forms are often couched in terms 
of the agents’ intentions or purposes when, autobiographical and 
in terms of imputed intentions and purposes when not autobio­
graphical. This is probably because of the foreknowledge of an 
agent’s acts yielded by his intentions and purposes ; it does 
not evidence any necessary conceptual link between trying or 
attempting and intending or purposing. An agent can try to do 
something which he does not intend to do ; for instance, with 
his key not turning in the lock and beginning to wonder what 
can be wrong, someone may be trying to get into his neighbour’s 
garage while not intending to do that but intending to get into 
his own adjacent garage. And conversely, an agent may be intend­
ing, in the sense of having an intention, to do something while
 not trying to do it. For instance, someone may intend to-day to
go to the cinema to-morrow, but his attempt to go to the cinema 
may not commence until he sets off for the cinema to-morrow. 
Examples can also be constructed to illustrate the independence 
of attempts and purposes. Thus the definition of trying which 
O ’Shaughnessy gives in "Trying (as the Mental ’Pineal Gland*)" 
(J.P.(1975)pp.565-86) seems to be misconceived : "Trying con­
sists in doing, intentionally and with just that purpose, what­
ever one takes to be needed if, the rest of the world suitably 
cooperating, one is to perform the action"(p.369).
A lack of awareness of the point that the verbs "try" and 
"attempt" do not function as verbs of action has led some to
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regard trying and attempting as particular species of acts, 
sui generis, and to seek for their essential characteristics®
On closer inspection, the features latched on to appear not to 
he essential in so far as contexts for the unexceptionable use 
of "try" and "attempt" can be constructed in which these fea­
tures are not evident. For instance, Thalberg maintains that 
one requirement for trying is that there is some obstacle in 
the way of the agent doing what he tries to do. "How could you 
strain in lifting your arm when you are in a normal, unhinder­
ed condition? Something must hamper you* The hindrance would 
be external if you are holding an immense bar-bell that makes 
you toil as you raise your arms above your head. Perhaps the 
impediment is inside you. You might have a painful stiffness 
that makes you struggle to move your arm"(E.A.p.91). Thalberg*s 
confusion of trying and striving is evident here. The title of 
his chapter on trying, "Some Puzzles about Effort", is sympto­
matic of this confusion and it pervades his account. It may be 
a necessary condition for an agent striving to do something 
that there is some impediment in his way, against which he has 
to exert himself or expend some effort, but this is not a neces­
sary condition for trying to do something. Lying quite still in 
bed, fatigued and letting oneself drift into unconsciousness, 
one is trying to go to sleep but one is not exerting oneself or 
expending any effort in the attempt. Conversely, a sleeper in 
the grip of a nightmare and thrashing about among the bed­
clothes is expending a good deal of effort, but could not lit­
erally be said to be trying to avoid the avalanche which he 
dreams is about to engulf him, nor literally be said to be try­
ing to do anything. Thalberg appears to have derived this re­
quirement for trying from some remarks in Philosophical Investi-
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gâtions. He makes an invalid Inference from one of these re­
marks : "’At all costs I will get to that house.’ - But if 
there is no difficulty about it - can I try at all costs to 
get to that house?"(§623). Perhaps not ; but the most that can 
be inferred from this is that one cannot try ab all costs to do 
something if there is no difficulty about doing it. It cannot 
be inferred that one cannot try to do something if there is no 
difficulty about it. "Can I try to get to that house if there is 
no difficulty about it?" "Of course you can. Just walk towards it.’ 
Another of Wittgenstein’s remarks, that "...in the sense in 
which I cannot fail to will, I cannot try to will either"(§618), 
seems to have inspired another of Thalberg’s requirements for 
trying : "...there must be some doubt that he will manage to %, 
before we can talk of his attempt to X. More precisely,; we say 
that a person is trying, or will try, to X, when we think he may 
be unable to X"(E.A.p.91). It is on the basis of this point of 
talk of trying "suggesting the likelihood of failure" that Thal­
berg develops the principle "If A tried to v, then A did not v"; 
the contrapositive of "If A v-ed, then A did not try to v". The 
example of someone trying to get a job and getting it shows this 
principle to be false. What seems to have led Thalberg to this | 
hasty and false generalization is an ignorance of the point that 
the predominant but not exclusive use of the verbs "try" and "at- j 
tempt" occurs in descriptions of acts which are in some way un- j 
successful. As Heath has noted succinctly in "Trying and Attempt- 
ing"(p.A.S.S.(197l)pp.195-808). "If trying meant having to fail, 
then obviously nobody would try if he could help it" (p. 194). "A 
tried to v" does not entail either "A v-ed" or "A did not v" ; 
the success or failure of an attempt is logically and conceptu­
ally independent of the attempt. It will, therefore, always be
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an open question whether an agent’s attempt to achieve some 
purpose succeeds or fails. And given the need foi' answers to 
such questions in the course of rational goal-directed action, 
the concept of results, a concept of outcomes of attempts to 
achieve purposes, can he seen to satisfy the need for a con­
cept in terms of which answers to those questions can be given.^ 
The notions of success and failure in results are reflect­
ed in the senses of the words and phrases used to express out­
comes of this type. Results of contests are usually expressed 
in terms of victories and defeats, wins and losses. Results of 
some kinds of tests and examinations are expressed in terms of 
passing and failing the test or examination»; the result of an­
other kind of test may be that a hypothesis is confirmed or dis- 
confirmed, and the result of another kind of examination may be 
that something is or is not found.A-marksman hits the bull’s-eye, 
scores an "outer" or misses the target ; a patient is completely 
cured, partially cured or dies as a result of the doctor’s 
treatment, the reader gets the point or fails to get the point. 
Some of the achievement verbs used to express results may also 
be used to express the purpose an agent has in performing a cer­
tain act. Generally, the purpose of competing in contests is to 
win and the purpose of travelling is to arrive at one’s destina­
tion, but not always. The purpose a person has in running in a 
race may not be to win it but to set a fast pace in its early 
stages in order to assist another runner to establish a record 
time, and the purpose of taking a walk may not be to arrive at a 
particular destination but merely to get some exercise or to 
sight-see. In each case, however, the degree of success or fail­
ure with which the agent’s purpose is achieved determines the 
result of his act.
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Foot-notes :
1 (from p.99) This remark is not made in Purberg’s revised 
work, Saying and Meaning*
2 (from p.104) This passage is quoted from the first edition 
of Words. The first quoted sentence is much more clear than 
the corresponding sentence in the second edition* In the 
phrase "the consequential effects of perlocutions", "of" 
should be read with its identity sense rather than with any 
of its origin, derivation or cause senses.
3 (from p.148) Austin discussed the differences between acting 
intentionally and purposely, and deliberately, more expertly, 
more exhaustively and more entertainingly in "Three Ways of 
Spilling Ink"(Papers pp.278-87).
4 (from p.157) Perhaps it has been unfair to zero in on Thal­
berg’ s account of trying in this section. But his account 
does have the merit over some others of being clearly false 
in parts and generally relevant to the topic. O ’Shaughnessy’s 
account, as its title suggests - "Trying (as the Mental ’Pin­
eal Gland’)"(J.P.(I975)pp.365-86) - does not clearly make the 
ascent to the level of falsehood, and Winch in "Trying and 
Attempting"(P.A.S.S.(1971)00.209-27) says little on the sub­
ject. Each of these accounts is to be distinguished from 
Heath’s generally splendid account, "Trying and Attempting" 
(P.A.S.S.(197l)pp.193-208). With his discussion of some of 
Austin’s remarks, Thalberg comes closest to, without actually 
touching on, the points which the writer has tried to develop 
in this account.
Chapter Four 
The Constitution of Illocutionary Acts
To perform an illocutionary act ’’•♦.is not to perform an 
act in some specially physical way, other than in so far as it 
involves, when verbal, the making of movements of vocal organs 
•••"(Words p.134). There is, then, an initial problem confront­
ing any attempt to give an account of illocutionary acts and, 
therewith, an account of the performative use of language, in 
terras of a theory of action. It may be called the problem of 
the constitution of illocutionary acts. The problem arises be­
cause such acts are not just physical acts ; an illocutionary 
act is not constituted ^  toto by movements of parts of the 
agent’s physical body. In this, illocutionary acts are unlike 
such acts as crossing the legs, folding the arms, twiddling the 
thumbs, nodding and blinking which are wholly constituted by 
movements of parts of the body and to whose performance there 
need be nothing more than such movements. The problem consists 
in determining the feature(s), apart from those ’’...more or less 
indescribable movements with the vocal organs”(p.114), by virtue 
of which an act is constituted as an illocutionary act.
these too are not just physical acts. The solution to this prob­
lem, given in Chapter One, is that a speaker’s act of uttering 
certain noises is constituted as a locutionary act by virtue of 
its being performed in a certain speech context, in conformity 
with the conventions of a language and fulfilling the speaker’s 
intentions with respect to that act. This solution offers a 
standing temptation to give a parallel account of the constitu­
tion of illocutionary acts in terras of linguistic conventions 
and/or speakers’ intentions. But, as argued in Chapter Two, lo-
A similar problem arises in the case of locutionary acts ; i
J
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cutionary and illocutionary acts are distinct, and later, in 
Chapter Six, it will be argued against those who have succumbed 
in different ways to this temptation that neither the speaker’s 
intentions nor the conventions of a language are the constitu­
tive features of illocutionary acts. The solution to the prob­
lem of the constitution of locutionary acts does, however, pro­
vide part of a solution to the problem of the constitution of 
illocutionary acts. For in so far as a use of language is exem­
plified by the performance of illocutionary acts it is only iui 
the performance of a locutionary act that an illocutionary act 
can be performed. So the problem can be formulated in the fol­
lowing question : \Vhat is the general feature by virtue of 
which a locutionary act is constituted as an illocutionary act?
Austin characterized both locutionary and illocutionary 
acts as conventional acts. Some of his remarks suggest that his 
adoption of the natural-conventional distinction here was simply 
in order to mark the distinction between physical and non-physi­
cal acts and- to register the point that illocutionary (and locu­
tionary) acts are not physical acts. For instance, "...a great 
many of the acts which fall within the province of Ethics are 
not, as philosophers are too prone to assume, simply in the last 
resort physical movements ; very many of them have the general 
character, in whole or part, of conventional...acts..."(pp.19-20). 
Later, the same contrast is alluded to in "...a non-conventional 
’physical* action. .."(p.Ill), and on the following tv/o pages il­
locutionary (conventional) acts were spoken of in distinction 
from physical acts and their natural consequences. This is not 
an idiosyncratic use of the natural-conventional distinction ; 
there is an established use of it in legal writing to mark the 
difference between things physical and non-physical. Thus Markby
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in his Elements of Law writes in §180 on Death : ”... besides 
the cessation of physical existence which is generally signi­
fied by the term, there is known to some systems of law a sort 
of conventional death....This used to be considered in Europe 
as taking place when a man made certain religious vows and be­
came a monk.” But other remarks make it clear that the point of 
Austin’s reiterated characterization of illocutionary acts as 
conventional acts was not just to emphasize the point that they 
are not a type of physical act. It was also to indicate the di­
rection in which a solution to the problem of the constitution 
of illocutionary acts was to be sought. For Austin also spoke 
of the conventions of illocutionary force and of illocutionary 
acts as acts performed in conformity with such conventions. "We 
must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act : 
an act done as conforming to a convention"(Words p.105). "What 
we do import by the use of the nomenclature of illocution is a 
reference, not to the consequences (at least in any ordinary 
sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of illocutionary 
force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion 
of the issuing of the utterance"(p.115), And there is that one 
cryptic but crucial remark on the constitution of illocutionary 
acts, "...that the act is constituted not by intention or by 
fact, essentially but by convention (which is, of course, a 
fact)"(p.l28).
It is important, therefore, to determine the sense with 
which Austin used "convention" in this latter connexion ; not 
only in order to solve the problem of the constitution of illo­
cutionary acts and thereby open the way for an account of the 
performative use of language, but also from the point of view 
of defending Austin’s conception of speech acts. For as well as
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being central to that conception, Austin’s thesis that illocu­
tionary acts are conventional acts, or acts constituted by con­
ventions, is also the thesis which has attracted the most con­
certed opposition from critics of that conception. This critic­
ism can hardly be supposed to be directed towards denying that 
illocutionary acts are not a type of physical act.
Irrespective of how sympathetically Austin’s thesis of the 
conventionality of illocutionary acts has been received, it has 
become customary for that thesis and Austin’s use of the natural- 
conventional distinction to be interpreted in terms of a distinc­
tion between brute and institutional facts. Much of the clarifi­
cation that has been given to this distinction is owed to An­
se ombe and her article "On Brute Facts"(Ah.(I958)pp.69-78). If 
it were to be asked, as Anscoïribe asks, whether the fact, W, that 
she owes the grocer so much money, consists in any facts beyond 
the ones, x,y,z, that she ordered a quarter of potatoes from hii% 
that he delivered them and that he sent her a bill, the answer 
would be "No". In the context of our institutions, the fact that 
the grocer is owed so much for the potatoes consists in these 
facts. The facts x,y,z are brute facts with respect to the in­
stitutional fact, W. A statement of W is not a description of 
the relevant institutions (in this case, those of buying and 
selling goods) ; but a statement of this kind presupposes such 
institutions as contextual background in order to be the kind of 
statement it is. But as for W with respect to x,y,z, so also for 
x,y,z. A set of events is the ordering and delivering of a quart­
er of potatoes and something is a bill only in the context of 
our institutions, hence the distinction between brute and insti­
tutional facts is not an absolute one, separating all facts into
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two mutually exclusive classes ; it is relative to the facts 
in question. Being supplied with a quarter of potatoes is a 
brute fact with respect to owing the supplier for them, but 
having the potatoes brought to one’s house, and left there, 
are brute facts with respect to being supplied with them. In 
essence, Anscombe’s distinction is that one fact is brute with 
respect to another if the description of the second is true in 
virtue of the first obtaining, among others, in the appropriate 
context, and if the description of the second presupposes an 
institutional context for its truth or falsity which is not pre­
supposed for the truth of the description of the first. Thus, 
being supplied with a quarter of potatoes is a brute fact with 
respect to owing the supplier for them, for v/hile the descrip­
tion of the second is true by virtue of the first obtaining, 
among others, in the context of the institutions of buying and 
selling goods, this institutional context is presupposed for I
the description of the second but not for that of the first.
The distinction between brute and institutional facts I
would seem to be easily applicable to the phenomena central to I
!Austin’s conception of speech acts. Accomplished illocutionary i
!acts which he maintained are conventional acts could be held \
out as good examples of institutional facts. It could be held,
for instance, that given the institutions of acting within some I
!system of ranked authority, of competitive sport, of debate and I
even of ordinary conversation, descriptions of illocutionary I
acts such as commanding, declaring won, arguing, greeting, etc. 
are true in virtue of other facts obtaining whose descriptions 
do not presuppose the same institutional contexts j such facts 
as, for instance, that in certain circumstances, the speaker 
issued a meaningful utterance and addressed it to an audience.
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Stresses and strains may begin to appear when an attempt is 
made to accommodate some of Austin’s other claims within this 
interpretation, e.g., the claims that locutionary acts are con­
ventional acts and perlocutionary acts are not conventional 
acts. But perhaps proponents of this interpretation could ex­
ploit the relativity of the distinction between brute and in­
stitutional facts and accommodate these- claims by holding that 
while performances of locutionary acts are brute facts with re­
spect to illocutionary acts, there are other acts whose perform­
ances are brute facts with respect to the performance of a locu­
tionary act. The description of an act of saying something pre­
supposes the institution of speech and is true in virtue of 
other facts obtaining whose descriptions do not necessarily pre­
suppose the same institutional context for their truth or false­
hood, e.g., that a person utters certain noises, in conformity 
with certain linguistic conventions, with certain intentions.
And it could be held that descriptions of perlocutionary acts 
such as convincing, humiliating and persuading, while presuppos­
ing some institutional context and being true in virtue of other 
facts obtaining whose descriptions do not presuppose the same 
institutional context, do not themselves presuppose the same or 
as much institutional context as descriptions of either locution­
ary or illocutionary acts, and hence are brute facts with respect 
to each of these. Or proponents of this interpretation may claim 
that these matters are peripheral. For the main purpose of im­
posing the distinction between brute and institutional facts upon 
Austin’s conception of speech acts has not been to redescribe the 
phenomena ; it has been to provide an interpretative framework | 
for developing or criticizing Austin’s thesis that illocutionary 
acts are conventional acts, acts constituted by convention.
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Searle’s commitment to this interpretation of Austin’s 
thesis is the most explicit. Taking over Anscombe’s distinction, 
Searle cites as examples of institutional facts the facts that 
one team beat another at baseball, a man married a woman, a man 
was convicted of larceny, as well as the fact that a man per­
formed a certain speech act : made a promise, stated a fact, 
etc.(s.A.pp.50-5). The terms in which Searle explicates the no­
tion of institutions are the explanatory terms in his account 
of the constitution of illocutionary acts. "These ’institutions’ 
are systems of constitutive rules"(p.51) and an act is consti­
tuted as an illocutionary act of a particular type by virtue of 
being performed in accordance with the appropriate set of con­
stitutive rules. Some of Strawson’s remarks in "Intention and 
Convention in Speech Acts"(Symp.pp.580-400) also show a commit­
ment to this "institutional-cum-rule-constituted" interpretation 
of Austin’s thesis that illocutionary acts are constituted by 
convention. Examples of illocutionary acts which Strawson allows 
are essentially conventional are adduced from within "...the 
sphere of social institutions which have a legal point (like the 
marriage ceremony and the law courts themselves) or of activi­
ties governed by a definite set of rules (like cricket and games 
generally)..."(p.384). Marrying, a Court judge’s pronouncing 
sentence, a jury foreman’s bringing in of a verdict, redoubling 
in bridge and a cricket umpire’s giving a batsman out are cited 
as examples. "Such acts could have no existence outside the 
rule- or convention-governed practices and procedures of which 
they essentially form parts"(p.39?). Strawson differs from 
Searle by denying that Austin’s thesis is true for all cases. 
Allowing that illocutionary acts of some types are essentially 
conventional, i.e., constituted by extra-linguistic conventions,
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Strawson maintains that in many cases, warning and objecting 
for instance, no conventions are involved other than those 
linguistic conventions required to determine the meaning of 
the utterance in the issuing of which the illocutionary act 
is performed. To the extent that Strawson affirms or denies 
Austin’s thesis, hov/ever, that thesis is interpreted in terms 
of rule-constituted acts performed in the context of certain 
social institutions. Schiffer denies completely the truth of 
Austin’s thesis, summarily dismissing the examples of acts 
which Strawson allows are essentially conventional. "Perhaps 
there are some speech acts - e.g., an umpire putting a runner 
out by uttering ’Out!* - which are conventional acts in the 
sense intended by Austin, but these are very special cases and 
of peripheral interest only..."(Meaning p.91) ; "...such speech 
acts as belong to highly conventionalized institutions are...of 
marginal interest only. The primary and important case is that 
of the kind of illocutionary act which is not essentially con­
ventional..." (pp. 93-4). "...I would agree with Strawson that in 
the majority of eases ’it is not as conforming to an accepted 
convention of any kind (other than those linguistic conventions 
which help to fix the meaning of the utterance) that an illocu­
tionary act is performed*. For example, in uttering the sent­
ence ’Jones has only one leg’, S may be objecting to A ’s state­
ment that Jones is a nimble dancer, but that this is so would 
seem to be a result of the intentions with which the sentence 
was uttered and not a result of any conventions of illocutionary 
force ’bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of 
the issuing of the utterance*"(p.91). But Schiffer*s interpre­
tation of the thesis he denies is as one with that of Searle and 
Strawson. "I think that we are to understand Austin’s claim that
16?
illocutionary acts are conventional acts as at least commit- 
ting him to this : a kind of act X is a kind of Illocutionary 
act only if there exist certain conventions such that (pri­
marily) by virtue of these conventions the performance of cer­
tain sorts of non-conventional acts (e.g., uttering sounds of 
a certain type) by certain sorts of persons in certain sorts 
of circumstances is constituted an instance of X-ing. This... 
suggests that Austin thought illocutionary acts are made poss­
ible by conventions or rules of the type which Rawls and 
Searle have called 'constitutive rules'.vl believe that it is 
false that illocutionary acts are conventional acts in the 
sense intended by Austin"(p.91).
Here, then, are three differing views on the truth of 
Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts, 
all based on the "conventional act" "institutional act" = 
"rule-constituted act" interpretation of that thesis. For two 
reasons, it is important to test the fidelity of this interpre­
tation to Austin’s thesis,: first, to determine whether Straw­
son's argument, endorsed by Schiffer, against the thesis so 
interpreted is an ignoratio elenchi or not, and second, to de­
termine the relevance of attempting to develop Austin’s concep­
tion of speech acts within the framework imposed by that inter­
pretation. The interpretation in terms of the distinction be­
tween brute and institutional facts is supposed to provide the 
framework of Austin’s solution to the problem of the constitu­
tion of illocutionary acts. An appropriate test of the fidelity 
of this interpretation, therefore, is whether it accommodates 
his crucial but elliptical remark about the constitution of il­
locutionary acts, that "...the act is constituted not by inten­
tion or by fact, essentially but by convention..."(Words p.128).
168
The short answer is that it does not, hut to show this more of 
the context of that remark needs to he considered.
Austin was discussing the formula :
(1) In saying that..., S was v-ing
which can he filled out to give a true description of a locu­
tionary act and an illocutionary act performed in the same 
speech act situation. He compared (and contrasted) with such 
descriptions the two descriptions :
(2) In buzzing, I was pretending to be a bee, and
(3) In buzzing, I was behaving like a buffoon.
Austin said of these, "...we find here that saying what one did 
(buzzing) in intention or in fact constituted my saying so-and- 
so, an act of a certain kind, and made it callable by a differ­
ent name. The illocutionary example ;
(4) In saying so-and-so I was warning
is of this kind.. ."(p. 128). (l)-(4-) have the general form of :
(5) In A-ing, S was B-ing.
In the last quoted remark, Austin linked the conditions for the 
description of an act (i.e., what makes it "callable by a dif­
ferent name") with the constitutive feature of the act so de­
scribed. What makes what is done, described by "A", able to be 
described by "B" is the feature by virtue of which A is consti­
tuted as B. "B" is a description of an act in terms of its con­
stitutive feature, this feature being mentioned in the descrip­
tion "B". This is the lesson to be drawn from Austin's examples 
(2) and (3). What constitutes the act of buzzing (A) as an act 
of pretending to be a bee (B) is the intention with which the 
agent buzzed, viz., the Intention of pretending to be a bee. 
This constitutive feature of the act B is mentioned in the de­
scription of the act, "I was pretending to be a bee". But, of
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course, agents' intentions are not the only constitutive fea­
tures of acts. What an agent does can, under one description, 
he described as an intentional act, and under a different de­
scription, not be described as an intentional act. This is il­
lustrated by Austin's second buzzing example, (5). Going about 
buzzing with no apparent intention is, when coolly considered, 
behaving rather stupidly and it is unlikely that it would be 
done with that intention, i.e., the intention to behave stupid­
ly. It is just as a matter of fact in this case that buzzing 
constitutes behaving stupidly, like a buffoon, and can be de­
scribed in these terras.
The illocutionary example (4) is like (2) and (3) in that 
what is done, described as an act of saying so-and-so (i.e., 
described by "A") can be described as an act of warning (i.e,, 
described by "B") in terms of the feature by virtue of which 
A is constituted as B. But it is different in that "the act is 
constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by 
convention". But "convention" here cannot be read as "institu­
tion's)" with fidelity to Austin's point. For v/hile the descrip­
tion "I vms warning" mentions the constitutive feature of that 
act, referred to here, vaguely enough, as a convention, the de­
scription does not contain a description of the institutions of 
v/arning : the established customs and practices of, say, trying 
to protect people from harm or alerting them to the existence 
of potential danger to themselves. The existence of such insti­
tutions is presupposed by the description of the act as an act 
of warning, but these institutions are not mentioned in that de* 
scription. Recurring to Anscombe : "...the statement that I owe 
the grocer does not contain a description of our institutions, 
any more than the statement that I gave someone a shilling con-
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tains a description of the institutions of money and of the 
currency of this country. On the other hand, it requires these 
or very similar institutions as background in order so much as 
to be the kind of statement it is"(/m,(I958)p.69).
So institutions are not the essential constitutive feature 
of illocutionary acts. It is not by virtue of being performed 
in the context of, or against the background of, certain social 
institutions that a locutionary act is constituted as an illo­
cutionary act of a particular type. Hence, Strawson’s argument, 
endorsed by Schiffer, against Austin’s thesis that illocutionary 
acts are convention-constituted acts, which they have interpret­
ed in these terras, is an ignoratio elenchi. And whatever rele­
vance the notion of rule-constituted behaviour has to an account 
of the constitution of illocutionary acts, it is not owed to 
that notion being an explication of the notion of a social in­
stitution. It follows, too, that if Austin’s conception of 
speech acts is to be developed, an alternative interpretation 
has to be found for "convention” as it occurs in his statement 
of the thesis that illocutionary acts are constituted by con­
vention* It would not be an altogether startling discovery if 
the materials for such an interpretation were to be found in 
the text of Austin’s own lectures.
Austin twice compared conventional acts with ritual and 
ceremonial acts : once in saying "...infelicity is an ill to 
which all acts are heir which have the general character of 
ritual or ceremonial, all conventional acts..."(Words pp.18-9), 
and again in "...the performance of a conventional action (here 
ritual or ceremonial) is rather like this..."(p.69). At several 
other points conventional acts were compared with one or other
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of these types of act (pp* 20,25,70,84-) • A common feature of 
ritual and ceremonial acts is that they are formal acts, per­
formed according to some form or procedure. In comparing con­
ventional acts with ritual and ceremonial acts it is unlikely 
that Austin was alluding to any other features of them beside 
this one, e.g., that some ritual and ceremonial acts are sol­
emn or religious in nature and sometimes accompanied by a 
measure of pomp and pageantry. For not only are such features 
never mentioned but Austin occasionally used "form" synonymous­
ly with "procedure" and "procedure" synonymously with "ritual" 
and "ceremony". Discussing the infelicities arising from the 
non-satisfaction of the Felicity conditions (B.l) and (B.2) 
Austin said, "By contrast with the A cases, the notion of the • 
B cases is rather that the procedure is all right, and it does 
apply all right, but we muff the execution of the ritual with 
more or less dire consequences ;...the purported act is viti­
ated by a flaw or hitch in the conduct of the ceremony"(p.17 
underlining added throughout this section). And later, discuss­
ing these infelicities in more detail ; "...a flaw in the rit­
ual is involved....we attempt to carry out the procedure but 
the act is abortive..*.my attempt ceremonially to open a li­
brary is abortive if..."(pp.36-7). A few pages previously, the 
synonymous use of"procedure" and "ritual" occurs again ; "... he 
did not accept the procedure, on the ground that the ritual was 
incompletely carried out..."(p.33). Austin's use of "procedure" 
synonymously v/lth "form" also occurred in his discussion of in­
felicities ; in the cases, for instance, of the procedures for 
getting married or naming ships being executed incorrectly, the 
participants "went through a form of marriage"(p.16) or "went 
through a form of naming the vessel"(p.23). Elsewhere, Austin
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spoke of the "...development of social forms and procedures 
..."(p.72).
Austin's comparison of ritual and ceremonial acts with 
conventional acts, and his use of "ritual" and "ceremony" syn­
onymously with "procedure" in his discussion of infelicities, 
directs attention to the notion which pervades his statement 
of the Felicity conditions ; the notion of a conventional pro­
cedure. "(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional pro­
cedure having a certain conventional effect...(A,2) the par­
ticular persons and circumstances in a given case must he ap­
propriate for the invocation of the particular procedure in­
voked. .(B.l) The procedure roust be executed by all participants 
both correctly and (B.2) completely, (r.l) Where, as often, the 
procedure is designed for use..."(pp.14-5). Now in his discus­
sion of these conditions in Lectures II-IV Austin sometimes 
used "convention" and "procedure" as abbreviations for "conven­
tional procedure". Discussing infelicities arising from the 
non-satisfaction of the condition (A.l) and taking the utter­
ance "I insult you" as an example, he said, "...while insulting 
is a conventional procedure..* so that in a way we cannot help 
understanding the procedure that someone who says 'I insult you* 
is purporting to invoke...we are bound to non-play him...be­
cause the convention is not accepted..."(p.31). Likewise when 
he introduced an example of infelicity which hovered on the 
borderline between not satisfying the conditon (A.l) and not 
satisfying the condition (A.2) : " we may say you have not 
picked George, whether because there is no convention that you 
can pick people v/ho aren’t playing or because George in the cir­
cumstances is an inappropriate object for the procedure of pick- 
ing"(p.28). The use of "convention" as an abbreviation for "con­
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ventional procedure" is also evident in "...it becomes more 
or less arbitrary whether we regard ourselves as deciding 
(A.l) that a convention does not exist or as deciding (A.2) 
that the circumstances are not appropriate for the invocation 
of a convention which undoubtedly does exist..."(p.32). And 
it would seem to have occurred again when Austin asked, "Have 
I invoiced a non-existent convention in inappropriate circum­
stances?" (p. 38). "Conventional procedure" can be read for 
"convention" in each of these passages without disturbing 
their sense. This is also true of the passages in Austin's 
later lectures, most evidently when he recurred to the Felici­
ty conditions to shov/ that stating was a type of illocutionary 
act, "The first cases are A.l and A.2, where there is no con­
vention (or not an accepted convention) or where the circum­
stances are not appropriate for its invocation by the speaker" 
(p.137). But it is also true of the passages in which Austin 
stated his thesis that an illocutionary act is a conventional 
act, an act constituted by convention, "Conventional procedure" 
can be read for "convention" in these passages without disturb­
ing their sense, e.g., "...the illocutionary act is a conven­
tional act ; an act done as conforming to a convention"(p.105). 
Most importantly, it is true of Austin's one explicit remark 
about the constitution of illocutionary acts. For recast as ; 
"...the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essen­
tially but by a conventional procedure", this remark provides 
the solution to the problem of the constitution of illocution­
ary acts.
It is by virtue of being performed as part of a conven­
tional procedure that a locutionary act is constituted as an 
illocutionary act. The particular conventional procedure exe-
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cuted in saying or asking something is the essential consti­
tutive feature of the illocutionary act performed in that lo­
cutionary act. It is not the mere matter of fact of saying or 
asking something which constitutes that act as an illocution­
ary act, Locutionary and illocutionary acts are distinct ; the 
performance of an act of each type may he attempted in the same 
situation and the attempt at the first may succeed while the 
attempt at the second fails. Nor, pace Schiffer, are the speak­
er's intentions the essential constitutive feature. Illocution­
ary acts of most types, including objecting, can be performed 
unintentionally yet felicitously, (This claim will be estab­
lished in the third section of Chapter Six.) The social insti­
tutions presupposed as background context by the descriptions 
of illocutionary acts are not the essential constitutive feat­
ures of those acts either. The respective institutions are pre­
supposed by, but not mentioned in, the description of an act as 
an illocutionary act of a particular type. On the other hand, 
the respective procedure constitutive of a particular type of 
illocutionary act is mentioned in the description of an act of 
that type. An illocutionary act is described in terms of the 
conventional procedure executed by the speaker in performing a 
locutionary act. Thus a speaker may be warning, rather than 
promising or predicting, in saying that he will go, and the 
conventional procedure of warning, as distinct from those of 
promising or predicting, is mentioned in the descriptions of 
his act as "an act of warning" or simply "He was warning".
The respective merits of institutions and conventional 
procedures as candidates for the constitutive feature of illo­
cutionary acts may be better judged after a brief consideration 
of these notions. It will be clear from the outset that instl-
175
tutions and procedures are not the same sort of thing. The 
institution of marriage, for instance, is not the marriage 
ceremony, the procedure for getting married. And in schools 
with a traditional bent, while the Old Boys yn School cricket 
match may be an institution in the life of the school, the 
playing, in any one year, of a one-day cricket match between 
the school's 1st XI and a team of ex-pupils is not itself an 
institution ; though to participate in such a game would be to 
go through a particular procedure. Institutions are established 
customs or practices ; procedures are forms of episodic actions. 
To go through a procedure for doing something requires only one 
performance of an act of that type but to make a practice of 
doing something requires more than one performance of an act of 
one or more specific type. Hence there is less irony in saying 
of a priest that his weddings are an institution than tliere is 
in saying of a bridegroom that his weddings are an institution. 
The existence of a practice is dependent upon the continual 
performance of the type(s) of act in which the practice con­
sists ; once such acts cease to be performed the practice which 
they go to make up ceases to exist. If people ceased to get 
married the institution of marriage would wither away ; if the 
ex-pupils could no longer field a side against the school's 1st 
XI each year, the Institution of the annual Old Boys ys School 
cricket match would die out. But even though institutions in­
volving the performance of acts constituted by procedures may 
cease to exist, the procedures for performing those acts remain. 
In present times, the staging of jousts trades on this fact. 
Jousting is no longer the established custom or institution 
which it once was but from time to time historically minded en­
thusiasts may re-enact such tournaments for their own enjoyment.
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In so doing, they do not recreate or re-establish the bygone 
institution ; nor is what they do constituted as such by the 
institution of jousting, for such does not exist. Rather, what 
they do is constituted as jousting by being performed in ac­
cordance with those forms and procedures of jousting which they 
adopt for enacting their tournament.
A similar but more apposite example, since it is an ex­
ample of an illocutionary act, is the case of challenging to a 
duel. Duelling is now a defunct social institution but the pro­
cedures for, as opposed to the practice of, duelling still sur­
vive ; the issuing of the challenge, its acceptance, the meet­
ing of the duellists, etc. Thus one vfho perhaps regrets the 
passing of the practice and believes in an old fashioned way 
that honour has been wronged may, even seriously, believing 
the circumstances to be appropriate, issue a challenge in say­
ing, "I'll meet you in the park at dawn to-morrow." In this 
case the speaker's utterance is especially liable to infelicity 
because the addressee may reject the whole code of honour in­
volved in duelling, and with that, all the procedures constitu­
tive of acts whose continual performance went to make up the 
practice of duelling. But suppose that the addressee does not ; 
suppose that he is of like mind with the speaker in regretting 
the passing of the institution of duelling and accepts the pro­
cedure which the speaker has invoked, and even, though this is 
not important, accepts the challenge. Now clearly, in this case, 
the speaker's illocutionary act of challenging is not constitu­
ted by any institution or practice of duelling for such does 
not exist. Here, as generally, the speaker's locutionary act of 
saying, "I'll meet you in the park at dawn to-morrow" is con­
stituted as an illocutionary act of the type it is by virtue of
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being performed as part of a particular procedure* The per­
formance of an illocutionary act is dependent, inter alia, 
upon the existence of an accepted conventional procedure for 
performing an act of that type and not on any associated in- 
stitution(s) which may or may not exist and which, if they do, 
are themselves dependent upon the continual performance of 
such acts among others.
By identifying systems of rules that are alleged to be 
constitutive of illocutionary acts with institutions, Searle 
implies not only that these latter are the constitutive feat­
ure of illocutionary acts but also that the performance of a 
particular illocutionary act is dependent upon the existence 
of some associated institution(s). Indeed, Searle says of acts 
of the same conventional (i.e., for him, institutional) type 
as illocutionary acts, "It is only given the institution of 
marriage that certain forms of behaviour constitute Mr Smith's 
marrying Miss Jones. Similarly, it is only given the institu­
tion of baseball that certain movements by certain men consti­
tute the Dodgers* beating the Giants 3 to 2 in eleven innings. 
And, at an even simpler level, it is only given the institution 
of money that I now have a five dollar bill in my hand. Take 
away the institution and all I have is a piece of paper with 
various gray and green markings"(S.A.p.51)♦ But take away all 
the "paper" and coins and one does not have an institution of 
money either. And acts of marrying, for instance, are not de­
pendent upon the institution of marriage ; the dependence is 
the other way around. The institution of marriage is dependent, 
inter alia, upon the continual performance of such acts without 
which the custom or practice would die out. What constitutes 
acts of marrying as such are the accepted conventional proce-
J
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dures, correctly and completely executed by participants in 
the marriage ceremony. This is the feature by virtue of which, 
for instance, a priest’s locutionary act of saying "I declare 
this man and this woman to be husband and wife" is constituted 
as his illocutionary act of marrying the couple before him.
There are two possible defences which Searle could make 
of his claim, that institutions, specifiable in terms of sets 
of rules, are the essential constitutive features of illocu­
tionary acts. First, he could maintain that he was merely tak­
ing Austin’s statement that an illocutionary act is constitut­
ed essentially by convention at its face value, interpreting 
it literally, and point to one of the Dictionary’s definitions 
of "convention" : "A rule or practice, based on general consent 
or accepted and upheld by society at large...". However, if the 
points made in this section bear the weight of argument placed 
upon them, "convention" in Austin’s statement of his thesis 
that illocutionary acts are constituted by convention is not to 
be taken at its face value but as an abbreviation for "conven­
tional procedure" ; and the notion of’ a practice (or institu­
tion) informing this sense of "convention" is inappropriate as 
an explanatory term in an account of the constitution of illo­
cutionary acts. If these points do not carry the argument, then 
the matter will have to rest until the next chapter. There it 
will be argued that an account of the conventional nature of 
illocutionary acts based on this sense of "convention" does not 
give an adequate explanation of the constitution of these acts, 
and that a different sense of "convention" is involved : that 
of a "general agreement or consent, deliberate or implicit, as 
constituting the origin and foundation of any custom, institu­
tion. ..or as embodied in any...standard of behaviour,
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will be clear that these senses of "convention" are distinct ; 
in the former sense, a convention is a rule or practice, in 
the latter sense, a convention is a general agreement or con­
sent. Alternatively, Searle could deny that in identifying 
systems of constitutive rules with institutions he was identi­
fying such systems with established customs or practices. That 
is, he may deny that he was using "institutions" with its nor­
mal sense. For in his earlier quoted statement that institu­
tions are systems .of constitutive rules, "institutions" is in 
quotation marks. This defence renders Searle's claim immune to' 
the points made in the three previous paragraphs but throws the 
whole weight of his account of the constitution of illocution­
ary acts onto his notion of constitutive rules. The criticism 
of this notion will be deferred until the next chapter as well.
In some cases, an act of a certain type is constituted as 
an act of that type by the circumstances in which it is per­
formed. This is not only so when the act, considered apart from 
its circumstances, is a physical act, as an act of coition is, 
and the circumstances in which that act is performed constitute 
it as either an act of love, or incest, or rape. Acts that are 
not just physical acts are in similar case. Thus the circum­
stance of not having the owner’s permission to enter his prop­
erty may constitute the act of entering his property as one of 
trespass ; being under oath when telling a lie constitutes that 
act as one of perjury and the circumstances of having one 
spouse already, living and undivorced, constitutes an act of 
going through a form of marriage to another as an act of bigamy.
White has claimed that Austin’s distinctions between locu­
tionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts parallel dis-
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tinctions drawn by others between "acts proper" (the basic 
physical movement of the agent), "acts and circumstances" 
and "acts and consequences"(P.A.p.9). No case can be made 
for the first claimed parallel : between locutionary acts 
and "acts proper". Even the phonetic act, the act of utter­
ing certain noises, is only a consequence of the "act proper"
- those certain more or less indescribable movements with the 
vocal organs. But some case can be made for the second claimed 
parallel ; between illocutionary acts and "acts and circum­
stances". Provided the constituent act of acts classified^ 
under that rubric include locutionary acts and are not re­
stricted to "acts proper" or physical acts, as the last three 
examples in the previous paragraph show they need not be, two 
points can be adduced in support of this claim. First, there 
is Austin’s own heavy emphasis in his early lectures on the 
need for the circumstances in which an utterance is issued to 
be appropriate for the performance of an illocutionary act in 
that situation to be felicitous. Allowing that such an act 
does not just consist in saying certain words, Austin said, 
"Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circum­
stances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, 
or ways, appropriate..."(Words p.8). His list of the Felicity 
conditions (A.l)-(r.2), the first two of which contain explicit 
reference to the circumstances of the speech act situation, is 
introduced with some understatement by, "Let us first at least 
concentrate attention on the little matter already mentioned in 
passing - this matter of ’the appropriate circumstances’"(p.13). 
And the ensuing discussion of infelicities arising from the 
non-satisfaction of these conditions is peppered with examples 
of acts which are either unsuccessful or infelicitous because of
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being attempted or performed in inappropriate circumstances. 
Secondly, as has been argued against Searle in defence of 
Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts, tokens of each of these types of act, performed in the 
same situation, can be distinguished by the different circum­
stances presupposed for the performance of each. With this 
support, White’s claim suggests that an illocutionary act is 
constituted as such by the circumstances in which a locution­
ary act is performed and that an account of the constitution 
of illocutionary acts could be given in these terms.
If this were so, and such an account were to be made com­
plete, it would yield, for each type of illocutionary act, a 
specification of the set of circumstances whose members, ob­
taining in a speech act situation, satisfied severally neces­
sary and jointly sufficient conditions on the circumstances of 
the situation to constitute the performance of a locutionary 
act in that situation as a felicitous illocutionary act of the 
respective type. In this section an attempt will be made to il­
lustrate what would be involved in such an account by showing 
some of the different sorts of circumstances that would be men­
tioned in it. The attempt will be summary in form, not only per­
force of space, but also for the number of reasons to be argued 
for presently, that even if such a range of sets could be speci­
fied they would not provide an adequate account of the constitu­
tion of illocutionary acts. In spite of this, the attempt will
not be wholly in vain. For while circumstances are not the es­
sential constitutive feature of illocutionary acts they do have 
an important place in the account of the constitution of illocu­
tionary acts to be given in terms of conventional procedures in 
the next chapter. So it is necessary, and at this stage, con-
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venient, to show something of the sorts of circumstances in­
volved. The account to he embarked oh here will also show that 
different sorts of circumstances are selective with respect to 
different types of illocutionary acts. That is, it will show 
that a certain circumstance may be a necessary condition for 
the performance of illocutionary acts of some types but not 
others, and indeed, may be such as to rule out the possibility 
of the successful performance of illocutionary acts of some 
types in the sets of circumstances of which it is a member.
This point of the selectivity of circumstances with respeqt to 
illocutionary act types will also be deployed later.
Now clearly, in order for such an account to proceed, dis­
tinctions need to be drawn between different sorts of circum­
stances. These distinctions may in the first instance be some­
what arbitrary and they will be subject to greater refinement 
as the account becomes more detailed. But to impose some init­
ial order, general distinctions which seem reasonably clear will 
be drawn between those circumstances of a speech act situation 
pertaining to the speaker, those pertaining to the audience of 
the illocutionary act, and those other circumstances of the sit­
uation, apart from those presupposed for the performance of a 
locutionary act, which do not pertain directly to either the 
speaker or the audience. Circumstances falling into this latter 
category will be dealt with first. Examples of illocutionary act 
t^ rpes to be discussed will be drawn in the main from the class 
of constative-determining illocutionary act types, i.e., those 
illocutionary acts whose performance determines that the utter­
ance, in the act of uttering which they are performed, is one 
which has a truth-value.
There is first, then, the circumstance of the bearing of
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prior illocutionary acts upon the current situation. The types 
of illocutionary act with respect to which this circumstance 
is selective can he divided Into three groups :
(a) those which presuppose the prior performance of an illocu­
tionary act of some specific type, e.g., reaffirming, re­
assuring, restating, etc.
(h) those which presuppose the prior performance of some illo­
cutionary act hut not of one specific type, e.g., concur­
ring, corroborating, dissenting, repudiating, etc.
(c) those which do not presuppose the prior performance of any 
illocutionary act, e.g., anticipating, forecasting, stating, 
reporting, describing, dating, etc.
Another of these circumstances is that of the temporal relation­
ship between the performance of the illocutionary act and the 
obtaining of the possible state of affairs that the speaker 
characterizes by his utterance in the issuing of which the act 
is performed. Again, the types of illocutionary act with respect 
to which this circumstance is selective can be divided into 
three groups ;
(a) those which require the state of affairs to be some future 
possible state of affairs, e.g., anticipating, forecasting, 
foretelling, predicting, prophesying, etc.
(b) those which require the state of affairs to be some present 
or past possible state of affairs, e.g., explaining, report­
ing, retrodicting, restating, stating, etc.
(c) those which are indifferent to any of these temporal rela­
tionships, e.g., claiming, dating, describing, estimating, 
postulating, reassessing, suggesting, etc.
It can be seen that these two threefold distinctions do not co­
incide ; they cut across each other.
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Among the circumstances presupposed for the felicitous 
performance of illocutionary acts which pertain directly to 
the speaker there are those which have to do with his mental 
states - attitudes, beliefs, intentions, etc, «-« and those 
which have to do with his authority to perform the illocution­
ary act. Some of the attitudes involved here can most easily 
be illustrated in the first instance with reference to the 
types of illocutionary act which presuppose the performance of 
some other illocutionary act. For instance, having a certain 
pro-attitude towards a previous utterance is a necessary cir­
cumstance for felicitously agreeing with what was said ; having 
a certain contrary-attitude is a necessary circumstance for 
felicitously disagreeing. As well as this sort of difference 
between attitudes, the strength with which a speaker holds 
these attitudes is a circumstance selective with respect to 
different t^ /pes of illocutionary act. Thus progressively 
stronger pro-attitudes are selective with respect to felici­
tously concurring, corroborating, confirming, and endorsing, 
while progressively stronger contrary-attitudes are selective 
with respect to felicitously dissenting, objecting, contra- 
verting, contradicting, and repudiating. (Depending on how the 
original speaker is moved in his beliefs by one of these chal­
lenges, he may either amend, revise, or correct his original 
utterance or, if he is unmoved, contend, maintain, or insist 
that it was correct.) The strength with which certain attitudes 
are held is also a circumstance selective with respect to some 
types of illocutionary acts which do not presuppose the prior 
performance of any illocutionary act. Thus, how reprehensible a 
speaker believes an act of his was is selective with respect to 
his felicitously allowing, admitting, or confessing that he com-
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mitted the act.
These attitudes are of the nature of beliefs. The differ­
ent terminology (i.e., ’’attitude” as distinct from "belief”) 
is intended simply to set these beliefs off from another which 
seems to have a special status among the set of beliefs com­
prising some of the necessary circumstances for the felicitous 
performance of a constative-determining illocutionary act.
This belief is one with respect to the possible state of affairs 
which the speaker intends to characterize by his utterance, and 
its special status consists in its holding by the speaker being 
a necessary condition for the felicitous performance of any 
constative-determining illocutionary act. Generally, but with a 
few exceptions, this belief is that the possible state of af­
fairs intended to be characterized by ^he utterance was, or is, 
or will be an actual state of affairs. The few exceptions occur 
in the case of such illocutionary act types as denying, dis­
claiming, disavowing, etc. where the relevant belief is that 
the possible state of affairs intended to be characterized vms 
not, or is not, or will not be an actual state of affairs. Here 
too, the circumstance of how strongly such a belief is held is 
selective with respect to particular types of illocutionary act. 
Felicitously affirming, assuring, avouching, and testifying 
are only appropriate in circumstances in which, inter alia, 
such beliefs are held especially strongly. These acts would be 
infelicitous, because insincere, in circumstances in which the 
speaker entertained doubts about the past, present or future 
actuality of the state of affairs he was professing to affirm, 
avouch, testify to, or assure his audience of.
The speaker's having of certain intentions is a necessary 
circumstance for the felicitous performance of illocutionary
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acts of some types. It is clear, though, that in the attempt 
to give an account of the constitution of an illocutionary 
act of any type by specifying the set of necessary and suffici­
ent circumstances for its felicitous performance, which set may 
include requisite intentions on the speaker's part, the speci­
fication of the speaker's intention to perform an act of that 
type has no place. For such a specification, being formulated 
in terms of the type of act of whose analysis it is intended to 
be a part, would render the account partially circular. This 
point provides one indication of the ultimate failure of the 
attempt to give a general and complete account of the constitu­
tion of illocutionary acts in terms of "constitutive circum­
stances". For those acts which can only be performed intention­
ally, it is a necessary condition on the circumstances of their 
performance that the speaker has the intention to perform an 
act of that type. But this condition cannot be specified with­
out circularity.
Cases in which the speaker's having of a certain intention 
is a requisite circumstance for the felicitous performance of 
an illocutionary act, and can be specified without circularity, 
are most easily discerned where the illocutionary act is of a 
type which invites by convention a sequel. The different types 
of sequel, thus required to be intended, are selective with re­
spect to different types of illocutionary act. For instance, 
the intention to implement some sequel, conditional upon some 
act by the addressee, is a necessary circumstance for felici­
tously threatening and offering, and is selective with respect 
to these acts as opposed to, say, promising and bequeathing.
The implementation of sequels to promises and bequests can be 
made conditional upon some act by the addressee but this is not
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a necessary circumstance for their felicitous performance 
(and, of course, special arrangements have to be made for the 
implementation of bequests). A sequel which is believed to be 
to the detriment of or to the benefit of the addressee is 
selective, respectively, with respect to felicitously threat­
ening and offering. However, neither of these types of illocu­
tionary act is a constative-determining type and parallel ex­
amples within the class of such types are not so common. But 
the procedure for arguing (philosophically) provides one ex­
ample : premising invites the sequel of concluding and having 
the intention to conclude something from premises would seem 
to be a necessary condition for felicitously premising.
The range of kinds of a speaker's authority which feature 
among the necessary circumstances for the performance of illo­
cutionary acts is considerable. The authority can be that of 
powers or rights of a legal or quasi-legal nature ; it can be 
the authority of personal influence ; it can be the authority 
of the evidence in support of beliefs held by the speaker.
These kinds of authority are not necessarily exclusive to par­
ticular types of illocutionary acts ; more than one kind may 
feature among the circumstances for one particular type. And., 
of course, it is not just conetative-determining types of illo­
cutionary acts to which the circumstances of the speaker's au­
thority are relevant. One kind of authority which is particu­
larly relevant to these types, however, is that of the eviden­
tial support of the speaker's beliefs. The type of evidence, 
and the strength of the support it gives to his belief about, 
for instance, the actuality of the possible state of affairs 
which he intends to characterize by his utterance, are selective 
with respect to a number of these act types. Different types of
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evidence are revelation (selective with respect to divining 
and prophesying), calculation and observation. Different mixes 
of the latter two, rather than each individually, are selective 
with respect to different types of illocutionary acts. Evidence 
for belief containing a greater element of observation than 
calculation is selective with respect to describing, forecast­
ing, judging or reporting what the speaker believes to be the 
case ; a greater element of calculation than observation in the 
evidence for his belief that something is the case is selective 
with respect to his estimating, foretelling or predicting it.
So far as the strength of evidence is concerned, progressively 
stronger support for a speaker's belief is selective with re­
spect to suggesting, estimating, claiming, asserting and stat­
ing. In the latter case, this evidential support must be such 
as to support the further belief of the speaker that he knows 
the state of affairs which he intends to characterize by his 
utterance to be the case. A speaker's belief that he knows so- 
and-so to be the case is a necessary circumstance for his fel­
icitously stating so-and-so to be the case. The circumstance of 
the strength of the evidential support for these beliefs is 
also selective with respect to a quite different class of illo­
cutionary act types, e.g., assuming, hypothesizing, postulating, 
presuming, speculating and surmising. The performance of acts 
of these types is appropriate in circumstances in which the 
speaker has very weak evidence or no evidence at all in support 
of the belief in the obtaining of the state of affairs which 
he intends to characterize by his utterance. Making explicit 
that an act of one or another of these types is being performed 
is one way of entering a caveat to that effect.
It has been remarked that more than one kind of authority
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may feature among the necessary circumstances for the perform­
ance of an illocutionary act of a particular type. In special 
cases, some acts of assuring and endorsing may require the 
speaker to have, in addition to evidential support for his be­
liefs, some special personal influence in order to be success­
ful on the occasion on which they are performed. And the having 
of certain powers or rights of a legal or quasi-legal nature 
may be an additional necessary circumstance for the successful 
performance of some acts of announcing and testifying. These 
latter two kinds of authority involve relationships between the 
speaker and his audience in ways v/hich the authority of the 
evidence for the speaker's beliefs does not. The circumstances 
of the relationship obtaining between a speaker and his audi­
ence in terms of one's authority vis-a-vis the other is select­
ive with respect to such other illocutionary act types as com­
manding, ordering, instructing, directing, demanding, request­
ing, pleading, entreating, beseeching, and begging. None of 
these is a constative-determining type of illocutionary act 
however.
One sort of circumstance which pertains to the audience of 
an illocutionary act, and is selective with respect to some of 
these types of act, is whether the presence of an audience is 
essential for the performance of the act or not. The presence 
of an audience, other than the speaker himself, is essential 
for announcing, asserting, attesting, averring, avouching, avow­
ing, claiming, confessing, confiding, declaring, disclaiming, 
disclosing, divulging, informing, intimating, notifying, re­
porting, revealing, stating, suggesting, telling, and testify­
ing. It is not essential for affirming, analysing, appraising, 
arguing, ascribing, assessing, assuming, attributing, class!-
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fying, conjecturing, dating, defining, divining, estimating, 
forecasting, foretelling, holding (as a matter of fact), hy­
pothesizing, identifying, judging, labelling, postulating, 
predicting, prophesying, recognizing, recalling, speculating, 
and surmising.
Here, then, are just some of the sorts of circumstances 
which can readily be seen to be candidates for inclusion in 
an account of the constitution of illocutionary acts given in 
these terras. Even this very restricted sample, however, has 
been sufficient to show the selectivity of different sorts of 
circumstances to different types of illocutionary acts. For 
instance, it has shown in the case of stating, maintaining and 
testifying, that apart from the necessary circumstances for 
their felicitous performance which acts of these types have in 
common, a speaker's belief that he knows that something is the 
case is a necessary circumstance for his stating that it is the 
case but not for maintaining that it is the case or testifying 
to it ; that some challenge, actually made or envisaged, is a 
necessary circumstance for maintaining but not for stating or 
testifying ; and that some authority of a legal or quasi-legal 
nature may be required by the speaker to testify but not to 
state or maintain. Similarly, it has shown in the case of pro­
phesying, forecasting and predicting, that different types and 
different mixes of different types of evidence in support of 
the speaker's belief in the future state of affairs which he 
intends to characterize by his utterance are necessary circum­
stances for the felicitous performance of acts of these differ­
ent types. Now there seems to be no reason in principle why a 
restricted account such as this could not be extended until it 
yielded a set of necessary conditions on the circumstances for
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the felicitous performance of illocutionary acts of each 
type, which range of sets contained no two sets that were 
identical with each other. Circumstances additional to those 
already mentioned would have to he introduced into the account, 
and finer distinctions between those already mentioned would 
have to be drawn. One way in which such an account could pro­
ceed is via the construction of a distinctive feature matrix 
of the necessary circumstances for the felicitous performance 
of illocutionary acts. The matrix would be set up by plotting 
illocutionary act types against all the sorts of circumstances 
that are necessary circumstances for the felicitous perform­
ance of any illocutionary act. Then, specifying for each cir­
cumstance whether it is a necessary circumstance for a given 
type of illocutionary act or not, and repeating this procedure 
for each type of illocutionary act, the sets of necessary 
conditions on the circumstances of the situation for the per­
formance of each type of illocutionary act could be specified 
by enumeration from the entries in the matrix. Suppose such a 
matrix ivas constructed. There are several reasons why it would 
not provide an adequate account of the constitution of illocu­
tionary acts ; just two need be mentioned here.
One of these reasons has already been noted in passing.
In the case of those types of illocutionary act which can only 
be performed intentionally, e.g., recognizing (something to be 
the case) and commiserating, it is a necessary condition on 
the circumstances for the performance of such acts that the 
speaker both has the Intention to perform an act of that type 
and does so with the intention. But these conditions cannot be 
specified without circularity.
A second reason for rejecting the suggestion that an ac-
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count of the constitution of illocutionary acts could he 
given solely in these terms is forthcoming from within Austin's 
conception of speech acts. It may he the reason for Austin's 
own apparent rejection of such a suggestion in his remark 
that "above all all must not be put into flat factual circum­
stances..."(p.89). It is the same sort of reason that led to 
the rejection of the claim that social institutions are the 
constitutive features of illocutionary acts. It will be recall­
ed that, for Austin, the constitutive feature of an act is that 
in terms of which the act is described - that feature being 
mentioned in the description of the act or in a synonymous de­
scription. Thus a conventional procedure, such as that of warn­
ing, or objecting, or promising, as part of which a locutionary 
act is performed, constitutes that act as an illocutionary act 
of a particular type ; the respective procedure is mentioned in 
the description of the illocutionary act as an act of warning, 
objecting or promising. Similarly, an act of perjury, constitu­
ted by the circiimstances in which a lie is told, can be describ­
ed synonymously with "He committed perjury" as "He lied under 
oath", and in this latter description the constitutive circum­
stances of the act are mentioned* But in the case of those acts 
performed against the background of a network of social insti­
tutions, these institutions are not mentioned in the descrip­
tion of the act though they are presupposed by it. And as for 
the institutions with respect to those acts, so also for the 
circumstances of a speech act situation with respect to illocu­
tionary acts. Certain circumstances obtaining in a speech act 
situation are necessary conditions for the performance of an 
illocutionary act in that situation and are presupposed by the 
description of that act. But they are not mentioned in that de-
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script!on.
Foot-note :
1 (from p.191) The term "distinctive feature matrix" is bor­
rowed from Cohen's article "Speech Acts"(C.T.L.pp.173-208) 
although the point of the distinctive feature matrix which 
Cohen sketches in outline there is quits different. Cohen re­
jects the terminology and distinctions of Austin's conception 
of speech acts and conceives his task to be thé elucidation of 
the role of the verbs used to describe the things achieved with 
linguistic utterances in virtue of their contents (p.192). The 
scope of this conception of speech acts is much broader than 
that of Austin's, as can be seen from the facts (a) that the 
class of verbs which Cohen's distinctive feature matrix ranges 
over includes but is not exhausted by the class of illocutionary 
verbs, and (b) that not all the features of Cohen's distinctive 
feature matrix are relevant to Austin's conception. However^ a 
closer examination than Cohen appears to have made of his own 
illustrative examples renders some of the distinctions in his 
matrix so unclear, or if clear, of such dubious validity as to 
put in doubt the relevance of such distinctions to any concep­
tion of speech acts. For instance, one distinction (the tenth) 
which Cohen draws is between those words whose meanings are such 
as to classify or evaluate the utterance's achievement that they 
describe. "Assert", "name" and "persuade" are some of Cohen's 
examples of classifiers ; "lie", "misname" and "refute" are some 
examples of evaluators. But even these few examples do not evi­
dence just one distinction : there seems to be no way in which 
the difference of meaning between "name" and "misname" is the 
same as the difference between either "assert" and "refute" or 
"assert" and "lie". Nor do these examples show a difference be­
tween classifying and evaluating verbs : if "He lied" is used to 
evaluate someone's utterance it may equally well be used to 
classify it - as belonging to a kind of telling of falsehoods* 
The point which Cohen seems to have missed here is that "classi­
fying" and "evaluating" are names for different uses of sent­
ences, not names for different kinds of meanings of words.
Two other distinctions (the seventh and eighth in Cohen's 
list) are unclear. "Hint" and "persuade" are given as respective
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examples of words which imply that the speech act they describe 
is covert or not. But gently persuading someone would seem to be 
a covert operation, and hinting broadly not so covert. In any 
case, Cohen does not specify what the covertness of a speech act 
consists in, nor what it is to be distinguished from ; "hot co­
vert" may mean "overt", "explicit", "open", "unconcealed", "pa­
tent", "definite". No two of these are exact synonyms. Cohen 
next distinguishes words used to describe acts achieved in vir­
tue of the content of an utterance, e.g., "lie", from those used 
to describe achievements in virtue of the vocabulary, style, ac­
cent of an utterance, e.g., "blaspheme". But a blasphemous utter­
ance would seem to be so, just as much, if not more, because of 
its content than its "vocabulary, style, accent, etc." And the 
essential element in lying is not the content of what the liar 
says but that he says what he says as if he believes it to be 
true while not believing it to be true. (The success of lie- 
detector tests suggests that there is more "style, accent, etc." 
involved in lying than Cohen supposes.)
These three distinctions seem to have been drawn simply for 
the sake of drawing distinctions : the most cursory examination 
shows them to be of the rapidly vanishing kind. The same is not 
true of the other distinctions in Cohen's matrix ; each of these 
is well-grounded and is of direct relevance to any investigation 
of speech acts. But at the same time, they are all accommodated 
within Austin's conception of speech acts ; none of them exposes 
any lacuna in that conception. Two of these distinctions, while 
clear enough in themselves, become problematic in Cohen's hands. 
For instance, the fourth distinction he draws is between those 
words which can be used to introduce indirect discourse of some 
kind - declarative, interrogative, imperative, optative - e.g., 
"report", "inquire", "order", and "hope", from those which can­
not, e.g., "resign". But as was shown earlier in the discussion 
leading to the introduction of basic normal forms of indirect 
quotation in Chapter One, "that-" or "w^hether-" clauses headed 
by words which can be used to introduce indirect discourse, even 
when used to describe truly some feature of a speech act situa­
tion, do not always yield an indirect quotation of the utterance 
issued in that situation. So if the notion of indirect discourse 
is to be given a place in the study of speech acts, more needs 
to be said about it than Cohen says here. Another of Cohen's dis-
195
tinctions (the fifth), between words whose meanings imply 
that the speech act they describe is regulated by extra- 
linguistic rules of some kind or not, is made vague by the 
variety of kinds of things he counts as extra^linguistlc 
rules* As well as logical principles, religious canon, and 
laws of inheritance he counts "a hierarchy of authority" as 
a kind of extra-linguistic rule. This is problematic.
The next two distinctions (Cohen's second and sixth), 
between descriptions which imply that the act is either in­
tended or not, and between descriptions which imply differ­
ent outcomes of the act, are quite straightforward. The lat­
ter is accommodated within Austin's conception of speech acts 
in terms of an act's securing uptake, taking effect and pro­
ducing a perlocutionary sequel. Of the three remaining dis­
tinctions in Cohen's matrix, two (the first and ninth) are 
appropriated directly from Austin in spite of Cohen's earlier 
expressed rejection of Austin's terminology and distinctions. 
Cohen's point here, though, is to try to show some inconsis­
tency between Austin's characterization of an illocutionary 
act as a type of act whose performance is able to be made ex­
plicit by the use of a performative prefix to the utterance, 
in the act of uttering which it is performed, and the lists 
of illocutionary act types given in the final lecture under 
the heads ; verdietive, exercitive, commissive, behabitive, 
and expositive. Cohen argues that "drink to" cannot be used 
to describe an illocutionary act even though it appears in 
Austin's lists of behabitives, and that "perorate", though it 
does not appear in any of Austin's lists, can be used to de­
scribe a type of illocutionary act. Austin did not claim that 
his lists were exhaustive, but even so, the non-inclusion of 
"perorate" is quite correct. When, if ever, "perorate" is 
used in an utterance having the grammatical form of an explicit 
performative utterance, it has the sense of "sum up" or "con­
clude". The use of such an utterance would be a case of suit­
ing the action to the word and Austin repeatedly distinguished 
such cases from those of performative utterances(W6rds pp.65, 
81,85). So it is not the performance of an illocutionary act 
that a speaker is making explicit in saying something like "I 
perorate as follows This point enables the other horn
of the dilemma on which Cohen attempts to impale Austin to be
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turned as well. A note in the Appendix to the second edition 
of Words indicates that "or suiting action to words" was 
written beside the words "drink to" (and "toast") in the list 
of behabitives in the original manuscript. So it is clear 
that Austin himself had strong reservations about these types 
of acts being types of illocutionary acts.
The remaining (third) distinction in Cohen's matrix, be­
tween descriptions which imply that the utterance is or is 
not to be taken literally, is not included in Austin's concep­
tion of speech acts but can be accommodated by it. Non-literal 
uses of language, e.g., telling an allegory, speaking in para­
bles, and non-serious uses of language, e.g., joking, pretend­
ing, etc. - the examples are Cohen's - are parasitic upon nor­
mal uses of language. In these cases, involving "a sea-change 
in special circumstances"(p.28) of the performance of a locu­
tionary act, the conditions for the use of words with their 
normal sense or reference are suspended.
Chapter Five 
Constitutive Rules and Constitutive Procedures
Under Wittgenstein's influence, the notions of following 
a rule, acting according to a rule, a rule-governed form of 
behaviour, and the like, have enjoyed a considerable vogue in 
certain philosophical quarters without the nature of the rules 
so frequently alluded to being adequately clarified. Searle's 
attempt to provide such clarification in his account of con­
stitutive rules (s.A*pp.53-6) was, therefore, to be welcomed. 
Searle's account is also of crucial importance to his theory 
of speech acts, for Searle suras up that theory in the hypothesis 
that "...the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as 
a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying 
constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts characterist­
ically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with 
these sets of constitutive rules"(p.37)♦ It is to be argued here 
that Searle has not given an adequate account of these rules ; 
in particular, that he has not shown that rules are constitutive 
in any sense other than one vfhich he himself admits is trivial, 
and that what Searle takes to be a "constitutive rule" in some 
non-trivial sense is not a rule but a definition. The discussion 
of Searle's hypothesis will be deferred until the next chapter.
Searle's account begins with a contrast between constitu­
tive and regulative rules. Not much is #aid to indicate what is 
meant by "regulative rule", but nothing said prevents taking 
"rule" in this phrase in what Ryle, in "Use, Usage and Meaning" 
(C;P.II pp.407-14), called that "...extended sense of 'rule' in 
which a rule is anything against which faults are adjudged to be 
at fault..."(p.410). Searle's initial contrast suggests that 
regulative and constitutive rules are rules of quite different
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types ; so different, indeed, that a token of one type cannot 
he a token of the other type. For Searle distinguishes the 
typical forms of expression of these rules ; whereas regulative 
rules are characteristically expressed in imperative form, "Do 
X" or "If Y, do X", constitutive rules are characteristically 
expressed in declarative form, "X counts as Y in context C".
This latter formula assumes considerable importance as Searle's 
account proceeds and it will be recurred to later. However, the 
formula "X counts as Y in context C" was not intended by Searle 
to be a formal criterion for distinguishing constitutive and 
regulative rules, for "first, since constitutive rules come in 
systems, it may be the whole system which exemplifies this form 
and not individual rules within the system"; and secondly, "Any 
regulative rule could be twisted into this form.,."(S>A,p.56). 
Moreover, Searle says that "constitutive rules constitute (and 
also regulate)..."(p.54), that they "... do not merely regulate 
..."(p.55), and talks of cases "where the rule is purely regula­
tive..."(p.56). So it appears that the initial suggestion was 
wrong. It now appears that the constitutive/regulative distinc­
tion does not distinguish two mutually exclusive sets of rules 
but two different functions of rules, both of w^hich may be 
shared by any one rule. Two criteria for this distinction can 
be extracted from Searle's account, one being specified in the 
material mode and the other in the formal mode. They are :
(C.l) In so far as a rule or system of rules is constitutive,
it creates or defines new forms of behaviour ; activities 
whose existence is dependent upon the rules. "The rules of foot­
ball or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing foot­
ball or chess, but as it were they create the very possibility 
of playing such games. The activities of playing football or
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chess are constituted by acting in accordance with (at least 
a large subset of) the appropriate rules"(pp.35-4). On the 
other hand, in so far as a rule is regulative, it regulates 
antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour ; 
"...for example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-per­
sonal relationships which exist independently of the rules"
(p.33). Searle's specific examples of rules conforming to this 
criterion are, in the case of constitutive rules î "A check­
mate is made when the king is attacked in such a way that no 
move will leave it unattacked" and "A touch-down is scored 
when a player has possession of the ball in the opponents' end 
zone while a play is in progress" and, in the case of regula­
tive rules : "Officers must wear ties at dinner" and "When cut­
ting food, hold the knife in the right hand"(p.34). These 
examples could easily be recast to conform strictly with the 
formulas "X counts as Y in context C" and "Do X" or "If Y, do X". 
(C.2) "...where the rule (or system of rules) is constitutive, 
behaviour which is in accordance with the rule can re­
ceive specifications or descriptions which it could not receive 
if the rule or rules did not exist"(p.55) ; for example, "They 
played football". "Where the rule is purely regulative, behavi­
our which is in accordance with the rule could be given the 
same description or specification.•.whether or not the rule 
existed..."(p.55) ; for example, "He sent out the invitations 
at least two weeks in advance".
Tills is Searle's account in summary form. Similar distinc­
tions have been discussed before and in other works Searle ac­
knowledges his indebtedness to Rawls and Black for different 
aspects of his account. Following Black in "Notes on the Meaning 
of 'Rule'"(Theoria(l958)pp.107-36,139-61), one sense of "const!-
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tutive rule" can be spelled out as follows : "Consider the 
case of any activity controlled by (or subject to) regulations 
but not constituted by them. Then it is always open to us to 
define another system of activities which is the system of ac­
tivities of those who do 'recognize* or heed the regulations 
in question. And this derivative system of activities will... 
necessarily be constituted by the relevant regulations. Take 
as an example, the system of activities consisting of the park­
ing of automobiles. This may be said to be subject to (official) 
regulations but not constituted by them. Call this system S.
Now consider the system of activities defined as the activities 
of those who are aware of the regulations for parking, and also 
take heed of them. Call this system S'. Then S' is, although 8 
is not, constituted by a set of regulations. It is clear that 
no matter what system S, of activities subject to rules is 
given, we can always in parallel fashion define an associated 
system, S', which will necessarily be constituted by the same 
regulations. Hence, there seems to be little point in talking 
separately about activities constituted by rules"(p.147). How­
ever, it is absolutely clear that it is not in this sense that 
Searle wants to maintain that some rules have a constitutive 
function, creative or definitive of "new forms of behaviour".
For commenting on this phrase, Searle says, "There is a trivial 
sense in which the creation of any rule creates the possibility 
of new forms of behaviour, namely, behaviour done as in accord­
ance with the rule", and adds, "That is not the sense in which 
my remark is intended. What I mean can perhaps be best put in the 
formal mode"(S«A.p«55). Searle goes on to give the criterion 
for the regulative/constitutive distinction out-lined under 
(C.2) above. Presumably, the examples which Searle uses to illu-
■ ■ . ' .. ■■ ■■
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strate this criterion for the distinction were chosen with i|
care. But far from showing what the non-trivial sense of 
"constitutive rule" is, which Searle is concerned to establish, 
these examples do not even show that there is such a sense.
For if it is asked what the rules are, that action described 
by "They played football" is action in accordance with, the 
answer which that question invites is : "The rules of the game.
In their play they observed all the rules of football and all 
their play was in accordance with those rules." And this only 
shows that these rules are constitutive in the agreed trivial 
sense of constituting an activity composed of acts performed 
in accordance with those rules, by agents observing or heeding 
those rules ; it does not show that there is any other (non­
trivial) sense in which these rules "create the possibility of 
new forms of behaviour", still less what that sense is. Indeed, 
here, Searle seems to have been misled by his own examples and 
by his preoccupation with the playing of games as an example 
of a rule-governed form of behaviour.
The activity of playing competitive games is engaged in, 
by and large, with the aim of winning according to the rules. 
Otherwise, when playing chess for example, why not just sweep 
all the opponent's pieces save for his king off the board and 
arrange one's own pieces in formation so that the opposing king 
"cannot move out of check"? It is just this feature of having 
wide-ranging restrictions imposed on the practical means that 
players could adopt to achieve the end which, if achieved by 
permitted means, would count as winning the game, that sets the 
playing of most games off from most other activities, and makes 
them the intensively rule-governed activities that they are.
But this is a distinctive feature of the activities, the games,
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not of the rules. Searle seems to have taken this difference, 
between activities which are intensively rule-governed, such 
as games of chess and football, and activities which like some 
social activities are not so intensively rule-governed, as in­
dicative of a difference between the nature of the rules gov­
erning those activities. But there seems to be no reason for 
supposing that rules have any different function or nature in 
a more intensively rule-governed activity than in a less inten­
sively rule-governed activity. It may well be that the exist­
ence and observance of rules in an intensively rule-governed 
activity should figure in a definition of such an activity and 
%rith this sense it may be said, albeit uncleanly, that the 
rules are to some extent definitive of the activity. But it is 
natural to define something in terms of its distinctive feature 
and this does not impute an extra function to the rules govern­
ing such activities. Even if an argument, which Searle does not 
provide, could be given to show that regulative rules take bn 
an extra "constitutive" function in intensively rule-governed 
activities, it would not help his account much. For Searle cites 
rules of etiquette as examples of purely regulative rules and 
rules of games as examples of constitutive rules ; but some 
games are subject to far more simple sets of rules than the set 
of rules governing, say, the conduct of the Japanese tea cere­
mony. And given that some activities are more intensively rule- 
governed than others, it should not be surprising to find that 
there is more scope for describing acts without presupposing 
the existence of any rules when those acts are performed as 
part of a less intensively rule-governed activity than when 
they are performed as part of a more intensively rule-governed 
activity. This evacuates much of the force from Searle's claim
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that there is a distinction between functions of rules of the 
sort drawn in terms of his second criterion. And for two 
further reasons, each forthcoming from within Searle's own 
account, the distinction drawn in those terms and illustrated 
by the examples "He sent out the invitations at least two 
weeks in advance" and "They played football" is quite illusory.
Further on in his book, Searle identifies systems of con­
stitutive rules with institutions and adopts this latter 
notion from Anscombe's distinction between brute and institu­
tional facts. Thus following Anscombe, Searle would want to 
say that the description "They played football" is true in 
virtue of certain other facts obtaining whose descriptions do 
not presuppose the same institutional context for their truth 
or falsity that "They played football" does ; such facts as, 
for example, that certain men performed certain acts with an 
inflated leather object. These latter facts are brute facts 
with respect to the institutional Tact that they played foot­
ball. But things are invitations and a set of acts is the 
sending out of invitations only in the context of certain : -
social institutions. So the description "He sent out the in­
vitations at least two weeks in advance" is like the descrip­
tion "They played football" in presupposing certain institu­
tions, and since, for Searle, these latter are just systems 
of constitutive rules, these descriptions are on a par in 
presupposing the existence of certain rules. Irrespective of 
whether Searle's identification of institutions with systems 
of constitutive rules is correct, these examples do not sup­
port the distinction between regulative and constitutive 
rules which he is attempting to draw.
The second reason for the failure of the second criterion
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for that distinction is forthcoming from Searle's own conces­
sion that regulative rules often provide the basis for apprai­
sals of actions which could not be made were it not for the 
existence of such rules, appraisals such as "He was rude" and 
"He was immoral". Searle seeks to defend his distinction 
against this point by claiming that these appraisals are not 
the same as the specifications or descriptions of acts which 
could not be given were it not for the existence of constitu­
tive rules, for example, "He voted for Wilkie" and "He hit a 
home run". This defence betrays a rather out-moded reliance on 
a simple value/fact distinction. It is not obvious either that 
"He was rude" and "He was immoral" cannot be used to describe 
as well as to appraise, or that "He voted for Wilkie" and "He 
hit a home run" cannot be used to appraise as well as to de­
scribe. "He voted for Hitler" and "He made four ducks in as 
many innings" could be used to do both. It is no good for 
Searle just to say, "...appraisals are not specifications or 
descriptions as I am now using those phrases"(p.56). His point 
in introducing these examples was to illustrate a distinction 
between two different functions of rules and this they do not, 
as they stand, do.
The failure of Searle's second criterion throws the burden J1of his account on to the first criterion for the distinction, 1!specified in the material mode. But it is not clear that the î
change of mode is of much help, or, even, that it makes much à
difference to Searle's account. For it is not clear what sense i
can be attached to saying, as Searle does, that constitutive |
rules create the possibility of new forms of behaviour whose |
existence is dependent upon the rules, other than that const!- I
tutive rules create the possibility of new forms of description
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of behaviour, or descriptions that are (logically) dependent 
upon the rules. And this would just seem to return the first 
criterion to the same status as the second. Searle would ac­
cept this, however. For in his remarks on the phrase "new 
forms of behaviour" he does allow that "it is possible that 
twenty-two men might go through the same physical movements 
as are gone through by two teams at a football game, but if 
there were no rules of football, that is, no antecedently 
existing game of football, there is no sense in which their 
behaviour could be described as playing football"(pp.35-6, 
underlining added). Nevertheless, this does bring into focus 
the problem which Searle's notion of constitutive rules is 
designed to solve.
Given the location of the distinction between brute and . 
institutional facts'within his theory of speech acts, Searle 
needs something which enables him to move from a description 
of what a speaker did as a brute fact - that he said certain 
words - to a description of what he did as an institutional 
fact - that he made a promise. What would meet this require­
ment is something of the nature of a definition, defining an 
institutional fact such as the making of a promise in terms of 
certain brute facts subject to conditions on the circumstances 
of the situation in which they obtain. And suitably filled out, 
Searle's formula "X counts as Y in context C", with "X" and "Y"
i
reserving places for the definiens and definiendum respectively, I
not only seems to satisfy this requirement but seems expressly j
Idesigned to do so. For commenting on the examples of constitu- j
tive rules which can be cast in this form : "Attacking a king i
in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked counts as |
checkmate in a game of chess" and "A player having possession j
,|
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of the ball in the opponents' end zone while a play is in pro­
gress counts as a touch-down in a game of American football", 
Searle says, "The rules for checkmate or touchdown must 'de­
fine' checkmate in chess or touchdown in American football in 
the same v/ay that the rules of football define 'football' or 
the rules of chess define 'chess'-"(p.34). Though doubts may 
be entertained about the basis of this analogy, i.e., that the 
rules of football define "football" and the rules of chess de­
fine "chess", it is clear from this remark that the distinctive 
function of what Searle calls a constitutive rule is that of a 
definition. But questions now arise as to whether rules can 
function as definitions, and vice versa, and hence, whether 
"rules" that are constitutive in this sense are rules. Certain 
differences between rules and definitions which Searle seems to 
have ignored will be discussed by way of arguing for negative 
answers to these questions.
These differences begin to emerge from the differences be­
tween rule-formulations and formulations of definitions. Searle 
seems to have noticed some of these but has failed to appreciate 
their significance ; for instance, he says that "if our para­
digms of rules are imperative regulative rules, such non-impera­
tive constitutive rules are likely to strike us as extremely 
curious and hardly even as rules at all"(p.54), to which it may 
be replied, "Indeed." Searle seems to have assumed that any ut­
terance occurring in the rule-book for a game is the formula­
tion of a rule. But this is not necessarily the case, any more 
than it need be the case that all the utterances in the speci­
fication of a cooking recipe are formulations of directions to 
be followed in preparing the dish for the table. In fact, usual­
ly, in the case of recipes, one finds a list of the ingredients
'207 ;
required to make the dish preceding the list of directions
for its preparation. And distinctions which are analogous to i
Jthis one between the list of ingredients and the list of dl- J
rections in the specification of a cooking recipe can be %
found in the rule-books for games. As well as formulations of 
the rules regulating players' actions, the rule-books for most 
games also contain specifications of what may loosely be call­
ed the "equipment" required for playing the game : the bats, 
racquets, sticks and balls with #hich the game is played, as 
well as specifications of tlie "location" of the game ; the 
board, court or field on which the game is played. Beside 
specifications of the equipment and location peculiar to this 
or that game occurring in the respective rule-book, terms 
peculiar to particular games for moves, positions or situa­
tions that may occur in the game also have to be defined : 
such terms as, for instance, "off-side", "touchdown", "castl­
ing", "taking passant". "promoting", "checkmate", etc. But 
of the sentences used to give these definitions it is more 'ï
correct to say that they are just formulations of definitions 
rather than rule-formulations. There are ways of deciding 
which is which : formulations of definitions are truth-valued, 
rule-formulations are not ; rule-formulations, if not in the I
imperative mood, will contain such deontic modal words as 
"must", "ought", "may", "permitted", "forbidden", etc., but 
these words are seldom used in the formulations of definitions. 
These differences are illustrated, conveniently, in the section 
of the Laws of Chess relating to checkmate, to which, apparent­
ly, Searle did not have recourse when formulating his version 
of the "rule" of checkmate. Article 10(2) of the-Lav/s of Chess 
reads ; "The check must be met on the move immediately follow-
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ing. If the check cannot he met then it is called 'mate'."
The first quoted sentence is a rule-formulation ; the second 
is a formulation of a definition.
These differences between definition- and rule-formula­
tions simply reflect the fact that the general point of the 
former is to specify what the definienda consist in while the 
point of the latter is to specify what acts are permitted, for­
bidden or required. But these differences indicate a more sub­
stantial difference between rules and definitions (of acts). 
Adequate formulations of each identify classes of acts ; in the 
case of a rule-formulation the class of acts so identified is 
the class of acts to which that rule can be applied ; in the 
case of a formulation of a definition it is the class of acts
i
so defined. Taking Article 10(8) of the Laws of Chess as an i
example again, the class of acts identified by the rule "The j
check must be met on the move immediately following" is the i
class of moves made by chess players whose kings have been jIchecked by their opponents’ immediately preceding moves* The |
class of acts (of checkmate) identified by the definition "If 
the check cannot be met then it is called 'mate'" is the class 
of moves made by chess players which give check to their op­
ponents * .kings in such a way that the check cannot be met on 
the move immediately following. Now an act which is a member 
of the class of acts identified by the formulation of a rule 
or definition can be said to fall within the scope of the re­
spective rule or definition. But while it makes sense to ask 
of an act which falls within the scope of a rule whether or 
not it conforms to that rule, it does not make sense to ask of 
an act falling within the scope of a definition whether it con­
forms to that definition or not. An act either falls within the
.J
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scope of a definition or not, and if it does there are no 
further appraisals of the act that can be made with respect 
to the definition* It is otherwise with an act falling with­
in the scope of a rule. In this case, the act is subject to 
further appraisal with respect to the rule ; in terms of 
whether it conforms to or contravenes the rule, whether it is 
or is not in accordance with the rule, whether it follows or 
fails to follow the rule, whether the rule is kept or broken, 
obeyed or disobeyed, and so on. Here, there is a whole bat­
tery of terms of appraisal of acts falling within the scope 
of a rule which not only are inapplicable in the case of an 
act falling within the scope of a definition but seem to have 
no counterpart in the latter case. A corollary to the point 
that these terms of appraisal are applicable to acts falling 
within the scope of a rule is that if these terms of appraisal 
are not applicable to an act then the act does not fall within 
the scope of a rule.
If Searle’s examples of constitutive rules are reconsid­
ered in the light of this point, it can be seen that they do 
not meet this rather minimal condition on being a rule. A move 
a chess player makes either does or does not fall within the 
scope of the formulation "A checkmate is made when the king is 
attacked in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked”. 
If it does not, then the move is not an act of checkmate ; if 
it does, the move is an act of checlcmate, but then it is not 
subject to any further appraisal with respect to what that 
formulation formulates. In particular, the terms of appraisal 
which are applicable to acts falling within the scope of a 
rule are not applicable to an act belonging to the class of 
acts identified by this formulation. It makes no sense to ask
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of an act of checkmate whether it conforms to or contravenes 
the ”rule" ”A checkmate is made when the king is attacked in 
such a way that no move will leave it unattacked”, or whether 
this "rule” was obeyed or disobeyed, kept or broken, followed 
or not. And it follows from the inapplicability of these terms 
that this formulation is not a formulation of a rule. The same 
point can be made with respect to Searle's other examples of 
constitutive rules.
Searle’s notion of a constitutive rule extends the ordin­
ary concept of a rule beyond its normal limits. And in at least 
one respect, the extension creates tensions in that notion 
which threaten its intelligibility. For in maintaining that 
constitutive rules define activities Searle is committed to 
maintaining that constitutive rules are like definitions and 
unlike ordinary rules in so far as a constitutive rule cannot 
be broken, disobeyed, contravened or violated by an act falling 
within its scope. At one point Searle draws attention to this itension in his notion of constitutive rules. "Indeed, it is |
not easy to see how one could even violate the rule as to what 
constitutes checkmate in chess, or touchdown in football”(p.41). 
But a rule which cannot be broken or disobeyed, contravened or 
violated is not a rule, and in so far as constitutive rules are 
definitive of activities- they are not rules- but definitions of 
activities. Searle has therefore failed in his attempt to 
clarify the notion of a rule which is so crucial to his account 
of the constitution of illocutionary acts. And the notion which 
emerges from that attempt, the notion of a definition, is quite 
irrelevant to the solution of the problem of the constitution 
of illocutionary acts. For to say that an act is constituted as 
an illocutionary act by virtue of the satisfaction of conditions
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specified in a definition of that act is not even to come to 
grips with the problem. The subsequent attempts to improve on & 
Searle*s account of constitutive rules, made by Ransdell in 
"Constitutive Rules and Speech-act Analysis"(J.P»(I97l)pp.585- 
400) and by Boer in "Speech Acts and Constitutive Rules"(J.P. 
(I974)pp.169-74), do not avoid Searle’s confusion of the 
notions of rules and definitions-.
As an alternative to Searle’s account of the constitution 
of illocutionary acts an account is to be given here in terms y
of conventional procedures. This account is designed to eluci­
date the solution to the problem of the constitution of illo­
cutionary acts offered in the previous chapter, viz., that an 
illocutionary act is constituted as such by the procedure as 
part of which a locutionary act is performed. The account will 
develop the points made by Austin in his statement of the Fel­
icity conditions (A.l)-(r.2), quoted above on p.47. The account 
will also incorporate those features of the performance of il- 
locutionary acts which Austin discussed in terms of their non- I
perlocutionary outcomes - an illocutionary act's "taking effect" 
and "inviting by convention a response or sequel" - as well as 
those features underpinning his fivefold classification of il­
locutionary forces of utterances as either verdietive, exerci- 
tive, commissive, behabitive or expositive.
The sense with which "procedure" is used in this account 
is not a technical or extraordinary one ; it is one of the 
senses specified for that word in the Oxford English Diction­
ary : "the...manner of proceeding with any action...in any cir­
cumstance or situation". Nor is it difficult to gain an intui­
tive grasp of this notion of a procedure. The course of ordin-
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ary everyday affairs provides numerous examples of such pro­
cedures being followed : getting up in the morning, getting 
dressed, preparing breakfast, having breakfast, going out to 
work, etc. Two such procedures will be taken as initial work­
ing examples ; their execution can be described in greater de­
tail. The first example is of a procedure for fishing. It is 
easy to imagine a fisherman, engaged in his business, going 
through the following procedure. Having prepared his tackle 
(itself a procedure involving an inspection of the net for 
tears and the mending of any that there are, a check on the 
floats and weights attached to the net, etc.) the fisherman 
takes it to the bank of the river from which he is going to 
fish. He selects a place on the river bank which he thinks is 
the best place to cast his net from, having a mind for such 
things as where in the river he has taken good or bad catches 
before, where he thinks fish will be swimming this time, ease 
of access to the water, and so on. He casts his net and waits. 
Then, when he thinks sufficient fish for one catch have swum 
into the net and been caught, or when he cannot afford to wait 
any longer, he pulls in his net. The second example, taken from 
the workshop manual for a particular make of car, is of a pro­
cedure for removing the silencer from the car. The origin of 
this example accounts for the procedure’s execution being speci­
fied in the form of a list of instructions. "Disconnect the bat­
tery cables (earth first). Remove the rear luggage compartment 
by undoing the two bolts set in the floor of the unit. Undo the 
nut and bolt on the pipe clamp at the rear of the silencer as­
sembly. Withdraw the tai1-pipe rearwards from within the si­
lencer and remove it from the vehicle. Undo the nut attaching 
the horizontal strap of the silencer assembly to the left-hand
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side of the clutch housing. Remove the two bolts and washers 
securing the silencer mounting bracket to the left-hand side 
of the gearbox. Undo the nut and bolt on the pipe clamp at the 
front of the silencer assembly. The silencer can now be re­
moved by withdrawing it rearwards off the down pipe." The main 
noteworthy features of procedures can be discussed with refer­
ence to these examples.
Procedures like these are means for attaining certain ends. 
Given a certain set of circumstances in which an agent is situ­
ated, with a certain end in view, the attainment of that end can 
be furthered by the adoption and execution of a particular pro­
cedure. Ends of different kinds may, of course, be served by 
procedures of the same type. An amateur who fishes for enjoyment 
or relaxation may adopt the same procedure for fishing as the 
professional who fishes in order to earn his livelihood. And go­
ing through the procedure of removing the car’s silencer may be 
part of a process aimed at improving the car’s performance or it 
may be part of a practical test set for apprentice mechanics. 
Procedures serve as means for the attainment of ends by virtue 
of the fact that, given circumstances appropriate for the adopt­
ion of a particular procedure, its execution in those circum­
stances has certain outcomes. These outcomes may be more or less 
remote from the desired end and additional procedures may have 
to be gone through (or the same ones repeated in the case of 
misexecutions) before that end is actually attained. Thus, unlike 
the amateur, the professional fisherman who earns his livelihood 
from fishing must not only go through the procedures of preparing 
his tackle and fishing, but also those of taking his catch to 
market and selling it, or having his catch taken to market and 
having it sold, and being paid for it. The improvement in the
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car’s performance may be attained simply by removing the car’s 
silencer, or it may require the replacement of the old silencer 
by a new one, or if no new silencers are available it may re­
quire the repairing and refitting of the old one after it has 
been removed. A single procedure, then, may only provide part 
of the means for attaining a certain end, but the successful 
outcome of the execution of one procedure in a sequence of exe­
cutions of suitable procedures represents a stage in the attain­
ment of that end. Procedures can thus be seen to have a place 
among the strategies and tactics which an agent adopts as part 
of his purposive action.
Procedures of the same type can be executed in different 
ways. For instance, the execution of the procedure of fishing 
may involve angling with rod and fly, or paying out a line with 
baited hooks attached, rather than the casting and hauling in of y 
nets. And the procedure for removing the car’s silencer may be 
just as successfully executed by taking a hack-saw to the parts 
attaching the silencer to the rest of the car as by performing 
all the acts listed for its execution in the car’s workshop man­
ual. Hence, procedures of different types cannot be individuated 
in terms of the types of act involved in their execution ; pro­
cedures of the same type can be executed in the performance of 
acts of different types. More apposite as terms for individuat­
ing procedures of different types are the types of circumstances 
that are appropriate for the adoption of a procedure of a par­
ticular type and the types of outcomes which the execution of 
that procedure is designed to have. For it is by virtue of these 
features that a procedure is a manner or means of proceeding (to­
wards some end) in any circumstance or situation.
There are important differences between the types of rela-
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tionsliip that can obtain between the execution of a procedure 
and its disparate outcomes. One of these is exemplified in the 
difference between the relationships obtaining between the exe­
cution of the procedures for fishing and removing the car’s si­
lencer, as described in first presenting these examples, and 
the occurrence of the outcome which each procedure is designed 
to have. In the case of the procedure for removing the car’s 
silencer, an occurrence of the outcome v/hich that procedure is 
designed to have, i.e., the removal of the silencer, is necessi­
tated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure.
That is to say, it is not possible that, given the correct and 
complete execution of the procedure, and nothing intervening, 
that outcome does not follow. In the case of the procedure for 
fishing, however, an occurrence of the outcome which that pro­
cedure is designed to have, i.e., a catch of fish, is not neces­
sitated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure.
In this case, it is possible that even though the procedure is 
correctly and completely executed, without anything intervening, 
no fish are caught. No fish, or none large enough to be caught in 
the net, may have been swimming at the time and place where the 
fisherman cast his net and waited until he hauled it in. j
Now between these (non-conventional) procedures and conven- Ittional procedures that are constitutive of illocutionary acts, of I 
which those of promising, warning and objecting will be taken as 1
examples, there is an important difference and some important i 
similarities. First, these procedures are alike in that the cir­
cumstances in which they are adopted must be appropriate if their 
execution is to succeed. For instance, if after a long drought a 
river has receded to a mere trickle in the middle of its bed and 
it is clear that it is carrying no fish, it would be inappropri­
1
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ate in these circumstances to adopt the procedure for fishing 
from that river. And the procedure for removing the car’s si­
lencer is not likely to he successful if, for example, the me­
chanic does not have the necessary tools for the job. Similarly, 
the circumstances would be inappropriate for adopting the pro­
cedure of promising to perform some act if for one reason or an­
other the agent could not perform that act ; the circumstances 
would be inappropriate for warning if someone was not, and was 
not believed to be, in any possible danger ; and for objecting if i 
something said was incontestably true. There is more to say, and  ^
more will be said, about the appropriateness of the circumstances 
in which these conventional procedures can be executed. The point 
of these examples, however, has simply been to show that since 
inappropriate circumstances can vitiate the execution of each of 
these procedures, the appropriateness of the circumstances in 
which a procedure is adopted is just as necessary for the suc­
cessful execution of a conventional procedure as it is for the 
successful execution of a non-conventional procedure.
The second point of similarity between these different kinds*? 
of procedure is that among the outcomes of their correct and com­
plete execution there are both necessitated and non-neceesitated 
outcomes. An example of a non-necessitated outcome of the execu- 1 
tion of each of these conventional procedures would be, respect­
ively, a promisee’s conviction that the promisor will perform the i 
act which he has promised to perform ; fright or alarm on the 
part of the person to whom the warning is addressed at the possi­
bility of the danger against which he has been warned ; admira­
tion on the part of the audience at the acuteness of the intelli- î 
gence of the speaker which has enabled him to raise the objection 
he has. In each of these cases it is possible that, without any­
' i
thing intervening, the correct and complete execution of the 
procedure does not have this outcome. The promisee may have 
found the promisor to he unreliable in the past, the promisor 
may have a history of broken promises known to the promisee 
who has decided never to trust his word, and even his promises, 
again. So the promisee is not convinced by this promise. The 
addressee of the warning may be cool-headed by nature and not 
prone to take fright or be alarmed at the prospect of personal 
danger ; so he is not frightened or alarmed by this warning.
And the audience amongst whom the objection has been raised may 
just fail to be impressed in the way indicated, having come a- 
cross the same sort of objection many times before and knowing 
that the speaker raising the objection is a bit of a plagiarist 
anyway. A single example of an outcome that is necessitated by 
the correct and complete execution of the procedure will suf­
fice as it applies equally in the case of each of these conven­
tional procedures. In ideal circumstances, the performance of a 
locutionary act, performed as part of the correct and complete 
execution of the procedure, necessitates the addressee’s under­
standing of the meaning and the force of the speaker’s utter­
ance. In Austin’s words, it secures uptake. In these cases, 
something does have to intervene for the correct and complete 
execution of the procedure not to have this outcome. For in­
stance, just as the speaker begins speaking, the addressee may 
suddenly be convulsed by a violent sneeze, preventing him from 
hearing all that was said and inhibiting his full understanding 
of it. And although the speaker may go on to complete the exe­
cution of the procedure correctly, uptake will not have been 
secured because of this intervention. But in the absence of any 
like intervention, it is not possible that the correct and com­
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plete execution of the procedure, in ideal circumstances, does 
not bring about the audience’s understanding of the meaning 
and force of the speaker’s utterance.
The point on which these two kinds of procedure differ im­
portantly is that the execution of a conventional procedure has 
a type of outcome which the execution of a non-conventional pro­
cedure does not, viz., outcomes that are strictly necessitated 
by the execution of the procedure* For this type of outcome, it 
is not possible, given the correct and complete execution of the 
procedure in appropriate circumstances, that such outcomes do 
not follow. The type difference between necessitated and strict­
ly necessitated outcomes is that in the former case it is poss­
ible for something to intervene to frustrate the occurrence of 
the outcome but in the latter case it is not* A strictly neces­
sitated outcome of the execution of the procedure of promising 
would be, for example, the speaker’s commitment to perform the 
promised act. Examples of outcomes of this type following from 
the execution of the procedures of warning and objecting will be 
introduced in the next section. To say that such outcomes follow 
from the execution of the respective procedures- as a matter of 
convention, or that they are conventional outcomes of those pro­
cedures, though true, is not, in the present context, to say 
very much. For it is the nature of the relationship between the 
execution of such a procedure and an outcome of this type, which 
has only been characterized schematically so far in terms of 
strict necessitation, that is part of the explanandum of the 
present account of conventional procedures* While an attempt to 
spell out the nature of this relationship will be made in the 
final two sections of this chapter, it may be noted here that it 
is such outcomes as these, and their obtaining, which provides
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content for the respective Aiistinian notions of a conventional 
procedure having "a certain conventional effect" and the per­
formance of an illocutionary act "taking effect".
These points of similarity and difference between conven­
tional and non-conventional procedures suggest the following 
principle of individuation for different types of conventional 
procedures that are constitutive of illocutionary acts. Two 
such procedures are procedures of the same type if and only if 
the correct and complete execution of those procedures requires 
the same set of (types of) presuppositions to be satisfied and 
strictly necessitates the same set of (types of) outcomes. The 
satisfaction of the presuppositions mentioned in this principle 
consists in the obtaining of certain circumstances in the speech 
act situation in which the procedure is to be adopted* The ob- “
jects of such presuppositions (i.e., what is presupposed by such 
presuppositions) are circumstances of the sort occurring in a 
distinctive feature matrix of the necessary circumstances for 
the felicitous performance of illocutionary acts, of the kind 
sketched in the concluding section of the previous chapter. The 
circumstances specified for a particular type of illocutionary 
act in such a matrix are the objects of the members of the set 
of presuppositions of the conventional procedure constitutive ^
of an illocutionary act of that type.
The specification of a particular type of conventional pro­
cedure can be completed by adding to the specification of its 
sets of presuppositions and strictly necessitated outcomes a 
specification of the set of (typeslof) acts in the performance 4
of any one of which a procedure of that type can be executed. 
However, with the restriction on conventional procedures to those 4 
that are constitutive of illocutionary acts as they are adopted i
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in oral speech act situations, these sets are singletons con­
taining just one type of act, vis., a locutionary type of act. 
Hence the conventional procedure constitutive of a particular 
type of illocutionary act can he completely specified in the 
form of an ordered triplet consisting of a set of (types of) 
presuppositions, a set of locutionary act types and a set of 
(types of) strictly necessitated outcomes. Bach of these three 
features of conventional procedures is mentioned in Austin’s 
statement of the Felicity condition (A.l) : that there must he 
a "...conventional procedure having a certain conventional ef­
fect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words 
by certain persons in certain circumstances...". The correct 
and complete execution of such a procedure is the felicitous 
performance of an illocutionary act. It is by virtue of being 
performed as part of such a procedure that a locutionary act is 
constituted as an illocutionary act. For any procedure consti­
tutive of a particular type pf illocutionary act, correctly and 
completely executed, the utterance issued in those circumstances, 
with those outcomes following, has and may be taken to have the 
illocutionary force of that type.
Perhaps this account can be clarified a little by analyzing 
some types of illocutionary acts in terms of it. The following 
analyses of the illocutionary acts of promising, warning and ob­
jecting are only intended to be illustrative. They are not in­
tended to be exhaustive of all cases of the felicitous perform­
ance of acts of these types. They do not, for instance, accommo­
date cases of these acts being performed in the issuing of el­
liptical utterances, e.g., promising in saying just "I promise", 
warning in saying just "I’m warning you", objecting in saying
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just "I object". Nor do they accommodate cases of these acts 
being performed in the issuing of an utterance in response to 
a question, e.g., promising in saying "Yes" to the question 
"Do you promise?" ; nor cases of these acts being performed 
in the issuing of conditional utterances, e.g., warning in 
saying "If you do that you’ll hurt yourself". As well as being 
subject to these limitations, the following analysis of object­
ing is further restricted to cases of an objection being raised 
against a constative utterance on the grounds that it is. con­
tingently false. But within the limits of these restrictions the 
following analyses are submitted as being tolerably correct.
Some presuppositions of the procedure of promising are :
(P.l) that the speaker intends to perform some future act,
(p.2) that the speaker’s performance of that act is possible,
(p.3) that the speaker believes his performance of that act 
is possible, and
(p.4) that the speaker has some evidence in support of such 
a belief.
There is a difference between (P.2) on the one hand, and (P.l), 
(p.3) and (P.4) on the other, which corresponds to the differ­
ence between the sorts of circumstances necessary for the fel­
icitous performance of an illocutionary act alluded to by Aus­
tin’s separate statements of the Felicity conditions (A.2) and 
(r.l). Attempts to execute the procedure in situations in which 
(p.2) is not satisfied are misapplications of the procedure ; 
the attempt is unsuccessful and the act is not performed. The 
execution of the procedure in situations in which either (P.l), 
(p.3) or (p.4) is not satisfied is an instance of insincerity ; 
the act, though successfully performed, is infelicitous because 
it is insincere. The kinds of circumstances which may lead to 
the non-satisfaction of (P.2), in addition to those of the
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speaker’s physical incapacity, are those of his being under 
some prior obligation or commitment which prevents him from 
performing the act. Even though a speaker may go through the 
procedure of promising in such circumstances, unaware of the 
non-satisfaction of (P.2), and hence without insincerity, the 
later discovery of that fact would he sufficient to void the 
promise.
The locutionary act performed as part of the procedure of 
promising, at least in the simple cases of the execution of the 
procedure that are being analyzed here, must be such that the 
product of that act, addressed directly or indirectly to the 
promisee, characterizes the speaker’s future performance of the 
(promised) act, e.g., saying that he will take her to the cinema 
to-morrow. And as has been noted already, one of the outcomes 
strictly necessitated by the correct and complete execution of 
the procedure is that the speaker is committed to performing the 
promised act. The point embodied in the claim that such an out­
come is strictly necessitated, viz., that it is not possible for 
anything to intervene between the correct and complete execution 
of the procedure and the obtaining of this outcome, is not 
jeopardized by the possibility of something occurring subseouent- 
ly to a felicitous act of promising which releases the promisor 
from his commitment to carry out his promise. Such an occurrence 
is not an intervention between the act of promising and the 
promisor’s being so committed and, indeed, presupposes that the 
promisor was so committed by his act of promising. Nor is it a 
counter-instance to this point that the speaker may be under a 
prior commitment or obligation which prevents his performance of 
the purportedly promised act. For a circumstance of this sort ob* 
taining in a speech act situation is sufficient to render that
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situation inappropriate for the adoption of the procedure of 
promising and hence the procedure cannot be correctly executed.
Promises are sometimes assimilated to predictions about 
one’s future actions. But they are really quite distinct from 
these, as well as from statements of intention with which they 
may also be confused. These differences are due to the differ­
ent procedures involved in the performance of these acts and 
begin to emerge from the different sets of presuppositions of 
the respective procedures. For example, (P.l) is not a presup­
position of the procedure of predicting ; one can quite happily 
predict that one will do something without at any time intending 
to do it. And (P.2) is not a presupposition of the procedure of 
stating (an intention to perform some future act). For one can 
intend to do what is in fact impossible, and, therefore, one can 
state the intention which one has to do it. There are, of course, 
numerous other differences between these procedures, and it 
would be a pleasant leisure-time activity to draw up lists of 
the constituent presuppositions and outcomes of these procedures 
as well as those of all the other different types of illocution­
ary acts. But this would be a strictly leisure-time activity ;
it is not clear what philosophical problems would be being
1solved in indulging in it. The differences between the proce­
dures constitutive of the various types of illocutionary acts 
are not, therefore, of immediate primary concern.
Some presuppositions of the procedure of warning are ;
(p.l) that there is some present or future possible state of 
affairs whose obtaining would put the audience in pos­
sible danger,
(p.2) that the speaker believes that such a state of affairs 
does or will obtain, i.e., that it is or will be an 
actual state of affaire.
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(p.3) that the speaker has some evidence in support of such 
a belief.
(p.l) and (p.2) are stated separately in order to accommodate 
cases of unintended warnings. Such cases are possible. For 
clearly, a speaker may say to a companion, as they stand to­
gether by the side of a frozen pond, that the ice on the far 
side of the pond is very thin, without believing, because he 
has no reason to believe, that his companion has any intention 
to go skating on the ice, and hence, without believing that his 
companion is in any possible danger from the thin ice. But if 
in fact hie companion does have such an intention, and being 
aware of the dangers generally inherent in skating on thin ice, 
he may take the speaker’s utterance as a warning, in which case, 
albeit unintentionally, the speaker will have warned his com­
panion. Hence, it is not a presupposition of the procedure of 
warning, though it may in fact be the case in the great major­
ity of instances of the execution of the procedure, that the 
spealcer believes that the audience of his act would be put in 
possible danger by the obtaining of the state of affairs whose 
obtaining would do so.
The locutionary act performed as part of the procedure of 
warning, e.g., saying that the ice over there is very thin, 
must be such that the product of that act characterizes the 
state of affairs whose obtaining would put the audience of that 
act in possible danger. Complete uptake of the utterance, i.e., 
the audience’s understanding of the meaning and force of the 
utterance, will not be secured unless the audience appreciates 
the possible danger to himself from the obtaining of the state 
of affairs characterized by the speaker’s utterance. But even 
if the uptake secured is incomplete in this respect, the speak­
er’s execution of the procedure is, ceteris paribus, an act of
.J
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warning in the sense of giving notice to the audience of the 
possible danger. One of the outcomes strictly necessitated by 
the correct and complete execution of the procedure is that 
the speaker has diminished responsibility for injury to the 
addressee of the warning flowing from the danger against which 
the speaker gave his warning, and against which the addressee 
has had reasonable opportunity to protect himself. The extent 
to which the speaker’s responsibility is so diminished will, 
of course, be affected by other contingent circumstances of 
the speech act situation ; e.g., the extent to which the speak­
er himself is responsible for the obtaining of the state of af­
fairs which would endanger the addressee, the extent to which 
the speaker is responsible for the general protection of the 
addressee, etc. But that some diminution of the speaker’s re­
sponsibility is consequent upon (the giving of) a warning tak­
ing effect is shown by the fact that it is in general out of 
order for the addressee of a warning to protest to the speaker 
about damage or injury he has suffered arising from the state 
of affairs against which he was given a warning.
Some presuppositions of the procedure of objecting are :
(p.l) that some previously issued utterance has a bearing on 
the current speech act situation, e.g., the utterance 
that Jones is a nimble dancer,
(p.2) that the speaker has ascertain contrary-attitude towards 
that utterance; in this case, a belief that it is false,
(P.3) that there is a possible state of affairs whose obtain­
ing provides some grounds for believing that that utter­
ance is false,
(p.4) that the speaker believes that such a state of affairs
has obtained, or does or will obtain, i.e., that it was, 
is or will be an actual state of affairs,
(p.5) that the speaker has some evidence in support of such 
a belief.
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The locutionary act performed as part of the procedure of ob­
jecting, e.g., saying that Jones only has one leg, must be 
such that the product of that act characterizes the state of 
affairs whose obtaining provides some grounds for believing 
that the utterance against which the objection is being raised 
is false. And one of the outcomes strictly necessitated by the 
correct and complete execution of the procedure is that there 
are some grounds before the audience for believing that the 
utterance being objected to is false.
Whether the evidence thus provided is sufficient for the î 
falsehood of the previous utterance determines the soundness 
of the objection. But a negative assessment of the objection 
in this dimension does not impugn the felicity of the object­
ion ; an unsound objection may be raised in all sincerity, 
just as a piece of bad advice may be given in good faith and 
not all false statements are lies. What this point does show, 
however, is the necessity of the satisfaction of (P.8) for a 
felicitous objection. For in saying that Jones only has one 
leg, in a speech act situation in which (P.1)-(P.5) with the 
exception of (P.8) are satisfied, the speaker may not be ob­
jecting to the previous utterance that Jones is a nimble 
dancer but confirming, corroborating or affirming that Jones 
is a nimble dancer. Again, that such a confirmation, corrobor­
ation or affirmation may be unsound is not to the point ; that 
depends, as for the soundness of the objection, on whether 
Jones* one-leggedness provides conclusive evidence for or a- 
gainst his nimbleness as a dancer. What is to the point is that 
the distinguishing feature of the procedures constitutive of 
objecting on the one hand, and confirming, corroborating and 
affirming on the other, is, ceteris paribus, the presupposition
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concerning the speaker’s attitude towards the previous utter­
ance. In the former case, this presupposition is one of the 
speaker’s contrary-attitude towards the previous utterance ; 
in the latter case, one of a pro-attitude.
(p.2) and (P.3) are stated separately for reasons similar 
to those for the separate statements of (P.l) and (P.2) of the 
procedure of warning, i.e., to accommodate cases of unintended 
objections. Again, such cases are possible. For a speaker may 
disagree with the previous utterance that Jones is a nimble 
dancer, i.e., believe that it is false, and yet while not be­
lieving that Jones’ one-leggedness is grounds for that belief, 
say with good grounds for believing it to be so that Jones 
only has one leg. And if, in fact, Jones’ one-leggedness is 
evidence for the falsehood of the utterance that Jones is a 
nimble dancer, then the speaker will have raised, albeit unin­
tentionally, an objection to that utterance. Hence, it is not 
a presupposition of the procedure of objecting, though it may 
in fact be the case in the great majority of instances of the 
execution of the procedure, that the state of affairs charac­
terized by the utterance issued as part of the procedure, 
which provides some evidence for the falsehood of the previous 
utterance, is believed to do so by the speaker. That (P.3) 
is a presupposition of the procedure of objecting is shown by 
the fact that if there is no possible state of affairs whose 
obtaining provides grounds for believing that an utterance is 
false, then that utterance is unobjectionable on the grounds 
that it is false. It may, of course, be objectionable on other 
grounds, e.g., on the grounds of triviality. In the present 
analysis, however, the cases of objections being considered 
are restricted to those made on the grounds that the previous
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utterance is contingently false. This restriction also pro­
tects the statements of (P.4) and (P,5), which would have to 
he amended if the analysis was to accommodate hypothetical 
objections.
In Lecture XII Austin out-lined a fivefold classification 
of types of illocutionary act, or types of illocutionary force 
of utterances, under the heads ; verdietive, exercitive, com­
missive, behabitive and expositive. The signal feature of this 
classification, one which Austin himself was at some pains to 
point out, is its tentative, provisional nature. "I said I 
would attempt some general preliminary classification and make 
some remarks on these proposed classes. Well, here we go, I 
shall only give you a run around, or rather a flounder around.
I distinguish five very general classes: but I am far from e- 
qually happy about all of them" (Words pp.150-1)* "We should be 
clear from the start that there are still wide possibilities of 
marginal or awkward cases, or of overlaps....! am not putting 
any of this forward as in the very least definitive"(p.152).
In Austin’s discussion of this classification his doubts about 
the exclusiveness of the distinctions between the classes are 
borne out in his systematic comparisons of members of one class 
with members of the others. Reasons justifying these doubts e~ 
merge from the defining characteristics of membership of the 
respective classes. "Verdictives consist in thé delivering of a 
finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to 
value or fact, so far as these are distinguishable"(p.153)•
"The second, exercitives, are the exercising of powers, rights, 
or influence"(p.151). "The whole point of a commissive is to 
commit the speaker to a certain course of action"(p.15?); "...
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the commissive is an assuming of an obligation...the behabi­
tive is the adopting of an attitude..."(p.163). "The fifth, 
expositives, are difficult to define. They make plain how 
our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conver­
sation, how we are using words..."(p.152). "An enormous num­
ber of expos!tives_7 seem naturally, but no longer neces­
sarily, to refer to conversational interchange.(p.162).
The definitions of the first four classes are specified 
in terms of different features - presupposed circumstances 
and outcomes - of procedures constitutive of illocutionary 
acts I terms which are implicit in Austin’s statement of the 
two Felicity conditions (A.2) and (r.l). The distinction be­
tween behabitives and commissives maps onto a distinction, 
drawn in the statement of (r.l), between procedures for use 
by persons having certain thoughts, feelings, etc., i.e., 
attitudes, and procedures for the inauguration of certain 
consequential conduct. The holding of a certain attitude is 
presupposed for the correct execution of a procedure of the 
former kind and a behabitive is the adopting of an attitude. i
By executing a procedure of the latter kind, a speaker as­
sumes an obligation in the form of committing himself to cer­
tain consequential conduct and a commissive is the assuming 
of an obligation ; its whole point is ;bo commit the speaker 
to a certain course of action. Among the circumstances pre­
supposed for the correct execution of a procedure that are al­
luded to in the statement of (A.2) are those of different 
kinds of authority required by a speaker for his illocution­
ary act. As emerged from the discussion of these circumstances 
in the final section of the previous chapter, the kind of au­
thority so required may be that of evidence in support of his
250
utterance in the issuing of which the illocutionary act is 
performed, or it may he that of powers or rights of a legal 
or quasi-legal nature or it may just he that of the speaker's 
personal influence. These different kinds of authority under­
pin Austin's distinction between verdictives and exercitives: 
verdictives consist in the delivering of a finding upon evi­
dence or reasons as to value or fact ; exercitives are the 
exercising of powers, rights or influence.
Austin seems to have been guided in classifying a partic­
ular type of illocutionary act as either verdietive, exercitive, 
commissive or behabitive by the sort of feature which is an 
especially prominent feature of the procedure constitutive of 
an act of that type. Thus an especially prominent feature of 
convicting (verdietive) is that the person performing the act 
does so on the basis of evidence. An especially prominent fea­
ture of demoting (exercitive) is that the person doing so has 
the requisite authority to demote. An especially prominent fea­
ture of promising (commissive) is that the speaker assumes an 
obligation and is committed to performing the promised act. An 
especially prominent feature of protesting (behabitive) is that 
the speaker has certain thoughts, feelings, etc., i.e., atti­
tudes, on the subject. If this is so, it is not surprising to 
find, as Austin showed, that there is a considerable degree of 
overlap between the classes. For while one feature of a proce­
dure may be an especially prominent feature, it is not the only 
one, and some of the procedure's other features may well be 
ones that are definitive of membership of other classes. Thus, 
for instance, the definitive feature of verdictives, that the 
speaker has evidence in support in some way for his utterance, 
is also a circumstance presupposed for the correct execution of
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the procedures demoting (exercitive), promising (commissive), 
and protesting (behabitive). The definitive feature of exer­
citives, that the speaker has certain powers, rights or in­
fluence, is also a circumstance presupposed for the correct 
execution of the procedures of convicting (verdictive), con­
tracting (commissive) and protesting (behabitive). The de­
finitive feature of commissives, that a speaker assumes an 
obligation with respect to acting in a certain way, is also 
an outcome of executing the procedures of convicting (verdic­
tive), excommunicating (exercitive) and challenging (behabi­
tive). And the definitive feature of behabitives, that the 
speaker holds certain attitudes, is also a circumstance pre­
supposed for the correct execution of the procedures of con­
victing (verdictive), advising (exercitive) and opposing 
(commissive).
The basis of Austin's classification of some types of il­
locutionary acts as expositives is in a quite different case.
His definition of this class, that its members "make plain how 
our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversa­
tion, how we are using words", suggests that what Austin had 
in mind as the basis for this classification was the role of 
the explicit performative prefix ; a phrase prefixed to an ut­
terance which serves to make explicit the particular type of 
illocutionary force with which the utterance is intended to be 
taken, or the particular type of illocutionary act whose per­
formance is being attempted in the issuing of the utterance.
On this basis, the class of expositives is the class of acts 
whose performance is able to be made explicit by the use of the 
explicit performative prefix. If there is anything to this sug­
gestion, the class of expositives includes the sum of the
1classes of verdictives, exercitives, commissives and behabi-
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tives since for any type of illocutionary act there is an ex­
plicit performative prefix which can be used to make explicit 
that it is an act of that type whose performance is being at­
tempted in the issuing of the utterance. It may be this point 
which underlies the first part of Austin’s comment that ex­
positives "...seem both to be included in the other classes 
and at the same time to be unique in a way that I have not 
succeeded in making clear even to myself"(p.152). A clue to 
the way in which expositives may be unique, albeit uncleanly 
even to Austin, can be seen in his other remark that an enor­
mous number of them seem naturally to refer to conversational 
interchange. For while it is easy to imagine an act of any of 
the types classified as expositive being performed in the 
course of conversation, e.g., describing, remarking, telling, 
answering, agreeing, arguing, explaining, calling, etc., it 
is difficult to conceive of acts of some of the types includ­
ed in the other classes being performed in the course of con­
versation, e.g., the verdictives acquitting and convicting, 
the exercitives excommunicating and declaring open, the com­
missives covenanting and dedicating oneself to, the behabi­
tives condoling and welcoming. But clearly, this distinction, 
between expositives on the one hand and verdictives, exerci­
tives, commissives and behabitives on the other, like those 
between the latter four classes, is a very blurred one, and 
perhaps the only merit in examining the bases of this classi­
fication is to justify Austin’s own doubts that any great
qweight can be put upon it.
It remains in this chapter to give some account of the 
conventional nature of the procedures that are constitutive
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of illocutionary acts. Because these procedures are, inter 
alia, means for attaining certain ends, to give an account 
of their conventional nature is, inter alia, to give an ac­
count of those of their features by virtue of which they are 
conventional means for attaining certain ends. And, as has 
been noted already, procedures are means for attaining ends 
by virtue of the fact that their execution has certain out­
comes - in short, because they are efficacious. So an account 
of the conventional nature* of the procedures constitutive of 
illocutionary acts can be approached by way of an account of 
how the efficacy of a procedure is at first natural but then 
ceases to be so and becomes conventional. This account will 
be given with reference to the example of the procedure of 
promising ; the application of its conclusions to other types 
of illocutionary act constituting procedures will be shown 
la ter.
Suppose that two members of a society are in a situation 
in which one wants to convince the other that he, the first, 
will perform some act in the future. It may be assumed that 
the members of this society are rational human agents, and 
quite clever with it, but that, as yet, there is known to them 
no conventional means, linguistic or otherwise, for convincing 
other people of something. That is, as well as not having a 
conventional procedure of promising, the language used by mem­
bers of this society does not have such adverbs or adverbial 
phrases as "definitely" or "without fail". The language of 
these people is thus somewhat restricted in scope but it may 
be assumed that it has sufficient resources to enable linguist­
ically competent members of the society to issue and understand 
utterances in conditional form, as well as utterances which
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characterize their own or others’ performances of acts at dif­
ferent times in the future. A member of this society, the 
speaker, wanting to convince another, the audience, of his own 
performance of some act in the future can thus say to his audi­
ence what act it is that he will perform but must seek some 
other means for convincing his audience that he will perform 
it. Being quite clever, he may hit on the idea of giving some­
thing of his own which is of value to himself and his audience 
to the latter, and saying to him that whatever it is - a goat, 
one of his wives, a sack of corn - is his to keep if he, the 
speaker, does not perform the future act but Is to be returned 
to him if he does perform the future act. That Is, the speaker 
gives his audience a hostage against his non-performance of 
the act, and says as much, along with saying what act It is 
that he will perform.
Now as a means of convincing his audience that the speaker 
will perform the future act, this move may or may not be suc­
cessful. It may be unsuccessful for a number of disparate rea­
sons. The procedure may have been altogether too complex for 
the audience to understand so that he is quite in the dark as 
to what is going on. Or the audience, while understanding the 
speaker’s utterance characterizing his future performance of 
the act, may have failed to understand the rest and taken the 
hostage as a straight gift. So slightly bewildered but pleas­
antly surprised at the beneficence of the speaker, he may have 
some belief that the speaker will perform the future act but 
not be convinced that he will. Or the audience may be convinced 
by some other means, per accidens. that the speaker will per­
form the act, and not because of the procedure which he has 
gone through. But while the procedure may be unsuccessful for
335gany of these reasons, and more, there are also reasons why
it may he successful. Given the audience’s understanding of
the speaker’s utterances, and his appreciation of the host­
age as such, the audience has a reason for being convinced 
that the speaker will perform the act. Being quite clever 
himself, the audience may reason from the premises that the 
hostage is of value to the speaker, and that its return to 
the speaker is conditional upon his performance of the act, 
to the conclusion that the speaker will prefer the perform­
ance of the act to its non-performance because it is in his 
own interest to perform the act. Perhaps the speaker hopes 
that his audience will reason in this way. But it does not 
seem to be a necessary condition for the audience’s arrival 
at such a conclusion that he recognises the speaker’s hope 
that he will reason in this way ; nor is it the case that 
the speaker has to rely on such a recognition being made in 
order for the procedure he has adopted to be successful. All 
the speaker need rely on, and perhaps, all that he can rely
on, is the audience’s native wit and ability to know a good
bargain (for another) when he sees one. This is, in any case, 
sufficient for the audience to be able to arrive at the hoped 
for conclusion and make the procedure successful. For to the 
extent that the audience believes that the speaker prefers 
the performance of the act to its non-performance because it 
is in his interest to perform the act, the audience has a rea­
son for being convinced that the speaker will perform the act. 
And being a rational person, to the extent that he has a rea­
son for being convinced that the speaker will perform the act, 
he will be so convinced.
Irrespective of the number of times a speaker may go
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through this procedure without success, once one of his at­
tempts with it is successful in the way indicated a signifi­
cantly new situation obtains. For there is now, where there 
was not before, a successful means for convincing another of 
one’s own performance of some future act known to at least 
two members of that society. A precedent has been set. And if 
either of those two people should subsequently find himself 
in a situation in which he wants to convince another of his 
own performance of some future act, either the person with 
whom he was involved on the occasion of the first successful 
execution of the procedure or another, it is more likely than 
not that he will follow precedent and adopt the same procedure 
to attain this end. Suppose the audience of the first success­
ful execution of the procedure subsequently wants to convince 
another, who is not the original speaker, that he will perform 
some future act. Ex hypothesi. he has no conventional means at 
his disposal for attaining this end. And although he is able 
to say to his audience what act it is that he will perform, he 
too, as the original speaker before him, must seek some means 
for convincing his audience that he will perform that act.
Even if he can devise a number of means, each of which he 
thinks could succeed in attaining his end but is different 
from the means which he knows has been tried and found to be 
successful for attaining a similar end, it is more likely than 
not that he will adopt the latter. For, ceteris paribus, he 
will be more sure of the future success of a means that he 
knows has already been tried and found to be successful than 
of the future success of untried means. And since as a rational 
being, he will adopt those means of whose success he is most 
sure, it is more likely than not that he will adopt those that
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have already "been tried and found to he successful, and hence 
follow precedent and adopt the same procedure as the speaker 
before him adopted to attain a similar end. If he does, then 
for the same reasons that applied before, the audience on this 
occasion may or may not be convinced by those means. And again, 
irrespective of the number of times the execution of the pro­
cedure by this speaker does not meet with success, if and when 
it does, a significantly new situation obtains. For now there 
is a successful means for convincing another of one’s own 
future performance of some act known to at least three members 
of that society. And if the audience of the second successful 
execution of the procedure should subsequently find himself in 
a situation in which he wants to convince another, who has not 
been a participant in either of the previous successful execu­
tions of the procedure, of his own performance of some future 
act, then for the same reasons that led the audience of the 
first successful, execution of the procedure to follow prece­
dent and adopt the same procedure in a similar situation, the 
audience of the second successful execution of the procedure 
will follow precedent and adopt the same procedure in that 
situation. And an execution of the procedure by this person 
which meets with success will have as one of its outcomes that
Ia successful means for convincing another of one’s own perform- |
Iance of some future act is known to at least four members of i
that society. And so on. I
In this way, iterated successful executions of the proce- !
dure will have a spreading effect throughout the society. With
each successful execution of the procedure, an increasing pro­
portion of the members of this society will come to know this 
procedure as an efficacious means for convincing another that
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one will perform some future act. This effect may also he con­
tributed to by speakers, who have used the procedure success­
fully before, executing the same procedure successfully in 
subsequent similar situations involving different audiences.
The reasons why a speaker is more likely than not to repeat
the execution of a procedure which he himself has tried and
found to be successful in the past in subsequent similar situ­
ations involving different audiences are, ceteris paribus, 
even stronger than those for an audience of a previously suc­
cessful execution of the procedure being more likely than not 
to adopt the same procedure in subsequent similar situations 
involving audiences other than the original speakers. For, 
ceteris paribus, one is even more likely to follow a success­
ful precedent in subsequent similar situations when that prece­
dent has been set by oneself than by another. Knowledge of this 
procedure may also become more widespread throughout the society 
in a quite different way. For as the procedure "catches on", 
people will start talking about it ; news of it will travel by 
word of mouth. It may even in this process be given a name, 
e.g., "the procedure of promising" or "promising" for short ; 
and a battery of "promising"-terminology may enter the vocabu­
lary and vernacular of the people, e.g., "promisor" and "promi­
see" may be introduced as general terms for, respectively, the 
speaker and the audience participating in an execution of the 
procedure, "promising" or "giving a promise" for the act of 
executing the procedure, "keeping a promise" and "breaking a 
promise" for performing and failing to perform the promised act. 
Part of what this increasingly general knowledge of the 
procedure of promising will consist in, be it gained from ex­
perience or hearsay, is knowledge of what is involved in its
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correct and complete execution ; i.e., that it is a procedure 
suitable for adoption in situations in which one wants to con­
vince another of one’s own performance of some future act, 
that it involves giving a hostage to one’s audience against 
one’s own non-performance of that act and saying to one’s 
audience that it is a hostage, as well as saying what act it is 
that one will perform. But because some of this knowledge is 
gained from experience of successful executions of the proce­
dure, it will also comprise the knowledge not only that the 
procedure is a successful means for attaining such an end but 
also the knowledge of how executions of it succeed in attain­
ing such an end, i.e., what the procedure’s efficacy consists 
in : its capacity to provide the audience with a reason for 
being convinced that the speaker will do what he says he will 
do - which reason is that, known to the audience, the speaker 
prefers the performance of the promised act to its non-perform­
ance because of his interest in the retrieval of the hostage 
which is conditional upon his performance of the promised act. 
And because this knowledge is passed on by word of mouth, not 
only will the recipients of this knowledge, as well as those 
passing it on, know these things, but each will know that 
others know these things. As the growing use of the procedure 
contributes towards the more widespread knowledge of it within 
society, so this knowledge may contribute towards the increas­
ing use of the procedure. For someone who has had no previous 
personal experience of the procedure, finding himself in a 
situation of wanting to convince another of his own perform­
ance of some future act, may, simply on the basis of his know­
ledge of the procedure gained from hearsay, adopt the procedure 
in that situation. So given time, not only may all members of
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the society gain knowledge and experience of the procedure of 
promising, but also, given a continual need for members of that 
society to convince others of their own performance of future 
acts, executions of the procedure in such situations may be­
come quite a familiar feature of the behaviour of members of 
that society.
Now there is a sense of "convention" with which it can be 
said that within this society there is a convention with re­
spect to the procedure of promising as it has been described so 
far. This is the sense of "a rule or practice based upon gener­
al consent, or accepted and upheld by society at large". Deri­
vative upon this sense, acts can be said to be conventional in 
so far as they are what agents usually or as a rule do, or make 
a practice of doing. And with this sense the procedure of pro­
mising as described so far can be said to be a conventional 
procedure in so far as executions of it are what members of this 
society usually or as a rule do, or make a practice of doing, 
when they want to convince another of their own future perform­
ance of some act. But if this sense is at all relevant, and it 
is not clear that it is, it is clear that it does not exhaust 
the sense with which it is said that the procedure constitutive 
of the illocutionary act of promising is a conventional proce­
dure. This can be seen from the different ways in which the ac­
count given thus far falls short of an adequate account of the 
procedure in its more highly evolved and familiar form. First, 
the use of the procedure, in the form described so far, is tied 
to the attainment of one particular type of end. But the use of 
the procedure in its familiar form is not so tied and an ade­
quate account of it should explain its suitability for the at­
tainment of a variety of types of end. Secondly, there is a
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major difference between the ways in which the procedure is 
executed in the form described so far and in its familiar 
form. Whereas the former includes giving something as a host­
age in addition to acts of saying something, the latter in­
cludes only acts of saying something and an adequate account 
of the procedure should accommodate the way in which, typi­
cally, in its familiar form, it is executed. Perhaps neither 
of these points by itself shows that the account given so far 
is inadequate as an account of the conventional features of 
the procedure. However, two further points do ; each high­
lights a part of the explanandum of an account of the con­
ventional nature of the procedure of promising which is not 
explained by the account given so far. The points are inter­
related and so their explanations are not independent of each 
other, but in the interests of clarity they will be stated 
separately. They have to do, respectively, with the nature of 
a promisor’s commitment to perform the promised act and the 
grounds of the reason, provided by an execution of the proce­
dure, for a promisee’s conviction that the promisor will per­
form the promised act. (In the meantime, this example of an 
end which can be attained by means of the procedure will be 
adhered to.)
Thirdly, then, while content can be found for the notion 
of a promisor’s commitment to perform the promised act, within 
the account given so far, the nature of that commitment is very 
different from that undertaken by a promisor executing the pro­
cedure in its familiar form. In the former case, a promisor is 
committed to performing the promised act because it is in his 
interest to do so, because the return of the hostage which is 
of value to him is conditional upon his performance. But in the
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latter case, where the execution of the procedure does not in­
volve the giving of a hostage, there is no such natural con­
straint upon the promisor to perform. So the account of the 
procedure given so far does not explain the nature of the com­
mitment undertaken by a promisor executing the procedure in its 
familiar form and hence does not explain the conventional 
nature of that commitment. Finally, the grounds of the reason 
for a promisee’s conviction that the promisor will perform the 
promised act, provided by the execution of the procedure, differ 
according to which form of the procedure is executed* Where the 
execution of the procedure involves giving a hostage, the reason 
for the promisee’s conviction, i.e., that the speaker prefers 
the performance of the promised act to its non-performance, is 
grounded upon the fact that it is in the speaker’s interest to 
perform, which interest lies in the value of the hostage to the 
speaker. And this is a matter of natural fact. It is a matter 
of natural fact, not of convention, that something is of value 
to someone, that he loses in the event of its forfeit and gains 
from its retrieval. And it will be clear that where the execu­
tion of the procedure does not involve giving a hostage the 
grounds of the reason for the promisee’s conviction provided 
thereby must lie elsewhere. But it is the procedure’s capacity 
to provide such a reason that comprises its efficacy as a means 
for convincing another. So the account of the procedure given so 
far does not explain the nature of the efficacy of the procedure 
in its familiar form and so does not explain the conventional 
nature of that efficacy. In the next section, an attempt will be 
made to explain and accommodate these four points within an ac­
count of the conventional nature of the familiar procedure of 
promising before extending the conclusions of that account to
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procedures constitutive of other types of illocutionary act,
One requirement on the correct and complete execution of 
the procedure in the form described so far is that the speak­
er has, at the time of executing it, some part of his posses­
sions at his disposal to give to the audience as a hostage.
This requirement may curtail the frequency of the procedure’s 
use. For situations may well arise in which a speaker may want 
to convince another of his own performance of some future act, 
and is familiar with the procedure of promising, but is pre­
vented from adopting it to attain this end for want of anything 
to give as a hostage. Suppose that such a situation arises ; it 
may be assumed that on this occasion the speaker knows that his 
audience is familiar with the procedure. Being quite clever, 
and his need to convince his audience being great, the speaker 
may hit on the idea of saying to his audience what act it is 
that he will perform, but instead of giving his audience a 
hostage and saying that it is a hostage, saying to his audience 
that he has no hostage to give against his non-performance of 
the act but that nevertheless he promises to perform the act. 
Given the audience’s understanding of the meaning of the speak­
er’s utterances and his familiarity with the procedure of pro­
mising, the audience will know that the speaker, in saying what 
he said, was at least trying to convince him of his future per­
formance of the act. To this attempt the audience may react in 
a variety of ways. He may laugh the speaker to scorn : "What do 
you take me for, a fool? Where’s your hostage?" Or, being a be­
liever in the virtue of tradition, he may point out rather 
prickily to the speaker that he has executed the procedure 
neither correctly nor completely and that he does not accept
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this unusual ("unconventional") procedure which the speaker 
has adopted. Or he may reason in the following way.
The speaker has tried to convince me that he will perform 
this act in the future. Either he is man of good faith or a 
man of had faith, i.e., a deceiver. If he is a man of good 
faith, then although he has adopted these unusual means in his 
attempt to convince me, his reasons for doing so are clear e- 
nough, and because he is a man of good faith he will, ceteris 
paribus, prefer the performance of an act which he has said he 
will perform to its non-performance. If he is a man of bad 
faith, i.e.; a deceiver, then he may or may not have been lying 
when he said that he had no hostage to give against his non-
performance of the act. But if he was lying and in fact did
Îhave something to give as a hostage, it is unlikely that he i
would adopt these means to deceive me on this occasion. For not | 
only does the mere fact of deviating from the usual way of exe~
' j
cuting the procedure reduce his chances of convincing me, and j
hence reduce his chances of deceiving me, but the particular
iform of that deviation on this occasion reduces those chances 
still further. For by not giving a hostage he makes it evident 
that he has nothing to lose from not performing the act, and 
hence makes it even less likely that I will be convinced that 
he will perform the act. Moreover, if he does have something to 
give as a hostage and does want to deceive me on this occasion, 
there are better means (i.e., means more likely to succeed) a- 
vailable to him for doing so. For he need only execute the pro­
cedure in the usual way and give me a hostage of such value 
that he thinks will be sufficient to convince me of his future 
performance of the act, and is of less value than that of the 
advantage to him of the successful deception, for these means
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to be not only worthwhile but more likely to succeed. And as a 
rational agent, he will adopt those means that are most likely 
to succeed in attaining his end. So if he is trying to deceive 
me on this occasion he would not have adopted the means which 
he has ; hence, he is not trying to deceive me on this occasion 
if he was lying when he said that he had no hostage to give.
But it is also unlikely that the speaker is trying to deceive 
me on this occasion if he was not lying when he said this, even 
though he is a deceiver. For he too will know that by deviating 
from the usual way of executing the procedure, especially in 
the Y/ay that he has, he reduces his chances of deceiving me. It 
is more likely, if the speaker is a deceiver with nothing to 
give as a hostage, and is at all clever, that what he is doing 
on this occasion is trying to establish the precedent of con­
vincing me (non-deceitfully) by these unusual means not involv­
ing the giving of a hostage. The speaker stands to gain from 
the setting of such a precedent. For on a subsequent occasion 
of the procedure being executed in this way, the precedent can 
be relied on, if it is known to the audience, to reduce the 
chances of the audience suspecting an attempt at deception be­
cause of the way the procedure is executed, and so to increase 
the chances of that attempt to convince the audience being suc­
cessful, whether it is made in good faith or not. (Nor is the 
subsequent acceptance of this way of executing the procedure, 
based on knowledge of a satisfactory precedent, advantageous 
only to deceivers who have nothing to give as a hostage. It is 
advantageous to all deceivers. For a procedural form which does 
not involve the giving of a hostage is, ceteris paribus, more 
advantageous to a deceiver than one which does, since the ad­
vantages to be gained from a deceitful use of the former are
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not diminished by the forfeit of the hostage as they would be 
in the case of a deceitful use of the latter. Thus the speaker 
who lies when he says that he has nothing to give as a hostage 
also stands to gain from the setting of such a precedent and 
the desire to set such a precedent may be a motive for his lie.) 
So it will be in the speaker’s interest to do all in his power 
to establish this precedent of a successful non-deceitful use 
of the procedure executed in this unusual way. And one very ob­
vious way open to him to do this is to perform the act which he 
has said that he promises to perform. For by doing so, he not 
only allays any suspicions of deception aroused by the unusual 
way in which he executed the procedure, but he also provides 
positive reinforcement for whatever conviction was created by 
it. Hence, even if the speaker is a deceiver, and whether or 
not he was lying in saying that he has no hostage to give, he 
will on this occasion, ceteris paribus, prefer the performance 
of the act which he has said he will perform to its non-per­
formance .
By reasoning in this way, the audience is able to exclude 
the likelihood that the speaker is trying to deceive him on 
this occasion. And by reasoning in this m y  to the conclusion 
that the speaker, whether he is a man of good or bad faith, on 
this occasion prefers the performance of the promised act to 
its non-performance, the audience has a reason for being con­
vinced that the speaker will perform that act. And because he 
is a rational being, to the extent that the audience has a rea­
son for being so convinced, he will be convinced. So the speak­
er’s execution of the procedure of promising in this new way, 
in the performance only of acts of saying something and not in­
volving the giving of a hostage, succeeds in attaining the end
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he wanted it to. It may have succeeded in different ways. So 
it is not a necessary condition for the success of the proce­
dure that the audience reasons in the way just indicated nor, 
even if the speaker has hopes of the audience reasoning in 
this way, that the audience recognizes such hopes. For the 
two participants in the procedure may he well known to each 
other, the audience may know the speaker to he a reliable sort 
of person and so accept his word on trust, without any thought 
of an attempt at deception crossing his mind. However, succeed­
ing in this way makes the success of the procedure fortuitous, 
flukey, and obscures the fact that its success has and can be 
shown to have a rational basis ; a basis, moreover, which under­
pins the conventional efficacy of the procedure executed in 
this new way as opposed to its natural efficacy when executed 
in the old way.
The efficacy of the procedure, to recapitulate, is its 
capacity to provide the audience with a reason for being con­
vinced that the speaker will perform the promised act. Whether 
the procedure is executed in the old or new way this reason is 
that, known to the audience, the speaker, ceteris paribus, pre­
fers the performance of that act to its non-performance. But 
where the procedure is executed in the new way, not involving 
the giving of a hostage, this preference cannot be grounded on 
the hostage’s value to the speaker. Here, the speaker’s prefer­
ence is grounded upon the coincidence of the audience’s expec­
tations of the speaker’s performance of the act (expectations 
created by the speaker invoking the procedure of promising by 
saying that he promises to perform the act as part of his exe­
cution of the procedure), and the speaker's preferences with 
respect to those expectations. In this case, the speaker prefers
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the performance of the promised act to its non-performance be­
cause the audience expects it and the speaker prefers the ful­
filment of those expectations to their non-fulfilment. It is 
not of importance to the present issue, the first successful 
attempt by these unusual means to convince another of one’s 
own future performance of some act, that the speaker may have 
different motives for preferring the fulfilment of the audi­
ence’s expectations to their non-fulfilment ; e.g., that if 
the speaker is a man of bad faith, his preference may be moti­
vated by a desire to establish the precedent of convincing an­
other by these means in order to make future deceptions easier 
and more advantageous to himself, whereas if the speaker is a 
man of good faith, he will, just by his nature, prefer to ful­
fil rather than disappoint another’s expectations which he him­
self has created. Nor is it important that the speaker may have 
other reasons for preferring the performance of the promised 
act to its non-performance besides that of the audience’s expec­
tations of it. What is important is that these expectations and 
preferences can be created by the speaker’s execution of the 
procedure in this way, and that they coincide. For these are 
the grounds of the audience’s reason for being convinced that 
the speaker will perform the promised act, and the capacity of 
the procedure to provide such a reason comprises its efficacy 
as a means for attaining such an end. Moreover, the coincidence 
of these expectations and preferences forms an implicit agree­
ment between the speaker and his audience and in so far as a 
convention is an implicit agreement it can properly be said that 
the efficacy of the procedure executed in this way is dependent 
upon a convention rather than a matter of natural fact such as 
the value of the hostage to the speaker.
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That this is a proper sense of "convention" and one di­
rectly relevant to an account of the conventional nature of 
the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts can be seen 
from part of the specification of another sense of that word 
in the Ox^ 'ord English Dictionary : an "...agreement or con­
sent, deliberate or implicit, as constituting the origin and 
foundation of any custom, institution...". For just as the 
first successful attempt to convince another of one’s future 
performance of some act by means of the procedure, executed 
in the old way, set a precedent for how best to proceed in 
subsequent like situations, so the first attainment of a simi­
lar end by means of the procedure executed in this nev/ way 
(the success of which is based upon a convention between the 
speaker and his audience) sets a precedent for how best to 
proceed in subsequent like situations, and thus originates 
the custom or institution of promising in its familiar style. 
The old way of executing the procedure may, of course, con­
tinue to be practised as the practice of executing the proce­
dure in this new way begins to develop. But this new way of 
promising has two features which together make it reasonable 
to suppose that it will eventually replace the old way of exe­
cuting the procedure and become the universally practised way.
The first may at first sight appear to be a reason for 
supposing just the opposite. It is the greater advantage that 
a speaker may gain from a deceitful use of the procedure when 
it is executed in the new way. This is not to say that a de­
ceitful use of the procedure, executed in the old way, may be 
entirely without advantage to the speaker. As indicated already 
a speaker need only give a hostage of such value as is suffici 
ent to convince the audience of his future performance, and is
I I
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less than the value of the advantages to him of the success­
ful deception of his audience, for that deception to be to 
the speaker's overall advantage. Nor is this to deny that 
persistently deceitful use of the procedure, executed in this 
new way, will he ultimately self-defeating. For if a speaker 
acquires a reputation of being a promise-breaker from his per­
sistently deceitful use of the procedure then those aware of 
this reputation and involved as the audience in his executions 
of the procedure will be increasingly less likely to be con­
vinced, and hence increasingly less likely to be deceived, by 
his execution of the procedure. So ultimately, the speaker 
will be unable to deceive another by these means. The point 
here is that on any one occasion of a deception being attained 
by means of the procedure, the advantages of that deception to 
the speaker will be greater, ceteris paribus. if the procedure 
is executed in the new way, because those advantages will not 
be diminished by the forfeit of the hostage as they would be 
if the procedure had been executed in the old way. There is, 
therefore, a partial restraint on the deceitful use of the pro­
cedure when executed in the old way, a restraint imposed by the 
requirement on the correct and complete execution of the proce­
dure in that way to give something of value as a hostage against 
one’s non-performance of the promised act, which does not oper­
ate in the case of executions of the procedure in the new way.
The opportunities thus afforded for more advantageous decept­
ions may be expected to be exploited by men of bad faith as the 
practice of executing the procedure in this new way begins to 
develop. Such exploitation will, however, check that development. I
{It is for this reason that it was said earlier that this feature |I
of the new way of executing the procedure may at first sight ap- I
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pear to be a reason for supposing that this way of promising 
will not become the universally practised way. For as the in­
creasing incidence of deceitful uses of the procedure becomes 
known to members of the society they will become more likely 
to suspect an attempt at deception whenever they are the audi­
ence of a speaker’s execution of the procedure. This will make 
it less likely that an execution of the procedure, even one 
made in good faith, succeeds in convincing the audience that 
the speaker will perform his future act, and repeated failures 
of attempts to attain this end by means of the procedure will 
make it a less sure means for attaining that end. Knowledge of 
this, gained by experience or hearsay, will reduce the inclina­
tion of members of the society to adopt this way of executing 
the procedure in situations in which they need to convince an­
other, and hence the practice of executing the procédure in 
this new way will diminish.
There is another reason why the execution of the procedure 
in this new way will become a less sure means for attaining 
that end as its practice begins to develop. On the first occas­
ions of it successfully convincing the audience, that success I
depends in part upon the audience being able to exclude the j
likelihood that the speaker is attempting to deceive him, on 
the grounds that the speaker is trying to establish a precedent 
of convincing another by these means and the best way which the 
speaker has of establishing such a precedent is to perform the 
promised act. But once this precedent has been established, 
with the first few executions of the procedure in this new way 
succeeding in convincing the audience, this factor no longer 
applies. It can neither feature in an audience’s reasoning on 
these subsequent occasions to the conclusion that the speaker
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prefers the performance of the promised act to its non-per- 
formance ; nor can it he relied upon to do so by a speaker 
contemplating this nev/ way of executing the procedure. Hence, 
for this reason as well, irrespective of whether a deception 
is being attempted, this new way of executing the procedure 
becomes a less sure means for convincing another as its prac­
tice begins to develop, and so that practice will diminish.
However, this situation is disadvantageous to members of 
the society, particularly to those among them who are deceiv­
ers. For not only are all of them in danger of losing an effi­
cacious means for convincing others of their own performance 
of future acts - an end which any of them may from time to 
time want to attain - but those among them v/ho are of bad faith 
and given on occasion to deceiving others are also in danger of 
losing an efficacious means for attaining that end. Of the de­
ceivers, those who tell the truth when they say that they have 
nothing to give as a hostage are in an even more disadvantage­
ous position than those who lie when they say this as part of 
their execution of the procedure. For even though the old way 1
of executing the procedure is a lees advantageous means for de­
ceiving others than the new way, those who lie can fall back on I
!the old way of executing the procedure to work their deceptions | 
whereas those who tell the truth cannot. But whether it is to 
retain a more advantageous means or just to retain any means 
for deceiving others, it will be to their advantage to retain !
Î1this new way of executing the procedure as an efficacious means 1
for convincing others. And being clever, they will realize this |
and realize also that the efficacy of the procedure, executed I
iin this new way, can be preserved by maintaining or (re-)estab- j 
lishing a personal reputation of being a promise-keeper. For J
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having such a reputation will make it less likely that a 
speaker will he suspected of attempting a deception in execu­
ting the procedure and hence more likely that any such at­
tempt so made will he successful. (Whether this personal 
reputation has to he re-established or just maintained de­
pends on how clever the respective person is ; on whether he 
has been able to anticipate the effect of persistently deceit­
ful use of the procedure upon its efficacy or has had to dis­
cover it from experience.) The best way to (re-)establish and 
then maintain such a personal reputation is to ensure that the 
incidence of one’s deceitful uses of the procedure is only a 
small, virtually insignificant fraction of the total incidence 
of one’s use of the procedure and that in the great majority 
of cases the promise so given is carried out. And because it 
is in a deceiver’s own interest to have the reputation of a 
promise-keeper, and this is the best way to establish and main­
tain such a reputation, he will, being rational, adopt this 
way. So each deceiver will execute the procedure in this new 
way whenever he has the opportunity to do so, even if this in­
volves lying in saying that he has nothing to give as a hostage, 
and will ensure that in the great majority of cases the promise 
given is carried out. A deceiver may even deliberately contrive 
situations in which he can adopt and execute the procedure in 
this way and carry out the promises thus given without disad­
vantage to himself in order to minimize the proportion of his 
total uses of the procedure that are deceitful. For it is only 
so long as deceitful uses of the procedure are the (rare) ex­
ception rather than the rule that an execution of it in this 
new v/ay remains an efficacious means for convincing others, and 
hence for deceiving others. But because it is a more advantage­
...«I
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ous means, and for some their only means, for deceiving others, 
it will he in the interests of deceivers to satisfy this condi­
tion. And being rational, they will satisfy it, and so execute 
the procedure in this new way whenever the opportunity arises 
or can be contrived, and will ensure that in the great majority 
of instances the promise given is carried out. So inspite of 
first appearances, this feature of the new way of promising 
will contribute towards that way becoming the universally prac­
tised way.
There is also in this point content for the notion of a 
promisor’s commitment to carry out his promise, given in this 
way, in the early stages of the development of the practice of 
executing the procedure in this new way. As with the procedure 
being executed in the old way, a promisor is committed to per­
forming the promised act because it is in his interest to do so. 
But whereas in the latter case it is in the promisor’s interest 
to perform the promised act because the retrieval of the host­
age is conditional upon such performance, in the former case it 
is in the promisor’s interest to perform the promised act in 
order to establish and maintain his reputation as a promise- 
keeper, so that his future executions of the procedure will suc­
ceed in convincing their audiences. It is in this way and to 
this extent, as the practice of executing the procedure in this 
new way begins to develop, that a promisor is committed to 
carrying out a promise given in that way.
. The second feature of this new way of executing the proce­
dure contributing towards that way becoming the universally 
practised way is its greater ease and convenience. As well as 
actually having something to give as a hostage, the following 
are further requirements on the correct and complete execution
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of the procedure in the old way ; finding part of one’s pos­
sessions to give as a hostage, transferring it physically to 
the audience, surrendering possession of it for some time and 
risking its loss in the event of the audience not returning it 
after the performance of the promised act. None of these is 
a requirement on the correct and complete execution of the pro­
cedure in the new way involving only acts of saying something, 
which is, therefore,, an easier and more convenient way of exe­
cuting the procedure. And as the practice of executing the pro­
cedure in this new way develops further, with deceitful uses of 
it becoming the (rare) exception and the procedure executed in 
this way thus becoming an increasingly sure means for convinc­
ing another, this feature may be expected to lead to the new 
way of executing the procedure being adopted even when the 
speaker has something to give as a hostage and no deception is 
being attempted or foreshadowed, simply because the execution 
of the procedure is facilitated thereby. So for these two rea­
sons the new way of executing the procedure may be expected to 
replace the old way and become the universally practised way.
Certain changes will occur as it does so. First, if the 
members of the society have used the same battery of "promis­
ing" -terminology to talk about the persons participating in the 
procedure and their actions, irrespective of whether the proce­
dure is executed in the old or new way, the consequent ambiguity 
in the sense and reference of those terms will be removed as the
new way of executing the procedure becomes the universally prac- 4itised way. Secondly, there will be a minor change in the way the j 
procedure is executed. For as the new way of executing the pro­
cedure replaces the old way, it will no longer be necessary for 1 
the speaker to say as part of his execution of the procedure ]
1
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that he has nothing to give as a hostage» All that it will he 
necessary to say is what act it is that he promises to perform 
and that he promises to perform it ; although on any occasion, 
either (but not both) of these may not have to be said if the 
context of the speaker’s utterance makes clear either what act 
it is that he promises to perform or that he promises to per­
form it. Hence, with respect to the v/ay in which the procedure 
is typically executed, the procedure in the. form described so 
far coincides with the procedure of promising in its familiar 
form.
The development of the practice of executing the procedure 
in the new way may be expected to follow the same pattern as 
the spread of the use of the procedure executed in the old way, 
subject to any checks (of a self-reversing nature) caused by 
phases of persistently deceitful use of the procedure by some 
members of the society. And with this development, knowledge of 
this nev/ way of executing the procedure, gained from experience 
or hearsay, will become general knowledge among an increasingly 
large proportion of the members of the society. Again, that 
knowledge will comprise, as well as the knowledge of what is in­
volved in the execution of the procedure, not only the know­
ledge that the procedure is a successful means for convincing 
others but also the knowledge of how an execution of the proce­
dure succeeds in attaining such an end, i.e., what the proce­
dure’s efficacy consists in, viz., its capacity to provide a 
reason for the audience’s conviction that the promisor will per­
form the promised act ; which reason is that, known to the prom­
isee, the promisor prefers the performance of the promised act 
to its non-performance, ceteris paribus, on the grounds that it 
is in his interest to perform that act in order to establish or
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maintain his reputation as a promise-keeper, i.e., on the 
grounds that he is committed to performing the act. And as be­
fore, as the development of the practice of executing the pro­
cedure in this new way contributes towards the more widespread 
knowledge of it within the society so that knowledge may 
further that development. A member of the society who has had 
no previous personal experience of the procedure being executed 
in this way but has this general knowledge of it, gained from 
hearsay, may, on the basis of that knowledge, adopt the proce­
dure as a means for convincing another of his own performance 
of some future act. So this knowledge is manifested in the be­
haviour of members of the society.
On the basis of this knowledge, members of the society will 
have certain expectations and preferences with respect to the 
use of the procedure. They will not only expect, on the basis of 
this knowledge, that those who execute the procedure are thereby 
committed to performing the promised act ; they will also prefer 
this. For it is by virtue of the fact that a speaker is commit*^ 
ted to performing the promised act by his execution of the pro­
cedure that the procedure is efficacious, and members of the 
society, being rational, will prefer to preserve rather than de­
stroy the efficacy of a means which is a means for attaining an 
end which from time to time they want to attain. These expecta­
tions and preferences too will be embodied in the behaviour of 
the members of the society, in their acting as if they expect 
and prefer a promisor’s being committed to performing the prom­
ised act to follow as an outcome of his execution of the proce­
dure. More will be said presently about this notion of a stan­
dard of behaviour embodying the social expectations and prefer­
ences with respect to a type of outcome following from the exe­
cution of a procedure. But here it can be noted that the coin­
cidence of such expectations and preferences forms an implicit 
agreement among members of the society and that in so far as 
an implicit agreement is a convention it can properly be said 
that it is by convention that a promisor’s being committed to 
perform the promised act follows as an outcome from his execu­
tion of the procedure, or that this type of outcome is a con­
ventional outcome of an execution of the procedure. That this 
is a proper sense of "convention" can be seen from the remain­
der of the specification of the sense of that word quoted earl­
ier from the Oxford English Dictionary : an "...agreement or 
consent, deliberate or implicit,...as embodied in any accepted 
usage, standard of behaviour.or the like".
Once it is established and generally known that this type 
of outcome is a conventional outcome of the procedure, one gen­
erally known both to be expected and preferred to follow upon 
an execution of the procedure, and human ingenuity being what 
it is, different uses for the procedure may be found. The pro­
cedure of promising may be deployed in attempts to attain ends 
of quite different types than that of another’s conviction that 
one will perform some act in the future. For example, a parent 
may have been encouraging his child for some time to give up 
the habit of smoking. Knowing that a promisor is committed to 
performing the promised act, and knowing that his child knows 
this, the parent may exploit .the opportunity offered by the 
child saying, perhaps in a moment of weakness, that he will 
give up smoking, to extract a promise from the child to that ef­
fect and so commit him to give up smoking. Obviously, in this 
case, if the child does promise in saying something like "Oh 
yes, all right, I promise" in reply to his parent’s question
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"Do you promise?" or "Is that a promise?" his act is liable 
to more than just the usual infelicities ; e.g., it may be 
marred by undue influence having been exerted upon him to 
produce the promise. But equally, his act may be quite fel­
icitous. For the child may realize that smoking is a bad 
habit and may want to give it up. He may even have a vague 
intention of doing so and believe that he can on the grounds 
that he has done so once before. Ke may, therefore, be in a 
position to commit himself to stop smoking by promising to do 
so, and may be quite willing to do so, not just to please his 
parent (and still less to convince him, for he may believe 
that his parent will remain unconvinced by such a promise) but 
also because by so committing himself he gives himself an ad­
ditional reason for breaking the habit. So here is an example 
of the deployment of the-procedure for the attainment of dif­
ferent ends, each distinct from that in the type of situation 
in which the procedure evolved. What makes the procedure suit­
able for deployment in a course of action directed towards the 
attainment of some end, apart from the possibility of its pre­
suppositions being satisfied by the circumstances of the par­
ticular situation in which it is adopted, is the extent to 
which the type(s) of conventional outcome following upon the 
execution of the procedure can further the attainment of the 
desired end.
It will be clear now hov/ this account of the conventional 
nature of the procedure of promising has application to the 
procedures constitutive of other types of illocutionary acts. 
While it is a fair guess that all these procedures have evolved 
from various forms of natural behaviour, it is not essential to 
their conventional status either that the paths of their evolu-
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tion are as direct or as straightforward as that out-lined in 
the foregoing conjectural, but hopefully plausible, account of 
the evolution of the procedure of promising ; or that there is 
a one-to-one relationship between each conventional procedure 
and some form of primitive behaviour from which it has evolved. 
Groupings of different conventional procedures can be discern­
ed whose members differ only relatively slightly with respect 
to their presuppositions and conventional outcomes ; it is rea­
sonable to suppose that such procedures have evolved from a 
common form of natural behaviour. For example, the conventional 
procedures of banishing, excommunicating, expelling and sent­
encing can be seen as related variants which have evolved from 
the form of natural behaviour of excluding someone from member­
ship of (some section of) a society ; the minor differences be- 
tvfeen their presuppositions and conventional outcomes reflect­
ing the special circumstances of the types of situation in 
which such behaviour occurs. The same is true of the convention­
al procedures constitutive of the central cluster of illocution­
ary acts of the constative-determining kind : asserting, de- j
scribing, reporting, stating, telling, etc. These may be suppos- I 
ed to have evolved from the natural pre-conventional form of be- j 
haviour of one person conveying information to another. Another 
group of procedures, constitutive of types of illocutionary act 
which are sometimes misleadingly classified as interrogatives, 
e.g., asking, inquiring, querying, questioning, etc., have sup­
posedly evolved from a form of behaviour of one person seeking 
information from another. Yet another large group, constitutive 
of types of act which are sometimes, again misleadingly, clas­
sified as imperatives may be supposed to have evolved from some 
form of one person attempting to get another to do something.
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e.g., commanding, ordering, demanding, requesting, begging, 
etc. What is essential to the conventional nature of these pro­
cedures, at least to the status of their conventional outcomes, 
is that for each, there is at least one type of outcome whose 
obtaining from the execution of the procedure comes to be both 
expected and preferred by the great majority of members of the 
society in which the procedure evolves. The conventional nature 
of the relationship holding between the execution of the proce­
dure and the obtaining of such an outcome consists in the coin­
cidence of such social expectations and preferences. In general, 
the presuppositions of a procedure specify conditions upon the 
circumstances of a speech act situation whose satisfaction is a 
necessary condition for executions of the procedure to be effi­
cacious. And because the efficacy of any procedure as a means 
for attaining certain ends is dependent upon the particular 
type(s) of its conventional outcome(s), the circumstances pre­
supposed for the correct execution of any procedure are of two 
general sorts : those whose obtaining is necessary for its par­
ticular type(s) of conventional outcome(s) not to be rendered 
pointless or vacuous in the situation in which the procedure is 
executed ; and secondly, those whose obtaining is necessary for 
the preservation of the conventional nature of the procedure's 
outcome(s). This difference between these two general sorts of 
circumstances was recognized by Austin in his separate state­
ments of the Felicity conditions (A.2) and (r.l). Some illus­
trative examples may be clarificatory.
Circumstances of the first general sort, mentioned in the 
Felicity condition (A. 2), are.exemplified by those presupposed 
by the presuppositions (P.2), (P.l), and (P.l) and (P.3), re­
spectively, of the procedures of promising, warning and object­
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ing. The non-satisfaction of these presuppositions in any 
situation in which an attempt is made to execute the proce­
dure is sufficient to render the conventional outcome of the 
respective procedure pointless or vacuous, and hence suffici­
ent to frustrate the efficacy of the procedure on that occas­
ion. For instance, if (P.2) of the procedure of promising is 
not satisfied and the speaker's performance of the purported­
ly promised act is not possible, there is no point to his be­
ing committed to perform it. Similarly, the conventional out­
come of warning, that the speaker has diminished responsibil­
ity for any injury to the addressee flowing from the danger 
against which he is given the warning, is rendered vacuous if 
(P.l) of that procedure is not satisfied and the obtaining of 
the state of affairs characterized by the speaker's utterance 
would not put the addressee in possible danger. And in the ■ 
case of non-hypothetical objections, the conventional outcome 
of that procedure, that there are some grounds before the au­
dience for believing the utterance purportedly objected to is 
false, is similarly frustrated if (P.l) of the procedure is 
not satisfied and no such utterance was issued. Austin called 
the infelicities arising from attempts to execute the proce­
dure in such inappropriate circumstances misapplications of 
the procedure ; in such cases, the execution of the procedure, 
the illocutionary act, is purported but void. The infelicities 
arising from a procedure being executed in a situation in 
which circumstances of the second general sort do not obtain 
were called insincerities. These circumstances, mentioned in 
the Felicity condition (r.l), have to do with the requisite 
psychological states of participants in the procedure : their 
attitudes, beliefs, intentions, etc. In general, the psycho­
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logical states thus presupposed are those that are relevant 
to maintaining the standards of hahviour (those, at least, of 
the participants in the procedure) embodying the coincident 
expectations and preferences in which the nature of the con­
ventional outcorae(s) of a procedure consists. Repeated execu­
tions of a procedure in circumstances in which these presupr 
positions are not satisfied are likely to give rise to an in­
cidence of agents not acting as if they expect and prefer the 
respective type(s) of conventional outcome to follow upon an 
execution of the procedure. Such an incidence will weaken the 
social expectations of, and preferences for, such an outcome 
to follow, and in turn, and in time if the trend continues, 
this will cause that outcome not to he a conventional outcome 
of the procedure and so destroy the procedure's efficacy. It 
is in this way that the obtaining of circumstances of this 
second general sort in situations in which a procedure is 
executed is a necessary condition for the (continued) efficacy 
of the procedure.
These circumstances are exemplified by those presupposed 
by the presuppositions (P.l) and (P.3), (P.2), and (P.2) and 
(p.4), respectively, of the procedures of promising, warning 
and objecting. If a promisor either does not intend to perform 
the promised act or does not believe that hie performance of 
it is possible (thus not satisfying either (P.l) or (P.3) of 
the procedure), it is unlikely that he will perform the prom­
ised act ; i.e., it is unlikely that he will carry out his 
promise. But the carrying out of a promise is one type of act 
which will be performed by agents acting as if they expect and 
prefer that a speaker’s commitment to performing the promised 
act follows upon his execution of the procedure. The carrying
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out of promises is one and, perhaps, the principal component 
of that standard of behaviour embodying the coincident social 
expectations and preferences with respect to this type of out­
come which comprise the conventional nature of that outcome.
Of course, a promise given in a situation in which either (P.l) 
or (p.3) is not satisfied may be carried out. If the promise is 
given by mistake, for instance, the promisor may, upon realize 
ing that he has given a promise, accept that he is committed to 
performing the promised act and so try to carry it out and suc­
ceed. But such cases are probably exceptional. It is more like­
ly that promises given in situations in which either (P-l) or 
(p.3) is not satisfied are deceitful promises, given not only 
without the intention of carrying them out but also, per­
haps, with the intention of not carrying them out. It is likely, 
therefore, that repeated executions of the procedure in such 
situations will give rise to an incidence of agents not carry­
ing out their promises, i.e., to an incidence of agents not act­
ing as if they expect and prefer promisors to be committed to 
performing their promised acts. This incidence will in turn 
weaken the social expectations and preferences with respect to 
this type of outcome following the execution of the procedure, 
in whose coincidence the conventional nature of that outcome 
consists, and hence will tend to destroy the efficacy of the 
procedure. The satisfaction of the presupposition (P.2) of the 
procedure of objecting, that the speaker has a certain contrary- 
attitude towards the utterance being objected to - in the cases 
considered here, a belief that it is false - is necessary for 
the preservation of the efficacy of the procedure, for a similar 
reason. Central among the types of act that will be performed by 
agents acting as if they expect and prefer that it follows as an
outcome of an execution of the procedure that there are some 
grounds for believing that the utterance objected to is false, 
are acts of withholding assent from and even dissenting from 
the truth of the utterance objected to. Such acts are an im­
portant part of the standard of behaviour embodying the coin­
cident social expectations and preferences which comprise the 
conventional nature of this type of outcome of the procedure.
But if a speaker executes the procedure without believing that 
the utterance against which the objection is raised is false 
(thus not satisfying (P.2) of the procedure), it is unlikely 
that he will withhold assent from, and even less likely that he 
will dissent from the truth of that utterance. So repeated 
executions of the procedure in situations in which this pre­
supposition is not satisfied are likely to give rise to an in­
cidence of agents not acting as if they expect and prefer that 
this type of outcome follows upon an execution of the procedure 
and so, for the now familiar reason, this will tend to destroy 
the efficacy of the procedure. The presuppositions (P.2) and 
(p.4) of the respective procedures of warning and objecting are 
alike in presupposing that the speaker believes that the poss­
ible state of affairs, characterized by the utterance issued as 
part of his execution of the procedure, was, is, or will be an 
actual state of affairs. This type of presupposition is shared 
by a great many other types of procedure constitutive of illo­
cutionary acts : all those, indeed, which involve a significant 
element of conveying information about how the world was, is or 
will be. For those types of procedure of which this type of pre­
supposition is a constituent, if the presupposition is satis­
fied then the speaker is not lying when he executes the proce­
dure. Now lying, essentially, is a deceitful use of a procedure
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which involves a significant element of conveying information 
about the world, and an account which in essential respects is 
parallel to the account given of the ultimately self-defeating 
nature of persistently deceitful use of the procedure of pro­
mising could be given of the ultimately self-defeating nature 
of persistent lying. Like persistent deceitful use of the proce­
dure of promising, persistent lying tends to destroy the effica­
cy of the very means by which a lie is accomplished. For any pro­
cedure, therefore, involving a significant element of conveying 
information about the world, of which warning and objecting are 
two, the satisfaction of this type of presupposition is a neces­
sary condition for the preservation of the procedure's efficacy.
The difference between these two general sorts of circum­
stances can be seen from the different effect upon the efficacy 
of the procedure of the non-satisfaction of presuppositions of 
the respective sorts. The procedure's efficacy is frustrated on 
the occasion of its execution being attempted in a situation in 
which circumstances of the first sort do not obtain because in 
those circumstances the procedure's conventional outcome is ren­
dered pointless or vacuous. And though the procedure may be suc­
cessfully executed in a situation in which circumstances of the 
second sort do not obtain, its execution in those circumstances 
is such that if repeated with a significant incidence, the pro­
cedure's conventional outcome, upon which its efficacy depends, 
7/ould cease to be a conventional outcome of that procedure. In 
a different idiom, the destructive effect upon the procedure’s 
efficacy of the non-satisfaction of presuppositions of the dif­
ferent sorts can be said in the first case to be occurrent and 
in the second case to be dispositional.
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Foot-notes ;
1 (from p.223) This point may be compared with that of Ryle’s 
aptly disparaging remark in "The Theory of Meaning"(C.P.II 
pp.350-72), "... as if the judge, in explaining to the mem­
bers of the jury the differences between manslaughter and 
murder, was helping them out of a philosophical quandary"
(p.372).
2 (from p.232) These reasons why the distinctions within Aus­
tin’s classification are not exclusive do not seem to have 
been appreciated by Searle in "A classification of illocu­
tionary acts"(Language in Society(1976)pp.1-23). And the ob­
jections which Searle does raise there against Austin’s 
classification are just as effective against the alternative 
taxonomy which Searle proposes. Searle*s main objections are 
that "there is no clear or consistent principle or set of 
principles on the basis of which the taxonomy is constructed" 
(p.8), and hence that "...there is too much overlap of the 
categories, too much heterogeneity within the ctegories"(pp. 
9-10). However, with four of Austin’s five classes being de­
fined in terms of features of the procedures constitutive of 
illocutionary acts the basis of Austin’s classification is 
more systematic than Searle allows. But Searle has failed to 
understand the role of conventional procedures within Austin’s 
conception of speech acts. Searle’s own proposal is for a 
taxonomy of five basic categories of illocutionary acts, dis­
tinguished in terms of something he calls the act’s illocu­
tionary point, the direction of fit between words and the 
world which is required of the utterance in the issuing of 
which the act is performed, and the type of psychological 
state expressed in the performance of the act. Thus the illo­
cutionary point of representatives "...is to commit the 
speaker to...the truth of the expressed proposition"(p.10) ; 
that of directives "...consists in the fact that they are at­
tempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something"(p. 
11). Searle’s class of commissives is appropriated directly 
from Austin ; their point "... is to commit the speaker to 
some future course of action"(p.11). The point of expressives
"... is to express the psychological state specified in the 
sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the
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prepositional content"(p.12). No illocutionary point is speci­
fied for Searle's fifth category, declarations, nor is it easy 
bo see from the offered examples what it would be. So Searle's 
taxonomy is not constructed on the basis of one "clear or con­
sistent principle or set of principles"either. Moreover, with­
in this latter category Searle defines a sub-category of rep­
resentative declarations whose point is "...issuing a repre­
sentative with the force .of a declaration.(p.16). So there 
is major overlap between Searle’s first and fifth categories 
and much heterogeneity in the latter. Overlap and heterogeneity 
within Searle's classification is further Increased by the fact 
that the expression of some psychological state, while being 
the main defining characteristic of expressives, also enters in­
to the definitions of membership of the other categories.
3 (from p.235) Another reason for the possible failure of the 
speaker to convince his audience by these means would be the 
latter's suspicion of an attempt at deception and his regard­
ing of the hostage as a decoy given to lure him into falsely 
believing that the speaker will perform the act. The effects 
of deceitful uses of the procedure on the efficacy and devel­
opment of the procedure will be discussed in the next section; 
they are not important at this stage of the account.
4 (from p.260) This use of the claseificatory terms "interroga­
tive" and "imperative" is misleading because it suggests, on 
the basis of the primary use of these terms as classificatory 
of syntactic forms, that the dependence of the type of illo­
cutionary act upon the syntactic form of the utterance in the 
issuing of which the act is performed is much stronger than 
in fact it is. Acts falling under either classification can 
be performed in the issuing of utterances of indicative syn­
tactic form, e.g., questioning in saying "I question his 
suitability for the position" and demanding in saying "I de­
mand to see the manager".
Chapter Six 
Convention and Intention in Speech Acts
A particular approach to a theory of speech acts has 
been developed to its highest point so far by Schiffer in 
Chapter IV of his book Meaning. That approach, which has dom­
inated developments in speech act theory since the publication 
of Words, can be traced from its origin in Strawson's article 
"Intention and Convention in Speech Acts"(P.L.pp.25-58), 
through the work of Searle to its most recent expression in 
Schiffer’s book. Its main feature has been the utilization of 
variously augmented and amended versions of Grice's theory of 
meaning for the purposes of giving an account of illocutionary 
acts within the framework of what its proponents variously de­
scribe as a theory of meaning or a theory of linguistic com­
munication. Each of these may be included within a theory of 
language, broadly construed. That approach differs from the 
one that has been adopted in this work, which has been directed 
tov/ards giving an account of illocutionary acts within the 
framework of a theory of action. Now, it is not to the present 
purpose to adjudicate the respective merits of the rival claims 
of each of these theories to be the sole theory suitable for 
explaining speech act phenomena. "The total speech act in the 
total speech situation...the only actual phenomenon which, in 
the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating"(VYords p. 148), 
being the many-faceted phenomenon it is, has features of vari­
ous types which are amenable to subsumption under different 
theories. But the writer has claimed, on the grounds that the 
main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts was the e- 
lucidation of the species of language-use exemplified by the
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performance of illocutionary acts, that a theory of action 
provides a more appropriate framework for developing that 
conception and furthering that purpose than a theory of lan­
guage. It is with the defence of this claim, against the 
counter-claims implicit in the work of Strawson, Searle and 
Schiffer, that the discussion in this chapter will he prin­
cipally concerned. If successful, that defence will provide 
further justification for the kind of development of Austin's 
conception of speech acts undertaken in the previous chapter, 
and the discussion will also go,some way towards showing 
which features of "the total speech act in the total speech 
situation" are amenable to subsumption under a theory of lan­
guage and which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of 
action. The tactics to be adopted to gain this end will be 
those of skirmishing rather than those of a set battle, per­
force of the enemy's dispositions along the line of engagement. 
For the line of engagement in this case is Austin's thesis that 
illocutionary acts are essentially conventional acts, acts con­
stituted by convention, and as shown in Chapter Four, Schiffer, 
Strawson and Searle hold differing views on the truth of that 
thesis. Before setting out the strategy to be followed, some 
quotations from Words may be in order to show that the position 
to be defended is an Austinian position.
There is, first, the general remark that "...we must meet 
the objection about our illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - 
namely that the notion of an act is unclear - by a general doc­
trine about action"(p.107). But more particularly, there are 
two remarks which seem, with hindsight, to have been expressly 
designed to reject an account of illocutionary acts in the sort 
of terms that are central to Grice's theory of meaning and have
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been taken over by Strawson, Searle and Schiffer in develop­
ing their respective accounts : i.e., those of the speaker’s 
intended effects on or responses from his audience, produced 
by his utterance in the issuing of which an illocutionary act 
is performed : "...much more important,we'must avoid the idea 
...that the illocutionary act is a consequence of the locu- 
tionary act, and even the idea that what is imported by the 
nomenclature of illocutions is an additional reference to some 
of the consequences of the locutions, i.e. that to say 'he 
urged me to' is to say he said certain words and in addition 
that his saying them had or perhaps was intended to have cer­
tain consequences (? an effect upon me)" (pp. 114-5). "\¥hat we 
do import by the use of the nomenclature of illocution is a 
reference, not to the consequences (at least in any ordinary 
sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of illocution­
ary force as bearing on the special circumstances of the oc­
casion of the issuing of the utterance"(p.115). The opposition 
between Austin's position and Schiffer's, for instance, is 
clearly evident in the contradiction between the remarks just 
quoted and Schiffer's earlier quoted remark that "...in utter­
ing the sentence 'Jones has only one leg', S may be objecting 
to A's statement that Jones is a nimble dancer, but that this 
is so would seem to be a result of the intentions with which 
the sentence was uttered and not a result of any conventions 
of illocutionary force 'bearing on the special circumstances 
of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance'"(Meaning p.91). 
How Austin's notion of "the conventions of illocutionary force 
as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the 
issuing of the utterance" is to be spelled out will be clear 
from the preceding chapter. These conventions are the conven­
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tional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts, executed 
by speakers in speech act situations in the performance of lo- 
cutionary acts and "bearing on the special circumstances of 
the occasion of the issuing of the utterance" by virtue of 
their presuppositions.
In Chapter Two it was argued that Austin's distinction 
between locutionary and illocutionary acts is sound. As a dis­
tinction between different types of act exemplifying different 
species of language-use, one exemplified by acts of saying or 
asking something, the other exemplified by acts of doing some­
thing distinct from saying or asking something, that distinc­
tion Indicates the line between those features of a speech act 
situation that are amenable to subsumption under a theory of 
language and those that are amenable to subsumption under a 
theory of action. And as a distinction between different types 
of act that are constituted in part or in toto by conventions, 
that distinction creates something of a problem for those who 
wish to give an account of illocutionary acts within the frame­
work of a theory of language. The conventions involved in the 
respective types of act are quite distinct. In the case of a lo­
cutionary act, the act is constituted in part by the conven­
tions of the language which the speaker is using, and in part 
by the speaker's intentions operating within the scope of those 
conventions. A theory of language, broadly construed, is ade­
quate for giving an account of acts of this type. The qualifi­
cation "broadly construed" is intended to make clear that the 
semantic component of such a theory is a theory of a speaker's 
communication intention, and a theory of language thus con­
strued may be distinguished from one in which the semantic com-
iponent is only a theory of formal semantics. But the "conven-
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tions of illocutionary force" constitutive of illocutionary 
acts are not linguistic conventions. These conventions, the 
conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts, 
are not included among the conventions of syntax, semantics, 
phonology, phonetics and orthography whose specification is 
the task of a theory of language. Acts constituted by these 
conventions of illocutionary force can thus be seen to fall 
outside the scope of even a broadly construed theory of lan­
guage. Those wishing to give an account of illocutionary acts 
within the framework of a theory of language have different 
moves available to them for trying to overcome this problem 
created by the distinction between locutionary and illocu­
tionary acts.
First, it may be allowed that these acts are acts of 
distinct types but denied that illocutionary acts are con­
ventional acts in the sense that they are constituted essen­
tially by non-linguistic conventions. The essential consti­
tutive features of illocutionary acts are then claimed to 
be certain intentions speakers have in issuing utterances 
and the scope of a theory of language, already broadly con­
strued, is thus extended further to encompass illocutionary 
acts. This is the move made by Schiffer, and by Strawson to 
the extent that the latter denies Austin’s thesis that illo­
cutionary acts are in general essentially conventional acts. 
Alternatively, it may be allowed that illocutionary acts are 
conventional acts but denied that locutionary and illocution­
ary acts are acts of distinct types. Illocutionary acts are 
thus brought within the scope of a theory of language ade­
quate for explaining locutionary acts and their constitutive 
features are held to be certain rules manifested in the se-
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mantle conventions of the language which the speaker is using. 
This is the move made by Searle prior to developing his ac­
count of illocutionary acts within the context of his hypo­
thesis "...that speaking a language is performing speech acts, 
acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking ques­
tions, making promises, and...that these acts are in general 
made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain 
rules for the use of linguistic elements"(S.A.p.16).
The strategy for defending the claim that a theory of 
action provides a more appropriate framework for an account 
of illocutionary acts than a theory of language,against the 
counter-claims implicit in the work of Schiffer, Strawson and 
Searle is, therefore, clear. It is to show that each of the 
crucial steps in their moves out-lined above is wrong. One of 
the steps in Searle’s move, the denial of Austin’s distinction 
between locutionary and illocutionary acts, has already been 
shown to be false in the defence, in Chapter Two, of that dis­
tinction against Searle’s objections to it. In the next sec­
tion but two, discussion will be concentrated upon Searle’s 
hypothesis. It will be argued that Searle has not established 
that what he regards as the rules constitutive of illocution­
ary acts are manifested in the semantic conventions of a lan­
guage. In the next two sections, the main points to be argued 
for are against Schiffer and Strawson and are two : first, 
that their argument against Austin’s thesis that illocutionary 
acts are in general conventional acts is invalid, and secondly, 
that speakers’ intentions are not the essential constitutive 
features of illocutionary acts.
In Chapter Four it was argued that Strawson’s argument.
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endorsed by Schiffer, against Austin's thesis is an Ignor- 
atio elenchi. Before exposing the misunderstandings of pur­
pose and detail of Austin's conception of speech acts in 
Strawson's argument, a short digression will be made to take 
in a different point in Schiffer's account of speech acts 
which is symptomatic of similar misunderstandings. Schiffer 
devotes a section of his chapter on speech acts to Austin's 
notion of explicit performatives (Meaning pp.104-10), the 
main thrust of which seems to be his "...wish to deny that 
explicit performative sentences are not constative" and to 
show thereby that "...Austin is wrong in his claim to have 
exposed a new class of masqueraders"(p.107). The appearances 
that Schiffer gives in this section of wishing to collapse 
Austin's performative-constative distinction are deceptive.
For example, Schiffer does not claim that all explicit per­
formatives are constative in the sense of being truth-valued. 
This much is clear from his comments on the definitions of 
the kinds of illocutionary acts in his classification of as­
sertive and imperative kinds of illocutionary acts (pp.95- 
104). Nor does Schiffer claim that explicit performatives 
are constative in the sense that in issuing such an utter­
ance the speaker is constating that he is performing an illo­
cutionary act of the type which he may be performing in so 
uttering. Schiffer agrees with Austin that this is not the 
case (pp.'107,108) and produces an argument to that effect 
(pp.108-9). Schiffer's claim is "...that there is no differ­
ence of the sort claimed in logical form or conventional 
force between, say, 'I (hereby) order you to leave' and 'I am 
scratching my head' or 'The cat is on the mat'"(p.107). Schif­
fer is not very forthcoming either on the different logical
....
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forms which he denies explicit performatives and constatives 
to have,' or on the same logical form which he claims they 
share. Some of his remarks make the entailed claim that all 
explicit performative utterances have the same logical form 
surprising. For instance, Schiffer mentions with apparent 
approval the Fregean device of assertion sign plus sentence 
radical and uses them to represent the logical form of the 
explicit performative, "I (hereby) promise to pay you two­
pence" as
(1) ray (hereby) promising to pay you twopence J  (p. 109). 
But Schiffer also places great emphasis on his claim that the 
class of utterances divides neatly into two mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive sub-classes which he calls the "assertive" and 
"imperative" classes. So one might have expected that Schiffer 
would represent the logical form of an explicit performative 
belonging to the latter class, e.g., "I (hereby) order you to 
leave" as
(2) my (hereby) ordering you to leave^/*
But it is not so. Schiffer represents the logical form of "I
(hereby) order you to leave" not as (2), but as
(3) my (hereby) ordering you to leave_/ (p.109).
So expectations to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems that
the logical form characterised by the Fregean device of asser­
tion sign plus sentence radical, as shown in (1) and (3), is 
the logical form which Schiffer claims that all explicit per­
formatives and constatives share. Schiffer goes on to defend 
his position, that in spite of the fact that explicit performa­
tives are constative in logical form a speaker who issues such 
an utterance is not constating that he is performing an illo­
cutionary act, with the claim that in such cases the speaker
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utters the sentence with something slightly less than its 
full conventional force (pp.109-10). The details of this 
claim, which seems ad hoc, need not he gone into here. What 
is more relevant is the claim, which Schiffer attributes to 
Austin, of a difference in logical form between explicit per­
formatives and constatives. The attributed claim is that the 
way to represent an explicit performative such as "I (hereby) 
promise to pay you twopence" is not as (l), but as
(4 ) Pr^"my paying you twopence
"where *Pr* is to be taken as a conventional force-indicating 
device which makes explicit that an utterance of the sentence 
has the force of a promise, just as ’ would serve to make 
explicit that an assertion is being made"(p.106). Now this 
claim has a distinctly Searlean rather than Austinian ring to 
it (see Schiffer's foot-note to p.106). Its connexions with 
Austin's conception of speech acts are tenuous in the extreme.
There is only one remark in Words which offers any textual
support at all for the attribution of this claim to Austin 
and that remark is heavily qualified : "...we could distin­
guish the performative opening part (l state that) which makes 
clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement 
(as distinct from a prediction, etc.), from the bit in the 
that-clause which is required to be true or false. However, 
there are many cases which, as lahguage stands at present, we 
are not able to split into two parts in this v/ay, even though 
the utterance seems to have a sort of explicit performative in
it : thus 'I liken x to y', 'I analyse x as y'. Here we both do
the likening and assert that there is a likeness by means of 
one compendious phrase of at least a quasi-performative charac- 
ter"(Words p.90). This is not so much a case of Austin damning
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with faint praise the claim which Schiffer attributes to him 
as of him rejecting it with faint mention.
Schiffer's mistake is evident from the introductory re­
marks to his section on explicit performatives. There he lo­
cates Austin!'s discovery of explicit performatives in a his­
torical tradition, stemming from Russell's paper "On Denot­
ing", in which different philosophers have argued that the 
grammatical form of some types of utterance is misleading be­
cause such utterances have a logical form quite different 
from the one which their grammatical form would suggest. 
Schiffer holds that Austin believed that in discovering ex­
plicit performatives he had not only exposed another class of 
'masqueraders' but had discovered a new logical form as well. 
But to locate Austin's discovery and his work on speech acts 
in this philosophical tradition is to locate it in the wrong 
tradition. Austin did not seek solutions to philosophical 
problems via the logical analysis of language but, inter alia, 
by attending to the uses of language. His discovery of explic­
it performatives was the discovery of a class of utterances 
masquerading in a deceptive grammatical form. But what their 
grammatical form was held to mask was not a new logical form, 
nor even a familiar logical form different from that which 
they appeared to have. It was, rather, a use of sentences dif­
ferent from that which hitherto had customarily been associated 
with utterances having that graimatical form ; the use of a 
sentence to do something distinct from saying something true 
or false. The implications of the concern for the uses as dis­
tinct from the forms of language in Austin's conception of 
speech acts for the type of theory appropriate for developing 
that conception are clear.
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Schiffer does not provide an argument of his own against 
Austin’s thesis that illocutionary acts are in general conven­
tional acts. As already noted, he merely endorses Strawson's 
argument against that thesis and summarily dismisses those 
types of illocutionary act which Strawson allows are essential­
ly conventional. If Strawson's argument were free from fallacy, 
it would have the effect of revising Austin's thesis so as to 
allow a broad distinction, admitting a wide range of intermedi­
ate cases, between two kinds of illocutionary acts : those that
are essentially conventional, in the sense of being constituted
oby non-linguistic conventions, and those that are not. The in­
terpretation in terms of institutions and rules under which 
Strawson denies Austin's thesis to be true in general is not 
the only Interpretation under which he considers that thesis. 
Strawson makes considerable play with one of Austin's remarks 
in Words which he takes to mean that the use of a sentence with 
a certain illocutionary force, i.e., an illocutionary act, may 
be said to be conventional in the sense that it could be made 
explicit by the use of a performative prefix. Strawson comments 
that "the remark has a certain authority in that it is the 
first explicit statement of the conventional nature of the il­
locutionary act"(p.l.p.25). and evidently regards it as Austin's 
definition of "conventional" as that word was used by Austin in 
stating his thesis. Adverting to the remark later on, Strawson 
denies that there is such a sense of "conventional" (and so de­
nies that illocutionary acts are conventional in that sense) 
but allows that "whatever it is that leads Austin to call illo­
cutionary acts in general 'conventional' must be closely con­
nected with whatever it is about such acts... that accounts for 
the fact that they at least could be made explicit by the use
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of the corresponding first-person performative form"(pp.27-8).
The alleged ability of Strawson's account to yield "...a de­
duction of the general possibility and utility of the explic­
itly performative formula for the cases of illocutionary acts 
not essentially conventional"(p.32) is claimed by Strawson to 
be one of his account’s explanatory merits. Two points need 
to be made by way of rejoinder to this interpretation which 
Strawson imposes on Austin’s thesis. The first has to do with 
Austin’s remark on which Strawson bases this interpretation : 
the second has to do with Strawson’s initial cornment on that 
remark.
The first point is that it is only when quoted out of 
context that Austin’s remark has even the appearance of a 
definition of the sense with which he was using "conventional".
In the passage in which it occurs, Austin was discussing the 
different species of language-use exemplified by illocution­
ary and perlocutionary acts, and the complete sentence, of 
which Strawson only quotes separate fragments, reads, "Speak­
ing of the ’use of "language" for arguing or warning’ looks 
just like speaking of ’the use of "language" for persuading, 
rousing, alarming’; yet the former may, for rough contrast, 
be said to be conventiona1. in the sense that at least it 
could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the 
latter could not" (Words p. 103). Here,. Austin was pointing out 
the ambiguity in the phrase "use of language" as used to talk 
about the uses of language exemplified by illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts, foreshadowing the distinction between
Ithese types of act as one between a type of conventional act I
and a type of non-conventional act and giving, not a défini- |
tion of "conventional" - as Strawson notes, there is no such )
Ii
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sense of "conventional" - but rather, a criterion for iden­
tifying these different uses of language in terms of their 
respective capacity and incapacity for being made explicit 
by the use of a performative formula. This last is, in any 
case, the point illustrated by the examples immediately fol­
lowing the quoted sentence. The second point is that Straw­
son’s initial comment on Austin’s remark is misleading. If 
Austin’s remark was the first explicit statement of the con­
ventional nature of illocutionary acts, this is so only be­
cause it was made soon after his introduction of the "nomen­
clature of illocutions". It was not the first statement of 
the conventional nature of the use of language exemplified 
by illocutionary acts ; acts performed acts of saying 
something. The conventional nature of these acts (illocu­
tionary acts in all but name) had been stated and explicated 
in Austin’s Lectures II-IV in terms of the conventional pro­
cedures constitutive of such acts whose performance in the 
issuing of an utterance was specified as a necessary condi­
tion for an utterance being a performative utterance. Straw­
son’s ascription of "a certain authority" to Austin’s remark 
by virtue of it being the first explicit statement of the 
conventional nature of the illocutionary act is just another 
product of the baleful influence of the "reject-and-replace" 
view’s bifurcation of Austin’s lectures and its obscuring of 
the relevance of the early lectures to the later ones.
Strawson’s unawareness of Austin’s use of "convention" 
as an abbreviation for "conventional procedure" in saying 
that illocutionary acts are constituted by conventions is 
evident in his argument by example and counter-example again­
st Austin’s thesis. Strawson notes with approval of Austin’s
.1J
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thesis that "...the fact that the word ’guilty’ is pronounced 
hy the foreman of the jury in court at the proper moment con­
stitutes his utterance as the act of bringing in a verdict ; 
and that this is so is certainly a matter of the conventional 
procedures of the law"(P.L.p.26). This remark comes very close 
to capturing the correct interpretation of Austin’s thesis but 
it is not clear that its doing so is not coincidental. The 
weight of evidence suggests that it is coincidental. For, 
first, there are the two other, different interpretations of 
Austin’s thesis under which it is rejected by Strawson, each 
of which receives far greater emphasis than the one alluded to 
in the remark just quoted. And secondly, in Strawson’s discus­
sion of his counter-examples to Austin’s thesis following the 
remark just quoted, that interpretation slips from view. The 
examples of warning and objecting are presented as counter­
examples, not to the thesis that illocutionary acts are con­
stituted by virtue of the conventional procedures as part of 
which locutionary acts are performed, but to the thesis that 
there are statable conventions simpliciter. other than those 
linguistic conventions which "...bear on the nature of the lo­
cutionary act..."(p.26) or which "...help to fix the meanings 
of the utterances"(p.27). It does not seem to have impressed 
Strawson that there are statable conventional procedures of 
warning and objecting by virtue of which speakers’ acts of 
saying something, performed as part of those procedures, are 
thereby constituted as acts of warning and objecting.
In developing his argument against Austin’s thesis to 
establish a kind of illocutionary act not essentially conven­
tional, Strawson makes use of an analysis of what it is for a 
speaker to understand an utterance. This analysis is comple-
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raentary to an amended version of an early Gricean analysis 
of what it is for a speaker to mean something hy an utter­
ance. The Gricean analysis is given in terms of a complex, 
threefold intention on the part of a speaker ; a speaker,
8, non-naturally means something hy an utterance x if S 
intends :
(i^) to produce hy uttering x a certain response r in an 
audience A, and
(ig) that A shall recognize S’s intention (i^), and
(ig) that this recognition on the part of A of S’s inten­
tion (i^) shall function as A ’s reason, or a part of 
his reason, for his response r.
Strawson makes it clear that his use of "response" in sum­
marizing Grice’s analysis is intended to cover cognitive 
and affective states or attitudes as well as actions (p.28). 
He takes Grice’s analysis to he one of a typical situation 
in which one person is trying to communicate with another 
and proceeds to construct an example which shows that while 
all the conditions corresponding to (ij_)-(i^ ) laid down in 
that analysis may he satisfied, the complex of intentions 
and appropriate actions does not amount to a case of attempt­
ed communication in the relevant sense. In order to rectify 
this, a fourth condition is added to the analysans, viz., 
that S should have the further intention :
(i^) that A shall recognize his intention (ig).
Strawson has reservations, which Schiffer has since shown to 
he justified, about the sufficiency of even this augmented 
set of conditions to constitute the case as one of attempted 
communication in a speech act situation, but uses it as the 
basis for his own account of an audience’s understanding of 
an utterance. Strawson’s analysis runs as follows : "...for
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A (in the appropriate sense of 'understand') to understand 
somethinR- hy utterance x, it is necessary (and perhaps suf­
ficient) that there should he some complex intention of the 
(ig) form, described above, which A takes 8 to have, and that 
for A to understand the utterance correctly, it is necessary 
that A should take S to have the complex intention of the 
(i ) form which S does have. In other words, if A is to 
understand the utterance correctly, S’s (i^) intention and 
hence his (ip) intention must be fulfilled”(pp.29-30).
Strawson next identifies this notion of an audience's 
understanding of an utterance with Austin's notion of uptake, 
the securing of which seems to have been held by Austin to be 
a necessary condition for the successful performance of an 
illooutionary act. Strawson believes that ”if the identifica­
tion were correct, then it would follow that to say something 
with a certain illocutionary force is at least (in the stand­
ard case) to have a certain complex intention of the (i^) 
form described in setting out and modifying Grice's doctrine” 
(p.30). It is true that Strawson qualifies his position here: 
the identification of his notion of audience understanding 
with Austin's notion of uptake is only tentative t- ''to be 
subsequently qualified and revised” ; his analysis of these; 
notions is only partial. But these qualifications, which are 
really only cosmetic, should not be allowed to obscure a much 
more important feature of Strawson's account, Strawson says 
that ”...the identification /~of his notion of understanding 
with Austin's notion of uptakeJ  is equivalent to a tentative 
(and partial) analysis of the notion of uptake and hence of 
the notions of illocutionary act and illocutionary force”(p. 
30, underlining added). Here Strawson assimilates the secur-
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ing of uptake to the performance of an illocutionary act, as 
is required for an analysis of the former to be an analysis 
of the latter, and commits himself to maintaining a much 
closer relationship between these two things than Austin was 
willing to maintain. For instance, when discussing the secur­
ing of uptake in terms of the achieving of a certain effect 
upon the audience, Austin said, "This is not to say *^"in the 
first edition : "This is to be distinguished from saying... _7 
that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain ef- 
feet”(Words p.116). Strawson's assimilation of acts of these 
distinct types is incorrect and betrays a misunderstanding of 
the main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts.
In Chapter Three, it was argued that Austin’s apparent 
view, that the securing of uptake is a necessary condition 
for the successful performance of an illocutionary act, is in­
correct. Strawson accepts objections to this view of Austin's 
(P.L.p.30). It is difficult to see, then, how Strawson can 
consistently maintain the assimilation of these different types 
of act as is required for his analysis. His response to these 
objections is to say, "...that the aim, if not the achievement, 
of securing uptake is essentially a^ standard, if not an invari­
able, element in the performance of the illocutionary act. So 
the analysis of the aim of securing uptake remains an essential 
element in the analysis of the notion of the illocutionary act” 
(p.30). But this is incorrect on two counts. First, it is not 
the case, as Strawson seems to hold, that if M is essentially a 
standard element in N, then an analysis of M is an essential 
element in the analysis of the notion of H. Compare Strawson's 
”...the aim...of securing uptake is essentially a standard... 
element in the performance of the illocutionary act” with ”the
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presence of a speaker is essentially a standard element in 
the performance of the illocutionary act”. It does not follow 
from the latter, which is true, that an analysis of the pres­
ence of a speaker is an essential element in the analysis of 
the notion of the illocutionary act, for this latter is false. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is not the case that the 
aim or achievement of securing uptake is an essential element, 
standard or otherwise, in the performance of an illocutionary 
act. Rather, the aim of securing of uptake is a standard ele­
ment in the total speech act situation, and if and when that 
aim is achieved, the act of securing uptake is distinct from 
the illocutionary act performed in that situation because the 
former is not a necessary condition for the latter. Strawson's 
assimilation of these distinct types of act and his attempt to 
provide an analysis of both in terms of an amended Gricean 
theory expose his misunderstanding of the main purpose of Aus­
tin's conception of speech acts. As Strawson's account pro­
ceeds, utilizing Grice's theory of meaning which "...is un­
doubtedly offered as an analysis of a situation in which one 
person is trying, in a sense of the word 'communicate' funda­
mental to any theory of meaning, to communicate with another" 
(p.28), the phrase "act of communication" is used repeatedly, 
and with a sense that can be clearly seen to be equivalent to 
that of "illocutionary act".: "What we initially take from 
Grice - with modifications - is an at least partially analyti­
cal account of an act of communication, an act which might in­
deed be performed nonverbally and yet exhibit all the essent­
ial characteristics of a (nonverbal) equivalent of an illocu­
tionary act"(p.35). But if it were to be asked what the speci­
fic use of language is which is exemplified by illocutionary
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acts, and which Austin’s conception of speech acts v/as pri­
marily designed to elucidate, it would 'be incorrect to give 
the ansv/er forthcoming from Strawson’s account, i.e., the 
answer, "The use of language to communicate.” So much is 
clear from the peripheral place within Austin's conception 
of speech acts of the notion of the act of securing uptake, 
which is the closest correlate of the notion of the act of 
communication of which Strawson makes so much.
Strawson’s tentative (and partial) analysis of securing 
uptake is intended as a tentative (and partial) analysis of 
illocutionary force as v/ellv.ss of the illocutionary act. So 
it may he appropriate to comment here on his views on illo­
cutionary force and the distinction between the locutionary 
meaning and the illocutionary force of an utterance. The 
metaphors which Strav/son uses to characterize the relation­
ship between these different notions in his more recent art­
icle, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'"(Essays pp.46-68), 
have already been remarked (see p.95 above). According to 
Strawson in that article, the illocutionary force of an ut­
terance is that part of its meaning over and above the lin- 
guis tic-cum-referentlal meaning of what is said which is not 
included in the part of the complete meaning of what is said 
that is implied by the speaker. (For definitions of the un­
derlined phrases see Essays pp.46-9. ) On this view, the more 
a speaker uses the linguistic devices which Austin noted were 
suitable for making explicit the illocutionary force of an 
utterance, the more its illocutionary force is "absorbed by" 
or "enters into" its locutionary meaning, i.e., Strawson's 
linguistic-cutïi-referential meaning. So that in the case, for 
instance, of an explicit performative utterance, to know its
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locutionary meaning is to know its illocutionary force and 
the knowledge of the latter adds nothing to the knowledge of 
the meaning of the utterance which cannot he gained from the 
knowledge of the former "except the knowledge that there is 
nothing to be added" (p.4-9). In "Intention and Convention in 
Speech Acts" Strawson's view is substantially the same al­
though the metaphors are different. There he says, "The mean­
ing of a (serious) utterance, as conceived by Austin, always 
embodies some limitation on its possible force, and sometimes 
- as, for example, in some cases where an explicit performa­
tive formula, like ’I apologize', is used - the meaning of an 
utterance may exhaust its force ; that is, there may be no 
more to the force than there is to the meaning ; but very of­
ten the meaning, though it limits, does not exhaust, the
force"(P.L.pp85-4). The "meaning-may-exhaust-force" metaphor 
has no source in Words and is a profoundly misleading way of 
characterizing the relationship between these categorially 
distinct notions. It encourages the view that what Austin 
called the illocutionary force of an utterance is just that 
part of a speaker's meaning, or his intended meaning, which 
is not conveyed directly by the literal meaning of his utter­
ance but which can be so conveyed by the use of the various 
linguistic force-indicating devices. But on this view, with 
more and more of the force of an utterance being able to be 
"absorbed into" or "exhausted by" its locutionary meaning, by 
the use of these devices, to the point where "there may be no
more to the force than there is to the meaning", an utterance
whose force is thereby made fully explicit has no force. By 
his use of these metaphors Strawson tries to assimilate illo­
cutionary force to locutionary meaning and tries to make it
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look as though a theory of meaning' would he adequate for ex­
plaining the notion of illocutionary force. Searle seeks to 
effect the same assimilation in a different way by invoking 
his Principle of Expressibility according to which whatever 
can be meant can be said. The details and application of this 
principle need not be gone into here. Both Strawson's and 
Searle's proposed assimilation is subject to the objection 
made in the final section of Chapter Two in the course of de­
fending Austin's distinction between locutionary meaning and 
illocutionary force against Cohen's criticisms, i.e., the ob­
jection that to .assimilate these two notions is to commit a 
category confusion. Austin’s talk of the force of an utter­
ance as distinct from its meaning, and of "how the utterance 
is to be taken" was, of course, metaphorical. But the origin 
of these metaphors in the language of action - how one takes 
a blow to the body : by ducking or fending it, depends on the 
perceived force of the blow - points to the sort of theory in 
whose terms the phenomena thus metaphorically described are 
to be explained.
It is on the basis of his account of securing uptake in 
terms of audience understanding that Strawson mounts his at- ■ 
tack on Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are in general 
essentially conventional acts. The crux of the matter for 
Strawson seems to be the different ways in which the complex 
overt intention of the speaker performing an illocutionary 
act may fail to be fulfilled. "In the case of an illocutionary 
act of a kind not essentially conventional, the act of commun­
ication is performed if uptake is secured, if the utterance is 
taken to be issued with the complex overt intention with which 
it is issued. But even though the act of communication is per-
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formed, the wholly overt intention which lies at the core of 
the intention complex may, without any breach of rules or 
conventions, be frustrated. The audience response'(belief, 
action, or attitude) may simply not be forthcoming. It is 
different with the utterance which forms part of a wholly 
convention-governed procedure. Granted that uptake is secured, 
then any frustration of the wholly overt intention of the ut­
terance (the intention to further the procedure in a certain 
way) must be a attributable to a breach of rule or convention" 
(p.37). So the revision of Austin’s thesis that Strawson seeks 
to effect relies for its success on the presumption that the 
failure of the audience of the illocutionary act to make the 
intended response to it, without contravening any rules or 
conventions, or the frustration, without any breach of rules 
or conventions, of the intention with which the act is per­
formed, implies that the illocutionary act itself is not a 
conventional act.
In his Introduction to P.L. Searle expresses doubts that 
this distinction has the force that Strawson attributes to it. 
There are good grounds for such doubts but they are not the 
ones which Searle advances, viz., that with Grice, Strawson 
confuses the notions of illocutionary uptake and perlocution- 
ary object. "Strawson and Grice both think of the 'overt in­
tention' of the speaker in the non-conventional case as the 
eliciting of some response or effect in the hearer, such as, 
e.g., getting him to believe something (the overt intended ef­
fect of statements) or getting him to do something (the overt 
intended effect of requests)"(p.8). But it is difficult to 
see how this charge can be made good against Strawson for the 
point on which he parts company with Grice is precisely that
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which concerns the extent of the intended audience response 
which is to he included in the complex overt intention mani­
fested in any illocutionary act. On p.33 Strawson argues for 
a more restricted view on this point than the one adopted by 
Grice and further on summarizes his position with the remark, 
"It would equally be a mistake, as we have seen, to general­
ize the account of illocutionary force derived from Grice's 
analysis ; for this would involve holding, falsely, that the 
complex overt intention manifested in any illocutionary act 
always includes the intention to secure a certain definite 
response or reaction in an audience over and above that which 
is necessarily secured if the illocutionary force of the ut­
terance is understood"(p.5?). Here, perlooutionary object is 
clearly distinguished and isolated in the intended response 
or reaction of the audience "over and above that which is 
necessarily secured if the illocutionary force of the utter­
ance is understood", i.e., if uptake is secured. The notions 
which Strawson has confused are not those of illocutionary 
uptake and perlooutionary object but those of securing uptake 
(of a locution) and performing an illocutionary act. Although 
it is serious in its own way, this confusion does not bear 
directly on the question whether Strawson has succeeded in 
establishing a kind of illocutionary act which is not essent­
ially conventional and whether, therefore, a revision of 
Austin’s thesis is necessary. But it would seem that Strawson 
has failed to establish this. For the contrast he draws in 
terras of the ways the complex overt intention manifested in 
any illocutionary act may be frustrated is a distinction not 
between kinds of illocutionary acts, but one between kinds of 
responses to illocutionary acts, i.e., between outcomes of
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illocutionary acts, not illocutionary acts themselves. And 
one can readily admit that the intended response from an audi­
ence of an illocutionary act, successfully performed, may fail 
to he forthcoming without any breach of convention without ad­
mitting, and without being committed to admitting, that the 
illocutionary act is of a kind not essentially conventional. 
For example, an act of promising may be performed with the in­
tention of convincing the promisee that the promisor will per­
form the promised act. This intention may be frustrated by the 
promisee’s refusal to be so convinced and the promisee’s refu­
sal to be so convinced contravenes no "conventions" of promis­
ing. But this does not imply that the act of promising is not 
a conventional act, an act performed in accordance with a 
fairly clearly statable conventional procedure constitutive of 
the act.
In developing his objection against Strawson, then,
Searle is on firmer ground when he compares a supposedly non- 
conventional illocutionary act, e.g., making a statement, with 
a conventional one, e.g., bidding at bridge, and declares, "In 
both cases the intended perlooutionary effect may not be 
achieved, e.g., the hearer may not believe my statement, or he 
may not believe I have as many high cards as my five no-trump 
bid would indicate. And in neither case does he breach any 
rules or conventions if he fails to believe me"(p.9). But what 
needs to be made clear here is that the distinction which 
Searle deploys against Strawson, between illocutionary acts 
and perlooutionary effects, is one which Austin himself formu­
lated and which was designed to mark the distinction between 
illocutionary acts and some of their outcomes. Moreover, the 
contrast Strawson draws between kinds of outcomes of illocu-
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tionary acts which may or may not fail to he forthcoming with­
out any breach of convention is also accommodated by Austin's 
distinction between responses and sequels to illocutionary 
acts which are invited by convention and those which are not. 
Austin regarded only the latter as perlooutionary outcomes of 
illocutionary acts and so Searle goes astray again in saying, 
"Furthermore, even in those cases where failure to secure the 
perlooutionary effect does indeed involve a breach of rules, 
this is only for the trivial reason that the rules are design­
ed to enforce the perlooutionary effect"(p.9). As Austin used 
the terminology of perlocutiens, such effects are not perlo- 
cutionary effects.
A second explanatory merit which Strawson claims for his 
account is its ability to explain the exclusion from the class 
of illocutionary acts of those acts which can be expressed by 
a verb "v" occurring in the formula "In saying that,...8 was 
v-ing" and which Austin denied, on intuitive grounds, were 
illocutionary acts, e.g., boasting and insinuating. However, 
a more apposite test of the explanatory power of any account 
is whether it accommodates those cases of which it purports 
to be an account. Strawson's account fails this test and this 
failure shov/s the falsity of holding that speakers' intentions 
are the essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts. 
This failure will be demonstrated with reference to the ex­
amples of warning and objecting. These are examples which 
Strawson alleges are counter-examples to Austin's thesis, so 
presumably they are examples which Strawson would claim are 
able to be accommodated within his alternative account of il­
locutionary acts. (It has already been shown, in the previous
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chapter, that these examples of illocutionary acts can he ac­
commodated within an account which develops Austin’s thesis 
and hence, contra Strawson, that they are not counter-examples 
to that thesis.)
Strawson glosses his account of warning as follows : "... 
where I do not simply inform, but warn, you that p, among the 
intentions I intend you to'recognize (and intend you to recog­
nize as intended to be recognized), are not only the intention 
to secure your belief that p, but the intention to secure that 
you are on your guard against p-perils"(p.33). It will be 
clear from this gloss that Strawson’s account cannot accommo­
date cases of warnings given unintentionally, and it will be 
clear from the general nature of Strawson’s account that it 
cannot accommodate any case of an illocutionary act performed 
unintentionally. Now Strawson does not deny that "...an illo­
cutionary act may be performed altogether unintentionally"(p. 
30,fn.4). "I do not mean that such an act could never be per-
formed unintentionally. A player might let slip the word ’re- ]idouble without meaning to redouble ; but if the circumstances |
are appropriate and the play strict, then he has redoubled (or I
he may be held to have redoubled)....Forms can take charge, in 
the absence of appropriate intention ; but when they do, the 
case is essentially deviant or nonstandard"(p.36). Strawson is 
justified in rejecting this example as a counter-example to 
his account. In the case described, if the player is held to 
have redoubled, the mistake by virtue of which he redoubled un­
intentionally, a slip of the tongue, does make the case essent­
ially a deviant or nonstandard one. In this case, it is not 
even true that the player says that he redoubles, in the full 
normal sense of "say". So the play would be overly strict.
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rather than just strict, if the other players exploited the 
coincidence of the word which was let slip being an utterance 
which could be used to bid, and of it being let slip in cir­
cumstances appropriate for bidding, to hold that the player, 
in letting slip the word in those circumstances, did bid. But 
there really is much more scope for unintentional performances 
of illocutionary acts than Strawson would seem, from this ex­
ample, to be prepared to admit. And the rejection of other 
examples of such performances on the grounds that they are es­
sentially deviant or nonstandard would contain an element of 
arbitrary legislation. For there are situations in which illo­
cutionary acts of some types may, either by mistake or by in­
advertence, be performed unintentionally, and yet be success­
fully performed and even, in some cases, felicitously performed. 
For instance, two courtiers making their plans to murder 
their king may be overheard by the king hiding behind the arras 
in the room in which they are talking. The courtiers certainly 
make a big mistake in not ensuring that they hatch their plot 
in secret, and the situation will become very unîiappy for them 
in the near future when the king’s loyal men-at-arms are sent 
in to despatch them. But no mistakes are made in what they say, 
and the king is warned of the plot against him ; and warned, 
albeit by mistake and unintentionally, by the conspirators in 
saying what they say. Next, an example of an objection raised 
by mistake. A speaker may have asserted that Jones is a nimble 
dancer and may be trying to corroborate this in saying that 
Jones has only one leg, believing, perhaps, that Jones must be 
nimble if he is a dancer and has only one leg. But if, in fact, 
Jones has only one leg and is not a nimble dancer because he 
has only one leg, then in saying that Jones has only one leg
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the speaker will not he corroborating his earlier assertion 
but raising an objection against it. In such cases of an un­
intentional warning or objection being given or raised by 
mistake, while the warning is felicitous (and therefore suc­
cessful) the objection is successful but infelicitous. The 
presupposition of objecting, that the speaker has a certain 
contrary attitude towards the utterance objected to, is not 
satisfied. This meshes with intuitions. It is indeed an un­
happy situation when one unintentionally raises an objection 
against something which one has said. An example of a felici­
tous unintentional objection and another example of a felici­
tous unintentional warning were introduced and discussed in ( 
the third section of the previous chapter and need not be re­
peated here (see pp.224,227 above). In those examples, the 
warning and objection are not given or raised by mistake but 
by inadvertence. The differences between unintentional objec­
tions being raised by mistake and inadvertently may be sketch­
ed schematically as follows if "p" abbreviates "Jones has only 
one leg" and "q" abbreviates "Jones is a nimble dancer". In 
either case of a speaker objecting that p against the utter­
ance that q, p is true and believed to be true by the speaker, 
and q is false. In the case of a speaker objecting that p a- 
gainst q inadvertently, q is correctly believed by the speaker 
to be false but he does not see any connexion between p and q, 
i.e., he has no belief with respect to one providing grounds 
for the truth or falsity of the other. In the case of a speak­
er objecting that p against q by mistake, q is incorrectly be­
lieved by the speaker to be true and he mistakes the connexion 
between p and q, i.e., he believes that p provides grounds for 
the truth of q when it provides grounds for the falsity of q.
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Each, of these examples is a different counter-example to 
Schiffer*s claim that " in uttering the sentence 'Jones 
has only one leg', S may he objecting to A's statement that 
Jones is a nimble dancer, but that this is so would seem to 
be a result of the intentions with which the sentence was 
uttered.,. " (Meaning p. 9:1). In the former example, the speaker 
is objecting without any such intention, and in the latter ex­
ample, he is objecting in spite of his intention to the con­
trary.
The possibility of illocutionary acts of most types being 
performed unintentionally is not the paradox that at first 
sight it may appear to be. Illocutionary acts are distinct from 
locutionary acts and the general presumption that an agent 
knows what he is saying is stronger than the general presump­
tion that he knows what he is doing. The knowledge alluded to 
here is just the knowledge an agent (or speaker) has of what he 
is doing (or saying) that is derived from his intentions. This 
difference surfaces in the difference between the rhetorical 
force of the reproofs "You don’t know what you're saying" and 
"You don’t know what you're doing". The first is much the 
stronger of the two. It seems paraphraseable as "You don’t, you 
can’t, mean what you say because if you did you wouldn’t say 
it", while the second seems paraphraseable as just either "You 
don’t foresee what is a fairly obvious outcome of what you’re 
doing" or "You’re making a bit of a mess of what you’re doing". 
The point here is not that unintentional acts of saying some­
thing are exceptional while unintentional acts of doing some­
thing are not. The point, rather, is that lack of the relevant 
intention(s) vitiates acts of the former sort but not acts of 
the latter sort. If a speaker "says" something without intend-
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ing to say it then he does not say it in the full normal sense 
of "say" ; hut if, for instance, an agent shoots someone unin­
tentionally, then he does shoot him in the full normal sense 
of "shoot". Because the speaker's having of the relevant inten­
tion is not a necessary condition for the successful and, in 
many cases, the felicitous performance of an illocutionary act, 
speakers’ intentions are not the essential constitutive fea­
tures of illocutionary acts. At one point, Schiffer glosses his 
account of illocutionary acts with the words "... to perform a 
certain illocutionary act is just to utter something with cer­
tain intentions... ".(p. 108). This will not do. Nor will it do to 
try to . extend'the scope of a theory of language to encompass 
illocutionary acts by denying their essential conventionality 
and making speakers’ intentions their essential constitutive 
features.
The main hypothesis in Searle’s attempt to give an account 
of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of lan­
guage is "...that the semantic structure of a language may be 
regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of 
underlying constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts 
characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accord­
ance with these sets of constitutive rules"(S.A.p.57). By way 
of initial clarification of this hypothesis Searle addresses 
himself to the following question : "What is the difference be­
tween making promises and, say, fishing that makes me want to 
say that doing the first in a language is only made possible by 
the existence of constitutive rules concerning the elements of 
a language and doing the second requires no analogous set of 
constitutive rules?"(p.37). Searle characterizes this differ-
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ence in terms of a natural-conventional distinction. "In the 
case of fishing the ends-means relations.that facilitate or 
enable me to reach my goal, are matters of natural physical 
facts.... that under such and such conditions one catches a 
fish is not a matter of convention or anything like a conven­
tion. In the case of speech acts performed within a language, 
on the other hand, it is a matter of convention - as opposed 
to strategy, technique, procedure, or natural fact - that the 
utterance of such and such expressions under certain condi­
tions counts as the making of a promise"(p.37).
With these remarks, Searle can be seen to be raising, al­
beit unclearly, the problem of the constitution of illocution­
ary acts. That the utterance of certain expressions under cer­
tain conditions counts as the making of a promise is not a 
matter of natural, physical fact, but a matter of convention ; 
and one which is to be explained, according to Searle, in 
terms of constitutive rules underlying and realized in the 
semantic conventions of a language. One of the unclarities in 
these remarks arises from Searle's mentioning of means-to-end 
relationships. At first sight, it appears as though Searle re­
gards the relationship between uttering certain expressions 
under certain conditions and the making of a promise as a 
means“to-end relationship, like that between fishing and 
catching a fish ; the two being distinct only in so far as the 
relationship is conventional in the former case and natural in 
the latter case. The impression conveyed by these opening re­
marks, that one of the roles for Searle’s notion of constitu­
tive rules is to explain the bringing about of some non-natural 
conventional end, is reinforced by another example which Searle 
uses to illustrate the difference between two practices, both
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of which have conventional modes of performance hut in only 
one of which it is the case that the conventions are realiza­
tions of underlying rules. The practice in which the conven­
tions are not realizations of underlying constitutive rules is 
that of a society of sadists who like to cause each other pain 
by making loud noises in each other’s ears and adopt the con­
vention of making the noise BANG- as a means of achieving this 
end. Searle’s point is that rules do not operate, and are not 
required to operate, to bring about this end because the pain 
so caused is a natural effect. Were Searle to go on and claim 
that rules do operate to bring about some conventional end, 
such as the making of a promise, and are required to operate 
in such a case because the end is a conventional end, it would 
create a serious flaw in his account quite apart from the in­
validity of such a move. For the uttering of certain express­
ions in certain circumstances and the making of a promise are 
not related as means-to-end, and to conceive them to be so re­
lated is to misconceive the problem of the constitution of il­
locutionary acts. But Searle does not make this move, and else­
where, denies that these acts are related as means-to-end, "Nor 
should it be thought from this that utterance acts... stand to 
illocutionary acts in the way buying a ticket and getting on a 
train stand to taking a railroad trip. They are not means to 
ends ; rather, utterance acts stand to.illocutionary acts in 
the way in which, e.g., making an ’X ’ on a ballot paper stands 
to voting"(p.84). So while Searle’s mention of means-to-end re­
lationships in these initial remarks on his hypothesis is not 
ultimately confusing, it does nothing to clarify that hypothesis. 
Another point arising from these remarks, which may just be 
noted here in passing, is Searle*s unargued rejection of proce-
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dures as the essential constitutive features of illocutionary 
acts. Searle does not appear to have considered very careful­
ly the possibility that it is by virtue of being performed as 
part of a procedure of a particular type that an act of utter­
ing certain expressions is constituted as, or in his termino­
logy, counts as, the performance of an illocutionary act of a 
particular type.
Searle illustrates the sense with which he uses the phrase 
"a conventional realization of underlying rules" by an example 
of the game of chess being played in different countries ac­
cording to different conventions, "Imagine, e.g., that in one 
country the king is represented by a big piece, in another the 
king is smaller than the rook. In one country the game is play­
ed on a board as we do it, in another the board is represented 
entirely by a sequence of numbers, one of which is assigned to 
any piece that 'moves’ to that number. Of these different 
countries, we could say that they play the same game of chess 
according to different conventional forms. Notice, also, that 
the rules must be realized in some form in order that the game 
be playable. Something, even if it is not a material object, 
must represent what we call the king or the board"(p.39).
Searle regards this situation as analogous to that of different 
natural languages - English, French, German, etc. - being dif­
ferent conventional realizations of the same set of underlying 
rules. But while the analogy between different conventional 
forms of the game of chess and different natural languages may 
be reasonably clear, the analogy between the rules of chess un.- 
derlying those different conventional forms of the game and the 
rules constitutive of illocutionary acts underlying those dif­
ferent natural languages is not at all clear. This latter anal­
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ogy is the more important of the two, and it is essential for 
the clarification of his hypothesis that Searle does succeed 
in establishing that there is such an analogue to the rules of 
chess. His one gesture towards doing this is made with a claim 
about the inter-translatability of languages. "Just as in the 
above chess_7 example, we can translate a chess game in one 
country into a chess game of another because they share the 
same underlying rules, so we can translate utterances of one 
language into another because they share the same underlying 
rules"(p.40). Different human languages, to the extent they 
are inter-translatable, can be regarded as different conven­
tional realizations of the same underlying rules"(p.39).
In view of Searle's aim to connect the rules constitutive 
of illocutionary acts with the semantic structures of differ­
ent languages, and given that meaning is what is preserved in 
translation, this is the sort of claim that may be expected 
from Searle, And this claim does serve as a reminder of one 
sort of rule which Searle is not concerned to establish as the 
rules constitutive of illocutionary acts. For these latter 
rules, underlying and shared by different natural languages, 
are not the rules peculiar to just one natural language which 
may be formulated in an attempt to specify the particular se­
mantic conventions of that language. Searle is quite explicit 
on this point. "When I say that speaking a language is engag­
ing in a rule-governed form of behaviour, I am not especially 
concerned with the particular conventions one invokes in 
speaking this language or that (and it is primarily for this 
reason that my investigation differs fundamentally from lin­
guistics, construed as an examination of the actual structure 
of natural human languages) but the underlying rules which the
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conventions manifest or realize, in the sense of the chess ex­
ample" (p. 41) . But this point having been made, it is difficult 
to see what rules there are, allegedly manifested in the seman­
tic conventions of natural languages and in virtue of which 
different languages are inter-translatable, that can serve 
Searle’s purpose. In another remark which makes much the same 
point as that of the previously quoted remark, Searle also 
gives what he evidently takes to be an example of such a rule, 
"The fact that in French one can make a promise by saying 'je 
promets* and in English one can make it by saying *I promise* 
is a matter of convention. But the fact that an utterance of a 
promising device (under appropriate conditions) counts as the 
undertaking of an obligation is a matter of rules and not a 
matter of the conventions of French or English"(pp.39-40). Set­
ting aside the questions of whether or not this fact is a mat­
ter of rules, and of how the rule, if it is a rule, that the 
utterance of a promising device (under certain conditions) 
counts as the undertaking of an obligation, fits in with the 
alleged series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, the 
questions now confronting Searle*s hypothesis are whether this 
"rule" is something manifested or realized in the semantic con­
ventions of a language, and whether it is in virtue of some­
thing like this that (fragments at least) of natural languages 
are inter-translatable. If the ansv/ers to these latter ques­
tions are in the affirmative, then what the "rule" specifies 
is what is meant or said when a speaker seriously and literally 
utters a sentence such as "I promise". For the rules manifested 
or realized in the semantic conventions of a language operate 
to assign meanings or semantic interpretations to sentences of 
the language, and a rule for translating an utterance in one
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language into an utterance in another language has to preserve 
the identity of what is said in the translation. But neither 
what is meant, nor what is said, is specified by Searle*s 
"rule" that the utterance of a promising device (under certain 
conditions) counts as the undertaking of an obligation. What 
this "rule" specifies - the undertaking of an obligation - is 
one of the things that might be done by a speaker in saying, 
seriously and literally, "I promise". So it would seem that 
the answers to these questions are in the negative, and that 
this "rule", which is typical of the sort of rules which Searle 
claims to be constitutive of illocutionary acts, is not mani­
fested or realized in the semantic conventions of a language. 
Searle has, therefore, failed to establish that there are un­
derlying rules, constitutive of illocutionary acts, manifested 
or realized in the conventions of natural languages analogous 
to the rules of chess in his example of the game of chess being 
played in different countries according to different conven­
tions. But the establishment of such (a series of sets of) 
rules is required for the clarification of his hypothesis, and 
lacking clarification from any other source that hypothesis 
seems unable to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity.
One reason for Searle’s failure to establish the required 
analogy can, perhaps, be shown by developing a slightly differ­
ent analogy - between playing chess and using a language - 
v/hich may also show why it is misguided to attempt to give an 
account of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory 
of language. It is not so important for this analogy that there 
may not be a very close analogy between the rules of chess and 
the rules of a language. There are obvious disanalogies between 
these rules arising from the greater complexity of the latter.
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But some possible disanalogiee between these rules which sug­
gest themselves may not be actual disanalogies. For instance, 
the suggestion that the rules of chess are prescriptive 
whereas the rules of a language are descriptive, if that dis­
tinction is a clear one, may just reflect the different state 
of codification of the respective rules rather than any dif­
ference in their natures. And it is sufficient for the pur­
poses of this analogy that these rules are alike in so far as 
it is by reference to each that certain faults in the respec­
tive performances of chess-players and speakers are judged to 
be faults. To the extent that these rules are analogous, a 
corrective can be found for Searle®s claim that there is, 
manifested or realized in the conventions of different natural 
languages, a common set of underlying rules analogous to the 
rules of chess that manifested or realized in each of the con­
ventional forms of the game of chess described in his hypo­
thetical example. If the analogues of these different conven­
tional realisations of the rules of chess are seen to be, not 
different natural languages, but different conventional rea­
lizations, e.g., phonetic and graphic realizations, of the 
output of the operations of the syntactic and semantic rules 
of one particular natural language upon the items in the lexi­
con of that language, as they may easily be seen to be, then 
Searle*s implausible claim has the ground cut from under it.
However, what Is more important in this analogy is the 
similarity between the ways in which the abilities displayed 
by people using a language, and playing a game such as chess, 
are not exhausted by the abilities gained from their mastery 
of the rules of the language, or from their mastery of the 
rules of chess. The possession of these latter abilities is,
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of course, a necessary condition for a person being able to 
use a language or to play chess at all. And in the case of a 
language-user, the possession of abilities gained from a 
mastery of the rules of the language, together with a know­
ledge of the lexicon of the language, is a sufficient condi­
tion for that person being able to speak the language. These 
abilities include the ability to issue lexically and syntac­
tically correct and meaningful sentences of the language, the 
ability to understand such sentences issued by others and 
which may or may not have been encountered previously, as well 
as the ability to recognize grammatical faults of various
types that may occur in attempts to issue such sentences. In
Austinian terms, the possession of these abilities by a speak­
er adds up to his being able to perform locutionary acts. In 
the case of a chess-player, the abilities gained from a mastery 
of the rules of the game include the ability to identify the 
correct arrangement of the pieces on the board preparatory to 
play from among any number of different arrangements of the 
pieces, the ability to distinguish legal moves from any illegal 
moves that may be made in the course of play, and the ability 
to identify a position of play which counts as winning, or los­
ing, or drawing a game of chess. However, the sense with which 
it may be said of a person that he can use language, or that he 
can play chess, which is informed only by the abilities gained 
from his mastery of the respective rules, is a very weak sense. 
Perhaps this can be seen most easily by imagining a speaker’s 
use of language or a chess-player’s game v/hich displays only 
these abilities. If all that can be said of a speaker’s use of 
language is that (most of) his utterances are well-formed, 
meaningful and clearly enunciated, then the speaker’s perform-
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ance is damned with faint praise. The same is true of a chess­
player’s play of which all that can he said are such things as 
that he arranged the pieces on the board correctly before the 
game commenced, that he made no illegal moves during the game, 
and that he knew that he had lost the game when his king was 
mated. Such performances invite the comment that the speaker 
or the chess-player does not really know how to use language, 
or does not really know how to play chess. T,hat is lacking in 
the chess-player's game is a display of some ability for com­
binational and positional play. In order to be able to play 
the game properly, a chess-player has to be able to adopt tac­
tics ‘which, given the position of play and the pieces at his 
disposal, will serve the principal strategic objective of win­
ning the game. The ability to adopt such tactics consists in 
the ability to adopt certain procedures whose executions at 
certain stages of the game have outcomes which further the at­
tainment of that objective. The intended analogy between the 
different abilities that Inform each of these senses with 
which it may be said that a person can play chess, and the 
different abilities, displayed in the performance of locution­
ary and illocutionary acts, that inform different senses with 
which it may be said that a person can use language, should 
now be clear* For what is lacking in the speaker’s performance 
which displays only the abilities gained from his mastery of 
the rules of the language is a display of some ability to per­
form illocutionary acts ; some ability, that is, to do things 
in the exercise of those abilities gained from his mastery of 
the rules of the language, which will help to bring about the 
various objectives that arise in the course of his purposive 
action. And this ability consists in the ability to adopt cer- i
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tain procedures whose executions in appropriate circumstances 
have outcomes which further the attainment of those objectives.
Perhaps an illustrative example will help to establish 
the analogy between the procedures constitutive of illocution­
ary acts that are adopted by speaker's in their use of language 
and the tactical procedures that are adopted by chess-players 
in their games of chess. A speaker may wish to convince someone 
of his own future performance of some act, and a chess-player. 
Black, will no doubt wish to defend his position against 
Volte's opening move (P-E4). The speaker may have a number of 
procedures available to him for convincing his companion but 
may decide to adopt the procedure of promising, believing that 
that is the best procedure to adopt in the circumstances. Simi­
larly, Black has a number of procedures available to him for 
defending his position against White's King's Pawn Opening but 
may decide to adopt the Sicilian Defence, believing that that 
is the best procedure to adopt in the circumstances. And just 
as what the speaker does, when he says that he promises to per­
form the act, is constituted as an act of promising by virtue 
of his locutionary act being performed as part of a procedure, 
what Black does, when he makes the move (P-QB4), is constituted 
as a Sicilian Defence by virtue of that move being made as part 
of a procedure. Each procedure can be specified in the same 
sort of terms : an ordered triplet comprising a set of (types 
of) presuppositions, a set of (types of) acts, and a set of 
(tjrpes of) strictly necessitated outcomes. And the following of 
such outcomes from the correct and complete execution of each 
procedure furthers the attainment of the speaker's and the 
chess-player's respective objectives.
The abilities displayed by people in their use of such
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procedures inform a stronger sense with which, it may be said 
that they can use language or that they can play chess. And 
although the acquisition and the exercise of these abilities 
go along with the acquisition and the exercise of the abili­
ties informing the weak sense with v/hich these things may be 
said, i.e., the abilities gained from a mastery of the rules 
of a language or from a mastery of the rules of chess, the 
former abilities are neither exhausted by the latter abilities 
nor gained from a mastery of the respective rules. Just as it 
is not a rule of chess that Black must play the Sicilian De­
fence to V/hite’s King's Pawn Opening, it is not a rule of 
language that a speaker must give a promise in order to con­
vince another of his own future performance of some act. That 
a chess-player's move (P-QB4) is a legal move is a matter, 
inter alia, of the rules of chess, and that a speaker's act of 
uttering the sentence ”1 promise” is an instance of him saying 
that he promises is a matter, inter alia, of the rules of a 
language. But that the chess-player's move is constituted as a 
Sicilian Defence, and that the speaker's locutionary act is 
constituted as an act of promising, are not matters of the 
rules of chess or of the rules of a language. Just as no rule 
of chess is controverted if the player's move (P-QB4) is not 
constituted as a Sicilian Defence - assuming that the move was 
legal in the circumstances in which it was made - no rule of 
language is controverted if a speaker's act of saying that he 
promises is not constituted as an act of promising. Just as a 
person does not learn from the rules of chess either what the 
Sicilian Defence is, or how, when or why it may be deployed, a 
person learns from the rules of a language which he has to 
master in order to be able to speak the language neither what
510
promising is, nor how, when or why promises may be given. From 
his mastery of those rules he acquires the ability to use "the 
procedure of promising" and "promises", but he does not ac­
quire the ability to use promises or the procedure of promis­
ing from his mastery of those rules. The objective of a theory 
of language is to give an account of the linguistic competence 
of native speakers of the language and the task of construct­
ing such a theory may be compared to the task of codifying the 
rules of chess. The tasks differ in that the former is com­
plete whereas the latter is still incomplete. But even if a 
complete codification of the rules of a language, whose mastery 
enabled people to be speakers of that language, was to hand, 
such a theory of language would be inadequate for giving an 
account of the use of language exemplified by the performance 
of illocutionary acts, because the abilities displayed in the 
performance of such acts are not included in the abilities 
gained from a mastery of those rules.
It may be objected against this analogy, and against the 
claim that has been defended in this chapter, that the concep­
tions of a theory of language which inform that analogy and 
that claim are too restricted. It may be held, for instance, 
that a theory of language need not, or does not, only have 
syntactic and semantic components.but may, or should, also 
have a pragmatic component. And it may be argued that because 
pragmatics is the study of language in relation to the users 
of language, and because illocutionary acts exemplify a speci­
fic use of language, such acts fall within the scope of prag­
matics and are amenable to subsumption under a pragmatic com­
ponent of a theory of language. Such an argument might be con­
vincing if it was clear what the scope and inter-relationships
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of these different components are ; and* in particular, if it 
was clear that a pragmatic component could not he included in 
the semantic component (and perhaps, in the syntactic compon­
ent as well) to provide an enriched theory of language which 
still, basically, comprised only a syntactic and a semantic 
component, rather than having to be given its own place in a 
genuinely tripartite theory of language. Some of Stalnaker's 
remarks in "Pragmatics"(8.N.h.pp.380-97) not only show some­
thing of the range of the different distinctions that have 
been drawn and deployed between pragmatic and non-pragmatic 
phenomena, and, thereby, something of the varying scopes of 
pragmatic components of theories of language ; they also show 
something of the arbitrariness with which these distinctions 
have been drawn. For instance, "The problems of pragmatics 
have been treated informally by philosophers in the ordinary 
language tradition, and by some linguists, but logicians and 
philosophers of a formalistic frame of mind have generally ig­
nored pragmatic problems, or else pushed them into semantics 
and syntax"(p.380). The distinction between pragmatic and non- 
pragmatic phenomena which is indicated by this partly histori­
cal remark distinguishes phenomena which are, or have been, 
treated informally in a theory of language from those phenomena 
which are, or have been, treated formally in such a theory. A 
similar distinction, going along with his distinction between 
theorists of formal semantics and theorists of communication- 
intention, can be seen to lie behind Strawson's remark that a 
theorist of formal semantics "...may be happy to concede rights 
in some small outlying portion of the 6^ facto territory of 
theoretical semantics to the theorist of communication-inten­
tion, instead of confining the latter entirely ,to some less ap-
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petizing territory called theoretical pragmatlcs"(Meaning and 
Truth p.15)* A different distinction between pragmatic and 
non-pragmatic phenomena which emerges from some of Stalnaker’s 
other remarks distinguishes, among the phenomena subsumed 
under a theory of language, those that are context-dependent 
from those that are not* For instance, Stalnaker maintains 
that the problem of analyzing the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the successful performance of speech acts is a 
pragmatic problem "...since these necessary and sufficient 
conditions will ordinarily involve the presence or absence of 
various properties of the context in which the act is perform- 
ed"(S.N.L.p.584). His qualification of this position is tell­
ing. "This is not necessarily so, however. Since speech act 
types can be any way of picking out a class of particular 
speech acts, one might define one in such a way that the con­
text was irrelevant, and the problem of analysis reduced to a 
problem of syntax or semantics, as for example the speech act 
of uttering a grammatical sentence of English, or the speech 
act of expressing the proposition X"(p.396,fn.6).
It is clear that this second distinction does not coincide 
with the first ; context-dependent features of speech can be 
treated formally. And it is the latter distinction which Stal­
naker deploys in his attempt "...to carve out a subject matter 
that might plausibly be called pragmatics.... a subject /"which / 
can be developed in a relatively straightforward way as a form­
al pragmatics no less rigorous than present day logical sjnitax 
and semantics"(p.380), According to Stalnaker, "pragmatics is 
the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are 
performed", and "there are two major types of problems to be 
solved within pragmatics: first, to define interesting types of
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speech acts and speech products ; second, to characterise the 
features of the speech context which help determine which 
proposition is expressed by a given sentence. The analysis of 
illocutionary acts is an example of a problem of the first 
kind... " (p. 383). But on the same page, Stalnaker claims', that 
"...it is a semantical problem to specify the rules for match­
ing up sentences of a natural language with the propositions 
that they express." So it is difficult to see Stalnaker's rea­
son for thinking that the problem of characterizing the fea­
tures of the speech context which help determine which propo­
sition is expressed by a given sentence is a pragmatic problem, 
rather than one for a context-sensitive semantic component of 
a theory of language. The views from which this thought seems 
to be derived, "...that semantics is best viewed as the study 
of propositions, and...that propositions may be studied inde­
pendently of language"(p.395), simply expose the arbitrariness 
of Stalnaker's demarcation of a pragmatic component of a theory 
of language in terms of what is context-dependent. It is a com­
monplace that the meaningfulness of sentences is context-depen­
dent, one more generally accepted than the view that the syn- 
tactic correctness of sentences is context-dependent, and it 
does not seem inappropriate that this commonplace should be ex­
plained within the semantic component of a theory of language. 
Stalnaker's reason for including illocutionary acts within the 
scope of a pragmatic component of a theory of language is not a 
sufficient reason. Types of acts which, like illocutionary acts, 
exemplify some use of language and are context-dependent would 
be included, even though they are not good candidates for in­
clusion ; e.g., playing Scrabble and doing cross-word puzzles.
To show that Stalnaker has not given a sufficient reason
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for regarding the analysis of illocutionary acts as a pragmat­
ic problem is not, of course, to prove that such acts cannot, 
or should not, be subsumed under a pragmatic component of a 
theory of language. But perhaps there is, in this discussion 
of Stalnaker's remarks on pragmatics, sufficient material for 
the construction of a defence against the previously outlined 
objection to the claim being defended in this chapter and to 
the analogy between playing chess and using a language. The 
objection was that the theories of language informing that 
analogy and that claim are too restricted in not, apparently, 
including pragmatic components. But it can be seen from the 
various distinctions which Stalnaker draws between pragmatic 
and non-pragmatic phenomena that each of these theories does 
include a pragmatic component. The theory of language inform­
ing the analogy, which is adequate for giving an account of 
locutionary acts, includes a pragmatic component within its 
semantic component by making the successful performance of a 
rhetic act dependent, in part, upon some of the circumstances 
of the context in which the act is performed. And the broadly 
construed theory of language informing the claim of this chap­
ter (i.e., the claim that a theory of action provides a more 
appropriate framework for developing Austin's conception of 
speech acts than a theory of language) also includes a pragmatic 
component within its semantic component by virtue of the lat­
ter being construed, not (just) as a theory of formal seman­
tics, but as (including) a theory of speakers' communication- 
intentions. The objection may be pressed. It may be urged that 
although Stalnaker may have failed to show that illocutionary 
acts fall within the scope of a pragmatic component of a theory 
of language, distinct from its syntactic and semantic compon-
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ente, some such component could he delineated and developed in 
order to provide an account of illocutionary acts. But to press 
the objection in this way is to lose the point, for two reasons, 
hot only is the envisaged theory of language radically differ­
ent from that deployed by Schiffer, Stray/son and Searle in 
their respective work on speech acts - and it is against the 
counter-claims implicit in that work that the claim of this 
chapter is being defended - but the scope of the envisaged 
theory of language contains an arbitrary extension beyond that 
of traditional theories of language, and an arbitrary extension 
beyond that required of a theory adequate for giving an account 
of the abilities displayed by people in so far as they are 
speakers of a language.
In "Speech Acts"(C.T.L.pp.175-808), Cohen argues "...that 
a study of the so-called illocutionary forces of English (or 
French) utterances is not to be thought of as a branch of lin­
guistics co-ordinate with English (or French) phonology, mor­
phology, syntax, and semantics"(p.199). However, the aim of 
this argument is not one which the writer is in sympathy with. 
In "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" Cohen argued for a negative 
answer to the title question, and in "Speech Acts" he makes 
four criticisms of Austin's conception of speech acts, each of 
which bears on the notion of the illocutionary act. Cohen's ob­
jective is not to show that the phenomena of illocutionary 
forces or of illocutionary acts are subjects for a theory of 
action ; Cohen would deny that such phenomena occur. His objec­
tive is to show that speech act phenomena are to be subsumed
4under a semantic component of a theory of language. Perhaps 
this discussion can be rounded off with a brief examination 
of these more recent criticisms that Cohen has made of Austin's
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conception of speech acts. In summary, they are that that con­
ception "...multiplies acts unnecessarily, its distinction be­
tween locutionary and illocutionary acts is obscure, its dis­
tinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is e- 
qually troublesome, and its thesis about the essential conven­
tionality of illocutionary acts is quite untenable"(p.180).
The first criticism, concerning the unnecessary prolifera­
tion of acts, has two quite distinct parts. For the first part, 
Cohen criticizes Austin's conception of phonetic, phatic and 
rhetic acts. "It is just a reification and telescoping of cus­
tomary distinctions between phonetic, morpho-phonemic, syntac­
tic, and semantic modes of description. In other words Austin’s 
theory sprouts novel and redundant terminology that cuts off 
his account of speech from any obvious continuity with current 
linguistic theory"(p.176). But even when this criticism is 
linked with Cohen's point that Austin adopted the material mode 
of discourse rather than the formal mode, what is wrong with 
what Cohen is criticizing here is not clear. Cohen does not 
sharpen the criticism ; nor does he show what is lost by Aus­
tin's abandonment of the formal mode in talking about speech 
acts ; in particular, Cohen does not show why a multiplicity of 
(types of) descriptions of speech act situations is to be pre­
ferred to a multiplicity of (types of) acts distinguished with­
in such situations. The point which Cohen seems to have missed 
in making this criticism is that the distinctions drawn within 
the locutionary act between phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts 
(distinctions which mesh with some of the more important dis­
tinctions drawn in linguistic theory), when set alongside the 
distinctions between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, 
serve to separate those features of a speech act situation
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which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language 
from those which are not. The second part of Cohen’s first 
criticism is "...that on some occasions at least an indefin­
itely large number of illocutionary acts are encapsulated in 
a single speech-act. In saying to a politician "There is a 
plot to oust you", a man may be committing himself to the 
politician’s cause, in thus committing himself he may have 
been condemning his own past actions, in condemning his own 
past actions he may have been repudiating his previous beliefs, 
in repudiating his previous beliefs he may have been drawing 
the obvious conclusions from events, and so on, and so on.
When acts begin to multiply like this it looks as though there 
is work for Occam's razor to do"(p.177). The point of this 
criticism is quite mysterious. It can hardly be that it is a 
consequence of Austin’s conception of speech acts that more 
than one type of illocutionary act can be performed in the is­
suing of one single utterance in a speech act situation. For 
such a state of affairs is possible, as Cohen’s example shows, 
and an adequate account of illocutionary acts should be able to 
accommodate such a possibility. The point of Cohen’s criticism 
may be that Austin’s conception of speech acts cannot accommo­
date such a possibility. (Compare the point which Cohen tries 
to make with a very similar example in "Do Illocutionary Forces 
Exist?"(Symp.pp.456-7).) But if this is the point which Cohen 
is trying to make, he has ignored the transitivity of the rela­
tionship expressed by the formula "In saying that..., S was v~ 
ing". This formula can be used to report a locutionary act and 
any illocutionary act performed therein. So if "v^" and "v^" 
are verbs which can be used to express illocutionary acts of 
different types, and if in saying that..., S was v^-ing, and in
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V.-ing 8 was Vg-ing, then in saying that..,, 8 was Vg-ing. A 
speaker performs just as many illocutionary acts in a given 
speech act situation as the number of procedures, constitutive 
of such acts, that are executed by the speaker in that situa­
tion.
In his criticism of Austin’s distinction between locution­
ary and illocutionary acts, Cohen merely repeats, without e- 
mendation, some of the points which he tried to make against 
Austin’s distinction between locutionary meaning and illocu­
tionary force in "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?". These points 
have been rebutted in the final section of Chapter Two and need 
not be discussed here. Cohen’s criticism of Austin’s distinc­
tion between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts focuses on 
the notion of securing uptake. Cohen’s point is that Austin 
tended to blur this distinction - as a distinction between an 
illocutionary act and some of the effects on the audience pro­
duced by the act - by holding that the securing of uptake, 
i.e., the achieving of a certain effect on the audience, is a 
necessary condition for the successful performance of an illo­
cutionary act. Cohen is correct in maintaining, contra Austin, 
that the securing of uptake is not a necessary condition for 
the successful performance of an illocutionary act. But his 
criticism that Austin’s notion of securing uptake blurs the 
distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts does 
not do justice to Austin’s discussion of the notions of secur­
ing uptake, taking effect, and inviting by convention a re­
sponse or sequel. By distinguishing these three types of out­
come involved in the performance of illocutionary acts, none 
of which is a perlocutionary type of outcome, Austin clarified 
the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
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Cohen’s criticism of Austin’s thesis of the essential 
conventionality of illocutionary acts is vitiated by his mis­
interpretations of that thesis. Against the interpretation, 
in terms of conventional procedures, which has been placed 
on that thesis in this work, Cohen has claimed, in correspond­
ence with the writer, that such an interpretation destroys an 
essential difference between acts like naming, excommunicating, 
etc. (which all have to be done in accordance with some special 
convention) and those like warning, commiserating, etc. (which 
are often done in unconventional ways) ; and further, that 
progress in the study of speech acts will not be made by de­
fending all of Austin’s ipsiesima verba. The writer fails to 
see what is essential about the difference between the acts 
which Cohen distinguishes, and believes that some progress in 
the study of speech acts has been made by defending most of 
Austin’8 ipsissima verba.
Foot-notes ;
1 (from p.272) This distinction between two types of semantic 
theory is drawn and discussed by Strawson in Meaning and 
Truth.
2 (from p.879) What follows in this section is primarily a de­
fence of Austin’s thesis against Strawson’s arguments. For a 
wider-ranging discussion and criticism of Strawson’s more 
constructive proposals in "Intention and Convention in 
Speech Acts" see Bird’s "Intentions and Conventions"(Logique 
et Analyse(1974)pp.495-507) and Cohen’s "Speech Acts"(C* T.L. 
(I974)pp.173-808, especially §3).
3 (from p.313) The views that the syntactic correctness of 
sentences is context-dependent and that it is now a common­
place among generative grammarians that syntactic rules are 
to some extent dependent on pragmatic considerations, i.e.,
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on the context of utterance, are views that have been put 
forward by Robinson in "Syntax, Meaning and Context: A Re­
ply to Keenan"(P.Q.(1977)pp.168-4) and in correspondence 
with the writer. The writer does not share such views ; see 
his "Reply to Robinson"(P.Q.(I977)pp.164-5).
4 (from p.515) For a discussion and criticism of Cohen’s 
rather sketchy proposals for how this may be accomplished 
see Bird’s unpublished paper "Do We Need a New Start in 
Speech Act Theory". The details of Cohen’s distinctive fea­
ture matrix for the semantic markers of verbs used to ex­
press speech acts, which is a part of these proposals, have 
been discussed above on pp.195-6.
Appendix 
Truth ill Words
Austin’s performative-constative distinction demarcates 
two classes of utterances : those that are truth-valued, i.e., 
constative utterances such as assertions, descriptions, pre­
dictions, reports, statements, etc., and those that are not 
truth-valued, i.e., performative utterances such as bets, com­
mands, greetings, promises, questions, threats, etc. It has 
been argued by some that Austin was wrong to draw this dis­
tinction, because performative utterances are truth-valued ; 
and it has been argued by one, Strawson, that Austin did not 
draw the distinction between truth-valued and non-truth-valued 
utterances (or that he did not maintain that distinction) and 
that he was wrong not to do so. It is to be argued in the 
course of this Appendix, in defence of Austin, that he did 
draw and maintain this distinction, and that he was right to 
do so. In this first section, an attempt will be made to rebut 
the tv/o main arguments that have been advanced in support of 
the view that performative utterances are truth-valued. Some 
intuitions in favour of the perforraative-constative distinc­
tion which, apparently, some do not share, will also be dis­
cussed. In the next section, Strawson’s misunderstandings of 
Austin’s views on the nature of performative and constative 
utterances will be exposed. In the final section, a neglected 
feature of Austin’s later views on truth will be discussed in 
order to show a possible starting point for a theoretical 
justification of the performative-constative distinction.
One of the issues that will be decided by the outcome of 
the arguments against this distinction is whether the Descrip-
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tive Fallacy still retains its grip in certain quarters, or
whether, in maintaining this distinction, Austin was main­
taining something that could he called the Descriptive Fal­
lacy Fallacy. For the arguments in support of the view that 
performative utterances are truth-valued have generally been 
advanced with respect to explicit performative utterances, 
i.e., utterances whose main verb is typically in the first 
person singular present indicative active, and whose main 
clause is used as a performative prefix to make explicit the 
type of illocutionary act whose performance the speaker is at­
tempting in issuing the utterance. It was just such performa­
tive utterances as these which were claimed by Austin to exem­
plify a type of sentence-use different from that which had 
usually been associated with sentences having that form - the 
use of a sentence to say something true or false - and to pro­
vide another reason for believing that the Descriptive Fallacy 
is a fallacy. The opponents of Austin’s performative-constative 
distinction do well to challenge the distinction at this point. 
For there is nothing in (the characterization of) the form of 
explicit performative utterances which serves to distinguish 
them from some constative utterances ; and the case against the 
distinction is at its most convincing v/hen argued with respect 
to equiform examples of explicit constative utterances such as 
"I predict that I shall go" and explicit performative utterances 
such as "I promise that I shall go". Of course, Austin would not 
have denied that a sentence of the latter type could be used as 
a constative utterance : to make an implicit statement of a 
habit, for instance. But this is not a point which is deployed 
against his distinction. The case argued for by opponents to his 
distinction is that the utterance "X promise that I shall go",
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when that sentence is used, to make a promise, has a truth- 
value, just as the utterance "I predict that I shall go", when 
that sentence is used to make a prediction, has a truth-value.
However, the emphasis upon explicit performative utter­
ances in the arguments against Austin’s distinction only 
throws into sharper relief one of the weaknesses in the general 
position being advanced by those arguments. For without guali- ' 
fication, the claim that performative utterances are truth­
valued entails the claim that implicit performative utterances 
are truth-valued ; and this claim commits the claimant to 
ascribing truth-values to utterances such as "Leave the roomî", 
"Good morning" and even "Are you going?". The oddity of ascrib­
ing truth-values to implicit performative utterances is some­
times admitted ; more often, this commitment is simply ignored. 
Thus Heal in "Explicit Performative Utterances and Statements" 
(P.Q.(1974)pp.106-21) defends the position that explicit orders 
such as "I order you to leave the room” can be assessed as true 
or false, but admits that such an assessment of the implicit 
order "Leave the room!" "... is indeed odd"(p.116). And Quine, 
in a contribution to "A Symposium on Austin’s Method"(Symp.pp. 
86-90), does not commit himself on the issue of whether the im­
plicit greeting "Good morning" is truth-valued ; but Quine does 
say that "...’I bid you good morning’ is true of us on a given 
occasion if and only if, on that occasion, I bid you good morn­
ing" (p. 90). An attempt to avoid the difficulties created by 
this commitment may be made by restricting the claim that per­
formative utterances are truth-valued to the claim that only 
explicit performative utterances are truth-valued. But this re­
stricted claim has problems of its own ; and not much scrutiny 
is required to see that any reliance for a basis for that claim
324
upon the similarity of form of explicit constative and per­
formative utterances is misplaced. For from Quine’s "’I bid 
you good morning’ is true...if and only if...I bid you good 
morning", it is a short step to "’I state that he did not do 
it’ is true if and only if I. state that he did not do it". And 
here, all contact with a rational theory of truth is lost. An 
Alice-in-Wonderland situation is entered into in which the 
truth of statements can be impugned by comments ad hominem*
"I state that he did not do it." "Well, that’s just a state­
ment about you." On this point, Austin’s insights seem to have 
been more clear than Quine’s. "If someone says *I state that 
he did not do it’, we investigate the truth of his statement 
in just the same way as if he had said ’He did not do it’ sim­
plicite r, when we took that to be, as we naturally often should, 
a statement. That is, to say ’I state that he did not’ is to 
make the very same statement as to say ’He did not*; it is not 
to make a different statement about what ’I’ state (except in 
exceptional cases : the historic and habitual present, etc.).
As notoriously, when I say even ’I think he did it’ someone is 
being rude if he says ’That’s a statement about you*: and this 
might conceivably be about myself, whereas ’I state that he did 
it’ could not"(Words p.135). The truth conditions of a consta­
tive utterance of a particular type are the same irrespective 
of whether the utterance is issued in implicit or explicit form. 
So restricting the claim against Austin’s distinction to the 
claim that only explicit performative utterances are truth-val- , 
ued merely replaces one set of problems with another. For pre­
sumably, not even Quine would want to say that "I bid you good 
morning" is true if and only if (it is a) good morning. And 
even if an account of the unusual truth conditions alluded to
in "’I bid you good morning’ is true if and only if I bid you 
good morning" could be generalized for all explicit performa- 
tive utterances- sucli an account would be so different from an 
account of the truth conditions of constative utterances that 
the argument against Austin’s perforraative-constative distinc­
tion, based on that account, would be oblique at best. But the 
attempt to assign truth-values to utterances such as "I bid 
you good morning" just seems to show a misunderstanding of the 
role which greetings play in ordinary, everyday discourse.
Another of Quine’s remarks, "A performative is a notable 
sort of utterance, I grant ; it makes itself true ; but then 
it is true"(Symjnp.90), suggests that he thinks that performa­
tive utterances are sentences verifiable by their use. Lemmon 
argued for such a claim in a paper, "On Sentences Verifiable 
by Their Use"(An.(1962)pp.86-9). which also contains a useful 
elucidation of the notion. According to Lemmon, "A sentence 8 
is verifiable by its use if and only if there are circumstances 
and a manner of delivery such that it is analytic that, for all 
people X, if in those circumstances x delivers S in the given 
manner then what x delivers is true"(p.88). What is peculiar 
to this sort of sentence is that "... in the appropriate circum­
stances, the very delivery of them in the right way ensures 
logically the truth of the propositions they in those circum­
stances express, without, as is ordinarily required of sent­
ences, reference to circumstances beyond the immediate circum­
stances of their delivery"(p.88). The spoken sentences "I am 
speaking" and "I arn thinking" and the v/ritten sentence "I am 
writing" are the examples which Lemmon used in developing his 
account* Each of these sentences is verifiable by its use be­
cause it is analytic that if a person delivers the sentence in
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the appropriate way then he is doing what he is saying or writ­
ing that he is doing, and so it is analytic that if the person 
delivers the sentence in that way then the sentence which he 
delivers is true.
At the beginning of his paper, Lemmon defined a sense of 
"performative verb" in which any verb "v" is a performative 
verb if and only if the sentence "For any proposition p, to say 
in the appropriate circumstances ’I promise that p ’ to pro­
mise that p" remains true v/hen the first occurrence of "promise" 
is replaced by the first person singular simple present tense 
of "v", and the second occurrence of "promise" is replaced by 
"v"(p.86). Lemmon maintained that sentences of the form "I pro­
mise that p" and all sentences of similar form constructed a- 
round such performative verbs are verifiable by their use. "Ex­
actly what the circumstances and manner of delivery in question 
are is hard to specify, but, for example, they do not include 
the cases in which a man is speaking in isolation or talking in 
his sleep. That there must be such circumstances and such a 
manner of delivery follows from the fact that we sometimes suc­
ceed in promising merely by using such sentences. Hence, in 
those circumstances and manner, it is analytic that if x deliv­
ers ’I promise that p ’ then what x delivers is true..."(p.89). 
However, Lemmon’s argument against Austin’s performative-consta­
tive distinction, based on this account of sentences that are 
verifiable by their use, is open to criticism at several points. 
First, it begs the question. Lemmon’s formulation of the defini­
tion of sentences that are verifiable by their use stipulates 
that the sentence, delivered in a certain way, in certain cir­
cumstances, etc., is true. This presupposes what the argument 
against Austin’s distinction purports to prove, viz., that the
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sentence used, or the utterance, is of a kind which can have 
truth-values ascribed to it, Secondly, it follov/s from Lem­
mon’s definition of a performative verb, "v", and hie claim 
that all sentences of the form "I v that p" are verifiable by 
their use, that explicit constative utterances are verifiable 
by their use. This consequence is unacceptable. These criti- . 
cisms may be able to be met fairly easily by reformulating the 
definition in the first instance, and, in the second instance, 
by imposing some restriction whereby the class of explicit 
constative utterances are not verifiable by their use. But meet­
ing these criticisms does not save Lemmon’s argument from an­
other, nor is it easy to see how this third criticism could be 
met.
In extending his account from examples of sentences that 
undoubtedly are verifiable by their use, e.g., "I am speaking", 
"I am writing", etc., to explicit performative utterances, Lem­
mon seems to have failed to notice a difference in the circum­
stances alluded to in the analytic sentences "To write in the 
appropriate circumstances ’I am v/riting’ is to write" and "To 
write in the appropriate circumstances ’I promise that p ’ is 
to promise that p". In the former case, as for sentences veri­
fiable by their use generally, these circumstances are just the 
immediate circumstances of the delivery of the sentence in a 
certain manner. It is precisely, and only, because no circum­
stances other than these need be in order for a person to suc­
ceed in doing what he should be said to be doing, in so deliv­
ering the sentence, that these sentences, when of a kind that 
are true or false, are verifiable by their use. The situation 
is different in the case of performative utterances such as "I 
promise that p". In this case, the immediate circumstances of
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the delivery of the sentence are never sufficient for the suc- 
cessful performance of the act which the person should be said 
to be doing in delivering the sentence. For instance, one cir­
cumstance. ..which is required for a successful act of promising 
is that the speaker can perform the promised act. But this 
state of affairs is no more an immediate circumstance of the 
delivery of the sentence than it would be of the delivery of a 
sentence which is used to state that the speaker can perform a 
certain act. (It should not be thought that just as the obtain­
ing of such a state of affairs satisfies a truth condition of 
such a statement, the obtaining of such a state of affairs sat­
isfies a truth condition of the promise. The relationships of 
such states of affairs to the respective utterances are differ­
ent : in the former case, the state of affairs is stated ; in 
the latter case, it is presupposed.) So sentences used as ex­
plicit performative utterances, even if they were of a kind 
which could have truth-values ascribed to them, are not veri­
fiable by their use. Perhaps this point can be brought out more 
clearly by recasting the two analytic sentences above as "Just 
to write ’I am writing’ is to write" and "Just to v/rite ’I pro­
mise that p ’ is to promise that p". The first is analytic ; 
the second is false.
Promises made in circumstances in which the promisors do 
not intend to carry out their promises are sometimes described 
as false promises. But this point cannot be used to show that 
promises made without this defect are true, and hence, that 
promises are truth-valued. "False" is not always used as an op­
posite of "true", as the descriptions of false beards and false 
teeth show. Here, "false" is used as an opposite of "real", or, 
more specifically, "natural". And in the case of promises,
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"false" is used as an opposite of "sincere" ; a false promise 
is an insincere promise. (A false statement is not necessarily 
an insincere statement.) It would be wrong to suppose that in 
making a sincere promise, a promisor is constating, i.e., de­
scribing, reporting, stating, etc., his intention to perform 
the promised act, and that his having of such an intention 
satisfies a truth condition of his utterance. Describing, re­
porting or stating an intention is not part of the execution 
of the procedure of promising. It is, in any case, difficult 
to see what a description of an intention would be like. One 
can describe an intended act, just as one can describe a pro­
mised act - but that is a different matter. And there are dif­
ferent procedures at a speaker’s disposal for reporting or 
stating intentions. These may be executed explicitly, in say­
ing "I report that I intend to go" or "I state that I intend 
to go", or implicitly in saying just "I intend to go". Between 
each of these and "I promise to go" a considerable gulf is fix­
ed. There is nothing analogous to either of the first two in 
the case of promising ; "I promise that I intend to go" is sol- 
ecistic. "I intend to go" and "I promise to go" are often only 
contrasted on the grounds that the latter makes explicit a 
stronger commitment to perform the respective act. But there is 
a more instructive difference than this one. "I intend to go" 
can be compared with "I hope to go", "I want to go" and "I ex­
pect to go". Utterances of these types are expressions of men­
tal states and are true or false according as their utterers 
have, or are in, the state in question. But whereas these ut­
terances can be characterized as expressions of intention, hope, 
desire, and expectation, respectively, "I promise to go" cannot 
be characterized as an expression of promising. A promise is
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not a mental state, so "I promise to go" is not true or false, 
as "I intend to go" is, by virtue of it being a report, state- 
ment, etc. of such a state.
In "Some Types of Performative Utterance"(Essays pp.69-89) 
Warnock takes both the points that performative utterances are 
not verifiable by their use, and that an utterance such as "I 
promise to go" is not truth-valued by virtue of its use on oc­
casion to make a false promise, but maintains, nevertheless, 
that explicit performative utterances are truth-valued, "...one 
can well hold, I think, that one can say ^truly or / falsely 
that one promises (and likewise mutatis mutandis for other ex­
plicit performatives). For promising is, as we earlier plati- 
tudinously remarked, not just saying: that one does so, just pro­
ducing that dictum. For it to be the case that one promises, 
there must (very roughly) be some envisaged commitment, asked 
for by, or offered to, some second party, which in one’s utter­
ance one formally undertakes. If I say here and now ’I promise’, 
out of the blue, I have not - other necessary circumstances be­
ing absent in this case - therein promised ; so that in such a 
case, maybe, I say that I promise, but falsely - I do not. (Of 
course I don’t make a false promise - that’s a different matter.)" 
(pp.84-5). Warnock does not specify the truth conditions for a 
promisor’s utterance "I promise" ; the closest he comes to doing 
so is to say that "...the truth-value of what he says is involv­
ed (let us say vaguely) in a decidedly unusual way with the fact 
that he says it"(p.85). But from other remarks, it is reasonably 
clear what Warnock takes such conditions to be. For example, "On 
any view, I do not promise in saying ’I promise’ if the circum­
stances in which I speak are wrong for the purpose ; so that, on 
my view, it seems it can be quite well held that, in unhappy
J
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circumstances, one may say that one promises falsely, when 
actually one does not"(p.85). On Warnock’s view then, "I pro­
mise" is true if and only if I promise, i.e., if and only if 
all the circumstances of the speech act situation in which "I 
promise" is uttered are such that the speaker’s attempted act 
of promising is successful. Warnock thus regards the felicity 
conditions for the successful performance of an illocutionary 
act as the truth conditions df thé utterance in the issuing 
of which that act is attempted. But this is confused. If the 
felicity conditions for the successful performance of an illo­
cutionary act are satisfied, then it is a fact that the speak­
er has performed that act* But it is not such facts as these 
that determine the truth-values of constative utterances. A 
sentence used to make a statement, if true, is not true "be­
cause the speaker succeeds in making a statement in uttering 
the sentence. Warnock would probably admit this, but claim 
that in the case of explicit performative utterances, it just 
is such facts as these which determine the truth-value of what 
the speaker utters, albeit in a decidedly unusual way. But it 
is even more unusual to say that these utterances do have 
truth-values. So much is apparent in Warnock’s own example of 
a speaker saying "I promise" out of the blue. In this case, 
other necessary circumstances being absent, the speaker does 
not promise, and so, according to Warnock, what the speaker 
says is false. But "That’s false" or "That’s not true" would 
be an odd retort to make to someone who did say, just out of 
the blue, "I promise". A more natural reaction would be one of 
puzzlement at what the speaker could have meant, whether he ac­
tually intended to say that he promises, and if so, why and 
what he was promising. Nor would these retorts be in order in |
less infelicitous circumstances in which it was clear that the 
speaker intended to promise, and it was clear what he was pro­
mising, hut for some reason, his promise was defective - for 
instance, because others knew, but the promisor did not, that 
the promise could not be carried out. Here, rather than saying, 
"That’s false" or "That’s not true" to the promisor, it would 
be more natural to say something like "You can’t promise that 
because you can’t do that". And in circumstances in which a 
fully felicitous promise had just been given, it would, at best, 
be something of a mild witticism to rejoin, "That’s truel You 
do" or "That’s true! You just have".
The argument in defence of Austin’s distinction, from the 
inappropriateness of assessments of explicit performative utter­
ances as true or false, has been criticized by Heal (P.Q.(1974) 
pp.115-6). But Heal’s attempt to dismantle this argument is un­
successful. She compares the remark "Very true - you order me 
to leave the room", made in response to the order "I order you 
to leave the room", with the remark "You have just uttered four­
teen words", made in response to the plea "For God’s sake help 
me - a homicidal maniac is chasing me y/ith a gun". Heal argues 
that the bizarre nature of these remarks can be explained by 
facts about conversational implication, and that the deliberate 
irrelevance of a remark is no proof that the remark is false or 
embodies a category mistake. There may well be deliberately ir­
relevant remarks made which both are, true and embody no cate­
gory mistakes. Heal’s second example provides a case in point. 
But what Heal needs to show in order to rebut the argument in 
favour of Austin’s distinction, and what she fails to shov/, is 
that it is ever relevant or appropriate to assess an explicit 
performative utterance such as "I order you to leave the room"
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as true or false. However, it seems that Heal has withdrawn 
from the position which she maintained in "Explicit Performa­
tive Utterances and Statements". For in a more recent article, 
"Insincerity and Commands"(P.A,8.(1977)pp*183-201), Heal takes 
lying, i.e., asserting that so-and-so when one does not be­
lieve that so-and-so, to be paradigmatic of insincerity, but 
argues that there is no strict analogue of this form of insin­
cerity in commanding. This position is inconsistent with her
earlier position that all explicit performative utterances, in-
2eluding commands and orders, are statements.
Strawson stands out among those who have argued against 
Austin’s performative-constative distinction as one who holds 
that the distinction between truth-valued and n on-1 ru tti - va lue d 
utterances should be drawn, and criticizes Austin for not main­
taining such a distinction. These criticisms are made in the 
final section of his paper "Austin and ’Locutionary Meaning'" 
(Essays pp.46-68). In the two preceding sections of that paper 
Strawson seeks to locate some notion of a proposition within 
Austin’s conception of speech acts in order to provide an in­
terpretation of Austin’s notion of locutionary meaning ; the 
need for which is regarded by Sti*awson as symptomatic of an am­
bivalence in Austin’s attitude tov/ards any conception of a pri­
mary and fundamental bearer of truth-value. Strawson’s criti­
cisms of Austin’s views on truth in Words are designed to show 
that reasons which Strawson thinJcs Austin had for reserve, and 
even scepticism, about a conception of a primary and fundamen­
tal bearer of truth-value are not good reasons.
The first of these criticisms rests on a change in Austin’s 
views between the 1950 paper "Truth"(Papers pp.117-33) and Words.
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In the former, Austin vms content to regard "statement" as the 
"...generic name for that which at "bottom we are always saying 
’is true’"(p.118). In the latter, a statement is held to "... 
have no unique position over the matter of being related to 
facts in a unique way called being true or false..." (Wqrdn p* 
14-9). Thus far, and in these respects, Strawson is in accord 
with Austin. In his reply to Austin in 1950, Strawson disclaim­
ed any objection to Austin’s use of "statement" in the way pro­
posed (p.A.8.8.(I950)p.189). And in the paper under discussion, 
Strawson agrees with Austin that there are many cases in which 
what is uttered has truth-value, but to which the noun "state­
ment" cannot be naturally applied.(Essays pp.62-3). Strawson 
goes on from this point to argue in support of his use of "the 
artificial term ’proposition’"(p.63) to stand for what primari­
ly and fundamentally is either trhe or false, this term having, 
or being given, the desired general coverage of cases, in which 
what is uttered has truth-value, that any term in common usage, 
e.g., "assertion", "statement", etc., seems to lack. But at the 
same time, Strawson construes Austin’s reservations about state* 
ments being the primary and fundamental bearers of truth-value 
as reservations about whether there are any such bearers of 
truth-value at all. And this, surely, is a mistake. Throughout 
the William James Lectures, and in his two subsequent published 
lectures on speech acts, Austin never abandoned the view that 
what are true or false are constative utterances : the bearers 
of truth-value are token utterances, issued in particular 
speech act situations as accusations, assertions, claims, con­
clusions, descriptions, estimates, forecasts, objections, pre­
dictions, reports, statements, etc. And it was precisely as a 
general term to cover this range of utterances having truth-
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value that Austin introduced the term "constative". Between 
1950 and 1955 there was a change in Austin’s views on the 
hearers of truth-value ; hut it was a change to a more catho­
lic position, not a sceptical one*
Another way in which Austin’s more catholic views on 
truth are shown is the target for Strawson’s second.criticism. 
Against the view that the question "Is it true or false?", 
asked about any constative utterance, admitted of a simple 
answer, "True" or "False", Austin maintained that it allows 
for, and, indeed, often requires a more or less qualified an­
swer. This kind of qualification in the assessment of the truth- 
values of constative utterances can be seen in the various 
terms of appraisal used in making such assessments, e.g., a 
rough description, an exaggerated claim, an approximate estimate, 
a fair statement. Each of these indicates that in some way the 
utterance is not completely true, nor yet completely false. The 
expressions "not absolutely", "not exactly", "not strictly",
"not altogether", "only roughly", "only more or less", when 
held ready to qualify the adjective "true", have the same use. 
Austin’s point here is consistent with his view that .the bearers 
of truth-values are token utterances. Being issued in particular 
situations and normally being directed towards specific audi­
ences, utterances have a greater or less degree of detail, pre­
cision and conciseness which reflects the intentions and pur­
poses of the speakers in the situations in which they are issued. 
Thus of two utterances of the same type issued in different 
situations, while one may be quite adequate in the circumstances 
and be judged true without qualification, the other may not be 
adequate, and may only be able to be assessed as true in some 
qualified way. In the former case, however, it is only in the
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light of full knowledge of the situation that an unqualified 
assessment can he made ; without such knowledge, the need for 
qualification on an assessment of the constative utterance’s 
truth-value arises here too. In Austin’s words, "...’true’ and 
’false’, like ’free’ and ’unfree’, do not stand for anything 
simple at all ; hut only for a general ! dimension of being a - 
right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in 
these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and 
with these intentions"(Words p.145). They are "...not names 
for relations, qualities, or what not, but for a dimension of 
assessment - how the words stand in respect of satisfactoriness 
to the facts, events, situations, etc., to which they refer"
(p.148). I
Eow, again, Strawson agrees with most of what Austin had 1
to say on this point. For instance, he allows that constative jj
utterances "...may be adequate for some purposes and not for iÎothers, suitable to some contexts and not to others"(Essays p. 1
63) ; and he allows that assessments of truth-values "...are 
liable to qualifications of degree, of more or less"(p.66). But 
Strawson takes this point to be a.denial by Austin that the 
words "true" or "false" can ever be used in giving a qualified 
assessment of the truth-value of an utterance. He claims that 
Austin’s "...tolerance wavers when the words ’true' and ’false’ 
come into play"(p.64) and puts the rhetorical question ; "Is it 
Austin’s point that the words ’true’ and ’false’ are never in 
place in such cases?"(p.64). But again, this is a mistake. To­
wards the end of his lecture "Performative-Gonstative"(P,L.pp. 
13-28), Austin addressed himself to the same point with refer­
ence to the same examples of constative utterances which he had 
used in Words ; "France is hexagonal", "Lord Raglan won the
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battle of Alma", together with the additional, one, "Oxford is 
sixty miles from London". Discussing each in turn, starting 
with "Prance is hexagonal" Austin said, "What are we to say, 
is it true or not? The question, plainly, oversimplifies things. 
Oh well, up to a point if you like, I see what you mean, true 
perhaps for some purposes in some contexts, that would do for 
the man in the street but not for geographers. And so on. It’s 
a rough statement, no denying that, but one can't just say 
straight out that it's false. Then Alma, a soldier's battle if 
ever there was one ; it's true that Lord Raglan was in command 
of the allied army, and that this army to some extent won a 
confused sort of victory ; yes, that would be a fair judgement, 
even well deserved, for schoolchildren anyway, though really 
it's a bit of an exaggeration. And Oxford, well yes, it's true 
that that city is 60 miles from London, so long as you want 
only a certain degree of precision"(p.21). Austin's use of "true" 
and "false" in the assessments of the truth-values of these ex­
amples of constative utterances makes it clear that Strawson 
has misconstrued Austin's point. Strawson says, "Austin success­
fully makes us aware of the hesitation we feel when confronted 
with the hold-up question 'Is it true or false that France is 
hexagonal?' But it is not so much the presence of the words 
'true* and 'false* as the absence of qualification or context 
that accounts for the hesitation"(Essays p.64). But in saying 
this, Strawson does not make a point against Austin ; he simply 
restates Austin's point. Austin's terminology of "a dimension 
of assessment" in talking of utterances' truth valuation is 
useful for registering the point that such assessments are open 
to qualifications of degree. But it is a misunderstanding on 
Strawson's part of Austin's handling of this terminology that
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lies at the bottom of his third, criticism.
There are numerous different points of view from which an 
utterance can be assessed as being in some way more or less 
right or wrong, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, in the situa­
tion in which it is issued. The criticism of a remark that it 
is ambiguous is different in kind from the criticism that it is 
impolite, and each is different In kind from the criticism that 
the remark is irrelevant. A criticism of the first kind alludes 
to the meaning of what was said, the second to the conventions 
of social etiquette adopted by the speaker, and the third to 
the point or bearing of the remark in the context in which it is 
made. A fourth kind of criticism or assessment of utterances, 
and one with which Austin was much concerned, is that which can 
be made in terms of an utterance’s "happiness", according as the 
Felicity conditions for the performance of the illocutionary act 
attempted or performed in issuing the utterance are satisfied or 
not. And alongside these several general dimensions of assess­
ment there is the one, for constative utterances, in terms of 
which the truth-value of the utterance can be assessed. Now it 
is clear that in the William James Lectures Austin was still 
wishing to maintain some Version of a correspondence theory of 
truth : "...the question arises, was what I stated true or 
false? And this v/e feel, speaking in popular terms, is now the 
question of whether the statement ’corresponds with the facts’. 
With this I agree; attempts to say that the use of the express­
ion ’is true’ is equivalent to endorsing or the like are no 
good. So we have here a new dimension of criticism of the ac­
complished statement"(Words p.140); and one, it may be added, 
that is made on the basis of the degree to which the utterance 
corresponds to a fact. But it was one of Austin’s points in
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this connexion, the one which attracts Strawson's third criti­
cism, that while the dimension in which an utterance is assess­
ed as just or more or less true or false lies within a range 
of dimensions in which utterances can be assessed on this basis 
- "how the words stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the 
facts, events, situations, etc., to which they refer" - it does 
not exhaust it. The specific dimension in which utterances are 
assessed for truth-value is only one among a number of differ­
ent dimensions in which utterances. Including performative ut­
terances of some types, are assessed on the basis of their cor­
respondence to facts. If in the first two points on v/hich 
Strawson takes issue with Austin there are moves by Austin to­
wards a more catholic view of truth, there can be seen in this 
last point a move by Austin to refine upon the catholicity of 
the notion of an utterance’s correspondence to fact in order 
to underpin a viable theory of truth.
The types of utterance and types of assessment of utter­
ances which Austin had in mind here are indicated in the fol­
lowing questions ; "Can we be sure that stating truly is a dif­
ferent class of assessment from arguing soundly, advising well, 
judging fairly, and blaming justifiably? Do these not have 
something to do in complicated ways with facts?"(p.142). The 
parallels between these types of utterance assessment have been 
discussed already (see pp.48-9 above). There is, however, a 
broad distinction to be drawn between this group of types of 
utterance assessment and another group of types of assessment 
which involve a relationship of correspondence between utter­
ance and fact. There is some overlap among the types of utter­
ance with respect to which the types of assessment belonging to 
each group are applicable, but characteristically, the types of
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assessment belonging to this second group are made with re-
spect to orders and commands in terms of their being obeyed 
or disobeyed, with respect to demands in terms of their being 
met or not met, with respect to pleas in terms of their being 
granted or not, and with respect to instructions, directions, 
and pieces of advice in terras of their being followed or not. 
These assessments are subject to qualifications of degree as 
well. Now, if the conditions to be satisfied for positive as­
sessment in any of these dimensions are regarded as the compli­
ance conditions of the respective utterance, the generic diff­
erence between the types of assessment belonging to each group 
can be seen in the different relationships of correspondence 
between utterance and fact which obtain when, say, the truth 
conditions of constative utterances are satisfied, and when 
the compliance conditions of utterances are satisfied. The dif­
ference ia in the direction of correspondence between utterance 
and fact. In the former case, the satisfaction of the truth 
conditions of an utterance is a matter of the utterance’s cor­
respondence to a fact ; in the latter case, the satisfaction of 
compliance conditions is a matter of a fact’s correspondence to 
an utterance. It follows that assessments made on the basis of 
compliance conditions are not assessments of utterances. Unlike 
the assessments of constative utterances as being just or more 
or less true or false, the more or less qualified assessments 
made in the specific dimensions of compliance conditions of ut­
terances are assessments of the responses of the addressees of 
the utterances to those utterances. A failure of correspondence 
between utterance and fact in one of these dimensions is a 
basis for imputing a fault to the performance of the agent re­
sponding to the utterance, not to the utterance itself. As An-
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8combe has remarked in this connexion, "In some cases the 
facts are, so to speak, impugned for not being in accordance 
with the words, rather than vice versa"(Intention §2). In the 
case of a request, for instance, it is not, without further 
explanation, a basis for assessment of the utterance that a 
person, in attempting to comply with the request to turn up 
the sound volume of a TV broadcast, exerts too much pressure 
on the sound control knob and turns the set off. Similarly, it 
is not a basis for an assessment of the order to turn left, 
that the addressee mistakes his right hand for his left and 
turns right, thereby failing to obey the order. The difference 
between the types of assessment belonging to each group can be 
illustrated most clearly with reference to pieces of advice. 
These are utterances to which types of assessment belonging to 
each group are applicable. But an assessment of the extent to 
which advice is good or bad, and an assessment of the extent 
to which advice is followed or not followed, are quite inde­
pendent of each other.
Orders, commands and requests are unlike pieces of advice 
in 80 far as utterances of these types are not assessed on the 
basis of their correspondence to facts. However, utterances of 
these types are subject to some assessment on the basis of 
their relationships to some of the facts bearing on the speech 
act situation. For example, when a request or order is issued, 
one of the facts bearing on the situation is that of the capac­
ity (or lack of it) of the addressee to comply with the request 
or order. On the basis of the relationship between the utter­
ance and this fact, the utterance can be assessed in terms of 
being more or less reasonable or unreasonable. Again, the stra­
tegic facts of the situation in which a speaker is acting bear
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on any command or order he issues, and on this basis, rhe ut­
terance can be assessed in terms of being more or less sound 
or unsound, according as compliance with the utterance is like­
ly to bring about the speaker’s strategic objective. But it is 
clear that the relationships between utterance and fact requir­
ed to hold for a positive assessment of the utterance in either 
of these dimensions is not one of correspondence of utterance 
to fact. An answer to the question of whether the state of af­
fairs characterized by the utterance actually obtains, either 
at the time of the issuance of the utterance or at some future 
time, does not determine the assessment of these utterances in 
either of these dimensions.
In the course of his third criticism of Austin, Strawson 
makes a. point which distinguishes, in a different way, the type 
of assessment made of constative utterances in terms of their 
truth-value from those made of performative utterances such as 
orders, commands and requests in terms of their reasonableness 
or soundness. In the former case, according to Strawson, a 
specification of the locutionary meaning of the utterance is 
also a specification of the conditions to be satisfied for a 
positive assessment of the utterance, i.e., as being more or 
less true. In the latter case, to specify the locutionary mean­
ing of the utterance is not to specify conditions for a positive 
assessment of the utterance in either of the respective dimen­
sions. A specification of the locutionary meaning - the content 
of the "thaf’-clause in an indirect speech report of the utters 
ance - of the order that B company is to attack and destroy the 
bridge south of the city before davm, is not a specification of 
the conditions to be satisfied for a positive assessment of the 
reasonableness or soundness of the order ; it is simply a speci-
345
flcation of who, according to the utterance, hs to do what, 
when and where. Doubts may be felt about the the first part 
of Strawson's point, about whether a specification of the lo­
cutionary meaning of a constative utterance is a specification 
of the sufficient conditions for its truth, but this point 
will be recurred to,
Strawson’s third criticism is that Austin proposed assimi­
lating the types of assessment made of requests as more or less 
reasonable or unreasonable, of orders as more or less sound or 
unsound, and of advice as more or less good or bad - what 
Strawson calls the warrantability-valuation of such utterances 
- to the type of assessment which is made of the truth-values 
of constative utterances. "What Austin proposes is that we re­
gard v/arrantability-valuation and truth-valuation as belonging 
to a single dimension of assessment - for which he appropriates 
the name, ’the truth-and-falsity dimension'"(Essays p.67).
"When he says that 'true' and 'false' are the names of a gen­
eral dimension of assessment, he means to include both the 
above kinds of assessment in this general dimension. He wants 
us to join him in refusing to draw any sharp line between say­
ing that an announcement, accusation, or surmise was true, and 
saying that a request, a piece of advice, or a command was war­
ranted or justified by the facts of the case"(p.66). This criti­
cism misrepresents Austin's position in two ways.
First, Austin did not use examples of utterances such as 
orders, commands and requests to make his point that some types 
of non-constative, performative utterances are subject to cer­
tain types of assessment on the same basis - that of their cor­
respondence to facts - as constative utterances are assessed on, 
in terms of truth and falsity. Austin’s examples, quoted earlier.
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Yfere of pieces of advice being assessed as good or bad, judg­
ments as fair or unfair, blame as merited or unmerited. So it
is misleading for Strawson to hold out the examples of orders, 
commands and requests as if they had been used by Austin to 
illustrate this point. And as the foregoing discussion has 
shown, the assessments of utterances of these types in terms 
of their reasonableness or soundness are not made on the basis 
of their correspondence to facts. Ironically, there is in this 
criticism just that sort of confusion of which Strawson wrong­
ly accuses Austin in Strawson's own assimilation of these types 
of assessment of orders, commands and requests, and the assess­
ment of advice as being good or bad, under the general title of 
an utterance’s "v/arrantability-valuation". Moreover, the closer 
affinity of this type of assessment of advice with the truth- 
valuation of constative utterances is one to which attention . 
may be drawn by Strawson's own point about a specification of 
the locutionary meaning of an utterance being a specification 
of the conditions to be satisfied for a positive assessment of 
the utterance in the respective dimension. To the extent that a 
specification of the locutionary meaning of the statement that 
he did it is a specification of the truth conditions of the 
statement, the specification of the locutionary meaning of the 
piece of advice that she should not do it is a specification of 
the conditions to be satisfied for that advice to be good advice* 
Strawson’s criticism misrepresents Austin’s position too 
because it implies that Austin misappropriated the words "true" 
and "false" as terms for both of what Strawson calls utterances’ 
truth-valuation and warrantability-valuation. Strawson does not 
offer any textual support for this point ; and, indeed, there is 
none to offer. But even if the notion of warrantability-valua-
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tion is discarded for being confused, and un-Austinian, and 
Strawson's claim is limited to the claim that Austin appro­
priated "true" and "false" to do general duty for the assess-
rnents made of utterances on the basis of their correspondence 
to facts - a point at which Strawson’s criticism might con­
ceivably get some grip - this revised claim must also be re­
jected as false. Turning again to Austin's remarks at the end 
of "Performative-Gonstative" : "If we are content to restrict 
ourselves to statements of an idiotic or ideal simplicity, we 
shall never succeed in disentangling the true from the just, 
fair, deserved.... etc.... " (P.L.p.22). The desire which so 
clearly lies behind this remark, to disentangle these terms of 
assessment is quite contrary to the point of the revised claim 
put forward on Strawson’s behalf, and even further removed 
from the proposed assimilation that Strawson himself alleges.
As well as being mistaken in various ways, Strawson’s 
criticisms of Austin’s views on the truth and falsity of con­
stative utterances are peculiarly obfuscating. Being made in 
defence of his imposition of the notion of a proposition upon 
Austin’s conception of speech acts, Strawson’s criticisms ob­
scure the main point of Austin’s discussion of truth in Words. 
This point is important, not only because truth is important, 
as Austin remarked elsewhere, but also because it suggests 
that a developed conception of speech acts may yield some in­
sights into certain features of the general problem of truth. 
With the emphasis in the discussion of Austin’s views on truth 
falling heavily on the 1950 debate with Strawson, and its se­
quels, this point, along with other changes and developments 
in Austin’s views after 1954, has been rather neglected. In
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Austin’s words the point is that "the truth or falsity of a
statement depends not merely on the meanings of the words hut 
on what act you were performing in what circumstances" (Words 
p.145). Perhaps it can he made even more clear if it is re­
phrased slightly : the truth or falsity of an utterance de­
pends not only on the locutionary meaning of the utterance, 
but also on the type of illocutionary act performed in the 
circumstances in which the utterance is issued. The point can 
be illustrated by cases of illocutionary acts of different 
types being performed in different tokens - or even the same 
token - of a type of locutionary act. In saying that he will 
do it, a speaker may be performing an illocutionary act of at 
least one of the four following types : stating an intention 
he has to do something, prophesying that he will do it, bet­
ting that he will do it, and threatening to do it. It is only 
in the first two of these cases, however, in which the utter­
ance is issued as a statement or a prophecy, that it is a 
truth-valued, constative utterance. In neither of the latter 
two cases is the utterance a constative utterance for neither 
bets nor threats are assessed in terms of truth and falsity. 
Moreover, between the first two cases, there is a difference 
in the truth conditions of the utterance which is also depend­
ent on the type of illocutionary act performed in issuing the 
utterance. A true statement of intention is true because of 
some state of affairs obtaining prior to or contemporaneously 
with the making of the statement - in this case, the fact that 
the speaker has the stated intention. A true prophecy, on the 
other hand, is true.because of some state of affairs obtaining 
subsequently to the making of the prophecy - in this case, the 
fact that the speaker performs the prophesied act. So not only
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is the constative status of an utterance dependent on the 
type of illocutionary act performed in issuing It, hut dif­
ferent types of truth conditons of constative utterances of 
different, types are similarly dependent. (This example,, in 
which identical locutionary acts may be performed, producing 
utterances with identical locutionary meanings but with dif­
ferent truth conditions, provides grounds for the doubt about 
Strawson’s point that a specification of the locutionary mean­
ing of a (constative) utterance is also a specification of the 
truth conditions of the utterance.) With this point, Austin 
seems to have been suggesting the need for a two-level theory 
of truth, operating on one level - the locutionary level - to 
explain how a meaningful utterance characterizes a possible 
state of affairs by virtue of its constituent words and phrases 
being used with more or less definite sense and reference, and 
on a different level - the illocutionary level - to explain how 
the particular type of constative-determining illocutionary act 
performed in issuing the utterance determines its truth condi­
tions.
A desirable preliminary to an explanation of the second 
sort would seem to be the identification of a feature common to 
constative-determining illocutionary act types which is not 
shared by other illocutionary act types. Such a feature appears
to be the presupposition of the conventional procedures consti- Ïtutive of some types of illocutionary act concerjiing the speak- ii
er’s belief about the actuality of the state of affairs charac- j
terized by the utterance in the issuing of which the illocu- |Itionary act is performed. This presupposition is selective with I 
respect to constative-determining illocutionary act types. For 
instance, it is a necessary condition on the circumstances in
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which felicitous acts of stating and prophesying are performed 
that the speaker believes, respectively, that what is stated
or prophesied is or will be an actual state of affairs, that 
it is or will be the case. But it is not a necessary condition 
for a felicitous act of betting, though, of course, it may be 
the case on the occasion of such an act, that the speaker be­
lieves that what he bets on will be the case. A person may, 
rationally and felicitously, bet on something happening which 
he does not necessarily believe will happen, just because the 
odds offered are so favourable. And it is not a necessary con­
dition for a felicitous act of threatening, though, again, it 
may be case on the occasion of such an act, that the speaker 
believes that he will perform the act characterized by the ut­
terance in the issuing of which the threat is made. The psycho­
logical state involved here is one of intention, not belief. It 
is a presupposition of the procedure of threatening that the 
speaker Intends to perform the threatened act (if and only if, 
of course, the addressee is not dissuaded by the threat) but it 
is not a presupposition of that procedure that the speaker be­
lieves that he will perform the threatened act (if and only if 
the addressee is not dissuaded). Nor is the holding of such a 
belief required by the having of such an intention. "A intends 
to v" does not entail "A believes that he will v". A may in­
tend to V without believing that he will v because he may not 
believe that it is possible for him to v. (Thus a person under 
torture may intend to hold out to the end against his torment­
ors, without believing that he will hold out to the end, be­
cause he may not believe that he will be able to.) There is no 
incoherence in such thoughts. It would be incoherent if A be­
lieves that he will v when he does not believe that it is pos-
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sible for him to v. And it may be Incoherent if A intends to 
V when he believes that it is impossible for him to v, but if 
this is so, it just shows that there is a difference between
"A does not believe that it is possible for him to v" and "A
believes that it is impossible for him to v".
Similar considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, in the 
case of promising. It is a presupposition of that procedure 
that the speaker intends to perform the future act character­
ized by the utterance in the issuing of which the procedure is
executed. But it is not a presupposition of that procedure that 
the speaker believes that he will perform that act ; merely, 
that he believes that his performance of that act is possible. 
Court verdicts, ascriptions of blame, and pieces of advice are 
non-constative, performative utterances, even though such ut­
terances are assessable in certain dimensions on the basis of 
their correspondence to facts. But it is not a presupposition 
of any of the procedures constitutive of the respective illo­
cutionary forces of these utterances that the speaker believes 
that the past, present or future possible state of affairs'., 
characterized by his utterances was, is or will be an actual 
state of affairs. For instance, it is not a necessary condi­
tion for a felicitous act of advising that the speaker believes 
that his advice will be followed, and hence, that the future 
act characterized by his utterance will be performed. A speak­
er may advise sincerely while despairing of his advice being 
followed. What is a necessary condition for a felicitous act 
of advising is the speaker’s belief that the performance of the 
advised act is in the best interests of the addressee. And it 
is by virtue of this belief being a presupposition of the pro­
cedure that utterances issued in the execution of the procedure
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are assessable as good or bad pieces of advice- In Words, warn­
ings hovered uneasily on the borderline between performative 
and constative utterances (see Words pp.56,145). A consequence 
of the view that the presupposition of the speaker’s belief in 
the actuality of the state of affairs characterized by his ut­
terance is selective with respect to the procedures constitu­
tive of constative-determining illocutionary acts is that warn­
ings are constative utterances. One possible merit of this view 
is that it provides part of the basis for a theoretical, as op­
posed to an Intuitive, justification of Austin’s perforraative- 
constative distinction between utterances which are truth-valued 
and those which are not.
Foot-notes ;
1 (from p.328) In "Performatives and Sentences Verifiable by 
their Use" (Syn.these(l967)pp. ), O’Hair has shown some of
the difficulties confronting the attempt to extend the class 
of sentences verifiable by their use beyond the class of sent­
ences used to make immediate autobiographical reports such as 
"I am talking", "I am writing"j etc. These difficulties sug­
gest that the class of sentences verifiable by their use may 
be relatively small, and, being restricted to such cases, that 
they are ultimately of no great interest. The difficulties 
confronting the attempt to extend the account of such sentences 
to explicit performative utterances have just been ignored by 
Aqvist in Performatives and Verifiability by the Use of Lan­
guage. Aqvist claims "...that Austin managed effectively to 
deadlock the discussion of the nature of performativeness for 
years by the unhappy requirement that performative sentences 
and utterances be essentially truthvalueless"(p.2) Aqvist ful- 
somely praises a paper by Hedenius which "...defines and de­
fends the position of the pro-truthvalue camp very clearly 
and cleverly, and, in our opinion, remains the most remarkable 
contribution to the solution of our key problem that exists up 
to this date"(p-2). But Aqvist makes no mention of, and pro-
ceeds regardless of, the objections to Hedenius’ position in 
that paper "Performatives"(Th6oria(1965)pp.115-56), which have 
been made by Hartnack in "The Performatory Use of Sentences”
(The o ri a(19 6 5)pp.137-46).
2, (from p.,333) Austin’s performative-conetative distinction, 
and in particular, his claim that performative utterances 
are not truth-valued, has been criticized by others, e.g., 
Davidson in "On Saying That"(Words and Objections pp.158- 
74), Lewis in "General Semantics"(S.N.L.ppl69-218) and Wig­
gins in "On sentenee-sense, word-sense and difference of 
word-sense"(Semantics pp.14-34). Where arguments are to be 
discerned in these criticisms, there are no points advanced 
against Austin’s distinction which are not advanced in either 
Lemmon’s or Warnock’s argument.
"...what has the fly missed, that has never got into 
the bottle and therefore never looked for or found 
the way out of it?"
- Ryle in Plato’s Progress with allusions to 
Wittgenstein
"My dear Kepler, what should we make of this? 
Should we laugh, or should we cry?"
- attributed to Galileo
Bibliography
Anscombe G.E.M.: "On Brute Facts"(An.(1958)pp.69-72)
 : Intention (Second Edition, 1963)
Aqvist L. ; Performatives and Verifiability by the Use
of Language (1972)
Austin J.L. ; "Truth"(P.A.S.S.(I950)pp.111-28)(Papers pp.117-35)
  : "Pretending"(P.A.S.B.(I958)pp.261-78)(Papers pp.
253-71)
   : "Performative Utterances"(Papers pp.255-52)
    : Sense and Sensibilia (Warnock O.J.(ed.), 1962)
   : How to Do Things with Words
(First Edition, Urmson J.O.(ed.), 1962) /^1975)
(Second Edition, Urmson J.O, & Sbisa M.(eds.),
  : "Performative-Constative"(Warnock G.J.(trans.),
Philosophy and Ordinary Language. Caton G.E.(ed.), 
1963, pp.82-54)(P.L.pp.15-22)
   : "Three Ways of Spilling Ink" (Forguson L.W. (ed. ),
P.R.(1966)pp.487-40)(Papers pp.272-87)
Bird G.H. : "Intentions and Conventions"(Logique et Analyse
(I974)pp.495-507)
  : "Do We Need A New Start In Speech Act Theory?"
(unpublished)
Boer:.S..,E.
Black M.
Bromberger S.
Brown R.
Gerf W.
"Speech Acts and Constitutive Rules"(j.P.(1974) 
pp.169-74)
"Notes on the Meaning of 'Rule’"(Theoria(1958) 
pp.107-26,139-74)
"Austin on Performatives"(Philosophy(1965)pp. 
217-26)(Symp. pp.401-11)
"IVhat are Effects?"(Analytical Philosophy. 
Butler R.J.(ed.), 1962, pp.15-20)
Review of Words (A.J.P.(1965)pp.417-24)
Review of Words (Mind(l966)pp.262-85)(Symp. pp. 
351-79)
Chisholm R. Review of Papers (Mind(1964)pp.1-26)(Symp. 101-26)
664
Cohen L.J,
Davidson D.
Dray W. H.
Pingarette H. 
Porguson L.W.
Purberg M.
Gardiner A.H. 
Garner R.T.
Griffiths L.
Hare R.M.
Hartnack J.
Heal J.
Heath P.
"Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?"(P.Q.(1964) 
pp.118-57)(Symp. pp.420-44)
Review of Linguistics in Philosophy (Founda­
tions of Language(l97l)pp.125-30)
"Speech Acts"(C.T.L.. Sebeok T,(ed.), 1974, 
pp.173-208)
"On Saying That"(Words and Objections, David­
son D. & Hintikka J. (eds» ) j -1969,. pp. 158-74)
"Must Effects Have Causes?"(Analytical Philo­
sophy, Butler R.J.(ed.), 1962, pp.20-5)
"Performatives"(A.P.Q. (I967)pp.39-48)
"In Pursuit of Performatives"(Philosophy(1966) 
pp.541-7)(Symp. pp.412-9)
"Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts"(Essays 
pp.160-35)
Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts,(1963) 
Saying and Meaning (1969)
The Theory of Speech and Language (1932)
"Utterances and Acts in the Philosophy of 
J.L. Austin"(Nous(1968)pp.209-27)
"The Logic of Austin’s Locutionary Subdivision" 
(Theoria(1969)pp.204-14)
"Austin’s Distinction between Locutionary and 
Illocutionary Acts"(Practical Inferences. 197 , 
pp.100-14)
"The Performatory Use of Sentences"(Theoria
(I963)pp.137-46)
"Explicit Performative Utterances and State­
ments" (P.Q.(I974)pp.106-21)
"Insincerity and Commands"(P.A.S.(1977)pp. 
183-201)
"Trying and Attempting"(P.A.8.S.(1961)pp. 195- 
208)
Hedenius I, "Performatives"(Theoria(1963)pp.115-36)
356
Holdcroft D. : "Doubts About the Locutionary Illocutionary
Distinction"(I.S.P.(1974)pp.5-16)
___________  : "Performatives and Statement"(Mind(l974)pp*1-18)
Keenan M.G.
Lemmon E. J.
Lewis D.K. 
Markby.W. 
Nordenstam T.
O’Hair 8.G. :
O’Shaugnessy B. :
Quine W. V. 0. :
Ransdell J. :
Robinson J. :
Rosenberg J.P. 
& Travis C.
Ross A.
"Indicatives, Performatives and Deep Struc­
ture" (unpublished)
"Robinson’.8 Individuation of Speech Acts"
(P.Q.(I976)pp.861-6)
"Reply to Robinson"(p.Q.(I977)pp.164-5)
"On Sentences Verifiable by Their Use"(An.(1968) 
pp.86-9)
"General Semantics"(S.N.L. pp.169-218)
Elements of Law (1871)
"On Austin’s Theory of Speech Acts"(Mind(l966) 
pp.141-3)
"Performatives and Sentences Verifiable by 
Their Use"(Synthese(1967)pp.299-505)
"Trying (as the Mental ’Pineal Gland’)"(J.P. 
(I973)pp.565-86)
Contribution to "A Symposium on Austin’s 
Method"(Symp. pp.86-90)
"Constitutive Rules and Speech-act Analysis" 
(J.P.(I971)pp.586-400)
"The Individuation of Speech Acts"(P.Q.(1974) 
pp.316-36)
"Syntax, Context and Meaning : A Reply to 
Keenan"(P.Q.(I977)pp.162-4)
Ryle G.
): Readings in the Philosophy of Language (1971)
"The Rise and Pall of the Doctrine of Performa­
tives" (Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia. 
Olsen R.E. & Paul A.M.(eds.), 1972, pp.197-212)
The Concept of Mind (1949)
"The Theory of Meaning"(British Philosophy in 
Mid-Century, Mace C.A.(ed.), 1957, pp. )
356
Ryle G,
Schiffer 8.R. :
Searle J.R. :
(ed. )
Sesonske A. 
Stalnaker R.C. 
Strawson P.P.
ïhalherg I 
Vendler Z.
"The Theory of Meaning" (C* P. II pp. 350,-72)
"Use, Usage and Meaning"(P. A. B. S.(I96l)pp.223- 
50)(C.P.II pp.407-14)
Meaning (1972)
"Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" 
(P.R.(I968)pp.405-24)(Essays pp.141-59)
Speech Acts (1969)
"A classification of illocutionary acts" 
(Language in Society(l976)pp.1-23)
The Philosophy of Language (1971)
"Performatives"(J.P.(I965)pp.459-68)
"Pragmatics"(s.N.L. pp.380-97)
"Truth"(P.A.S.S.(I950)pp.129-56)
"Intention and Convention in Speech Acts"(P.R.
(I964)pp.439-60)(Symp. pp.580-400)(P.L.pp.23-38)
Meaning and Truth (1970)
"Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning’"(Essays pp. 
46—68)
Enigmas of Agency (1972)
"Effects, Results and Consequences"(Analytical 
Philosophy, Butler R.J.(ed.), 1962, pp.1-15)
Linguistics in Philosophy (1967)
Res Cogitans (1972)
Warnock G.J. : "Some Types of Performative Utterance"(Essays
pp.69-89)
White A.R.
Wiggins D,
Winch P. :
Wittgenstein L.:
: Review of Words (An.S.(1965)pp.58-64)
(ed.); The Philosophy of Action (1962)
; "On sentenee-sense, word-sense, and difference 
of word-sense"(Semantics, Steinberg D.D. & 
Jakohovits L.A.(eds.), 1971, pp.14— 54)
 "Trying and Attempting"(P.A.8.8.(1971)pp.209-27)
Philosophical Investigations (1953)
